given the meaning of these words we can just decide that a stone is a bishop — Michael

We can't though. See above.

changing the meaning of the word "magnetic" isn't going to get a piece of wood to stick to my fridge door. — Michael

Of course not. We also need to change the meaning of the word 'stick'!

Physical constraints apply to bishops too. We cannot, no matter our assignation, claim an object larger than the square on our chessboard is a bishop. It could not function as one, no matter how much we define it as such. If we say "bishops move diagonally on a chess board" then something which, by it's physical properties, cannot so move cannot be a bishop.

Likewise with gold. If we define gold as something with 79 protons then something which physically cannot meet those requirements cannot be gold.

Neither the bishop nor gold are more or less constrained by reality than the other once defined.

We can't turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold, but we can turn a stone into a bishop just by using it as such on a chess board. — Michael

Of course we can turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold. We only need say that the definition of gold is now anything with between 79 and 82 protons. Voilà, lead is now gold.

Even if in using the statement "the grass is green" I imply that I believe that the grass is green it doesn't follow that "the grass is green" means "I believe the grass is green". — Michael

I don't think I'd claim that it does follow. My claim (in total) only requires that it can, ie it's opposite doesn't follow either.

Your claim that...

They have different propositional content (the aboutness). — Michael

...doesn't follow either. We certainly could treat them that way, separating propositional content from the implications of it's use, but we needn't. There's no logic or rule which compels us to.

In the case of the former we're describing an object's chemical composition — Michael

No, we're assigning an institutional grouping to the entire collection of sensory data the object has (the realism part - we're assuming there is definitely an object with the properties our senses seem to detect). Is an object with 26 protons and 27 neutrons still iron? We've just decided it is. It could have been otherwise. We call it an isotope of iron rather than give it some completely new name.

So saying "this is iron" is saying that this is the sort of thing iron is. What sort of thing is and isn't iron is an institutional fact. We decide what criteria we want to use to determine membership of that class of materials.

I think it's more the case that "this is a bishop" is an institutional fact but that "this is wood" isn't. — Michael

But we're not obligated by God to group all the products of trees into one grouping are we? Maybe the material from Oak is not the same thing as the material from Beech. There need be no such thing as 'wood'. It's an institutional fact that there is.

"The grass is green" is true if and only if the grass is green.
"I believe the grass is green" is true if and only if I believe the grass is green.
"I know the grass is green" is true if and only if I believe the grass is green and the grass is green. — creativesoul

It is the matter of the last that's in contention, so taking it as given would be begging the question.

One need only look at the form you've had to put it in. The other two deflate. There's nothing more to "it's true that 'P'" than 'P'. But in the last, you smuggle in P1 (the grass is green). All of a sudden, the unanalysabilty of truth as a property goes out the window. The proposition "it's true that 'X knows P'" is no longer reducible only to 'X knows P', now hidden within it is P itself.

Time for a break from all this lay speculation... Let's hear from some independent experts.

you think what we call wood is a theological given? Or that the role of a bishop is too? Word use is a human institution. It cannot be otherwise. — StreetlightX

This is what I was getting at right back on the first page when I wrote...

isn't "the bishop is made of wood" institutional too by virtue of the institutional fact that "that's the kind of thing 'wood' is". — Isaac

I gotb the impression @Banno, that you were amenable to such an interpretation?

Amenable, but uninterested perhaps?

Those are two very different issues though. — Isaac


Truth and error? — Banno

Sorry, no. I meant Error and knowledge.

Error is in hindsight "that went wrong", knowledge in foresight " I know the bridge will hold". The other way round each are perfectly sensical, but useless.

So error is important and inescapable (the bridge didn't hold, it's on the ground, what are we going to do better next time). Knowledge is just bragging, or showmanship, or politics. "I know the bridge will hold" (as JTB) doesn't help anyone over "I believe the bridge will hold" or just "the bridge will hold". It's nothing more than a boastful self aggrandisement " not only to I think the bridge will hold, but I have access to The Truth™, and I know the bridge will hold".

Hence my suspicion of those who need it to be about Truth. Merely competing for people's faith by convincing them isn't enough. They want their big stick back. You'll know, I expect, of the much studied relationship between political extremism and dogmatism. The more extreme the political group, the more they need to be the bearers of The Truth™. I bring this up just to say that theories of truth are political, we're not in mere idle philosophical territory.

I think the approach adopted in this thread is demonstrative of the philosopher's habit of theorising from too limited a set of cases. — Banno

I think it's the other way round. The cases presented here in support of a simple JTB are the very cases in which we hardly ever use the word 'know'. I mean, who says "John knows the cat is on the mat"? A primary school teacher perhaps, showing her children how to use the word in a sentence. In real life, no-one ever says such things. Partly because such cases are so obvious they don't need saying. In real life "I know" is reassurance ("I know you love me", "I just know I left my keys here somewhere"), or claims of political or social capital "He's an expert, he knows what he's talking about", "John knows where the treasure is hidden"...

I'll go back to Tarski's analysis; or rather the inability to analyse:

p is true IFF p

That's as much as one can get out of truth. I don't think you will disagree, since you have understood Ramsey. — Banno

Ramsey's view is slightly different. In “The Nature of Propositions” Ramsey showed how even the simplest of propositions was infinitely complicated such as to render an correspondence theory of truth problematic at best, if not redundant entirely. The examples he gave were Russell's facts, but much as we've been presented with here - "The apple is in the bag", "Zelenskyy is President of Ukraine". Such propositions (said Ramsey) are too complex to be truth apt.

I don't want to hijack @hypericin's thread into an exposition of Ramsey, but my critique of @hypericin's position derives, in part, from Ramsey's

we have seen no reason to suppose there are facts and if truth be indefinable, I think none can be drawn from the nature of truth; so if truth be indefinable we have no reason to suppose there are facts and therefore no reason for thinking true beliefs are related to facts in a way which false ones are not. — The Nature of Propositions 1921

... and trying to reconcile that with an ordinary language understanding of 'knowledge'.

He talks at length about the relation between degrees of belief and knowledge, he talks a lot about truth (from a nuanced redundancy position), but he doesn't (as far as I know) directly relate the two. If one reads "Truth and Probability", however, it is littered with references to knowledge, and without directly claiming it, all these uses are treated as if knowledge were a form of belief where the degree of belief were near 100%, so that's what I'm working with.

I would have thought that, being a model, it would be wrong in that it does not represent what is being modeled, therefore it becomes useless as such. — Harry Hindu

Well, yeah. But you've yet to demonstrate that it doesn't represent what it models, you've only shown that it's possible to model language in other ways (as about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world.)

Searle is modeling language using language? Is an actual car a model of a car, or is it just a car? Seems like circular reasoning to me. — Harry Hindu

I don't see why. I can model a car with cars, I could build a model of a brick out of bricks...

So you wouldn't be interested in knowing why your models are not useful to others? — Harry Hindu

Well, it depends who those others are. I mean there are 7 billion people on the planet, I can't possibly give consideration to the interest of all of them. For me, personally, I restrict my interest to how useful others in my field find my models. I suspect Searle does too.

Even if you declare that geometry is purely mental (I disagree, but I guess it is possible to argue), this theory does not intersect with the nature of the assertive speech acts which communicate it. — hypericin

How so? I mean, it seems to me to intersect in the manner of christening of terms at the very least. You've not supported your assertion.

the theoretical status of truth does not intersect with the everyday usage of the concept. — hypericin

Yes, you asserted that without argument too.

The fact that you can construct these cumbersome sentences is supposed to say what exactly? — hypericin

The sentences should make sense if 'I know X' can be treated as an empirical fact. The sentences don't make sense. So there seems to be a problem with treating 'I know X' as if it were an empirical fact.

"External world" is not what I want. Rather, external to the speaker. — hypericin

But the idea of a ratio within a perfect circle is not external to the speaker. There are no perfect circles, the concept is entirely internal (but shared). Which seems of the same sort as "suppose there's a big green dragon..." Which evokes something in the mind of both the speaker and the listener.

More so if the speaker says something like "we'll call him George". An entirely fictitious entity is undergoing a declarative christening.

I'm pursuing thus because I think it's going to be relevant later with language rules, but I may be completely off track.

The phrase "the grass is green" doesn't logically entail the phrase "I believe the grass is green", even though in practice someone who (honestly) asserts one will (honestly) assert the other. — Michael

Yes. I'm talking about the language use and the meanings those expressions have, I'm not assuming logical entailment, not even sure how expressions about belief could logically entail anything.

It's not about my beliefs. You're conflating the propositional content of a statement with the reason for asserting it. — Michael

Again, not 'conflating'. You keep going back to assuming I'd like to use the traditional theory but I'm confused about how it works. I'm not claiming any expert, in depth, understanding of conventional theories of truth, propositions, knowledge etc., but I am reasonably familiar with them. I don't agree with the distinction you're assuming is the case.

It's not an ideal. The actual colour of the grass is a real thing (the argument between direct and indirect realists notwithstanding), not imaginary or hypothetical. Even if I don't have direct access to this fact, I'm quite capable of understanding what it would mean for someone to correctly describe it — Michael

Imagining what it would mean makes it an ideal. It's not a real fact of the world for you.

regardless of my beliefs I can say "John knows that the grass is green only if the grass is green" — Michael

Your ability to say it is not in question. What it means is. The sentence is of the form "A is the case if B". If A is an empirical fact, then anyone can know it, including John. That means the expression "John knows A" would have to be sensical. But substituting, we get "John knows John knows that the grass is green", which is nonsensical, so A can't be an empirical fact.

My answer is the same answer that you gave: the latter is about my state of mind, the former about the state of the world. — Michael

Right. I'm off out now, so forgive my brevity, but following through the rest of my post with that conception of the difference should yield the same unsatisfactory result I get. If not, I'll try to clarify later.

this isn't true, the majority is against Russia's invasion, as seen through UN's votes.

141 of the 193 member states voted for the resolution, 35 abstained and five voted against — Christoffer

By population that amounts to just over half the world abstaining. Funny how readily you forget the grossly disproportionate power Western countries have in the UN.

You answered this yourself: "The [latter] is about my state of mind, the [former] about the state of the world."

Are you now going back on that? — Michael

It was a question back to you, to answer from your position of JTB.

we can understand "I know that the grass is green" as a combination of "I believe that the grass is green" (a statement about my state of mind) and "the grass is green" (a statement about the state of the world). — Michael

How does the statement "the grass is green", when uttered by me, have any different meaning to "I believe the grass is green" (or " I know the grass is green ")? Unless I'm lying, my saying " the grass is green " automatically entails that I believe the grass is green.

Break the statement down. According to JTB, you're saying "I believe the grass is green" and "it's true that 'the grass is green'". Now since you can't rationally claim the latter with entailing tormer claim becomes redundant. So you're just claiming "it's true that 'the grass is green'", which deflates to "the grass is green".

perhaps this is better understood in the third person: "John knows that the grass is green." The statement isn't about me or my beliefs (even if my beliefs motivate the assertion) — Michael

It is clearly about your beliefs. Since the actual truth of the grass's greenness can't be established, the comment can only be interpreted as comparing the expressed certainty of John's belief to the certainty you have in yours.

You obviously can't be comparing John's stated belief to the actual truth, since that is only an ideal.

If we are talking about the use of the symbol itself, that is also an assertion of convention:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is denoted by π" — hypericin

Exactly. Yet your claim was that such assertions refer to objects in the external world.

Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker. — hypericin

This one doesn't. Ratios in perfect circles don't exist in the external world, they're a mathematical artefact, yet here they are being christened by a declarative, not a supposition.

I don't know what you mean by "must" here. I'm not saying that the word "knowledge" must mean this; I'm only saying that the word knowledge does mean this. — Michael

Yeah, my lack of clarity. I mean to invoke the difference between something I merely could think and something I'm compelled to think. That there are alternative models of knowledge is something we already agree on. You seem (to me) to be merely presenting the fact that a JTB interpretation exists, that it is plausible, makes sense etc. I already agree on this. Where I disagree would be an argument that we are compelled (by reason, logic, whatever) to accept the JTB interpretation. That's what I mean by 'must'.

We can then use tense to talk about having (or not having) a justified true belief or having had (or not having had) a justified true belief, and so on, but grammatical tense has no bearing on the meaning of the noun. — Michael

As per above. We can then use our definition of 'knowledge' to talk about it in two different tenses, but we are not in any way compelled to do so. So in pointing out that we can, you've not made an argument that we, in fact, do.

why do you believe that a phrase like "I know that there is an apple in the bag" doesn't use this perspective but that a phrase like "there is an apple in the bag" does? If we just use your meaning-as-use approach then we will say that both assertions are only ever used when we believe that there is an apple in the bag, so then both knowing that there is an apple in the bag and there being an apple in the bag is just a matter of belief? — Michael

The former is about my state of mind, the latter about the state of the world. I don't know if you read the posts above so I'll repeat. My problem with treating "I know X" as an empirical fact similar the "the grass is green" is that a body of knowledge is typically held to consist of such facts. we say "I know the grass is green", meaning that the greenness of the grass is a fact that is in my body of knowledge. So if we treat "I know X" as an empirical fact in the same way, then "I know X" becomes one of the things I know. just like "the grass is green" becomes one of the things I know...

...which means I know I know X, which is itself a knowledge claim, the truth of which is an empirical fact which can form part of my body of knowledge, just like any other empirical fact, hence I know I know I know X. Yet if I say to you "I know I know I know the grass is green", you don't nod agreement, you'd more likely back slowly away shaking your head. Treating "I know X" as an empirical fact like "the grass is green" doesn't match how we use the term, otherwise "I know I know X" would make perfect sense in the same way as "I know the grass is green " makes perfect sense. Only it doesn't, does it?

I think the notion of truth plays a far more important place in keeping things coherent and consistent, than does knowledge. For example i can't see how we might understand error without having the truth and falsehood; nor could we differentiate what we know from what we merely believe. — Banno

Those are two very different issues though. Error is something that can only be judged in hindsight, knowledge (distinct form belief) is about foresight. So "if we can't make sense of errors, we can't fix 'em"? Sure, but I don't see how that situation (which I agree ought be avoided) has any bearing on knowledge claims.

If something goes wrong, we need to work out what went wrong and why. Where were we in error. But if I say "I know that bridge will hold" as opposed to "I really, really believe that bridge will hold", determining whether I'm correct to say the former is exactly the same process as determining whether the bridge will, in fact, hold. In other words, finding out I'm right to use "I know..." doesn't help us in any way over and above just finding out if the bridge will hold. So I definitely see the utility of the former, but the latter... well... I can't quite shake my deep suspicion that it's main motive to act as a 'bigger stick' with which to beat those with whom one disagrees. "I know X" sounds more convincing than "I believe X" but to carry off that bluff it needs a good solid sounding theory behind it. JTB provides just such a theory. Maybe I'm just cynical, but, in my defence (apart from just the cynicism old age seems to automatically bring) I have spent a career studying exactly how people defend beliefs which are not readily defensible. I may have developed a bias, but people (myself included, of course) sure do an awful lot of 'air-castle-building' when it comes to beliefs they hold dear and I'm deeply suspicious of any scheme which hands out bricks.

I think that we do know things like that 2+2=4; that this sentence is in English; that you have some expertise in neural science. And since we know them, I think we can conclude that they are true. — Banno

No, you're absolutely right. I agree that 2+2=4 is true (as did Ramsey, so I'm still faithfully representing his position here - I think), I had simply not thought to include such truths in my exposition, which is my error.

I do, however, think the issue with JTB stands, even aside from the existence of some truths which we won't ever come to disbelieve. But I think your idea of a public commitment has some use here (more on that in a minute). The problem I have with "I know" being empirical in any way is this...

What is the content of a body of knowledge? Broadly speaking it's empirical, truth apt, facts, yes? - I know "the grass is green", I know "the keys are on the table", I know "the capital of France is Paris"...

Once we admit "I know X" into the realm of such empirical facts (it's either true or not that "I know X" with the truth-maker being the external state of the world - X's being the case) then it becomes a proper candidate for the contents of a body of knowledge. I know "that I know X". But then this, in turn, becomes a proper candidate for a body of knowledge by the same token, I know "that I know 'that I know X'"... and so on ad infinitum.

But this does not, you'd have to admit, reflect how the word is used at all. If I said to you "I know I know I know the grass is green" you'd think me mad.

So...

Rather that thinking of knowing as a mental state, with the implied privacy, think of it as a public commitment. So if we (not I) do not know that this thread is in English, we have no basis for continuing. Knowledge as shared truths... — Banno

This is kind of where I got to when I last tried this (reconciling ideas of knowledge with Ramseyan ideas on truth). We have to have some kind of public 'truth' (even in matters outside of the 1+1=2 kind) with publicly acceptable criteria. This forms what we call 'knowledge' facts which have been established in such a way as that it is unreasonable to doubt them. It's unreasonable of me to doubt this thread is in English, it's unreasonable of me to doubt 1+1=2, it's unreasonable of me to doubt theories of electromagnetism...

But, given the above issues, whilst I don't have any problem with these as criteria for knowledge. I do have a problem with those same criteria being used for the proper meaning of the expression "I know..." which I take to have a different meaning on account of it's everyday use.

While you were away, a thief broke into your car, and replaced it with a bag of oranges. Later, you claim, "I know I have a bag of apples in the car". By every standard you are perfectly justified in believing so. And yet, you do not know it, because the truth is, you have a bag of oranges. — hypericin

Again, you're just repeating back to me what your preferred theory of knowledge is ("yet, you do not know it, because the truth is..."). You've not demonstrated that I don't 'know' it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something. You've just declared that I don't know it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something.

Look at the phrasing. There's no argument showing that it must be the case that "you do not know it, because the truth is...". That 'because' is the very matter we're discussing, you're just begging the question by using is as the explanation.

Imagine if we disagreed over the Trolley Problem, I think we should switch because consequences guide morality and you think we should not because virtues do and we shouldn't intentionally kill anyone. It wouldn't constitute an argument if I were to say "But it would be moral to switch because morality is what harms least people", that's the very matter in contention.

I'm arguing that the truth of "I know X..." is not determined by the truth of X. I'm arguing that using the actual way we make what is considered proper use of the expression "I know X...".

There are plenty of examples of well justified falsehoods, like the one I gave above. — hypericin

Not currently there aren't. This is what I mean about tenses changing things. There are currently no well-justified falsehoods. There may be some in the future (when we have better justifications - when we look in the bag) but currently there are none.

By your logic, the use of the everyday word 'true' would be impossible, since no one has access to the truth. — hypericin

Yes. I'm deflationist about 'truth'. I thought I explained that earlier by referencing Ramsey. The entire problem here is the definition of "I know" for someone deflationist about truth.

The way out is simple: every "I know", every "this is true", is a claim to knowledge and truth. We don't need direct access to the truth to make claims to it. — hypericin

I've shown the problem with this above. If "I know" is simply a claim to knowledge, then we have to admit of the disjunction "I believe I know..." and "I know I know...". Then we have to admit of "I believe I know I know..." and "I know I know I know...", and so on.

Your model is not "simple" at all.

So we thought we knew, but we were mistaken. — Banno

Here, the present tense references actual 'truth' (our past belief was false relative to the truth now), yet the past tense references only beliefs ('we thought we knew'). You've changed references between tenses. "we thought we knew but now think we don't" would preserve our beliefs about our knowledge as the subject of both tenses. or "we knew, now we don't" would preserve our actual knowledge as the reference.

We've talked at great length about belief and truth before, I know, so there may be little value in retreading all that old ground, but here, in this change of subject between tenses, is where I think all the problems of JTB lie.

What we think is true is that which we feel well-justified in believing, that it is is actually true is unknown to us and always will be (we always might be mistaken). It's true that the cat is on the mat if the cat is on the mat, but we can never be sure the cat is on the mat (we might be hallucinating etc) so we can only ever reference our justification for believing the cat is on the mat (i saw it there, I stroked it etc).

So to properly use the word knowledge, the public rule governing it's proper use (the rule which we reference to say what it 'means') cannot use the concept of what is 'actually true' since no-one in the public rule-making community has this information. It can only use what they think is true. But that (as above) already constitutes that which is well-justified - and being well-justified is already one of the criteria for 'knowledge' under JTB.

Essentially the muddle here with 'to know' is that it attempts to treat a mental state as a function of empiricism. What if "I'm in pain" were treated the same way. That external facts could alter whether that were the case, we have to say "I think I'm in pain...but I'm not sure". But what could that possibly mean?. Well likewise with treating "I know X" as similarly bounded? We'd have to admit to the possibility of the disjunction - "I believe I know X" and "I know I know X". But if we admit them we'd have to also admit "I believe I know I know X" and " I know I know I know X"... and so on.

Far simpler, I think, to accept what you've already had to accept anyway in your first expression - that they way we use "I know..." differs from the way we use "He knows..." and the way we use "I/he knew...". The former is about our confidence in the justification we have for our belief. The latter two are an assessment (in the light of our current understanding) of how well placed that confidence was. This better reflects how the words are actually used, and only complicates matters by requiring a change in subject over tenses which you've already had to include anyway to say "we thought we knew, but we were mistaken" or expressions like it.

And using this example; assume you start digging and break a gas pipe. You wouldn't say "I knew where all the gas pipes were, but I was wrong"; you would say "I didn't know where all the gas pipes were." — Michael

Almost every competent English speaker will agree with this. Our understanding of the word "knowledge" is that it includes the condition of truth. — Michael

Again, all this use of the past tense shows is that "I know X" could be made true by the truth of X. Given that some very smart people have proposed the idea, I should jolly well hope it could be, otherwise something's gone very seriously wrong in the philosophy departments' various hiring policies.

What it fails to show is that it must be. It's perfectly plausible that we use the past tense of 'to know' to reference the relationship between our previous state of mind and out current beliefs about the state of the world, and the present tense to reference the relationship between our current state of mind and our current beliefs about that state of the world. To make something past tense, we only have to put one aspect into the past, not all aspects. "There was an apple in that bag" is past tense even though I'm referring to a current bag - that one.

The use of some perspective other than our own as the 'reality' we are talking about the confidence we have in our beliefs matching doesn't mean we always must use that perspective in all cases, only that we can.

That's true of everything we say. I say "the grass is green" when I believe (with justification) that the grass is green. I say "the defendant is guilty" when I believe (with justification) that the defendant is guilty. It doesn't then follow that X being true isn't the truthmaker. — Michael

Again, you're just showing that "I know X" could be of a form similar to "the grass is green" where we could look to some empirical fact to show it's truth. You're not showing anywhere that is must be of that sort.

What would it mean for you to be wrong if there are many possible models? — Harry Hindu

Between models, utility, within models, it depends on the model. Usually they have criteria for correctness within them.

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model. — Isaac

Is Searle's model wrong? How would we know? — Harry Hindu

I find it useful, so no. I strongly suspect it wouldn't have made it this far is everybody thought it was useless, but in academia, stranger things have happened...

The distinctions Banno, by way of Searle, is making are useless when you understand that all language use is about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world. — Harry Hindu

It's not a matter of 'understanding that...'. You're just presenting a different model, and it's not for you to say what I, or others, find useful.

because we use the phrase "the grass is green" when we believe that the grass is green — Michael

But this, and ...

You claim that there is an apple in the bag. We open the bag to find an orange. It didn't stop being an apple when we opened the bag; it just never was an apple. — Michael

...this, only show to serve that "I know X" (probably) has a truthmaker, not what that truthmaker is. The presence of the apple in the bag is the truthmaker of "there's an apple in that bag". If it turns out there wasn't, then "there's an apple in that bag" was false.

But I'm not arguing there's no truthmaker for "I know X", I'm just arguing that the truth of X isn't it.

So, like our apple, proper justification (relative to the context) is the truthmaker of "I know X". If it turns out that (like our apple not being there) that I don't have proper justification for believing X, then the proposition "I know X" is false.

You're trying to claim the the truth of X is the thing that renders "I know X" true or false, but your argument consists only of a demonstration that something renders "I know X" true or false. You haven't yet presented a case for what that something is.

My argument is to look to the use of the term. It's used (present tense) in situations where the justifications are of a sufficient level. It's not reserved for use only when X is true. It's used in the past tense comparing to what we currently believe. Again, truth is not referenced at all.

If you want to add 'truth' to the criteria for the meaning of 'knowledge', you'd have to show some way the word, in use, references truth, but I can't see it referencing anything other than the quality of justification.

If I've misunderstood Ramsey, I'd be grateful for your (well sourced) corrections. — Isaac

@hypericin I mean this last quite seriously, by the way. Ramsey is the only philosopher I've made any significant study of and I'm something of a collector of both his works and secondary sources. So insults are secondary to the opportunity to get new information.

Then Searle is not talking about language-use in the world. Hes talking about his own feelings about language-use.

So is this thread about language-use or Searle's feelings or views of language use? Is there any relationship between the two? — Harry Hindu

Of course he's talking about language use in the world. I could classify my books by author, subject, publication date, or binding colour. The choice is entirely mine, but the classification remains of the actual books and in each case I can be wrong about a particular book's placement within the scheme.

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model.

This is not even philosophy anymore, just basic English. — hypericin

No. This is basic English.

knowledge
noun
uk
/ˈnɒl.ɪdʒ/ us
/ˈnɑː.lɪdʒ/
B1 [ S or U ]
understanding of or information about a subject that you get by experience or study, either known by one person or by people generally — Cambridge

knowledge
(nɒlɪdʒ IPA Pronunciation Guide )
1. uncountable noun
Knowledge is information and understanding about a subject which a person has, or which all people have. — Collins

Definition of knowledge

1a(1) : the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained through experience or association
(2) : acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art, or technique — Merriam (for the Yanks)

No mention of truth in any of them. If you want to start a crusade against ordinary use, crack on, but don't try and claim it's just basic English.

Note how they all mention the importance of the method of acquisition (the justification). None mention the veracity of the information thereby gained.

Just as every command can be preceded by, "I want...". A command refers to the demanding party's wants. The person being commanded can refuse the command, so the actual command couldnt have been used to make someone do something. Its use only displays what the person making the command wants. — Harry Hindu

I'm afraid I don't see the relevance. Searle is not saying "this is how it must be", he's giving a (hopefully useful) account. A counterargument would be that it wasn't useful, not that alternative accounts are also plausible.

It is an assertion, of a geometric fact. — hypericin

What, that we refer to the ratio with the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet? That's a geometric fact?

So now meaning shifts with tense to keep your account coherent. And I'm the dogmatist. — hypericin

Difference is I'm not claiming your account is factually wrong, you are mine, hence dogmatism.

This is simply bad English, given that the speaker presumably knows that it does not. "Know" in English cannot be applied to something that is known to be false. Similarly, it cannot be applied to a guess, and be good English. This is not how "know" ought to be used, it is how it is used. — hypericin

I don't know what this is supposed to be a counter-example to, but no-one has suggested it's correct English to use 'know' about something known to be false.

to be clear, I'm not looking for someone to clarify what the standard theory is, I'm trying (or was) to explain a different theory (broadly Ramseyan - or my interpretation of it). — Isaac


Please. — hypericin

If I've misunderstood Ramsey, I'd be grateful for your (well sourced) corrections.

I think it was decided to keep it seperate, rather than suggest that two acts were being performed at once. It's clearer. — Banno

Makes sense, thanks.

Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker. — hypericin

I see the distinction, but it's less clear with something like "the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is Π" This doesn't apply to any object in the external world (unless you want to posit the existence of perfect circles), but it declares rather than supposes.

An inward declaration would make no sense in the same way a private rule would make no sense. A declaration is a public event, creates a public rule.

I think you are right that suppositions are declarations. — Banno

I think there's a sense in which they're assertions too. All stories might be preceded by the unspoken "in the story...", and so it becomes a declaration about a fictitious story. It is false that 'in the Lord of the Rings' Aragorn takes the ring to Mordor.

There's a crossover with previous declarations. It's the same as "I name this ship QE2" being a declaration. From then "this ship is called QE2" becomes an assertion.

East European countries have improved their situation after joining the EU. — ssu

You're assuming (again) that there are only two options. It may well be better for Ukraine to be in the EU than, for example, to be part of Russia, but why on earth would we consider those the only two options? It seems a common tactic (one which is being used to great effect in the media) to use the evils of one option as justification for advising another. It's as is you could point to the awfulness of my paisley tie (and it is awful), and use it to justify my wearing the salmon pink one (which is also awful) when I have an entire wardrobe full of much more sensible ties.

What good is a definition that does not represent what people normally mean when they say the word? Answer - not much. — T Clark

Yeah, that was pretty much my starting point too. "It's true that the grass is green" adds nothing to "the grass is green". The 'it's true' bit is implied by the statement within the context of a particular language game, there's nothing more to the truth of 'the grass is green' than the grass being green. Likewise with 'I know' (again, in certain contexts), where "I know the grass is green" adds nothing to the statement "the grass is green". After all, to use a famous example, I can hardly say "I merely believe it's raining outside, and it's raining outside", It wouldn't make sense. The expression "It's raining outside" already entails that I know it to be the case.

The problem people have is with their conception of truth differing from their conception of knowledge or beliefs. Personally, I'm not a strong realist, so I don't necessarily think there is a truth about certain propositions (some, but not all), but let's say there is, I think we'd all agree that it's an asymptote at best, something we approach with better models but never reach. So a Justified True Belief model of knowledge would have no-one ever having knowledge, it too would become an asymptote because of the nature of one of it's requirements (I suspect one could even demonstrate this mathematically - but I won't attempt it). So one could only properly make claims to knowledge, or claims to truth, never assertions (without dogmatism).

But then we go back to where I (and you) started. That's simply not how the word(s) is used. We don't use either 'know' or 'true' as if we were making claims to an asymptotical ideal which we will never reach (for a start, with the latter we already have such an option - we'd use 'truer', or 'more true'). If we don't use the words that way, then how can that be their meaning? Hence the need for a different understanding of them.

I just don't see the point of @hypericin's quest to tell us what the word ought to mean. We seem to have got by quite well enough with it meaning what it currently does mean thus far.

This is untrue (and therefore, not knowledge).

Did the ancient Greeks know the earth was the center of the universe? This is bad English. It is proper to say, they believed, or thought they knew. — hypericin

'Knew' is the past tense. We use the past tense differently to the present tense.

'I know' is a description of a relationship between one's mental state (in relation to, maybe an image of the kitchen, my keys), and the world as I (the speaker) understand it to be. To say "I know my keys are on the table" is to say they match with some certainty - I'm not 'filling in the blanks' with guesswork, I'm pretty sure my mental image matches the world.

So in the past tense we're describing a previous mental image (or state), but still comparing it to the current understanding of the speaker, never the past one. So if I now have mental image of the the kitchen table sans keys, I can only say, of my past state of mind "I thought I knew where my keys were, but I didn't".

That doesn't change what 'I know' means in the present tense. It can still be an expression of the relationship it seems to be describing.

The trouble with your dogmatism is that you've no root for it. Why must we use the present tense and the past tense the same way? Why must there be some universal one-size-fits-all definition of 'knowledge' which matches every single use case? You've no Ten Commandments of language for your absolutism, your theology is missing a God.

I agree that "I know where my keys are" is grammatically correct, but it doesn't then follow that it's true. — Michael

I accept that "I know where my hat is" is a grammatically correct English sentence. But it doesn't then follow that it's true. — Michael

Ah, I remember our conversation on this last time now. I think we got about as far.

To be clear, I'm not looking for someone to clarify what the standard theory is, I'm trying (or was) to explain a different theory (broadly Ramseyan - or my interpretation of it). If you're not interested, that's fine, I've no compulsion to persuade you of it, but it's pointless you just repeating the standard theory back at me, I'm quite aware of it already and although I'm sure I don't have any more than the superficial grasp of the layman, I'd probably turn to the books if I wanted a deeper one.