(Sorry, I can't type fast enough and always think of little edits I want to add.)

What I am trying to say is that present mental content is narrative, not experience.

But doesn't this argument suggest that experience may be doubted? Narrative-of-a-supposed-experience (which may be in the present) is not the same as the experience itself.

No, the narrative ("Oh look, a tree.") may be in the present, but knowledge of the experience we believe we are presently having cannot be direct, and so the experience must be in the past. We must first place the experience (if it actually occurs) into narrative to be aware of it.

EDIT : I see this level of skepticism as a logical conclusion of anti-realism. Not only must we doubt that qualia give us information about some outside world, we must also doubt that even the qualia exist! All we can really be sure of is narrative.

Perhaps reality is nothing more than the scrolling of a novel that we tell ourselves.

What you can't be mistaken about is (1) your present phenomenal experience as your present phenomenal experience, and (2) your present evaluations/assessments as your present evaluations/assessments. — Terrapin Station

I don't think we can be mistaken about our current experiences, but we can be mistaken about past ones. — andrewk

Reply :

Every experience, by the time it has occurred, is in the past. This, along with your statement as a premise, produces the logical conclusion that we can be mistaken about all experiences. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem that MU has identified re past and present can be stated another way : All knowledge is narrative. We have no direct access to present phenomenal experience. Our only knowledge of this experience is what we know of it from narrative. When we consider "present" phenomena, we are in fact telling ourselves a story. "Oh look, a tree."

It's just not the same thing to list a set of components in a way that leaves out the further fact that is their organisation. — apokrisis

So the "sum of the parts" consists of the material parts and their organization (arrangement). How then is the whole different from the sum of the parts? It seems that the parts and their organization must exhaust what constitutes the whole, and therefore are equivalent to the whole. Whatever properties the whole exhibits will also be exhibited by the parts and their organization - which is how you have defined the "sum of the parts" - and the aphorism is shown to be false.

Emergence is already saying the organisation that emerges is more than what can be found in the parts themselves. — apokrisis

I agree that a particular arrangement (organization) may exhibit different properties from the parts when those parts are not placed into that arrangement. But that has been my point all along. Any collection of the parts that is not organized in the given arrangement as needed to form the whole must have a different arrangement, or not exist at all. And different arrangements can have different properties.

Then we supply the value assessment (i.e., rank the arrangements).

Let me try again : A listing of the parts (the sum of the parts) is a whole no less so than any other arrangement of the parts. And no arrangement carries any more value than any other, accept that the observer chooses to make it so. In other words, we decide to rank the arrangements - to give them value. But such a ranking is not to be found in the arrangements themselves, or we would all share the same rankings.

In reading through the comments, I see that I am repeating a point already made. So I won't belabor the point, but I will leave you with one question. In the aphorism as it is normally given, what exactly is meant by the phrase "the sum of the parts"? Is it a listing of the parts as I've suggested, or something else? I think that the way one interprets that phrase goes a long way toward determining how they view the truth of the aphorism.

Now the aphorism is not entirely without meaning - when properly understood. It actually means, "One arrangement is valued above other arrangements."

Do we need to worry about sensitive terminology here? "Dull normal" might be less hurtful to women who whelped really stupid bastards. — Bitter Crank

90-110 IQ isn't a moron but "average". Borderline retardation is 70-80, which I suppose I'd equate with morons. — Benkei

If you asked my children, a moron is the driver of another car when riding with Dad.

The whole (i.e., particular arrangement) is never greater than the sum (i.e., listing) of the parts unless an observer decides it to be the case. In fact, the listing (or sum) of the parts is just another particular arrangement (or whole). Different arrangements may have different properties, but deciding that one arrangement is greater than another is simply a judgment we choose to make at the moment.

So maybe we should say, "I believe that this arrangement of parts conveys more information than some other arrangement."

Or perhaps, "The meaning assigned by an observer to this particular arrangement of parts may be greater than the meaning assigned to the parts themselves."

Or even, "This particular arrangement of parts has different properties (which I value more) than some other arrangement of the parts."

The value assigned to a particular arrangement (i.e., what the term greater seems to imply) depends on the interpretation of the observer. To one who speaks only English, a particular arrangement of brush strokes may appear random. But to a speaker of Chinese, those brush strokes may signify a word. Thus to the Chinese speaker, the whole (the arrangement of the brush strokes) may be greater (carry more information) than the parts (the brush strokes themselves). But to the English speaker ...?

Saying "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts" has poetic value, but is not technically correct.

Saw my sister's new kid over the holidays. It put me in mind of some of my favorite lullabies.

Don't know much about Chelsea P. Manders, but I like this lullaby and would sing it to my own children if they were younger



Or if your taste runs a little darker (the lyrics start about 45 seconds in),

So, how old are you now and how old were you when you first read the trilogy? — Bitter Crank

I first read LotR in the 1970s. Yes, I'm that old.

Can't stand Lewis - a terrible story teller. Have you ever read the last book in his series? A bizarre book to begin with (an ape gets a donkey to impersonate Aslan), but then toward the end we discover that the human characters have all been ghosts or something from the beginning and that the whole thing was a dream. Very disappointing.

Do you listen to any Tropicalia? I just picked up some Tom Ze.

Here is a video of Gilberto Gil, Tom Ze, and Caetano Veloso singing Veloso's sublime song "Tropicalia" in 1997. A little choppy, but one of the rare videos of the three founders of the movement on stage together.

I was born and raised among civilized folk who said "soda". I now live in "pop" country. Bumpkins.

Who is the Hero of LOTR? — Bitter Crank

Of course, there are several characters in LotR who might merit consideration : Gandalf, Aragorn, certainly Frodo. But I think it is someone else, and Tolkien apparently did too.

It's Sam.

Consider the evidence :

1. It is Sam who completes the quest. Sam wounds and drives off Shelob, rescues Frodo from the Cirith Ungol, and literally carries Frodo (and thus the ring) much of the rest of the way.

2. It is Sam who restores the Shire - a very important act in the books. In fact, the entire last chapter is really about Sam.

3. Sam is the only mortal (the godling Bombadil doesn't count) who rejects the ring of his own free will. Even Gandalf is afraid to handle it.

4. It is Sam and his descendants who inherit the new Middle Earth. The elves, Gandalf, even Frodo leave Middle Earth soon after the quest is completed. And although the kingdom of men is restored, Aragorn is the last of his line, which ends upon his death.

As far as symbolism goes, Sam represents the working-class man who began to assert himself as WWI and WWII brought the old class system in England to an end. Suddenly merit and enterprise were more important than who your parents might be. (Remember, Frodo is upper class as far as the Shire is concerned. And Frodo's time is coming to an end.)

Peter Jackson completely missed the importance of Sam - which many others do as well. I realized this as soon as Galadriel failed to give Sam his gift toward the end of the first movie. I have never watched any of the movies that followed.

Yikes, I must seem like the worst fan-boy. It probably sounds like I live in my parents basement surrounded by posters of dragons. "Mom, bring me a soda. I'm busy talking to my internet friends."

I must be terrible at recognizing symbolism - I have never seen Catholicism in Tolkien's work, other than in the broad sense that both conform to aspects of myth-making. I've always seen his works as being more English (country not language) than anything else. His main theme in both The Hobbit and LotR seems to be the triumph (and tragedy) of the common man who must break free of his respectable, parochial life when faced with a world-shattering challenge. Remember that Tolkien's worldview was forged by the two great wars fought by England in the 20th century which dragged that country into the modern era.

Just as a fun side-bar, who do you think is the "true" hero of LotR? My brothers and I figured it out in our late teens, and many years later it was verified to me when I read a letter Tolkien wrote to his son shortly after WWII in which he explicitly mentions who he meant the true hero to be. You can find it in his collected letters edited by Humphrey Carpenter. Any guesses?

Hmm, I need to consider this a bit. My first reaction is that the neurological activity is in response to the incoming information, but I do not discount that the particulars of our bodies do effect our sensing (I have already cited color-blindness, for example).

Regardless, I still feel justified in asserting that the OP is flawed - sensing simply does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organs.

... sensing is not passive. There is an enormous quantity of activity occurring within the human body which constitutes sensing. Have you ever considered the activity required to touch something, or to taste something. — Metaphysician Undercover

The action required to place one's sensing organs in better position to pick up incoming information (reaching out with the hand, bringing food to the mouth, etc.) can hardly be said to constitute active sensing. That is merely moving the sensing organs to to locations that are more likely to allow sensing to occur, but it is not the actual sensing.

Just because body activity occurs before sensing does not mean that sensing is active.

Yes, I can interact with the surrounding environment (picking up a cup, drinking the coffee inside, etc.), but this interaction is not the same as sensing the environment (feeling the smoothness of the cup, tasting the coffee). Sensing occurs at the sensing organs, not outside of them (as I interpreted the OP to be saying).

I can sit in quietly in my backyard and sense my surroundings - I feel the hardness of the chair, hear the birds in the trees, watch clouds drift by. What actions am I taking? What am I doing to the world?

Sensing is hardly passive ... — jkop

Given your exchange with MU, I am somewhat surprised by this.

Regarding vision, it seems reasonable to assert that sensing does not extend beyond the surface of the eye. We may make a similar argument for hearing, touch, et al. So in what way is sensing anything other than passive?

The notion that sensing is not passive is exactly what I object to in the OP - vision does not consist of eye-beams shooting out from the observer to interact with objects in the visual field.

... the cat does not really act to produce the observer's visual experience of it. — jkop

I would amend that slightly. The cat does not cause the observer to have a visual experience, but it does cause the visual experience to be that of a cat. (See my comment just above this one.)

It is true that particular properties inherent in the observer at the time of observing (like color-blindness, as an extreme example) may direct what that observation is like, but it requires the cat to make the observation that of cat. Sensing is passive.

Ah, its the combination of sensing organs and cat that causes the cat to be observed. No observer and no cat, then no observation of a cat. I'm hip.

But when the cat is not present, the sensing organs are still sensing things - just not cats. It is the presence of the cat that causes the sensation to become that of sensing-a-cat rather than that of sensing-a-tree or sensing-a-cup. So to claim that sensing-a-cat is caused by the sense organs is not the usual way that the situation is understood.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no.

Is it possible to see a cat if one has never been in your presence? It should be, if the mere act of sensing causes the sensation.

Yes, you might be able to imagine a cat if a mammal with whiskers and a propensity for fish were described - or you might accidentally imagine a walrus.

Hi TS,

Just returned to TPF for the first time since my last comment (the pesky real world got in the way this weekend).

Yes, you are fighting the good fight. But you do seem to be in the minority. I must say, that in my 50-something years, I have never experienced vision in the way suggested by the OP - nor do I know anyone who has.

I have just re-read the OP, and this is the most anti-science thing I have ever read. I know philosophy isn't enamored of science, but this is like someone raised by wolves making up their own ideas of how the human body (and world) works. I hate to be so negative, but this is bizarre. And everyone responding seems to be nodding their heads, going, "Yup. Eye-beams."

What am I missing?

Perhaps I have misread the OP (I am rather tired), or perhaps it is because I come from a science background and not a philosophy one, but I must say I am bewildered by this. Is it everyone's experience that eye-beams shoot from your eyes (and ear-beams from your ears) when you look at things? Like the character Cyclops in the Marvel comics? Is this some esoteric philosophy terminology that I have yet to run across? I am at a loss.

Must we share our icky bodies on a pristine philosophy forum? Do we need to be reminded that we are gassy meat-bags? Let the anonymity of the internet leave us the illusion of perfect forms! :D

Yuck!

I think many people hold materialist views without thinking through what they really mean. — Wayfarer

Perhaps. But as John has pointed out, one needs to beware of hubris. It seems that one who has experienced such an epiphany (i.e., embracing idealism) should desire to help others achieve it as well. The Buddha was not content to leave this plane of existence, but instead decided to stay and teach. In similar fashion, let us simple materialists benefit from your wisdom. Who knows - maybe a well-constructed argument will sway a few more converts to the side of enlightenment.

(And I won't continue to insist that the driving impetus behind idealism is a need to feel important in an otherwise uncaring universe.) :D

Of course! But the realist believes that the world continues while the brain lies dormant. Unconsciousness, sleep, etc. are no problem for the realist. But for the idealist, they must either believe unconscious minds are self-aware, or that minds can somehow be discrete (non-continuous) entities.

If all existence is infinite then you would need to be infinite to inhabit it, or so it would seem. — John

Let me try again : If existence is contingent on my experiencing it, then there can be no existence without me. In that case, I inhabit all of existence whether it is infinite or no.

Remember, I am trying to follow idealism to its logical conclusions. I am not presenting the arguments as my own.

****************

How might I be infinite? How many real numbers exist between 0 and 1? Perhaps each moment of our existence is like a point on a line segment - infinite points on a finite line. (I don't really believe this - just tossing it out there for fun.)

:D

Berkeley's Prime Perceiver having a bit of fun?

The point is that idealism appears to lead to absurdities : If existence is contingent on my experiencing it, then there is no existence if I do not experience it (regardless of my corporeal state). Should I cease to exist (as ghost or man), then the universe ceases as well. So the universe's existence is tied to my existence - they are in fact equivalent. I need not be infinite to inhabit all of existence. But if I inhabit all of existence, am I not then immortal?

So what is behind the order of the universe? — Wayfarer

An interesting question, in a meta- sort of way : Is order a property of things (like universes), or is order a tag humans apply to particular things? Perhaps we see the universe as "ordered" precisely because we are of the universe and are incapable of seeing it any other way. Should the universe be otherwise, would we not still view it as ordered? (Of course, "order" might mean something different then, but we wouldn't know it.)

That we inhabit a universe favorable to life is not a miracle. Should we inhabit a universe hostile to life, now that would be a miracle!

Fish need water to breathe. And where do you find fish? In water! A miracle!

And when I leave a room full of people then walk back in a few minutes later, it is as if the conversation went on without me. Weird.

But if one's soul continues on after death, can one be said to be really dead? Thus, one is immortal in that scenario as well.

It is true that one's existence may be finite. But if the world is contingent on my observing it, then there is no existence without me, and I may be said to be immortal (i.e., alive for all of existence). That the world is then also finite is no concern of mine.

What is a mind to you? To me it's a cohesive collection of thoughts and memories and experiences. Does it make sense for there to be unconscious thoughts and memories and experiences? I don't think so. Which is why I won't accept that minds persist when unconscious. The mind is consciousness. — Michael

Ah, so minds are not continuous (since, seemingly, a person may be unconscious for a time).

Or perhaps you are arguing for a discrete existence that only appears continuous to the observer who is "inside" that existence. I mean, should I become unconscious for a time, that time does not actually exist for me. In other words, consciousness is like a song on an old cassette tape that stops when you press the STOP button, and starts up again from the exact same point when PLAY is pushed. To the song (i.e., the consciousness) no time has passed at all.

To think that few people are capable of understanding idealism is to partake of the hubris of those who congratulate themselves that they can see something that others cannot; who like to think so because they like to think they have discovered an arcane secret difficult to divine. This comes out of a desire to inflate the importance of idealism. — John

Exactly. But the hubris goes deeper. Idealism arises from a person's desire to make their consciousness primary. The thinking goes : If all of reality exists only through me, then I am God. I lose my special place if I am nothing more than a part of a larger reality.

Consider :

Idealism can make one feel immortal. "There is no existence without me, so I am alive for all of existence. I am mortal only if there is a world after I cease to exist, which is absurd."

Idealism can make one feel omniscient. "I know all there is to know. If I do not know a thing, it is because I have not experienced it, and it does not exist. Are there any things I do not know? Where are they?"

I can only imagine the indignant replies!
:D

But the veracity of idealism isn't the issue here. The issue is whether or not idealism entails solipsism. — Michael

But that is the issue. To defend idealism against the charge of solipsism, you wish to make a special claim for consciousness - that other minds persist (but trees do not) because they are self-aware (i.e., experience themselves). I am trying to examine that claim. If another mind can ever be shown to be non-self-aware (i.e., not experiencing itself) then it would appear to be no different from trees in terms of its continued existence when not being experienced by me.

Let us accept for the moment that minds persist when unconscious or in non-dreaming sleep. I assume then that you must hold the belief that (higher order) animals also persist when not being perceived by humans, for surely the mental ability of a wakeful dog is the equivalent of an unconscious human. To believe otherwise seems to me to be a case of special pleading.

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? (I.e., during non-dreaming sleep, coma, or unconsciousness?) — Real Gone Cat

I'd say not. I'm inclined to equate the mind with self-awareness. — Michael

Just to be clear : When I stagger home drunk and my wife hits me in the head with a rolling pin, and I go down for the count, I am still self-aware. Is that correct? I mean, obviously my brain is present, but what am I thinking about?

When do babies become self-aware? Does a new-born continue to exist when you put it down for a nap? How far back along development does self-awareness go? Birth? Conception?

And by the way, how - besides base speculation - do you know any of this?

Following the appropriation, only if a person were unable to distinguish between dreaming and non-dreaming would they have grounds to doubt. But, not being able to know when they were in a dream state, they would not have reason to believe that they were ever in a dream! In fact, they would not even know what a dream was - even if you tried to explain it to them (like trying to explain blue to a blind man).

EDIT : After re-reading this, I realized that it might not be clear as to what I was trying to say.

Conclusion : The act of dreaming can never be used as grounds for doubting existence-sans-minds. Either we know the difference between dreaming and non-dreaming and could not logically use dreaming to disprove something about non-dreaming or, we do not know what a dream is and cannot hold it up as evidence for doubt.

Do minds need to be experienced (not sure how we see 'em) for there to be other minds? — Real Gone Cat
In the sense that includes minds experiencing themselves (i.e. self-awareness), sure. — Michael

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? (I.e., during non-dreaming sleep, coma, or unconsciousness?) Perhaps you do not believe that a mind can ever be non-self-aware. OK. But if you do believe that there are such times, then what happens to that person when everyone leaves the room? Where do they go? No one (including themselves) is experiencing them.

Also, there are qualia suggestive of other minds. But I have never actually experienced another mind. It seems that I must infer that which I have never experienced. How is the certainty of other minds ever achieved?

What's the difference between realism and materialism, btw? — Mongrel

Both believe in the existence of that which is not experienced by their own mind.

One calls it "matter", the other calls it "mind-stuff".

******

I believe that the difference comes down to one's notion of their place in the world. A realist sees him or herself as a (small) part of a wider existence. An idealist sees his or her own existence as primary.

To the realist, we happen to the world. To the idealist, the world happens to us.