I never said nor implied that he did.

I did not state or imply — 180 Proof

He didn't state nor imply that you did.

You must suffer from some kind of masochism. Otherwise, I can't explain why you're torturing yourself trying to refute non-arguments presented by persons/bots like — Eugen

I'm hoping to bring him into the fold a little. If he carries on like that he'll be banned eventually, but we all have to start somewhere.

EDIT: no doubt I'll be banned someday. I'll get so enraged I'll commit suicide by mods.

-I don't understand your point because you are saying that you aren't anything more than two abstract concepts (Chemisty or space).
Chemical processes are a basic condition necessary for our physical existence. Depending from the scale we choose to observe this phenomenon our description also changes. From a molecular to the scale of biological systems and behavior we can identify many different processes responsible for our existence. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, I was responding casually to @Metamorphosis who accused me of thinking I was made of magic spirit or something instead of plain ol' chemistry. And I was reassuring him that I do think I'm made of chemistry, with the caveat that all chemistry is conscious.

-You are committing a logical error. Your position SHOULD be induced by your premises. Its shouldn't be your conclusion product of a tautology. — Nickolasgaspar

My panpsychism is the conclusion to a bunch of premises. I just haven't given them here. I have done so at length in the past on this forum, and everyone is bored of me doing so, apart from you, so maybe I'll do it again just to annoy everyone. No right now though I don't have time.

Being conscious can only be evidence of the ability of a biological process(you) to be conscious. — Nickolasgaspar

No, that's wrong.

Arguing from the general to the specific is a fallacy and its in direct conflict the the most successful Scientific paradigm. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm arguing from the specific (me) to the general (everything). That's a different fallacy, no doubt, I'm sure someone will point it out in a minute. 3....2....1....

Our practice to remove Agency from nature was the single most important thing we ever did to enable the run away success of our epistemology. — Nickolasgaspar

Luckily for nature it's agency is still there regardless of what we think about it. Yay for realism.

Advanced high level features are contingent to specific Low Level Mechanisms. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, in many many ways. Just not with regard to consciousness.

In order to overturn this Paradigm you will have to offer far more convincing evidence than "your self being conscious". — Nickolasgaspar

I won't accomplish anything, I'm too puny and my dick is too small. But there is plenty of support for panpsychism across fields, including neuroscience. But if you're interested here is one short argument:

1) 'Consciousness' is not vague
2) The structure and function of systems generally thought to realise/cause/be (pick your verb) consciousness are sufficiently complex to be highly vague.
3) Therefore there is unlikely to be non-arbitrary way to decide at what point in the development of these systems consciousness emerges.
4) It is far more likely that consciousness does not emerge
5) Nevertheless consciousness exists (I know it does in me, that's the datum of evidence)
6) Therefore panpsychism

Another one:
There are three possibilities: eliminativism, emergence or panpsychism
All of these are problematic.
Eliminativism is false because I am conscious.
Emergentism is false for a number of reasons depending on the version of it. E.g. functionalism is false because it has no answer to 'Why can't that happen in that dark?'
Panpsychism is the least problematic and is the only theory standing, even though that has problems too (the combination problems most famously).
Therefore, provisionally, panpsychism

That's a very quick and dirty overview from my perspective.

I can not find any earlier comments of mine in this thread so I don't think your comment is relevant to my thesis on the subject..at least I don't understand your point. If not, please elaborate. — Nickolasgaspar

Sorry, that was directed at Metamorphosis.

@Nickolasgaspar @Metamorphosis

You two should be friends.

Actually, I don't think I'm anything more than organic chemistry, except maybe space as well. But as a panpsychist I think all chemistry is conscious. My evidence for this is that I am conscious.

I don't think you've quite grasped the point about non vagueness. Your brain farts and such are experiences and therefore do not constitute states that are indeterminate as to whether or not they are conscious.

Or if someone gets Alzheimer's and slowly loses their personality and ability to communicate then there's not always a clear line dillionating between consciousness and non-consciousness — Metamorphosis

From whose point of view?

I mean come on if someone slowly loses their mental faculties does not like a moment where they're no longer conscious but we can kind of see that their organismic abilities are slowly diminishing — Metamorphosis

Certainly what people experience changes, including approaching death. But can you think of a state which is neither conscious nor non-conscious, but indeterminate as to which it is?

Sure if you want to talk mumbo jumbo... If someone gets hit on the head and is in a hospital bed it's not always clear whether they're conscious or not — Metamorphosis

Indeed, nevertheless there is a fact of the matter whether they are or not, even if we don't know what that fact is.

f you want to just argue the philosopher jargon you've memorized, — Metamorphosis

It is also my view

Consciousness... it's a vague word because ultimately life is transient and fleeting — Metamorphosis

I can't make sense of that.

Of course the normal definition is that someone is conscious if they can say they are and they can back it up with continued dialogue — Metamorphosis

That is indeed one definition (more or less) but there are several others - check a dictionary. This is not the definition typically used by philosophers of consciousness. Typically philosophers use (roughly) the first definition listed in dictionaries (at least most of the ones I've looked at).

And we normally think other complex organisms like primates and other mammals are probably conscious because they show similar abilities without being able to use human language... Like being able to pass the mirror test and all that — Metamorphosis

Yes, the argument form analogy for other minds.

But seriously consciousness is just vague because it touches on our cultural conceptions which often are shrouded in superstition and a history of magical thinking — Metamorphosis

Maybe some concepts of consciousness are, I don't know. But phenomenal consciousness is not a vague concept. But it's a hot topic, lots disagree.

For a long time in history we thought life was a substance or an essence that was different than immaterial objects — Metamorphosis

Did we? I don't know. But that's irrelevant to the topic of consciousness. I think you mean 'material objects'.

But now we know that life is evolved complex chemistry. So consciousness is just the ability of certain organisms and that's completely a matter of definition and how we define the term and what we entail it to mean — Metamorphosis

The word 'so' is doing an awful lot of hidden work there!

What ability of certain organisms is it? I'm interested in your definition.

But again most people are naturally duelists in their thinking and they think in terms of mind and matter as separate... — Metamorphosis

Are they? How many of them are substance duelists, how many of them are property duelists, and how many are pistols at dawn dualists?

Consciousness is ultimately a human construct like intelligence or awareness or even beauty or health. — Metamorphosis

So consciousness could be destroyed by human consensus?

Well... at first it sounded good, but then I asked myself: is water vague? I don't think so. Water is H2O. So I don't think vagueness is an argument for consciousness being fundamental or so.

What do you think? — Eugen

I think you've picked an interesting example. Tables are large, and you can make small changes to a table without altering its tableness, so it becomes a vague matter as to when it ceases to be a table.

A water molecule is not like that, it's very small. It's not clear what changes could be made to a water molecule without risking altering its wateriness. I don't know enough chemistry to be able to argue it one way or another. The smaller we go, the more a single alteration affects the nature of the object, and the less vague its defining characteristics are.

Brains are typically said to be important to consciousness. But these are very much macro-objects, and their defining characteristics in terms of structure and function are very much vague.

Consciousness is often observed to not be vague. There are no intermediate stated where it is indeterminate as to whether x is conscious or not. Either there is something it is like to be x, or there is nothing. This presents a problem for the emergence of consciousness from brain structure and function.

Consciousness is the word we give to certain features of certain organisms... — Metamorphosis

Which features of which organisms?

Are they settled? — 180 Proof

My answers to them were shite. The method for answering these questions, at least up to a certain depth is settled though in a way that the origin of ideas is not. We don't even know how to go about answering the question of where ideas come from.

Why? — 180 Proof

Because the matter is not settled in the way that clouds waves and sunspots are.

And isn't this topic for a cognitive neuroscience forum? — 180 Proof

It might be, and it's definitely a topic for a philosophy forum.

Where do clouds come from? — 180 Proof

Evaporation of water from the oceans that condenses in the cooler air as small droplets, I think.

Where do ocean-waves come from? — 180 Proof

Ah, that's the wind I think, causing ripples on the surface which grow. Not sure on the precise mechanics.

Where do sunspots come from? — 180 Proof

Don't know that one, sorry.

Aren't these items for a physics forum though?

I don't know, the issue I have is this one post on Quora that to me proved it. But i can't remember or find it or know what it was about or what it said.

It's driving me crazy. — Darkneos

Oh that's a bummer. I would have liked to have seen the proof!

The solipsist says there are no other minds, but what does the solipsist say about other bodies? How does he relate to his own body? Are there multiple bodies but one mind? Or are there no bodies at all distinct from ideas?

Like people saying there is no difference in the world if it’s true or not so you’re better off believing whatever works for you. — Darkneos

Oh, I agree that's no help at all. You want a real proper reason to think there are other minds, no?

1) My body does what it does because of my mind. If I didn't feel things and have experiences, my body wouldn't do what it does. Mind is a necessary condition for me to behave the way I do.
2) Other bodies are separate from my body.
3) Other bodies do strikingly similar things to mine in a very lawlike way - eating three times a day, saying ouch when damaged, etc.
therefore, 4) The obvious explanation for the behaviour of their bodies is that they have minds too.

This argument is inevitably questionable, but I find it totally persuasive. Advocates of the causal closure of the physical will have something to say about (1) but it's not clear that that actually undermines the argument. It might strengthen it.

Granted it doesn't give deductive certainty, but I think it puts the existence of other minds beyond reasonable doubt.

Perhaps another way to say the same thing is to observe the limits of one's own power. Solipsism is hard to escape if you just think in terms of consciousness, as there is nothing in my experience beyond my experience. But there are powers beyond my powers. I can't do what I want. There are powers beyond mine that limit mine. My body is very limited in its power, but it is also a centre of power. Again, the obvious explanation is that other bodies are like mine. They are also centres of power that do what they do because of how they feel.

I'm open to the idea of some kind of cosmic consciousness which our separate consciousnesses are derivative on in some way, and I guess this is a kind of solipsism, but it's not a lonely one, and I note it doesn't bother you as much.

Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent? — Eugen

Not on my understanding of the concepts of emergence. Even if we say that activities don't emerge, we can just rephrase to make the properties those activities depend on emergence. So if consciousness is something a brain does, then the capacity of a brain to do that thing would be an emergent property of the matter comprising the brain. To my mind, @180 Proof is an emergentist at least with regard to the properties necessary for a system to realise consciousness, but we may have different understandings of what emergence is.

Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?

I don't think so. It seems to me there are broadly three basic categories that theories of consciousness usually fall into:

Eliminativism (nothing is conscious)
Emergentism (some things, relatively late in the universe, are conscious)
Panpsychism (everything is conscious)

Most physicalist theories are either emergentist or eliminativist. But it depends on what concept of consciousness they are starting with. Some people are eliminativists regarding concepts of consciousness that they (usually wrongly) suspect of being fuzzy woo woo concepts, but emergentists with regard to what they think of as more modern scientific concepts of consciousness (usually defined in functionalist terms to begin with).

Some panpsychists call themselves physicalists (Galen Strawson) arguing that physical nature, properly conceived, has consciousness built in as a fundamental feature. It's just another physical property of the world.

Idealism I suppose is a kind of panpsychism.

Yeah, a non-reductive physicalist functionalist-enactivist :smirk: (if there's such a hybrid). — 180 Proof

There is now! I'll see if I can work out what that means.

That wasn't the one I was thinking of actually. I can't find it now, odd. No matter. You most often speak as if you a are a kind of functionalist, broadly, that consciousness is something that brains do.

@180 Proof Ill see if i can find it. I could be wrong. I asked 'strong or weak?' You 'said jury's out' or something.

I know you've never been a substance dualist, but emergence typically applies to properties, not entities, in the discourse. And properties can refer to actions as well. So if consciousness is the action or function of modelling the world and making predictions, then the capacity to do that is the corresponding emergent property.

Regarding vagueness, 'consciousness' is considered by a number of philosophers to be one if the few non-vague concepts we have.

@180 Proof Previously you have said you are an emergentist wrt consciousness. Have you changed your mind? If so, what precipitated the change?

Then why don't they just call it consciousness? — Eugen

I'm not sure. Maybe they want to avoid potential accusations of anthrpomorphization. They perhaps want to avoid being accused of saying that atoms fondly remember days of their youth in stars and regret they are now stuck in some cold asteroid a zillion miles from anywhere interesting. So instead of this kind of conscious experience we as humans are familiar with, they give the experiences of atoms, whatever they might be, a different name to distance them from us. I don't know. I haven't read much by people who are specifically pan-proto-psychists.

I don't know what the difference could be between proto-consciousness and consciousness. There's no conceptual space in between consciousness and non-consciousness for it to exist in.

Everyone on this forum is a bullshit generator. At least chatGPT is comprehensible bullshit written in clear measured prose

Moral realism is the idea that moral statements have a truth value - they are true or they are false. — Banno

I thought that was moral congitivism. Moral realism, surely, is the idea that morality exists independently of any minds.

In metaethics, it is exceedingly common to divide views into two subcamps: anti-realism (i.e., that there are no categorical imperatives) and realism (i.e., that there are categorical imperatives). Although I find this to be an intuitive distinction (as an approximation), I am finding the distinction blurring for me the more precise I analyze my metaethical commitments. — Bob Ross

I thought the categorical imperative wasn't a name for a type of view, by the particular view of Kant, namely something like "act only on those principles that, if universalised (acted upon by everyone) does not lead to contradiction." Or something, there are various formulations. I've always thought it was complete bollocks but perhaps I don't get it. It's an attempt, contra Hume, to ground morality in reason rather than sentiment. Is that really what you wanted to talk about? It seems like it may be that you are looking to ground morality in reason as well perhaps:

o the idea that “it is most rational to fixate upon what is implicit of one’s nature”--and this is by no means a concession that anyone must abide by that principle (i.e., that it is itself a categorical imperative). — Bob Ross

Are you getting at the tension between there being moral facts about the world, but the individual person is always able to say "So what? I don't actually give a crap bout that."?

Good stuff from Banno. I've never managed to form a strong opinion on knowledge. Still don't know what line to take.

The Secret Life of Minerals, David Attenborough

Given the premise of your question does not convey what I've stated — 180 Proof

So state it differently then so that your meaning is more transparent. You cant read for your readers, but your readers can't write for you either.

I'll try and work through this. :)

I know that everything I will present from 1 to 4 is debatable, but, for the sake of the argument, let's assume that we all agree that everything up to 4 is proven to be false. — Eugen

Understood.

Therefore, if I were a materialist.

1. Strong emergence - I would accept that it is logically impossible and that it is not pure materialism anyway.

If I were a (materialist) naturalist/physicalist I might try and make something of strong emergentism in order to keep my concept of phenomenal consciousness. But we're assuming it's false, so that's OK. No strong emergentism.

2. Therefore, I would adopt weak emergence. That would force me to adopt the identity theory.

I would adopt weak emergence. And I'd jump straight to functionalism. I didn't think functionalism was a subset of identity theory. I thought Identity theory was that the mind is the brain, or something like that. But I could be wrong. Anyway, weak emergence is rejected too, fair enough.

3. Type-Type Identity can be refuted by multiple realization.

So a type of mind is identical to a type of physical system? I guess that can be refuted by multiple realisation. But multiple realisation hasn't been proven. However it is intuitively plausible and is arguably entailed by functionalism. So we ditch that as well, fair enough.

4. So, the next step is to adopt Token-Type. Here the problem arises: depending on what we categorize an emotion?

Token-type identity? Which side is the physical, which the mental? I don't think I've understood this one. I did a quick search and nothing immediately came up.

4.1. The only way here is represented by functionalism, which can in turn be refuted by inverted qualia or multiple realization.

If I were a physicalist functionalism is an attractive option. It has a number of virtues. Inverted qualia may be a problem for functionalism (but it hasn't been shown as far as I am aware), but I thought multiple realisability was one of its features, not a bug.

Unfortunately, I have noticed that most materialists stop here. But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether.
There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical,...

I disagree with you here. In principle one could have two identical brains realising the same function. In that way we would have two experience of the same type, assuming functionalism. They would be qualitatively identical, but quantitatively distinct. Have I misunderstood you?

so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:

I don't follow you here, sorry

2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose.

I agree with you. So we're ditching functionalism here?

I realize that this position is very weak in terms of explanatory power, but I don't see any logical argument that invalidates this exact position. So feel free to hit me with counterarguments. Thank you!

I'm unclear what your physicalist position is that you have arrived at. So what is an experience in this view?

EDIT: I sense logical thought in the OP, but there is too little concession to the reader to clearly discern it.

EDIT: the psychology of the materialist is odd here. He's decided to be a materialist, and then set about finding a coherent line. I guess that's what someone who isn't starting out as a materialist would do to charitably try to find a coherent materialist position.

Well along in my 60th year, I find myself even more cognitively isolated from my peers (and family) than I'd felt in previous decades. — 180 Proof

Do you live in a very religious social environment? I find one person I can talk to freely is enough, but less than that is rough.

@Michael

Back to basics!

I guess non-emergent monistic property dualism would be one unbroken circle with a P and an M in it. Is that right?

Emergent property dualism would be the same as the pysicalism diagram I suppose. So I guess physicalist emergentism divides into two, weak emergentism (no property dualism) and strong emergentism (property dualism). We should do another more complex diagram to include more positions. I think it's useful. Might head off a lot of pointless exchanges if we could all see the map of the various positions. @Nickolasgaspar Where are you in this scheme? Outside it throwing rotten eggs?

Any age is too young. At no point is a person's potential exhausted. On the other hand people need to get out of the fucking way and die.

I enjoyed this disproportionate response.

Yes, according to Deleuze.

The world is an egg, but the egg itself is a theatre: a
staged theatre in which the roles dominate the actors, the spaces dominate the roles and the Ideas dominate the spaces. — Joshs

That doesn't mention chickens. Consider:

"The world is an egg, but the egg itself is a theatre: a
staged theatre in which the chickens dominate the actors, the spaces dominate the chickens and the Ideas dominate the spaces."

Straw poll: who else participating in this thread accepts that rocks are beings? — Wayfarer

I do, but coming from a panpsychist that doesn't help does it?

But even if rocks weren't conscious (which they most definitely are) I'd still say they are beings, sorry. But I know what you mean, 'being' often is used they way you use it. In philosophy I'd say 'things that exist = beings.'

Words can have a meaning even if nothing exists which satisfies the conditions of that meaning. Nothing is "supernatural", but the difference between the natural and the supernatural doesn't dissipate — Michael

That should be pinned somewhere

Good stuff from @Michael. I agree with the characterisation of idealism.