that it is is actually true is unknown to us and always will be — Isaac

Well, I see your point but do not agree. I think that we do know things like that 2+2=4; that this sentence is in English; that you have some expertise in neural science. And since we know them, I think we can conclude that they are true.

The ubiquitous idea that what is true is unknown to us perhaps has its origin in folk considering the difficult edge issues rather than the central, more clearly demarcated examples. Like the odd non-theft in 's example; it's not difficult to make up counterexamples for any rule one thinks up. for truth, woman, real - trolly problems to keep philosophers in a job. It's a view I shared for many years, back in my days of reading Popper and Churchland and so on, but I dropped on giving more consideration to natural language.

So to be sure, sometimes what is actually true is indeed unknown to us; but not always.

Rather that thinking of knowing as a mental state, with the implied privacy, think of it as a public commitment. So if we (not I) do not know that this thread is in English, we have no basis for continuing. Knowledge as shared truths...

Some folk will insist that they do not know that this thread is in English, but that they assume it is for the pragmatic purposes. This strikes me as quite disingenuous. The doubt that this thread is in English is pretence.

I think that we do know things like that 2+2=4; that this sentence is in English; that you have some expertise in neural science. And since we know them, I think we can conclude that they are true. — Banno

No, you're absolutely right. I agree that 2+2=4 is true (as did Ramsey, so I'm still faithfully representing his position here - I think), I had simply not thought to include such truths in my exposition, which is my error.

I do, however, think the issue with JTB stands, even aside from the existence of some truths which we won't ever come to disbelieve. But I think your idea of a public commitment has some use here (more on that in a minute). The problem I have with "I know" being empirical in any way is this...

What is the content of a body of knowledge? Broadly speaking it's empirical, truth apt, facts, yes? - I know "the grass is green", I know "the keys are on the table", I know "the capital of France is Paris"...

Once we admit "I know X" into the realm of such empirical facts (it's either true or not that "I know X" with the truth-maker being the external state of the world - X's being the case) then it becomes a proper candidate for the contents of a body of knowledge. I know "that I know X". But then this, in turn, becomes a proper candidate for a body of knowledge by the same token, I know "that I know 'that I know X'"... and so on ad infinitum.

But this does not, you'd have to admit, reflect how the word is used at all. If I said to you "I know I know I know the grass is green" you'd think me mad.

So...

Rather that thinking of knowing as a mental state, with the implied privacy, think of it as a public commitment. So if we (not I) do not know that this thread is in English, we have no basis for continuing. Knowledge as shared truths... — Banno

This is kind of where I got to when I last tried this (reconciling ideas of knowledge with Ramseyan ideas on truth). We have to have some kind of public 'truth' (even in matters outside of the 1+1=2 kind) with publicly acceptable criteria. This forms what we call 'knowledge' facts which have been established in such a way as that it is unreasonable to doubt them. It's unreasonable of me to doubt this thread is in English, it's unreasonable of me to doubt 1+1=2, it's unreasonable of me to doubt theories of electromagnetism...

But, given the above issues, whilst I don't have any problem with these as criteria for knowledge. I do have a problem with those same criteria being used for the proper meaning of the expression "I know..." which I take to have a different meaning on account of it's everyday use.

To be sure, even Socrates didn't like the JTB account, describing it as so much flatulence in the Theaetetus.

So the Gettier examples are beside the point.

i'd happily give up knowledge before truth. As in, I think the notion of truth plays a far more important place in keeping things coherent and consistent, than does knowledge. For example i can't see how we might understand error without having the truth and falsehood; nor could we differentiate what we know from what we merely believe.

And if we can't make sense of errors, we can't fix 'em.

For what it's worth, there is a standpoint known as nonjustificationsim; the idea has its roots in post-Karl Popper science. After all, no (scientific) hypothesis can be proven true; all that can be done is falsify them once we get our hands on some testable predictions that they entail.

Intriguing to say the least, no (scientific) hypothesis can be justified as truth and yet we do believe them to be so.

Intriguing to say the least, no (scientific) hypothesis can be justified as truth and yet we do believe them to be so. — Agent Smith

This is only true if "justification" means establishing the truth of an assertion without doubt, which can't be done.

What it fails to show is that it must be. — Isaac

Again, you're just showing that "I know X" could be of a form similar to "the grass is green" where we could look to some empirical fact to show it's truth. You're not showing anywhere that is must be of that sort. — Isaac

I don't know what you mean by "must" here. I'm not saying that the word "knowledge" must mean this; I'm only saying that the word knowledge does mean this.

It's perfectly plausible that we use the past tense of 'to know' to reference the relationship between our previous state of mind and out current beliefs about the state of the world, and the present tense to reference the relationship between our current state of mind and our current beliefs about that state of the world. — Isaac

I don't understand what tense has to do with it. In the general form we're discussing the meaning of the noun "knowledge" which obviously has no tense. The proposed definition is "a justified true belief". We can then use tense to talk about having (or not having) a justified true belief or having had (or not having had) a justified true belief, and so on, but grammatical tense has no bearing on the meaning of the noun.

The use of some perspective other than our own as the 'reality' we are talking about the confidence we have in our beliefs matching doesn't mean we always must use that perspective in all cases, only that we can. — Isaac

So why do you believe that a phrase like "I know that there is an apple in the bag" doesn't use this perspective but that a phrase like "there is an apple in the bag" does? If we just use your meaning-as-use approach then we will say that both assertions are only ever used when we believe that there is an apple in the bag, so then both knowing that there is an apple in the bag and there being an apple in the bag is just a matter of belief?

-"Knowledge is true belief justified by true premises"
-This problematic definitions states that Knowledge is a true belief someone holds based on truth claims.
So in my opinion this definition informs us more on what people do with a true claim than what a knowledge claim really is.
Knowledge is an evaluation term. We use it to evaluate claims in general. A claim is accepted as knowledge when it is in agreement with available facts and carries an instrumental value.
With that definition we avoid the black whole of "true" because people tend to mix absolute truth with "Currently true statement".

If there isn't a bus and you say "there's a bus" then what you say is false. — Michael


But what's wrong with saying something false? — Isaac

-Ok this explains your absurd arguments in our discussion about morality.For a moment I thought I was not explaining things well but you are just in the Philosophy of Absurdism.
So to answer your question there is this fallacy called Argument from Ambiguity. Words represent concepts and concepts include specific meanings. If you are not going to use them according to their common usage then you won't be able to arrive to meaningful conclusions.

Evaluations of knowledge and truth fail when we apply absolute standards.
Science showed us that those standards are useless and disabling. "Beyond reasonable doubt" is a far better standard than "absolutes". Statistical Standards are far superior since a knowledge claim is not just a true one...it also carries an instrumental value and we NEED to act upon it.
So we need to take the risk...and this is what is rewarding. This is why Tautologies are valueless and Inductive reasoning is the main characteristic of scientific knowledge.

This is only true if "justification" means establishing the truth of an assertion without doubt, which can't be done. — T Clark

A (mere) quibble.

I don't understand what tense has to do with it. In the general form we're discussing the meaning of the noun "knowledge" which obviously has no tense. The proposed definition is "a justified true belief". We can then use tense to talk about having (or not having) a justified true belief or having had (or not having had) a justified true belief, and so on, but grammatical tense has no bearing on the meaning of the noun. — Michael

-Well I dare to say that I understand Isaac's point. Before that I must point out that the definition proposed in this thread is a messy one. I think I have a better one that avoids the use of the word "true".
People tend to project an absolute meaning to the word "Truth" which is unrealistic.(Absolute /ultimate knowledge/ true)
We can only evaluate a claim as true or not true based on the facts that are currently available to us...not in an absolute sense, because we don't know if we have all the facts needed to make such an absolute evaluation.
So when a claim is true, it means that it is Only Currently true based on the limited available facts we have.
Knowledge and Truth values are affected by tense since the accumulation of facts never really stops (especially in science). Knowledge claims, especially in science are tentative and remain always falsifiable since we constantly improve our methods of observation.
My preferred definition is to view knowledge as an evaluation term that identifies claims being in agreement with currently available facts and with an instrumental value.

Now on an other point, the example of 2x2=4 describes a fact(relation) among physical entities(by physical I mean entities which obey the 3 logical absolutes). No new observation can add new facts to this "fundamental relation" between physical entities. You can argue that in QM we might find problems with how well Logical absolutes apply , but then again we don't really deal with physical structures (entities) but with different energetic states of matter.
We need to understand that our frameworks (truth claims) are GOOD for the scale and scenario they were designed to describe. If we find issues in our descriptions then we need to check whether we have drifted outside the area our frameworks are good for.....logic included.

We can only evaluate a claim as true or not true based on the facts that are currently available to us...not in an absolute sense, because we don't know if we have all the facts needed to make such an absolute evaluation.
So when a claim is true, it means that it is Only Currently true based on the limited available facts we have. — Nickolasgaspar

That's a non sequitur. A jury can only judge a defendant to be guilty if the evidence suggests beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime, but whether or not he committed the crime has nothing to do with the evidence available to the jury and everything to do with historical events that actually happened.

So my evaluation of a claim as being true might be based on whatever facts are available to me, but that's not the same thing as the claim being true which is often based on things that I'm not aware of.

Pls explain how your statement is in conflict with what I wrote?

In both cases(jury trial knowledge evaluation) we can never be absolutely sure and this is why in the case of the jury...the members don't choose between guilty and innocent! Like with every application of the Null Hypothesis, Significant findings are demanded in order to departs from the normal risk free position. So its always guilty/not guilty or true/not true without absolute convictions.

but whether or not he committed the crime has nothing to do with the evidence available to jury and everything to do with historical events that actually happened. — Michael

-Correct, being reasonable and accepting the current facts has nothing to do with the actual True statement. BUT again, the time to depart from our Default Position is ONLY after we have available facts to support our position.
We need to acknowledge that our Knowledge and truth claims are limited by our nature, our methods and the rules of Logic.
Reasonableness doesn't equate Truthiness but Absolute knowledge and truth are red herrings that either distract us from what we can really achieve or act as an excuse to accept unfounded claims.
Maybe you can elaborate on what you disagree with.

In both cases(jury trial knowledge evaluation) we can never be absolutely sure and this is why in the case of the jury...the members don't choose between guilty and innocent! Like with every application of the Null Hypothesis, Significant findings are demanded in order to departs from the normal risk free position. So its always guilty/not guilty or true/not true without absolute convictions. — Nickolasgaspar

The defendant is claimed to be guilty, but it doesn't follow that the defendant is guilty. And the same with truth; we might claim that something is true, but it doesn't follow that the claim is true. I might claim that there is an apple in the bag, but there might not be an apple in the bag.

We need to acknowledge that our Knowledge and truth claims are limited by our nature, our methods and the rules of Logic. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes, our truth claims are limited by our nature, but truth itself isn't. Either there is an apple in the bag or there isn't, regardless of whatever I claim.

A claim is accepted as knowledge when it is in agreement with available facts and carries an instrumental value. — Nickolasgaspar

A random guess may be in agreement with facts, it may have instrumental value, but it is not knowledge.

We can only evaluate a claim as true or not true based on the facts that are currently available to us...not in an absolute sense, because we don't know if we have all the facts needed to make such an absolute evaluation. — Nickolasgaspar

I see no inconsistency with this account of truth and JTB. If we cannot evaluate truth in an absolute sense, then we cannot evaluate knowledge either. We can only claim that something does or does not hold the status of knowledge. What is or is not considered knowledge changes over time, because our body of currently accepted truths, as well as the justifications we consider legitimate, change over time.

I think the notion of truth plays a far more important place in keeping things coherent and consistent, than does knowledge. For example i can't see how we might understand error without having the truth and falsehood; nor could we differentiate what we know from what we merely believe. — Banno

Those are two very different issues though. Error is something that can only be judged in hindsight, knowledge (distinct form belief) is about foresight. So "if we can't make sense of errors, we can't fix 'em"? Sure, but I don't see how that situation (which I agree ought be avoided) has any bearing on knowledge claims.

If something goes wrong, we need to work out what went wrong and why. Where were we in error. But if I say "I know that bridge will hold" as opposed to "I really, really believe that bridge will hold", determining whether I'm correct to say the former is exactly the same process as determining whether the bridge will, in fact, hold. In other words, finding out I'm right to use "I know..." doesn't help us in any way over and above just finding out if the bridge will hold. So I definitely see the utility of the former, but the latter... well... I can't quite shake my deep suspicion that it's main motive to act as a 'bigger stick' with which to beat those with whom one disagrees. "I know X" sounds more convincing than "I believe X" but to carry off that bluff it needs a good solid sounding theory behind it. JTB provides just such a theory. Maybe I'm just cynical, but, in my defence (apart from just the cynicism old age seems to automatically bring) I have spent a career studying exactly how people defend beliefs which are not readily defensible. I may have developed a bias, but people (myself included, of course) sure do an awful lot of 'air-castle-building' when it comes to beliefs they hold dear and I'm deeply suspicious of any scheme which hands out bricks.

-"The defendant is claimed to be guilty, but it doesn't follow that the defendant is guilty. "
-Correct but we don't know that.We can only arrive to a conclusion based on available facts. So our statements are evaluated as true or not true based on those facts.

-"And the same with truth; we might claim that something is true, but it doesn't follow that the claim is true."
-Correct, but again our evaluation can only be made based on the available facts either we are happy or not.
i.e.
Was Geocentrism a true statement. Based on the contemporary available facts it was considered a true statements.
Is Heliocentrism a true statement. Based on our available facts, it is considered to be a true statement.
Can we be absolutely sure that Heliocentrism is true? We can say yes...based on our current available facts and assuming that there aren't any facts out here that could change this.

-" I might claim that there is an apple in the bag, but there might not be an apple in the bag."
-Correct but I don't have any facts to evaluate your claim, either than it is possible for you to have an apple in the bag. IF I saw you holding an apple earlier and now I see a protruding bump in the shape of the apple on your bag I can evaluate your claim as true.

Again I don't really get your objection since all the examples you give seem to provide support to "truth limited to current available facts" than "absolute truth".

Yes, our truth claims are limited by our nature, but truth itself isn't. Either there is an apple in the bag or there isn't, regardless of whatever I claim. . — Michael

-Ok I think I found the problem in your argument. You are arguing about the Abstract concept of truth as an Absolute Ideal and I am pointing out that there is ONLY one meaningful use in our daily life and the only type of evaluation we have access! Sure we agree that only one out of two possible answers can be true. How that can change the Actual and ONLY meaningful use that "truth" has as an evaluation term in our lives?

Words have practical and common usages. We need our words to satisfy our needs in our communication. We need to label a claim that is in agreement with what we know TODAY.(true statements in relation to available facts).
We also need a concept that points to our final goal (seek absolute Truth).
So in order to avoid Ambiguity fallacies you will need to distinguish those two concepts.
As I said we only have access to the first concept in our evaluations and we can only strive towards an absolute goal theoretical without being able to achieve it.
So reality checks points out to us that we can only evaluate claims based on what we currently know.
They might be proven wrong in the future but that doesn't really change the fact that our current position based on those facts is the most reasonable position to hold.

Correct but we don't know that.We can only arrive to a conclusion based on available facts. So our statements are evaluated as true or not true based on those facts. — Nickolasgaspar

Correct, but again our evaluation can only be made based on the available facts either we are happy or not. — Nickolasgaspar

I know. The point I am making is that the below are two different claims that you are conflating:

1. The statement has been evaluated as true
2. The statement is true

You argue for the former and conclude the latter which is a non sequitur.

I don't know what you mean by "must" here. I'm not saying that the word "knowledge" must mean this; I'm only saying that the word knowledge does mean this. — Michael

Yeah, my lack of clarity. I mean to invoke the difference between something I merely could think and something I'm compelled to think. That there are alternative models of knowledge is something we already agree on. You seem (to me) to be merely presenting the fact that a JTB interpretation exists, that it is plausible, makes sense etc. I already agree on this. Where I disagree would be an argument that we are compelled (by reason, logic, whatever) to accept the JTB interpretation. That's what I mean by 'must'.

We can then use tense to talk about having (or not having) a justified true belief or having had (or not having had) a justified true belief, and so on, but grammatical tense has no bearing on the meaning of the noun. — Michael

As per above. We can then use our definition of 'knowledge' to talk about it in two different tenses, but we are not in any way compelled to do so. So in pointing out that we can, you've not made an argument that we, in fact, do.

why do you believe that a phrase like "I know that there is an apple in the bag" doesn't use this perspective but that a phrase like "there is an apple in the bag" does? If we just use your meaning-as-use approach then we will say that both assertions are only ever used when we believe that there is an apple in the bag, so then both knowing that there is an apple in the bag and there being an apple in the bag is just a matter of belief? — Michael

The former is about my state of mind, the latter about the state of the world. I don't know if you read the posts above so I'll repeat. My problem with treating "I know X" as an empirical fact similar the "the grass is green" is that a body of knowledge is typically held to consist of such facts. we say "I know the grass is green", meaning that the greenness of the grass is a fact that is in my body of knowledge. So if we treat "I know X" as an empirical fact in the same way, then "I know X" becomes one of the things I know. just like "the grass is green" becomes one of the things I know...

...which means I know I know X, which is itself a knowledge claim, the truth of which is an empirical fact which can form part of my body of knowledge, just like any other empirical fact, hence I know I know I know X. Yet if I say to you "I know I know I know the grass is green", you don't nod agreement, you'd more likely back slowly away shaking your head. Treating "I know X" as an empirical fact like "the grass is green" doesn't match how we use the term, otherwise "I know I know X" would make perfect sense in the same way as "I know the grass is green " makes perfect sense. Only it doesn't, does it?

The former is about my state of mind, the latter about the state of the world. — Isaac

Then we can understand "I know that the grass is green" as a combination of "I believe that the grass is green" (a statement about my state of mind) and "the grass is green" (a statement about the state of the world).

Or perhaps this is better understood in the third person: "John knows that the grass is green." The statement isn't about me or my beliefs (even if my beliefs motivate the assertion), and it's not just about John's belief as we can say "John believes that the grass is green but he doesn't know that the grass is green because the grass isn't green."

The grass being green is a requirement for John to know that the grass is green. A strongly held, justified belief isn't sufficient. And the grass being green is a requirement for me to know that the grass is green.

A random guess may be in agreement with facts, it may have instrumental value, but it is not knowledge. — hypericin

Well by definition it can be. The utilization of that guess and the successful yielding of results alone render it" knowledge". Unsystematic Empirical Knowledge is mostly the result of guessing and unconscious or conscious empirical testing.
You seem to use "Knowledge" as an idealistic "quality" that a claim has it or not...when its the other way around. All claims are put out and through testing they awarded the title of knowledge.

If we cannot evaluate truth in an absolute sense, then we cannot evaluate knowledge either. — hypericin

Same error here(absolutism). Knowledge and truth are not(always) the same thing.
I.e. We know Relativity(in an ontological sense) is wrong but we still use it for its instrumental value.
Epicycles in Ptolemaic Astronomy did have an extensive epistemic and predictive value, but it was not a true model of the solar system.
In science there is a well used principle Known As Quasi Dogmatic principles. Its this process when a untrue framework is still used for its instrumental value while it crashes and burns, providing valuable data , supportive for the new framework!
So we need to distinguish truth and knowledge...and this is the reason why I AVOID "TRUTH" in my definition. Sure most knowledge is indeed based on true claims...but there is big but especially in scientific procedures.

We can only claim that something does or does not hold the status of knowledge. — hypericin

-Correct as I already said, knowledge is nothing more than an evaluation term. Its a status we apply on claims that are in agreement with currently available facts.
Whether those facts allow us to have the whole picture, thus our claim to be an ultimately true statement...that is an other discussion.

This is why Science doesn't do " ultimate TRUTHS". Its only provide descriptions based on current facts. Those facts can be used to evaluate claims as true or not true (without a capital T).

What is or is not considered knowledge changes over time, because our body of currently accepted truths, as well as the justifications we consider legitimate, change over time. — hypericin

-I will only change the term "truths" with "facts."
Yes truth and knowledge change with our advances in our technology and observation. Additional facts change the narratives that describe accurately a phenomenon. The newer narrative is True...the older no true anymore.

I know. The point I am making is that the below are two different claims that you are conflating:

1. The statement has been evaluated as true
2. The statement is true — Michael

No I am not. My whole argument is to distinguish true statements from Absolute truth.

I pointed out that true statements (based on facts) are reasonable but not necessarily absolute truths.
Reasonableness(accepting a claim to be true based on current facts) and Absolute Truthiness are two different things.

You argue for the former and conclude the latter which is a non sequitur. — Michael

-No my arguements have nothing to do with this strawman. Pls reread my posts more carefully.

I only pointed out that its meaningless and irrational to reject current truth claims ( in agreements with current facts) in hope or holding Absolute Truth as an excuse to do it.
Do you get the difference between those two positions?

Again my definition addresses the ACT of Evaluation...not the idealistic concept of absolute truth.

we can understand "I know that the grass is green" as a combination of "I believe that the grass is green" (a statement about my state of mind) and "the grass is green" (a statement about the state of the world). — Michael

How does the statement "the grass is green", when uttered by me, have any different meaning to "I believe the grass is green" (or " I know the grass is green ")? Unless I'm lying, my saying " the grass is green " automatically entails that I believe the grass is green.

Break the statement down. According to JTB, you're saying "I believe the grass is green" and "it's true that 'the grass is green'". Now since you can't rationally claim the latter with entailing tormer claim becomes redundant. So you're just claiming "it's true that 'the grass is green'", which deflates to "the grass is green".

perhaps this is better understood in the third person: "John knows that the grass is green." The statement isn't about me or my beliefs (even if my beliefs motivate the assertion) — Michael

It is clearly about your beliefs. Since the actual truth of the grass's greenness can't be established, the comment can only be interpreted as comparing the expressed certainty of John's belief to the certainty you have in yours.

You obviously can't be comparing John's stated belief to the actual truth, since that is only an ideal.

No I am not. My whole argument is to distinguish true statements from Absolute truth.

I pointed out that true statements (based on facts) are reasonable but not necessarily absolute truths.
Reasonableness(accepting a claim to be true based on current facts) and Absolute Truthiness are two different things. — Nickolasgaspar

I don't know what you mean by "absolute truth". Statements are either true or false, and then either said to be true or said to be false.

How does the statement "the grass is green", when uttered by me, have any different meaning to "I believe the grass is green" — Isaac

You answered this yourself: "The [latter] is about my state of mind, the [former] about the state of the world."

Are you now going back on that?

You answered this yourself: "The [latter] is about my state of mind, the [former] about the state of the world."

Are you now going back on that? — Michael

It was a question back to you, to answer from your position of JTB.

It was a question back to you, to answer from your position of JTB. — Isaac

My answer is the same answer that you gave: the latter is about my state of mind, the former about the state of the world.

-" Statements are either true or false, and then either said to be true or said to be false. "

-You are addressing a completely different dichotomy (and a false one since you include two different "positive" evaluations, true and false, in one).

True or not true are the possible evaluations we can arrive for any specific claim.
I am not denying or objecting to those options. I can be reckless and even include falseness in the same statement.

My point is simple. Truth is a human concept that help us evaluate claims in relations to the facts available to us.
Ultimate truth is the goal we strive for. In a hypothetical, if we had all the available facts we would be able to arrive to statements that were ultimately true.
So we might hold claims that are true to us (based on the facts we have) but ultimately they can be wrong because we don't have ALL the facts needed for a complete picture.

So I am claiming the opposite you are accusing me of because I am addressing a different dichotomy....what we know to be true vs what we would know to be true if we had all the facts needed for a complete picture.

I don't know if this helps you but I will try to introduce some perspective.
I am a Methodological Naturalist. As such I accept our Limitations as a Pragmatic Necessity in our what we can observe, verify and learn. So based on that acknowledgement I understand that everything we know and learn are limited between the nature of our methods (observations) and the nature of the investigated realm we have access.
So for me Absolute values of Knowledge and Truthiness are red herring, distracting us from what we can actually achieve in those areas.
Our evaluations will always be limited by the available facts but that shouldn't be used as an excuse to embrace claims that aren't based on any facts at all.

My answer is the same answer that you gave: the latter is about my state of mind, the former about the state of the world. — Michael

Right. I'm off out now, so forgive my brevity, but following through the rest of my post with that conception of the difference should yield the same unsatisfactory result I get. If not, I'll try to clarify later.