You really should check the text before saying such things: — Fooloso4

Lets just say that the Notebook was never written or that it was unavailable to us, and we only had the Tractatus. Do you think that from the statement above only, we can infer that W linked the world of the happy man to the good exercise of the will, whereas the world of the unhappy man to its bad exercise, and all this to ethics?

The quote is from the Tractatus:

6.43

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus

Yes ok. So? Why do you see good willing to be a characteristic of the happy man, and bad willing that of an unhappy man? Because they are placed in the same order afterwards? If he wrote:

"The world of the unhappy man is a different one from that of the happy man",

would you have said that the good exercise of the will is that of the unhappy man, and bad willing that of the happy man?

I don't see the connection, in fact, I don't think they are related at all, in that happiness does not have anything to do with the will, as it is stated above, I am saying that the two statements are unconnected.

Yes ok. So? Why do you see good willing to be a characteristic of the happy man, and bad willing that of an unhappy man? Because they are placed in the same order afterwards? If he wrote:

"The world of the unhappy man is a different one from that of the happy man",

would you have said that the good exercise of the will is that of the unhappy man, and bad willing that of the happy man?

I don't see the connection, in fact, I don't think they are related at all, in that happiness does not have anything to do with the will, as it is stated above, I am saying that the two statements are unconnected. — Pussycat

The numbering system in the Tractatus is not ornamental. The remark about the world of the happy man is not some offhand remark unrelated to the statement in which it occurs. It follows from the prior related statements.

6.41
In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have
no value.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.

6.42

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.422

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)



6.423
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus

According to 6.41 value is not found in the world. This is followed by 6.42 which states that there can be no ethical propositions because propositions cannot express anything higher. Ethics is transcendental (6.421). This is followed by 6.422 which states there must be ethical rewards and punishments, and that they reside in the action itself. 6.423 states that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. This is because the will is not a thing in the world. Rather than attributes of the will it is the actions or exercise of the will that is at issue, but it cannot change what happens in the world, it changes the world as a whole (6.43).

This last comment must be understood in light of the claim that the world is my world. It is my world that changes with my actions. But it cannot be anything in my world that changes, and whatever that change is it must be rewarding if I exercise my will in ways that are good and a punishment if I do not. If the reward is of value that value is not something that can be found in the world. My world becomes a different world dependent upon my ethical actions. Happiness is the reward for good actions and unhappiness for bad actions.

The numbering system in the Tractatus is not ornamental. The remark about the world of the happy man is not some offhand remark unrelated to the statement in which it occurs. It follows from the prior related statements. — Fooloso4

Yes of course, the numbering is not ornamental in the Tractatus. But if we want to take things from the beginning, chapter 6 begins with :"The general form of truth-function is: [...]. This is the general form of proposition". And then 6.4 states: "All propositions are of equal value". What relation do you think the general form of truth-function has with 6.4?

According to 6.41 value is not found in the world. This is followed by 6.42 which states that there can be no ethical propositions because propositions cannot express anything higher. Ethics is transcendental (6.421). This is followed by 6.422 which states there must be ethical rewards and punishments, and that they reside in the action itself. 6.423 states that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. This is because the will is not a thing in the world. Rather than attributes of the will it is the actions or exercise of the will that is at issue, but it cannot change what happens in the world, it changes the world as a whole (6.43). — Fooloso4

But in 6.422 he says that the consequences of an action are irrelevant. And that the reward and punishment must lie in the action itself, they must thus be intrinsic to the action, in and of itself, with no recourse to experience, to what happens in the world outside of us I mean, as a result of this action. Thus, willing anything, IF it changes anything (the if here is not to be taken lightly), it won't change the external world, the macrocosm, but only our world, the microcosm, how we see and value things. But value does not exist in the external world, the world of logic that can be expressed in language, therefore, IF it exists anywhere, it must lie on the outside, or inside our microcosm. All this however, is purely psychological, since believing, willing, judging etc something does not necessarily make it so, which is the foundation for all psychology. And thus the Tractatus has explained how value judgements are possible. Finally, it is evident from the above that the will resides in our microcosm, being part of our psychology, so anyone, like Kant, that speaks about the will is doing psychology and not philosophy or logic. However, because "logic fills the world", it mixes with our soul and psyche somehow - the microcosm, and it is not a happy coincidence that the word itself "psycho-logical", bears a logical part, but language has managed to preserve and show this mixture, as well as distinction. And it is for this reason that philosophers have more than often confused logic and rationality with their own psychology.

And I think that 6.43 was purposely numbered so by Wittgenstein, being in equal section under 6.4 (All propositions are of equal value) and not under 6.42 (as in 6.424 for example) where he discusses ethics, in order to show that what is contained there (the will and feelings of happiness and unhappiness) pertains to psychology, mostly, and not ethics.

At least this is what I believe about the Tractatus.

What relation do you think the general form of truth-function has with 6.4? — Pussycat

The answer is:

6.42

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. — Tractatus

Ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, for propositions can express nothing higher.

All this however, is purely psychological, since believing, willing, judging etc something does not necessarily make it so, which is the foundation for all psychology. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein says:

5.641
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a nonpsychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world — not a part of it.

And:

6.423
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.

And thus the Tractatus has explained how value judgements are possible. — Pussycat

He has done no such thing. There is no talk of value judgment in the Tractatus. It is a matter of seeing of what makes itself manifest (6.522).

However, because "logic fills the world", it mixes with our soul and psyche somehow — Pussycat

Where does he say that logic mixes with the soul? Once again you have missed an essential element of the Tractatus, the "I" or self or soul is not in the world, it stands outside it.

and it is not a happy coincidence that the word itself "psycho-logical", bears a logical part, — Pussycat

The term psychological does not mean that there is a logical part of the psyche. Logic is derivative of the Greek "logos", which meant originally to gather together, and thus to give an account, to speak or say. Psychology is the logos of the psyche.

And I think that 6.43 was purposely numbered so by Wittgenstein, being in equal section under 6.4 (All propositions are of equal value) and not under 6.42 (as in 6.424 for example) where he discusses ethics, in order to show that what is contained there (the will and feelings of happiness and unhappiness) pertains to psychology, mostly, and not ethics. — Pussycat

The reason it is not "6.424" is because it is not a continuation of 6.423, which says that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. The subject is still ethics. Ethics is not about attributes of the will. It is about the exercise of the will. How we choose to act and the rewards or punishment that follow.

Ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, for propositions can express nothing higher. — Fooloso4

So if ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, does this mean that no truth comes out of ethics?

He has done no such thing. There is no talk of value judgment in the Tractatus. It is a matter of seeing of what makes itself manifest (6.522). — Fooloso4

I didn't say that there was talk of value judgement in the Tractatus, but only an explanation how these are possible. How is it that people value one thing over another, for example a piece of music, some ideology, some human characteristic, different beliefs etc.

Where does he say that logic mixes with the soul? Once again you have missed an essential element of the Tractatus, the "I" or self or soul is not in the world, it stands outside it. — Fooloso4

Well yes, he doesn't, but seeing that you get ahead of yourself, I took the liberty to improvise as well, I mean why should there be only you that has that privilege?

The term psychological does not mean that there is a logical part of the psyche. Logic is derivative of the Greek "logos", which meant originally to gather together, and thus to give an account, to speak or say. Psychology is the logos of the psyche. — Fooloso4

So psychology is the logos of the psyche, not the logic of the psyche?

The reason it is not "6.424" is because it is not a continuation of 6.423, which says that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. The subject is still ethics. Ethics is not about attributes of the will. It is about the exercise of the will. How we choose to act and the rewards or punishment that follow. — Fooloso4

By what you are reasoning here, you say why it is not a continuation of 6.423, but you don't actually say why or how it is a continuation of 6.42, where ethical propositions are discussed. But let us take propositions 6.4x from 6.43 and below. We have:

6.43 If good or bad willing ... (let us not repeat ourselves)

6.44 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.

6.45 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling.

Do you think that in 6.44 and 6.45, the subject is still ethics? And if so, how is ethics connected with these propositions?

So if ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, does this mean that no truth comes out of ethics? — Pussycat

No propositional truths.

I didn't say that there was talk of value judgement in the Tractatus, but only an explanation how these are possible. — Pussycat

He provides no such explanation, and if he did wouldn't he have to discuss it, that is, talk about value judgments? You miss the point. It is not about value judgments but the experience of value.

Well yes, he doesn't, but seeing that you get ahead of yourself, I took the liberty to improvise as well, I mean why should there be only you that has that privilege? — Pussycat

First of all, I am not ahead of myself. I have followed the Tractatus. In a few places I cited his other writings. There is nothing else in addition to these points that I have said that cannot be found in the Tractatus. Second, your claim about mixing logic and soul is contrary to the Tractatus. If you like you can assert the "privilege" of saying things that are contrary to the text but you should be aware and make note of the fact that they are.

So psychology is the logos of the psyche, not the logic of the psyche? — Pussycat

'ologies' are the talk about or examination of or study of the subject matter. Biology is not the logic of life, it is the study of life. Psychology is not the logic of the psyche, it is the study of the psyche.

By what you are reasoning here, you say why it is not a continuation of 6.423, but you don't actually say why or how it is a continuation of 6.42, where ethical propositions are discussed. — Pussycat

Actually, I did. 6.42 explains why there can be no propositions of ethics. This is, however, not the last word on ethics. Ethics is about what we do, that is, the exercise of the will and the pursuant rewards and punishments. In other words - not this (6.42) but this (6.43). But this is not the final word either.

Do you think that in 6.44 and 6.45, the subject is still ethics? — Pussycat

Yes.

And if so, how is ethics connected with these propositions? — Pussycat

Ethics and aesthetics are the same (6.421) 6.44 and 6.45 refer to aesthetic experience, meaning and value.

But since there can be no propositions of ethics he is not pointing to ethical facts or what is the case with regard to ethics, but rather to what can be seen from a vantage point that is outside of logic and propositions and facts:

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54) — Tractatus

No propositional truths. — Fooloso4

What sort of truths then? Truths that cannot be expressed in language? Is this what you say? Personal truths? What exactly?

He provides no such explanation, and if he did wouldn't he have to discuss it, that is, talk about value judgments? You miss the point. It is not about value judgments but the experience of value. — Fooloso4

Basically my questions and let's say assertions have to do with the fact that I don't understand what you mean by these experiences, the experience of value. But I think that you are using the word 'experience' in a different context as the one that is conventionally used, I mean, how to say, the every day experience, or like a physicist would use it when he conducts his experiments. Do you think that this experience of value is of the same form of everyday experience? Somewhat related, or entirely different?

First of all, I am not ahead of myself. I have followed the Tractatus. In a few places I cited his other writings. There is nothing else in addition to these points that I have said that cannot be found in the Tractatus. Second, your claim about mixing logic and soul is contrary to the Tractatus. If you like you can assert the "privilege" of saying things that are contrary to the text but you should be aware and make note of the fact that they are. — Fooloso4

I did it to myself in my first comment, and then in the second I publicly acknowledged it. I am just following on Wittgenstein's footsteps here that he carved for us but without us, I think, when he said:

Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.

Some trial and error, so to speak. As long as thoughts are expressed. But if one gets it at the end, it wouldn't matter what happened in the past, would it now?

'ologies' are the talk about or examination of or study of the subject matter. Biology is not the logic of life, it is the study of life. Psychology is not the logic of the psyche, it is the study of the psyche. — Fooloso4

So you are saying that logic plays no role at all in biology or psychology? Cause this is what I am getting at, the logical forms found in those.

Ethics and aesthetics are the same (6.421) 6.44 and 6.45 refer to aesthetic experience, meaning and value. — Fooloso4

Again, per my question as to these experiences.

What sort of truths then? Truths that cannot be expressed in language? Is this what you say? Personal truths? What exactly? — Pussycat

We have been over this. Experiential. A proposition does not tell me if I am happy or in pain.

Do you think that this experience of value is of the same form of everyday experience? Somewhat related, or entirely different? — Pussycat

It would not be the everyday experience of the unhappy person. For most people I would think it would be a matter of degree. To delight in being alive is something that many of us have experienced at some time. The sense of the word as mystical is less common.

So you are saying that logic plays no role at all in biology or psychology? — Pussycat

I am talking about the etymology and meaning of the terms. The term biology does not mean that logic is mixed with life. The term psychology does not mean that logic is mixed with psyche. More to the point,
Wittgenstein marks the limits of logic and world and the "I" is not within those limits. They are separate and distinct, not mixed.

Again, per my question as to these experiences. — Pussycat

Again, are you asking me to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot be put into words? The problem can be seen, as I pointed out, with mundane experiences such as the taste of vanilla ice cream. This is an experience that most of us can relate to. In the Investigations he talks a great deal about the experience of pain. When someone says that they are in pain we know what they mean. But the experience of the mystical is not one we can so easily understand since it is not a common experience.

In the Lecture on Ethics he gives examples from his own experience: wonder, feeling absolutely safe, seeing the world as a miracle. He also says:


... It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.'


And:

... no description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value ...

The experience is a fact, but what it is the experience of, what he calls absolute value, is not itself an experience.

We have been over this. Experiential. A proposition does not tell me if I am happy or in pain. — Fooloso4

Ah so experiential truths, like the truth of what vanilla ice cream tastes like (mundane), the truth of me having a toothache, the truth of feeling safe and in accordance with the world, the truth of seeing/feeling the world as mystical or a miracle, the truth of being happy. And you are saying that these experiential truths cannot be expressed in language and propositions, thus we cannot communicate them, at least not in the ordinary sense, but only show them (this be the only - if any at all - way of communication), they make themselves manifest. Right?

I am talking about the etymology and meaning of the terms. The term biology does not mean that logic is mixed with life. The term psychology does not mean that logic is mixed with psyche. More to the point,
Wittgenstein marks the limits of logic and world and the "I" is not within those limits. They are separate and distinct, not mixed. — Fooloso4

But what is logic, according to Wittgenstein? Or the logical form? When I say that logic mixes with X, I mean to say that the logical form is inherent in that X, that X has a logical structure. So biological forms have a logical structure. And I say that this is also the case for the psyche, giving birth to psychology.

Again, are you asking me to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot be put into words? The problem can be seen, as I pointed out, with mundane experiences such as the taste of vanilla ice cream. This is an experience that most of us can relate to. In the Investigations he talks a great deal about the experience of pain. When someone says that they are in pain we know what they mean. But the experience of the mystical is not one we can so easily understand since it is not a common experience. — Fooloso4

I was asking so that I could understand what you mean. But if you think that what I am asking cannot be put into words, but only shown, then I guess that your efforts should have been better focused on the latter, the showing. For example, in one of my previous comments to you, I used the word privilege ironically, this was evident to you, and to anyone following the discussion I think, pretty obvious. And it was evident to me that you realized it, putting it in quotes and all. Because "privilege", as used in that context, is not identical to the "privilege" that is commonly ascribed to, let's say, a king, but nevertheless has some relation to it. What happened there? A combination or mixture of forms, logical forms I mean: the logical form of privilege proper was mixed with irony, irony's logical form, and this was made manifest, it showed itself, irony showed herself. And then you decided, on your own merit, not to further fuel the so-called quarrel, but somehow quiesce it. This also was made manifest, this silencing. But had you acted differently, then we might have seen what it is for something to wax, only to wane at a later time, as it was done before. So all these forms, logical forms, of waxing, waning, quiescing were made manifest, here, as is the case, apparently, in every discussion. But one cannot talk about these forms in hope that he will represent them in his speech or language, but only show them.

... It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.' — Fooloso4

Yes, it would seem or appear so, but you know what they say, appearances can be deceiving.

I was asking so that I could understand what you mean. But if you think that what I am asking cannot be put into words, but only shown, then I guess that your efforts should have been better focused on the latter, the showing. — Pussycat

Once again you miss the point. I cannot show you what the mystical is, you have to experience it for yourself. This is all part of the distinction between the world and my world, what can be said and what can only be seen or experienced solus ipse.

For example, in one of my previous comments to you, I used the word privilege ironically ... — Pussycat

I have no idea what you are trying to get at. I see no indication that you were using the word ironically. What I saw was you falsely accusing me of getting ahead of myself and improvising, and using that as your defense for ignoring what the text actually says and making unfounded claims. The rest of the paragraph might be your idea of improvising, but it is meaningless. It is like someone who does not understand the music getting up at a jam session and making noise, with no regard to the form or melody of the song.

Yes, it would seem or appear so, but you know what they say, appearances can be deceiving. — Pussycat

This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him?

edit

This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him? — Fooloso4

Accuse is a bit harsh for a choice of words, but yes, I am saying that you don't understand him. "should seem to have" is not the same as "has", I wonder how and why you don't see that.

So, given my adoration for the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, I was wondering if anyone is interested in participating in a reading group of it.
The text is available in a very nice and convenient format online, which can be found here.
It's fairly short and not too burdensome. — Wallows

Wallows, this is your thread, your discussion, started 9 months ago with so much promise.
What happened ?

Given recent exchanges, it seems that the aim has changed to a matter of whim for anyone who wants to join in. Questions apparently to be answered by a nebulous 'we'. There is no group as such. No leader taking responsibility.

It is unfortunate that there is little to no acknowledgement of interventions by e.g. Luke who pointed out an error in your understanding of Wittgenstein. Instead of showing any degree of comprehension, you deployed your customary strategy of deflection by question. Or, elsewhere, the use of special pleading of being 'slow'. Even when patience has been bestowed, there is little indication of follow-up understanding.

Clearly, this discussion can go on and on. After all, the title includes the word 'Ongoing'.
However, there are limits to time, energy and patience supplied so far by Fooloso4, to name but one along the way. He has worked systematically and also dealt with false allegations and more with an unbelievable generosity of spirit.

The poster Pussycat has repeatedly challenged him. Fair enough. However, each time he provides the answer it is ignored, there is a move to something else. It is not clear whethet his careful responses are getting through or whether there is a better understanding of the text.
After all that is what is important, no ?

The latest offering by Pussycat takes the discussion to a new low.
Is it now about improvising as you go...?
A serious text discussion now reframed as The Never-ending Witterings of Wallows and Co.

This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him?
— Fooloso4

Accuse is a bit harsh for a choice of words, but yes, I am saying that you don't understand him. "should seem to have" is not the same as "has", I wonder how and why you don't see that. — Pussycat

Fooloso4 chooses his words carefully; it is not harsh to use the word 'accusing'. For that is what it is.
It is a continuation of your personal false allegations you made about him previously.
That much is clear.

Also clear is that you are right. The phrase 'should seem to have' is not the same as 'has'.

Fooloso4 in his understanding of Wittgenstein would probably point out that the reason why Wittgenstein said:  "should seem to have" is because that refers to how things are to Wittgenstein.

If Wittgensteun used "has" he would be making a factual claim, and he rejects factual claims about ethics.

At least that is what I have gleaned so far. From listening...to Fooloso4.
Of course, I stand ready to be corrected...as always.

I have no idea what you are trying to get at. I see no indication that you were using the word ironically. What I saw was you falsely accusing me of getting ahead of myself and improvising, and using that as your defense for ignoring what the text actually says and making unfounded claims. The rest of the paragraph might be your idea of improvising, but it is meaningless. It is like someone who does not understand the music getting up at a jam session and making noise, with no regard to the form or melody of the song. — Fooloso4

Yup. Your patience must be wearing thin. All this din.

You know, it's funny, Amity, that you only see my "lows" and personal false allegations but somehow manage to turn a blind eye to Fooloso4's lows and personal false allegations, repeated comments about my blind spot, and my cacophony as of late. As well as to patience, you think that it is only him that is patient with me, whereas I am just ... what? Fooling around?

Yup. Your patience must be wearing thin. All this din. — Amity

It has.

The poster Pussycat has repeatedly challenged him. Fair enough. However, each time he provides the answer it is ignored, there is a move to something else. It is not clear whethet his careful responses are getting through or whether there is a better understanding of the text. — Amity

This is the crux of the matter. Thank you.

Fooloso4 in his understanding of Wittgenstein would probably point out that the reason why Wittgenstein said:  "should seem to have" is because that refers to how things are to Wittgenstein.

If Wittgensteun used "has" he would be making a factual claim, and he rejects factual claims about ethics. — Amity

That is correct. This is a basic Tractarian distinction. One that I have repeatedly pointed to only to have it ignored and the same mistake repeated.

I am grateful that at least one person has been following this thread and perhaps gained some insight. If there are others who have questions or comments I would be glad to respond. But as things stand right now it is pointless for me to continue.

Sorry, my mind has been preoccupied with some dumb shit. Personally, I've been enjoying the dialogue between Pussycat and Fooloso4. I'm not an expert on Wittgenstein, and anyone who claims that they are, are likely full of shit. So, I don't know what issues I should intervene.

I'll try and keep a more watchful eye out for the sake of this thread.

I must admit though, that my interest in philosophy has been lackluster as of late. Ehh.

I'm not an expert on Wittgenstein, and anyone who claims that they are, are likely full of shit. — Wallows

no shit Einstein! hahah

down in the deathly hallows
there's a man that wallows
oh what a pity to be
in a pit most shallow
I say spit boy!
and never swallow

That is correct. This is a basic Tractarian distinction. One that I have repeatedly pointed to only to have it ignored and the same mistake repeated — Fooloso4

Nope, wrong again. And well, no matter how many times a mistake is repeated, it still remains a mistake won't you all agree now? The only thing that a repetition shows is that someone is stuck in time, sounding like a broken record, like a needle stuck in a groove, as the expression goes.

Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it.

Here Wittgenstein says that Ethics is supernatural, he doesn't say that "Ethics seems to be supernatural", so there goes the argument about the factual claim. And of course, sceptical like he is, unlike others - not to name them, adds "if it is anything", I mean the guy is not even sure that ethics exists, or if it is anything at all, like a ghost or an apparition or something.

In case anyone else is confused, perhaps this letter from Wittgenstein to Ludwig von Ficker will help. In it he makes clear not only that he is certain that ethics exists, but that it is of central importance to the Tractatus.

The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. [emphasis added] — Letter to von Ficker

Sorry, my mind has been preoccupied with some dumb shit. Personally, I've been enjoying the dialogue between Pussycat and Fooloso4. I'm not an expert on Wittgenstein, and anyone who claims that they are, are likely full of shit. So, I don't know what issues I should intervene.

I'll try and keep a more watchful eye out for the sake of this thread.

I must admit though, that my interest in philosophy has been lackluster as of late. Ehh. — Wallows

Understood. Dealing with real life issues takes priority over any philosophy forum input.
However, sometimes - as you know - forums can be a positive distraction, and way to connect with people who share same interest or fascination.
Other times, we need to get out of our own way !

Clearly the dialogue between Pussycat and Fooloso4 has been of benefit. Thanks to both. It has drawn out their respective enthusiasm and interpretation of this text. However, there has also been a straining of patience as described above.

We are all here to learn or share philosophical understandings; it is good when we can acknowledge both similarities and differences, don't you think ?

Life is difficult enough at times. And this is where being good to yourself comes in.
If reading a philosophy text or two ain't doing it for you, then use your own best way of thinking to try and lighten the load.
Sticking labels like failed Stoic or Cynic, misanthropist, on your head - how helpful is that ?

Please don't feel you have to 'watch out for the sake of the thread'. That's minor. But perhaps it might help not to have it as an Ongoing project. Rather have a timely conclusion ? That way it is less of a burden ?

Philosophy isn't just for Christmas. Or an academic term. Or about arguing the toss about what some old or dead white guy said, or didn't say. It's a way of life which at its best helps in thinking clearly and putting things into perspective. At least, those are my thoughts this morning.

Thanks to you, and others, for providing some inspiration and humour along the way.

Thank you Amity, I guess ... :blush:

I do appreciate Fooloso4's interpretation of the unsaid in the Tractatus, which is hard to find in any textbook. The ethical, mystical, and mysterious. It's good stuff all around.

Cheers.

I do appreciate Fooloso4's interpretation of the unsaid in the Tractatus, which is hard to find in any textbook. — Wallows

I am not surprised that this is hard to find in textbooks, but there are ample secondary sources that support this view. This was not always the case for those who could not see past the influence of Positivism, Russell, and others, but no credible contemporary interpretation can ignore the central importance of the ethical and mystical for the Tractatus.

Ethics still of course exists, in a sense, or rather not in a sense, it actually exists, for those that are still on the bottom of the ladder or climbing it up, but once they reach the top, they see it as something senseless, it just won't make sense to them at all then.

Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted? — 6.521

Once they transcend it, or go beyond it, its senselessness will become clear.

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — 6.54

But getting rid of excess baggage is not as easy as it sounds, and one has to occupy oneself considerably with the subject matter in order to do that, for example walking away like the guys in the Vienna circle did, is not an option. And what a peculiar and special deed would that be, if to get rid of something heavy, one had to carry it through thick and thin, only to throw it away at the end. The Tractatus describes that deed.

Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.

But I think that Wittgenstein did not think so only of ethics, but of everything that cannot be expressed in language, ethics only being a small part of it. That is one interpretation at least, but surely there are more, as the bibliography suggests, I mean if one would do some research on the Tractatus, he would find plenty of different views, it is not at all clear.

Ethics still of course exists, in a sense, or rather not in a sense, it actually exists, for those that are still on the bottom of the ladder or climbing it up, but once they reach the top, they see it as something senseless, it just won't make sense to them at all then. — Pussycat

And yet at the penultimate rung of the latter at 6.421 he says that ethics is transcendental. How do you explain this?

What one sees when the world is seen aright is not simply that propositions about what cannot be put into words are senseless but that the world is mystical.

6.522:

There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

What is inexpressible would be nonsense if one attempted to express it. This does not mean that the mystical or the ethical does not exist. It does, it shows itself. What is senseless is not the ethical but rather propositions about the ethical.

I mean if one would do some research on the Tractatus, he would find plenty of different views ... — Pussycat

If one would do some research he would find that the same is true with the work of any philosopher. While there may be no final and definitive interpretation there are interpretations that are more plausible than others. The best interpretations make connections between each of the parts and sheds light on the whole.

And yet at the penultimate rung of the latter at 6.421 he says that ethics is transcendental. How do you explain this? — Fooloso4

He gives no meaning to "transcendental", so anyone can explain it how he sees fit. One can take Kant's meaning of transcendental, for which by the way there are different interpretations and debates. Another can say that transcendental is something that can be transcended, or gone beyond, for whatever that means. Another that transcendental is itself nonsensical and cannot be put in words etc.

when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

What is the meaning he gives to "transcendental"? What does this sign represent in the proposition "ethics are transcendental"? Is it a metaphysical concept to begin with?

What one sees when the world is seen aright is not simply that propositions about what cannot be put into words are senseless but that the world is mystical. — Fooloso4

Yes, the world is mystical, like we didn't know.

What is inexpressible would be nonsense if one attempted to express it. This does not mean that the mystical or the ethical does not exist. It does, it shows itself. What is senseless is not the ethical but rather propositions about the ethical. — Fooloso4

It doesn't mean it exists either. Or that the ethical that has been transcended has anything to do with what is obtained at the end of this transcendence, it might be something completely different.

There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

So he says that the mystical shows itself, not the ethical. But then again, someone may say that whatever is inexpressible shows itself, and as long as the ethical is inexpressible, then also the ethical, which is the mystical, shows itself. Go figure. But this all too funny I think. :grin: