That's because, originally, Philosophy included aspects of Physical Science, Metaphysical Philosophy, and Sociological Religion/Politics. Christianity made Philosophy subservient to the Church (Theology). Politics, as usual, revels in Sophistry. And Science has left both Religion and Philosophy in the dust as the best source of knowledge about the real world. What's left for modern Philosophy is the stuff that very few people care about : the esoteric topics we discuss on this forum. :smile: — Gnomon

Yeah, I think that philosophy spent too much time with the sciences, that started to believe and eventually convinced herself that she is one of them. And so tries to express herself as a set of propositions, the so-called philosophical propositions, where in fact there are none. This is because philosophy thinks in terms of science, and in science there are indeed scientific propositions.

PS___If you want to revive philosophy, simply ask "what's for dinner tonight?". In many modern families a heated debate will ensue. :razz: — Gnomon

Well, I guess you know a lot about that! :)

Do you know the joke with the madman at the square?

Philosophy is dead! Philosophy remains dead! And we have killed her! How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us? With what water could we clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become philosophers merely to appear worthy of it?

But imagine if the bloody thing were dead, and we did not know it, what a tragedy that would be. And if it were so, how to announce it to the academia? They would crucify us!

So is it dead and buried? If so, how did it die. Did someone kill it?

My original intention was to put the question of absolute otherness aside for the time being. It is often the case that what I cannot understand at one moment becomes clearer later. I decided not to go further with reading the text now not because of a standstill but because of other demands, including the demand to not spend whole days with one text or with sitting, reading, and writing. — Fooloso4

Yes, I got what you said the first time, "taking too much time and energy", as it happens to be the case for me too. But when I asked "why did you stop your reading?", I was not referring to you, or at least not just you personally, but to the reading group, huh, as a whole. The same for the "you" in the "standstill".

While I do think that the subject must be taken into consideration with regard to the object, I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject. Perhaps here we must confront absolute otherness. The object of knowledge in general is not the subject, although with regard to knowledge of it there are the poles of knower and known. — Fooloso4

I am not sure I understand what you mean by "I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject". In any case, I was referring to the relation that philosophy has to its subject-matter. I will rephrase it in another way. If we say that philosophy is a collection of thoughts, then, if we are talking about the totality of thoughts, philosophy should also include itself in this collection, because the collection of all thoughts is also a thought. This differs from anatomy, or other sciences, since the anatomical thoughts or propositions regarding the animal or human body do not refer to or include the science - anatomy - that examines them. In the same way as with philosophy, a work on logic that attempts to find the laws of logic, must include itself, since it is through logic that the logical laws are to be found. So it is evident that it must be something circular, like for example a feedback loop, positive or negative or both, the loop being stressed in time.

Does Hegel address the question of why things exist, why there is something rather than nothing? — Fooloso4

From what I know, no, he does not address this question, do you think he had his reasons for not doing so, or the thought didn't just cross his mind? Heidegger, I believe, following in Hegel's footsteps, attempted to answer this question, but I don't know what he presented as answer. But when I wrote "the reason why these every-things exist", I wasn't thinking of this question in terms of existence, but as to their purpose, what do they serve?

If one's goal is to understand Hegel, and by this I mean regard him as a teacher of philosophy with something to teach us, then I think it best to follow his lead. — Fooloso4

But what lead is that? Never satisfied with himself, as can be seen from his re-workings and the renewed prefaces, he kept changing it. At some point he asked for patience and indulgence. Well no more!! haha Anyway, we will see.

2. Hegel admits somewhere, either in the Phenomenology or in the Science of Logic, or you all might have said it yourselves, that the order of how true philosophy is exposed does not matter, the parts. I am guessing that he was at odds with himself with how he would present his findings. Eventually he settled with something, since anyway he couldn't have done otherwise. But we should bear in mind that from the point of view of someone that has seen the whole, it is not easy to bring this into the minds of people that have seen only parts, if any. After all, we are all different, and what appeared to Hegel as the correct method - if there is such - to present his system, might not agree with everyone. So what I said earlier:

Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.

is plain wrong. I don't think there is a "right" method or order, which means that we can be at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, bringing things out of order, or seeking help elsewhere, it is not a linear development I mean, but nevertheless not to lose track of the end result, which is to understand Hegel's philosophy.

It's gonna be a long road, for sure, but maybe we can come back with a story to say.

So, what are your thoughts on the preface to the Phenomenology as it has been discussed so far in this topic? — Fooloso4

I haven't really meticulously gone through everything that you discussed, but, from what I read, I think that you came to a standstill with the Phenomenology, as have I of course, which happens every time I occupy myself with Hegel. :groan: So I don't have a lot to say. Just two things.

1. When Hegel compares his own work with a work on anatomy, what he means to say is that in the latter, this work separates itself from the subject, as it is something external to it, like force is assumed, or at least was, to be something external to a body. In that, there is a very clear separation between the subject matter in hand - the anatomical body - and the theory that attempts to explain it - anatomy. Anatomy could never and in fact never participates in its subject, the body, how could it anyway? But in the case of philosophy that deals with the whole, a philosophical work must also include itself, even if at the beginning of the exposé it seems that the subject-matter is something external to it, or some particular, like anatomy is to the body. Eventually, and if it is successful, it should be found out and be evident that the work was speaking about itself all along, or the universal, so the relation that a philosophical work has with its subject-matter is internal, and not external. This is very difficult to do of course, and I think only philosophy does this, I can't think of any other. I mean, if there is such a science, like philosophy, that examines everything there is and the reason why these every-things exist, then sooner or later the philosopher and examiner will start wondering about philosophy herself and her own reason, making it so to fall back on herself, and then what would we have to say if philosophy's subject-matter turns out to be herself? Well, it seems that we would have to say things like Hegel did. I guess that this shouldn't come up as a surprise, but it does.

I think this is what you meant when you wrote:

The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.

The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.

That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive. — Fooloso4

Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.

§ 210. Gravitation is the true and determinate concept of material corporeality ...

This would indicate that the processes are not the same, but I have not read the text, although one leads to the other. — Fooloso4

Regarding gravity, at the time of Hegel, gravity was thought as an external force acting upon the bodies. Hegel says this is not correct reasoning, but that gravity is a manifestation of the bodies themselves. He therefore criticizes Newton for speaking of a dubious "force" of gravity, acting at a distance, and praises Kepler for showing the same "law of gravity" only geometrically, relating motion with time and space:

Dimensionless time achieves therefore only a formal identity with itself; space, on the other hand, as positive being outside of itself achieves the dimension of the concept. The Keplerian law is thus the relation of the cubes of the distances to the squares of the times;-a law which is so great because it simply and directly depicts the reason of the thing. The Newtonian formula, however, which transforms it into a law for the force of gravity, exhibits only the perversion and inversion of reflection which has stopped halfway. — hegel

And of course, this is how general relativity treats the concept of gravity, any force is fictitious and superfluous. Spacetime is not some container where matter happens to exist and move, but it is indistinguishable from matter:

Einstein believed that the hole argument implies that the only meaningful definition of location and time is through matter. A point in spacetime is meaningless in itself, because the label which one gives to such a point is undetermined. Spacetime points only acquire their physical significance because matter is moving through them. In his words:

"All our space-time verifications invariably amount to a determination of space-time coincidences. If, for example, events consisted merely in the motion of material points, then ultimately nothing would be observable but the meeting of two or more of these points."[7]

He considered this the deepest insight of general relativity. — wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hole_argument

Whether he succeeded or not in reaching the goals he set out for himself is one thing. Referring to those goals as a given is another. — Valentinus

Speaking for my part, I take these goals as a given in order to understand what on earth he was on about. We shall see.

The question is not whether he leaves these things behind but whether the process of nature is the same as the process of the development of spirit, specifically, whether the development is a process of aufheben. For example, in the link to Hegel's philosophy of nature he says: — Fooloso4

The link I posted is only a brief description/outline. For more details, you should see Hegel's philosophy of nature, the long version. There he starts with the concept of Space, showing how it negates into Time:

Negativity, as point, relates itself to space, in which it develops its determinations as line and plane; but in the sphere of self-externality, negativity is equally for itself and so are its determinations; but, at the same time, these are posited in the sphere of self-externality, and negativity, in so doing, appears as indifferent to the inert side-by-sideness of space. Negativity, thus posited for itself, is Time. — hegel

From there he goes on to speak of bodies and matter, and eventually gravity.

The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; philosophy fights against this 'also'. — hegel

Well, philosophy fought against the separation of space and time, combining them into spacetime. But this is nevertheless a mathematical construct, what it means philosophically, I think it still escapes the scientists.

Hegel is talking about the movement of thought or spirit. I don't think this extends to physics or evolution, but I could be wrong. — Fooloso4

But Hegel's philosophy is about the whole, so how could it leave these things behind?? After all, Hegel provides the scientific foundations, and physics and evolutionary biology are sciences.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/natindex.htm

It was taking too much time and energy. I was spending many hours working through a single paragraph in some cases. — Fooloso4

Indeed, these things have leisure as a prerequisite.

'It was only', says Aristotle, 'after almost everything necessary and everything requisite for human comfort and intercourse was available, that man began to concern himself with philosophical knowledge' 'In Egypt', he had previously remarked, 'there was an early development of the mathematical sciences because there the priestly caste at an early stage were in a position to have leisure'. — science of logic

Yes, sublation, if this is how all things are evolving, then it must also be at the core of the Theory of Evolution, speciation I mean, the way new species are being generated. Thus giving birth to man, the most contradictory being that man knows. But I am mostly interested in Hegel from a physics point of view, as it is reflected in bohmian mechanics, the peculiar interpretation of quantum mechanics that David Bohm developed along with mathematician Basil Hiley.

Anyway, why did you stop your reading?

Perhaps I wasn't clear, I will post an example. In the Science of Logic, Hegel writes (21.13):

“In so many respects,” says Aristotle in the same context, “is human nature in bondage; but this science, which is not pursued for any utility, is alone free in and for itself, and for this reason it appears not to be a human possession.” — Hegel

In the above, Hegel quotes Aristotle, where the latter tries to find and define the "first science", metaphysics or theology as he calls it, what its subject matter is etc.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D982b

And so, the first science appears to Aristotle to be of divine nature, giving his reasons for it. Hegel gives his own reasons as well for this appearance, but in terms of his own philosophical system, and thus goes further than Aristotle. In the process, he would have to explain why Aristotle didn't think of what he himself did.

And elsewhere, where for example he examines Plato's Ideas, Hegel does so within his philosophical system, he doesn't just say that Plato was wrong and disposes of his thoughts, but tries to give an account of what Plato thought in hegelian terms. I have no idea how he does this, but I am certain that every thought, no matter what, is put under the microscope in his own system.

Yes, so his philosophy, method or theory has the explanatory power to give an account for all philosophical thoughts throughout history. Meaning for example when Aristotle thought something, Hegel can come up and say why he thought so and what he meant by it, the same for everyone else. Also, it explains itself.

Nevertheless, the idea is a bit grandiose, don't you think?

I don't know whether you know Tomas Szasz:

Thomas Stephen Szasz (15 April 1920 – 8 September 2012) was a Hungarian-American academic, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. He served for most of his career as professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, New York. A distinguished lifetime fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and a life member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, he was best known as a social critic of the moral and scientific foundations of psychiatry, as what he saw as the social control aims of medicine in modern society, as well as scientism. His books The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and The Manufacture of Madness (1970) set out some of the arguments most associated with him. — tomas

He is best know for the statement:

"If you talk to God, you are praying; If God talks to you, you have schizophrenia. If the dead talk to you, you are a spiritualist; If you talk to the dead, you are a schizophrenic."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Szasz

haha pretty poetic! :)

For sure, there is no single definition of the mystic, or for anything. But we can focus our attention on different meanings for the same word. Which means that there is no point in us, or anyone for that matter, arguing what a mystic really is, really pointless, but to give an account, a description, for what we, individually, mean by that, like you ask. So I am saying that Hegel believed, mystic or not, purported himself to be the one to see the whole, "see the whole of the moon", would you agree?

I mean, like timmy :) above referred from the marxists:

"Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom — he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me”. By the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom."

In order to know with what we are dealing with here. Are we dealing with this? With a method to attain absolute knowledge, everything that there is to know?? But I think that Hegel did not identify himself with absolute knowledge, like he did not say that he knew everything that there is to know, but that his method, the hegelian method, will lead someone to absolute knowledge.

Has Hegel lost his mind, or does he know what is he talking about?

He may be right, of course, I don't know. But it is crucial to know beforehand what we are delving into here.

So, to make things clear, you say that a mystic is like the one being portrayed in the following music video, one that "saw the whole of the moon"?



And that Plato was not one, but Hegel was?

I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
I spoke about wings
You just flew
I wondered, I guessed and I tried
You just knew
I sighed
But you swooned, I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
The whole of the moon

How would Hegel call this, the distinction between loving to know and actual knowledge, or I dunno?

Yes of course, you are right, the first task is to read and understand what is written. I was just commenting on the mystical.

Perhaps men have themselves bereft Hegel of his wits, or maybe he too is a man of worth. In that case he would be like Plato in that both have a lot to say but both leave the things of the most worth unsaid. I am certain that this is the case for Plato but do not know if it is for Hegel. — Fooloso4

Exactly! Which is why I said "but Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff". No matter whether Plato or Hegel were really mystics, it's another question what they took themselves to be. In that respect, Plato certainly took himself as one, but I doubt that the same can be said of Hegel. In fact, I believe that Hegel wanted to do away with mysticism, most probably seeing the "young spirit" as mystical and secretive, but in its progression breaking free from this secrecy, like you say "it seems clear that Hegel's thinking goes further than that of the mystics".

I am talking about this sort of thing, as it was laid out by Plato (or his followers) in "The Seventh Letter":

Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men "have themselves bereft him of his wits."

Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well that, if Dionysios or anyone else, great or small, has written a treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he has, so I say, neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the subject of his treatise; otherwise, he would have had the same reverence for it, which I have, and would have shrunk from putting it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it, not as an aid to memory-since there is no risk of forgetting it, if a man's soul has once laid hold of it; for it is expressed in the shortest of statements-but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy, if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it. — plato 7th

http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/seventh_letter.html

Well! Wittgenstein, being in dire straits and not making head or tails of the situation, not knowing his way about and not relying upon anyone, started writing his thoughts in his little diary, as his own means for clarification. But later, after all his friends' betrayals, and no matter how clearer things got - fighting with the dirt and all - he realized that this was not some private investigation, just like there is no private language, and after all it brought him no pleasure knowing anything unless this knowledge is somehow shared, as in the dictum sharing is caring, or it is no gift unless it is shared. And so he decided and tried to open his thoughts to the public, turning it into a public investigation. 'Cause what have you got at the end of the day, when the curtain falls, what does it all matter anyway?

As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...? — Fooloso4

A mystic is someone who knows or thinks to know something but refrains from uttering it, for various reasons. Mysticism's main tenet can be summed up in the proposition: "'Whereof one dare not speak thereof one must be silent". But Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff.

So, Kant would argue that in a truly moral world, there is absolutely no room for lying. And even the smallest lie destroys his precious categorical imperative. So, Kant would say, if a killer came to your house, looking to kill the man hiding upstairs and asked where he was, you'd be obliged to tell him. In his perfect world, you know, you couldn't lie.

Yeah, I can see the logic that if you open the door, even just a crack, you accept a world where lying is permitted.

Okay, then, then you'd say if the Nazis came to your house, hiding Anne Frank and her family, and asked if anyone was in the attic, you'd say, "Ja, the Franks are upstairs." I doubt it. Because there's a difference between a theoretical world of philosophy bullshit, and real life, you know? Real, nasty, ugly life that includes greed, and hate, and genocide. Remember, if you learn nothing else from me, you should learn that much of philosophy is verbal masturbation. — irrational man

Maybe, just maybe, using a bit of sophistry, or other techniques, the categorical imperative can be salvaged. But in any case, what difference does it make, what does it matter, if people suffer and die as a result? I mean, philosophically speaking, Kant could be right, and his CI alive and kicking, like they say, but the people dead and buried, what is it that we really want here?

If you want to treat prove as an object, but l don't think wittgenstein would allow it. — Wittgenstein

Sure as hell Wittgenstein wouldn't allow it, at least the early one, but I am not so certain about the late, I think he would allow any kind of game.

It is because you said:

I don't think we can understand wittgenstein unless we apply his philosophy on practical examples to see his theory of proposition becoming alive and clear. — Wittgenstein

Well, I gave you just that, I think, why won't you take it? But if you want to be loyal to the Tractatus, like Fooloso4 does, who is loyal in general, then what sort of examples can we give? I don't think the Tractatus, carried out strictly, leaves much room for play. Loyal or renegade, what say you?

Well it is clear a proof consist of more than one proposition, is it simple, I dont think so.Further can we l dont think wittgenstein says object and proposition are same, let alone a set of proposition and an object.I could be wrong though. — Wittgenstein

I am talking about proof's form in general, a proof of something. For example, a mathematical proof like Fermat's theorem, proof about who the murderer is, proof that your wife is cheating you, whether it is raining etc. Proof can be combined with these, but it cannot combine with, lets say, what the best colour is. If you wanted to picture "proof", as a concept, how would you do it? Or if you wanted to explain it to someone ignorant, what would you tell him?

I have to disagree, he does mention what objects are in the tractatus.
3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)
The question remains that are the names universals or particulars ?
Can you clarify on pictorial form ?
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.
2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.
How can we know a pictorial form since it is outside the representational form, are there rules in which object combine to form a proposition ? — Wittgenstein

Continuing from what I wrote before, let us take the concept of proof and treat it as a tractarian object. We have a name for it, called "proof", in english, in other languages it is called otherwise. But however it is called, the meaning is the same - the object (proof) is the name's meaning. What is its pictorial form, how do we know it, and how does it combine with other objects to form propositions?

cool, but what about the other series, Legion? You haven't told me.

He clearly states the proposition "P is not provable has to be given up ". — Wittgenstein

I think that he was just trying to clarify what the concept of "proof" really is, and what does it do. Wasn't it in this section that he wrote that squaring the circle with just using only compass and straightedge was proved impossible, or do I remember incorrectly? And that this proof stopped people from further trying? So, if I remember correctly, he said that proof ends all further attempts, this is what proof actually does to you. And my take is that he was afraid that, once people accepted Godel's theorem, taking it as a proven fact, they would stop further inquiry into the matter. oof!

But if it is such that God is connected with meaning, then I think that the act would have to be that of giving meaning to one's life, to find purpose, to make one's life meaningful, to make it worth and mean something, whatever that may be, and what happens afterwards, as a consequence of this act, this is not related to God's will in any case. And furthermore, a meaning-giving act is something most godly, holy and divine (good willing) that brings about happiness - a hallowing, whereas a meaning-removing act something most ungodly and unholy (bad willing) that brings about unhappiness - a wallowing. Such that the value of the action is in the act itself, like you said, the act being a meaning-creating one, in contrast to a meaning-destructive one, both acting on the ethical plane, and not on the facts of the world. Who would support the notion of a meaningless God anyway? So it would appear that Wittgenstein is telling us that it is God's will to give ourselves a purpose in life, but not specifying which. — Pussycat

Yes, a wallowing of sorts... But, there's something to be said about wallowing, coming from a professional wallower. In that to wallow is to appreciate and prioritize or value what one does already have. The act of endowing meaning onto the world is in some sense solipsistic and egotistical. As if the ant or pig, which we step on or eat, didn't have a personal life of its own, which it might as well have. — Wallows

Hey Wallows, in regard to these, have you watched the series "Hannibal"?

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2243973/

No wonder Wittgenstein was suicidal.
My goodness, you tried to tear me into pieces. — Wittgenstein

Yes, well, sorry, I like to dissect to see what's inside, don't take it personally! :)

Since we are talking about earlier Wittgenstein, this was before Godel came with his incompleteness theorem which by the way, Wittgenstein rejected even in the latter days.He couldn't have meant that when he wrote back then but you can take his wordings differently to get the accurate interpretation. — Wittgenstein

I remember reading about Wittgenstein's efforts to understand Godel and his incompleteness theorem, Wittgenstein used, as usual, a dialectical approach, like a child, and wrote his thoughts in his notebook. After seeing this, Godel exclaimed: "Has Wittgenstein lost his mind?!" :D But I don't think that we should see Wittgenstein's remarks neither as an affirmation nor as a rejection of the theorem.

What I meant by certainty was a relative certainty in science compared to absolute uncertainty in ethics,metaphysics ( these 2 ).If you look at Wittgensteins mathematical philosophy, he considered them to be tautologies which do not belong to this world. — Wittgenstein

You know, "absolute" and "relative" do not make much sense. But there is surely a difference between scientific and ethical matters. Current situation in mathematics is that to prove stuff, a mathematician must make clear what system and what axioms are going to be employed. A theorem that is proved in one system, might be disproved or be not provable in another, and I think that most mathematicians have stopped trying to conform maths to reality, seeing their science as a game, sui generis. Whereas in physics, we are at a standstill, with all these tens or hundres of interpretations of quantum mechanics flying around, each giving its own view of how things stand, the physical reality I mean. So pretty uncertain there, not to mention the uncertainty principle. Now, ethics is something else, I doubt that we can even use "certain" or "uncertain" to describe it. And I don't think that Wittgenstein used the term "tautologies" for ethics and metaphysics, but for propositions of logic.

Tbh, it was a complete intrepretation but it had flaws too.
There are countless ways to read the Tractatus, I dont think any viewpoint is totally wrong.There are flaws and advantages.Can you explain how it is incomplete. — Wittgenstein

I think that the logical positivists paid no attention to the last few pages of the Tractatus, treating them as mere nonsense, as if they outright discarded it. Which is why I said "uninterpreted", but yes of course, you can say "misinterpreted" as well. So either "complete (and flawed)" or "incomplete", logically it makes no difference anyway, the difference is only a psychological one, it is what it is, like they say.

On the last point, the tractatus talks of states of affairs which are essentially all the possible combinations of objects, and the possibility is written in the objects themselves.We get the picture theory from it and in my opinion, the picture theory favours taking objects as tangible things for lack of better word.He describes somewhere that we cannot think of a geometrical object without space to further elucidate his picture theory. — Wittgenstein

I will take these two propositions from the Tractatus:

2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.0251 Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.

So objects are entities, things. And if their form is space, time and colour, something pretty abstract that is, then we can only imagine what objects really are. Not anything tangible anyway.

Also:

2.021 Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects.

Substance, which is related to objects, does not have any material properties. Which is where logical positivists I think got it wrong, assuming that objects are something like elementary particles, with elementary propositions describing how these particles are and behave.

So I see that Wittgenstein took tractarian objects as an auxilliary hypothesis, like those used in philosophy of science, dark matter, for example: "we don't know what/how they are, but we are certain that they exist, we hope that future examination will give us more insight into these". But of course Wittgenstein was forced later to drop all talk about elementary propositions, and objects too, I suppose. (a picture held us captive)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter#In_philosophy_of_science

How old are you btw, it seems you are older than me. — Wittgenstein

I will tell you, since you ask, but let us see first if you can guess my age?

If you want to know about my last statement you can check this out. — Wittgenstein

Thanks, I read it, I tried to find what your opinion is on these simple objects, but I can't say that I have.

Wittgenstein, the Man himself? :lol:

But we can still have certainty in the knowledge of mathematics and science according to logical positivists. — Wittgenstein

Knowledge of mathematics and science have been somewhat shaken lately.

This movement has died but it is nevertheless an intrepretion of tractatus. — Wittgenstein

It cannot be a complete interpretation though, since it leaves many things discussed in the Tractatus uninterpreted.

The limits of the world are anything other than these two, as they go into the the region beyond logic and language, such as ethics and metaphysics. — Wittgenstein

which two you mean?

But this is only possible if we regard objects as something we experience. — Wittgenstein

Say what?

Yes, if the "limits of my language are the limits of my world", then solipsism seems inescapable. Have you watched the series "Legion"?

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5114356/

If for God, solipsism and realism are one and the same, then I find it odd that Wittgenstein would say this in the Tractatus, in the part where God is out of context. But just like he says, "God does not reveal himself in the world", the same holds for solipsism, in that it cannot reveal itself in the world, there are neither divine propositions nor propositions that equate solipsism to reality. Also, if all this is correct, then being closer to God means being closer to solipsism.

yes of course, God is obviously inexpressible anyway, just because we talk about God, doesnt mean we express something meaningful. But do you think that God is also a narcissist, besides a solipsist and an egotist?

Well, if God started doubting, then we would be fucked, wouldn't we? But I was thinking in terms of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein says that in solipsism, if it is strictly carried out, then it coincides with pure realism (5.62 - 5.641). Do you think that W. describes God's situation there?

And, let us not forget that God is the ultimate solipsist. — Wallows

What do you mean by that, God is not a realist?

Yes, a wallowing of sorts... But, there's something to be said about wallowing, coming from a professional wallower. In that to wallow is to appreciate and prioritize or value what one does already have. The act of endowing meaning onto the world is in some sense solipsistic and egotistical. As if the ant or pig, which we step on or eat, didn't have a personal life of its own, which it might as well have. — Wallows

Wallowing was a poor choice of wording, as it generally does not convey what I was trying to say. I thought twice about putting it here, but at the end it seemed to me a good idea, since it rhymes with hallowing, and, well, because of you. But to make things right, lets just say that there are two wallowing principles, the weak and the strong. The weak is the one you describe above, where there is some sense of value, albeit a peculiar one. While in the strong, both meaning and value are absent, the world for the strong wallower is completely void of these two, one's existence is utterly meaningless and pointless, a nihilistic worldview. This feeling and willing I say above that is ungodly and unholy.