Nothing comes from nothing. — Pantagruel

Yet...

Consciousness is not nothing — Pantagruel

So consciousness must be in the class of things that you took account of to deduce that "Nothing comes from nothing".

If not, then how have you reached your premise despite knowingly excluding some 'things' from your gathering of evidence?

If so, then you already knew the answer beforehand, why the charade of investigation?

But propagandising is not discussion. I think questioning e.g. whether the Holocaust happened, i.e. disguising propaganda as debate — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, this is the important bit. We have to draw a line, and the fact that doing so is fraught and involves contextual judgement does not absolve that duty.

Where someone, as has been increasingly the case, presents uncorroborated speculation again and again without updating their view in the light of evidence to the contrary, we can be sufficiently sure they're not here to 'debate' for us to make such a judgement call.

'Free speech' is already all too often confused with 'free access'. This is a debating platform and so only speech amenable to debate is generally appropriate for access to it.

Took a pretty leap to get to that bolded portion sir. Thats not what im saying. No matter who they’re from? Where did you get that from what I said? — DingoJones

It's not from what you said. I just mean by it that even in cases where people do renounce ideas after discussion, it's often traceable to the social position of the person with whom they're discussing, not the ideas themselves. The point you made was that "The best remedy...". I'm contesting that superlative.

I would prefer that it not be seen at a battle at all, but if it's going to seem like some people are attacking you, instead of us all just cooperatively working on a puzzle together, then it's nice to have other people comforting and supporting you too. — Pfhorrest

Are you sure the one resulted from the other, and not vice versa? What could less give the impression we're co-operatively working on a puzzle than people jeering on one 'side' or the other?

Someone to affirm that you're not completely crazy, that there's some worth and merit to your thoughts, even if there is also room for refinement. — Pfhorrest

Yes. That's part of the problem with having lower standards of OP. That you're not crazy and your ideas have some merit should be the bare minimum to even be responded to. It should be assumed, not pointed out.

when so far as I can tell you're not just some crazy person I can safely ignore, it makes me feel obliged to address your responses, at whatever length necessary, no matter how obviously wrong I think you are. — Pfhorrest

As I was just discussing above, this seems to me to be the crux of this entrenching. If a person who you think is not crazy tells you you're wrong, but you don't think you are, it surely demonstrates as clearly as possible that something's seeming to you to be the case cannot itself be sufficient evidence that it is the case. Yet, no amount of internal reflection is going to get any more than something's seeming to you to be the case. One cannot take another person's contrary position and examine it against one's own web of beliefs. It will as obviously fail such a test as taking a Land Rover component and bolting it to a Ferrari would fail. You have to create a virtual web of beliefs built around what your (non-crazy) interlocutor is saying - a kind of joint space which neither of you actually believe in. But since neither of you own this space, there's not much incentive to do so in a combative environment.

I know it seems rather fusty, but the process of citation and building very gradually and slowly on previous work is a grand scale manifestation of this mental process, the academic corpus in general being the shared web of beliefs which neither party completely believes. This is why I think that "I've re-written the whole of..." type posts are just combative from the start (no matter the intention of the poster). They eschew the shared space of beliefs we already have. Doing so is equivalent to turning up to a negotiation with gun and expecting that not to have any influence of the parties' approach.

People tend to be cognitive misers. They are willing expend only a little effort to understand other people, and they underestimate the effort a particular other person would need to make in order to understand them. — baker

Yes. I think that's true but this is one of the reasons why social media (all internet platforms really) might be such breeding grounds for extremism. Much of our bandwidth is occupied with the judgement of social relations - the intentions of others, their social position etc. It's supremely hard work (in terms of how much brain power it takes).

People use their resources differently in internet interactions, much information we'd normally use to judge someone's intent is unavailable so there's a theory that a lot of the behaviour popular online is an attempt to extract that kind of data from a medium we're not used to. Just a theory...

This is not a scientific journal, — synthesis

Obviously you've never written for a scientific journal if you think adding a couple of references turns what we have here into anything like one.

Obviously you have access to the internet, so you can do your own research and counter arguments. — synthesis

That's just disingenuous laziness. Why would I trawl the internet for evidence-based counter-arguments if my interlocutor didn't go to such effort in the first place. All we end up with a a pointless list of some random people's opinions.

If we follow your notion of correct conduct, then where does one draw the line? — synthesis

We already have rules about quality and tone, both of which require some contextual line to be drawn. Such a requirement doesn't seem to have brought the site to it's knees yet. I don't see why the provision of references should be any more difficult to judge.

"I think Trump's a brilliant leader" doesn't require a reference (though maybe a lobotomy)

"

BLM used carefully edited cell phone footage to create a social media narrative to suggest that police were murdering black people — counterpunch

..does.

Is it really that hard to tell the difference?

Even if this was a scientific journal, any breakthrough requires taking accepted thought and jumping up and down on it until it is no longer recognized as truth. — synthesis

No. No breakthrough requires that. Breakthroughs require careful and diligent hard work researching and checking, peer-reviewing, checking again, correcting mistakes, more checking... and then, finally maybe publishing. It pisses me off intently that after all that hard work someone claiming to be interested in the subject (whatever it is) can't even be bothered to type the question into a search engine to find out if anyone has done such painstaking work.

Who would make a point of visiting and posting at a forum which they know to be very different from their own views? — baker

I think there are a small but significant number of people who've somehow misunderstood the nature of the 'marketplace of ideas'. More than average in fields like philosophy, politics, sociology... People seem to be unable to see the difference between something seeming to them to be the case and something's actually being the case, as if there were no further step that need be taken to get from the former to the latter. I think these people do indeed deliberately join forums whose culture is generally opposed to theirs, deluded into thinking that they only need present what seems obvious to them and all 'right thinking' people will fall into line on reading such cold hard logic.

For that reason I try to give signs of encouragement to others I agree with in other threads, even if I'm not going to go to the effort of really engaging in their battle against their opponents. Just so they know that someone is on their side, and they're not alone.

I think the forum would be a much more pleasant place if people generally would do things like that more often. — Pfhorrest

So you're suggesting we should become even more partisan? It's not enough that discussion be seen as a battle but that we must now have a jeering crowd egging each combatant on?

What do you think it says about our relationship with ideas that you feel bad when no-one is agreeing with you and you know that signs of agreement make you feel better? If I , for example, were to chime in to one of your discussions to say I agree, would that have the same effect on your well-being as if [insert some well-respected poster here]?

I think herein you have your answer as to why Dingo is exactly wrong that "The best remedy for bad ideas like fascism is discussion, to show where these ideas fail and where they lead". The result is only that ideas which draw a cheering crowd are bolstered and those which receive muted sniffs of derision as dropped.

The best remedy for bad ideas like fascism is discussion, to show where these ideas fail and where they lead — DingoJones

Where on earth did you get that idea from? Have you honestly seen any evidence of it, in general. Do people, in your experience, generally have a tendency to listen to arguments (no matter who they're from) and alter their opinions accordingly?

You see something in the distance on a hot day that looks like a pool of water. But from other knowledge, such as the local geography and climate and of the refraction of light in air of different temperatures, you do not believe there is a pool of water there, even though you perceive one. — Pfhorrest

Actually, when you see something like a pool of water in the distance, what happens is that the little people in your brain ('numbskulls' is the technical term), check the image your eye-cameras project against a database of images accessed by Wi-Fi (which our brain naturally receive). If comes back labelled 'pool' we're good to go, if it comes back labelled 'illusion', it's a non-starter.

I mean, whilst you're just making shit up you might as well have it interesting.

Apply your own standard and try to support your claims instead of throwing them out. Funny you’re chewing someone out for not supporting their claims about BLM on the leftist forum thread right now. — khaled

It's not a factual claim. I thought that was clear from the context, but if not then hopefully this will serve to clarify. Obviously antinatalism cannot seek to achieve anything. That's why I chose the term rather than antinatalists with which I would have taken more care.

These consequences are predictions, things I'm concerned about, antinatalism is thankfully not popular enough to gather any meaningful data on current consequences.

If you want evidence of philosophical outlooks in general having negative consequences socially as they are adopted more widely I can provide that, so as to support the idea that concern is not unreasonable, but I suspect you'd already agree.

The evidence is in the presence of punishments and rewards in all societies. Why do you think they exist and are so universal? — Olivier5

You're seriously telling me you can't think of a single other explanation? I'm not sure how to interpret that.

The facts cited are from the Bureau of Justice Statistics - data sets from 2003-2012. — counterpunch

Working backwards. ..

There are plenty of poor white people. They don't commit murder at 6 times the national average. — counterpunch

BLM used carefully edited cell phone footage to create a social media narrative to suggest that police were murdering black people — counterpunch

, but give yourself up to police and they won't kill you. — counterpunch

Or they are more likely to resist arrest - thereby endangering the police officer or members of the public. — counterpunch

The raw data doesn't show that:

unarmed black people are 3.49 times more likely to be shot. — counterpunch

various demographic and factors have been ASSUMED, — counterpunch

Violent offenders are more likely to get shot. — counterpunch

we messed around with the raw data until we proved our own politically correct assumptions." — counterpunch

There are plenty of poor white people.[enough to affect the conclusion that] Inequality isn't the explanation. — counterpunch

All of these claims require support. There's absolutely no point in maintaining an internet space to act as nothing more than a selective database of what some random people reckon might be the case.

my argument was that if what feels good hedonistically was always equal to what is a moral course of action, then there would be no need for punishments and rewards. This is pretty clear, and dare I say obvious. You could have addressed the point a long time ago if you wanted to. — Olivier5

No, I couldn't because you provided no evidence for your assertion for me to examine. Would "no, you're wrong" have been a remotely interesting response for anyone else to read? A thing appearing obvious to you does not constitute evidence that it is the case.

What fun is there in repeating ourselves — Albero

Oh it's not fun. Antinatalism seeks to turn the loving relationship between parent and child into one of resentment and blame, seeks to turn attention away from actual action to reduce suffering here toward some esoteric idea of non-existence, and seeks to focus the negative aspects of life, which might otherwise be overlooked, in a populace which has already a shockingly high suicide rate.

I can't speak for others, but it's not for fun that I argue against it.

...and @jamalrob

Just reading through this thread, it seems to me that the site rules would benefit from something against this sort of posting habit. I know it's not currently against the rules, but repeatedly making specific factual claims without even an attempt at citation or support (as counterpunch is doing here) is just wasting forum space.

There are limits of tolerance on written style, I don't think it's excessive to have limits also on strucure.

Precisely because it's trivial. You could find some literature supporting pretty much any common sense position. In fact even the most non-sensical positions would have some literature backing them up. — Olivier5

I don't follow what that's got do do with it. As I said, quite clearly, in my post "The purpose of a citation is so that we can see where the opinion derives from and follow the line of argument. Without it, there's nothing to argue. We might as well just write "yes it is", "no it isn't" all day - pointless."

The purpose is not to say "I've got a reference so I must be right". I cannot argue against, nor learn from, a position whose supporting evidence is not properly cited. That much should be obvious. This is not an exercise in canvassing the opinions of some random people on the internet.

It's still fresher than Buridan, who dates back to the middle ages and is what you seem to go by. You are just another behaviorist if you ignore the multilayered complexity of our cognition, and the role of language in it, and behaviorists are basically treating people as beasts, like Buridan was doing. That's bad middle age thinking... — Olivier5

I have literally no idea what you're talking about here. My understanding of moral development comes from researchers like Karen Wynn, Tania Singer, Alison Gopnick, Paul Bloom, Naomi Ellemers, Joshua Greene... None are from the middle ages.

Of course it's a trivial matter. — Olivier5

Then why not just include it in the first place. The purpose of a citation is so that we can see where the opinion derives from and follow the line of argument. Without it, there's nothing to argue. We might as well just write "yes it is", "no it isn't" all day - pointless.

A couple of issues -

Firstly Le développement du jugement moral chez l’enfant 1932, was by Piaget. Kohlberg was 5 in 1932, he would have been incredibly precocious to have been involved.

Secondly, why are you citing a work from nearly a hundred years ago to support a modern argument. Are you suggesting that no progress at all has been made in the neuroscience of morality since then? Or do you think that all modern work simply upholds what the likes of Piaget and (presumably the 1958 publication by Kohlberg) concluded? Why no mention of Gilligan, Singer, Wynn or Gopnik?

What does this have to do with anything. Also the "it" is ambiguous, idk what you mean. — khaled

It has to do with...

stealing form someone you hate feels good, yet is wrong. — khaled

I disagree that stealing from someone you hate is morally wrong for normal people. Hating someone so much that stealing from them becomes overall pleasurable involves either a pathological psychology, or the assignation of a social status to that person which renders stealing from them morally acceptable to the person in question.

That's why I brought up war. Killing Germans was morally acceptable during the Second World War. Why? Because we'd assigned a social status to Germans based on their aggression toward us. Certain types of soldier might even feel good both hedonically and morally about a victory in which hundreds of enemies died.

I'm not suggesting that individual hedonic value can be directly equated with societal-level moral judgement, but I don't see much evidence for factors other than societal-level hedonic value in explaining the vast majority of societal-level moral judgement. Once we've isolated the pertinent subject matter (empathy, social cohesion, self-evaluation), then it seems hedonic responses in those areas are pretty much the be-all and end-all of what is considered 'morally right/wrong'. An exception might be made perhaps for the initiation of some new social taboo, but even then, I'd argue there's little evidence that the initiators themselves considered their new taboo in that way (but rather more as tool for social control) and within barely a single generation acting against it would already be causing negative hedonic values in the social cohesion areas.

Do you know what "despite" means? — khaled

Fair enough, I misread that.

Stealing from an orphanage is likely to produce a lot more guilt than stealing from someone you hate for example. The latter might even overall feel good (in the one instance). — khaled

Indeed. So why do you hate the person? Are all wars considered morally wrong, for example, despite that fact that they involved much suffering? It seems that in most calculations of 'moral', these considerations have already been taken somewhat into account. Stealing from a orphanage would definately cause more guilt than stealing from someone you hate, but it would also be considered more morally wrong, especially if you hated the person in question for good reason.

...and, if you didn't hate the person for good reason then we're back to abnormal psychology again.

As there are many cases where something feels good to do despite the guilt. — khaled

What is guilt if not a 'bad' feeling, thus rendering the activity one which does not 'feel good'?

The label in question was "Moral claim" not "Morally wrong". — khaled

No. The claim I was responding to was

what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category? — Isaac


That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it. — khaled

This clearly specifies a reason for inclusion in the category 'morally wrong', not the category 'moral claim' which has not, in this topic, even been mentioned.

What makes you think I need that anymore than you do? — Olivier5

The fact that you keep making inane speculations on the subject which have been already dealt with by entire schools of thought to which you could otherwise have referred. If you are that well-schooled it should be a trivial matter to put your hands on the actual research backing up your claim. This is a public forum, not a private blog. It is a common standard to back one's claims up with reference, quotes or citations. Anyone remotely experienced in academia should have a visceral reaction to making claims without thinking "how do I support that?"

That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it. — khaled

How does this explain the overwhelming grouping of moral codes, the presence of specific brain regions activated in moral decision-making, the similarity of endocrine response to moral activity, the overlapping psychology of anti-social behaviour with moral impulse control problems, the involvement of regions like the vPFC in moral decision-making, the commonality in criminal psychoses...

The idea that the only common factor in what is considered 'morally wrong' is that lack of ulterior motive is ridiculous.

You can't just claim stuff and not back it up with empirical evidence, it's pointless on a public forum. I can't understand what makes you think people would be interested in what you just 'reckon' is the case. If you've found out something people might be interested in, then great, but just coming on and idly speculating without any prior research seems utterly pointless.

I suspect it is precisely because short term gratification can be pleasurable but anti-social that human societies have a need for a moral code. — Olivier5

Well, that's great. As I've mentioned before, why don't you get yourself a grounding in social or psychological sciences, put together a research proposal and pursue it. It sounds like an interesting line of investigation...unless, heaven forbid, someone in the world actually thought of that possibility before the topic was blessed with your Solomonesque gaze, and, like, actually did the research, and actually found out and wrote it down in a fucking book or something.

Sure would be ridiculous if anyone claimed that huh. — khaled

Then what are we to make of...

I disagree that it has anything to do with hedonism. — khaled

and...

I’m saying that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

?

If hedonic pleasure is not involved at all "entirely divorced from..." and not "...anything to do with", yet the label is not applied randomly either, then what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category?

Now back to the actual topic, do you agree with:

what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

No - hence the 'not only' aspect of the model of decision-making I've been outlining. Decisions are made by the combination of multiple brain regions utilising several endocrine motivators. Hence it would be as ridiculous to say that that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense as it would to say it's entirely divorced from any other motivating factor. The list of behaviours we generally agree are 'wrong' are loosely connected by their evoking certain types of displeasure - particularly associated with feelings of empathy for the victim, feelings of social condemnation and feelings of poor self-evaluation. We appear to have biological mechanisms designed specifically to deal with each of these systems and each is activated at the respective type of moral decision. It's fairly easy for a culture to introduce moral 'wrong's by indoctrination, but it's difficult to explain the universality of certain endocrine responses without a very substantial biological basis being inferred.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random.

It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good — Isaac


Whereas the article states:

We aimed to determine whether life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities by testing the hypothesis that it is also associated with brain structure abnormalities. — Isaac


“Life course persistent antisocial behavior is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities” is entirely consistent with “It feels good to rob people if you hate the victim”. One is talking about life course antisocial behavior, one is talking about a single instance. — khaled

I'm not talking about a single instance either, that's why I used the word 'overall', and referred to "what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time". If we're just going to have the same trouble following an argument here then I'll quit now before I waste too much time.

Is there a study showing that a single instance of guilt-free theft is enough evidence to diagnose people with sociopathy? — khaled

No. There is a significant body of evidence showing that numerous brain regions are involved in decision-making where multiple competing risks and benefits have to be assessed, for example https://science.sciencemag.org/content/293/5537/2105.full, or http://users.econ.umn.edu/~rusti001/Research/Neuroeconomics/JNPAmbiguity.pdf. It would be inconsistent with most of what we know about the psychology of decision-making to assume a model of a single objective from short-term pleasure to be capable of accounting for any given behaviour.

Is your claim literally that there is never a situation where violence or theft feels good and that it is always a result of a neurological abnormality? I just want to get that clear. — khaled

Yes. I would bet money on the claim that you could find no case at all where the only psychological response to an anti-social act was pleasure without also seeing signs of significant neurological abnormality. We're social creatures, have been for some time, and our neurological processes reflect this in our motivating endocrine responses.

But there are countless situations where theft would overall feel good — khaled

Just declaring it doesn't make it the case. It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good and cases where it does seem to require significant alteration in brain structure - https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(20)30002-X/fulltext

This is not to say that there aren't such people in whom it 'feels good', and that it is still wrong, but that's not the same as an argument that 'wrong' is divorced entirely from what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time.

I’ve never stolen anything. Hear it feels good though. — khaled

No, stealing where it only feels good is Kleptomania, it's a psychological illness, not a normal state of humanity. For most people it also involves remorse, guilt, anxiety, and negative empathetic feelings for the victim.

Do you ever plan on replying on the other thread btw? — khaled

No. Figured we're just going round in circles, I've made my case.

Theft feels good to everyone all the time. So is punching people you disagree with. — khaled

You should be wary of assuming others share your sociopathic world-view.

Still peddling this?...

As we've been through before "...actually account for" and "...requires the least effort" are no less subjective than the terms you started with. Unless between now and the last time we discussed this you've managed to come up with some truly unbiased measure of 'account for' or 'efficiency' - whatever they mean.

I've acknowledged that the word freedom has various usages; I think Kant's is the ultimately correct usage. — tim wood

Tangentially related perhaps, but how so? How do you judge the 'correct' usage?

"Murder" would never be moral. As to killing, it's conceivable that she should be killed, but not that I should do it. The reason being that marriage is a peculiar, unique contract — tim wood

It's things like this that I don't know how to respond to, and yet your posts are littered with them. Am I to take such brazen declarations as something you're supposedly educating me about, or as a rhetorical device to seek agreement/disagreement. It's really hard to tell, you keep just declaring things to be the case without offering any support or inviting agreement, it's frankly a bit odd. Not that I mind odd, but it's difficult to formulate a response.

What does HR do? He puts me at disproportionate risk of damage, harm, injury, death. — tim wood

Right. As does the helmeted rider via other means. That was my point. He doesn't serve as a waymarker of anything other than your personal preference for riding motorcycles but doing so with helmet. Or, being more charitable, if he does serve as a waymarker it is only of the basic truth that some behaviours are less socially responsible than others. I don't see how it's any waymarker helping to decide which are which.

That is, if you're going to argue that moral freedom includes the ability to determine the moral action on the basis of what you like or don't like, then we're irreconcilable — tim wood

You've misunderstood the purpose of my example. I'm not arguing that what is moral is just what we like or don't like. I'm saying that "Y will lead to X and you'd like X" is an example of a conclusion with normative force. Equally ..."and X is better for society" might do the same, or "...and X will make your loved ones happier"...

At root, people will only do what they feel some motivation to do, and that includes behaving rationally.

The reason being that in liking or wanting, to that extent we're not free, but rather subject-to. A matter of having a liberty. Agreed, the word "freedom" is commonly used here, and well-understood, but it cannot stand because it's a contrary to the freedom Kant has in mind. — tim wood

Again, this skirts the issue here. I'm quite happy with the notion of a 'Kantian' Definition of freedom. Let's call it Freedom B and the more normal definition Freedom A. Now when one says "you ought not do X because it leads to a loss of Freedom A", one does not need to go any further. People risk their lives for Freedom A, it is evidently something people aspire to and so any course of action advised on the grounds of avoiding it's loss has normative force already. But when you say "you ought not do Y because is leads to a loss of Freedom B", there's no such self-evident manifestation of people's aspiration. People do not regularly risk their lives in aspiration of Freedom B. You need to provide a reason why we should aspire to Freedom B because it is not already self-evident that we do.

It's just interesting already to read through the press releases of the World Food Programme and compare December 2019 and December 2020: https://www.wfp.org/news?text=&page=11 — Benkei

Yes. It's shocking. I don't know if you keep up with UNICEF as well, but this was one from this month...

in the world’s 47 Least Developed Countries (LDCs): 1 in 2 health care facilities does not have basic drinking water, 1 in 4 health care facilities has no hand hygiene facilities at points of care; and 3 in 5 lack basic sanitation services.

it would cost roughly USD 1 per capita to enable all 47 LDCs to establish basic water service in health facilities. On average, USD 0.20 per capita is needed each year to operate and maintain services.

And yet the UK Government is set to cut £2.9billion from it's overseas aid budget to pay for their Covid response whilst giving billions to the pharmaceutical industry for a vaccine which, according the WHO...

we still don't know with many of the vaccines whether it is going to prevent the person from getting infected so the vaccines have been shown to be efficacious against developing disease.

What we hope is the vaccines will also prevent infection so that transmission can be cut as well but as of now we don't have the evidence to prove that — Dr Soumya Swaminathan - WHO

It's a simple unavoidable fact that millions die each year from conditions which are preventable using less money than has been spent on preventing millions of deaths from Covid-19. Those people are mostly poor, young and non-white. Anyone who thinks that's a coincidence is deluding themselves.

This is true, but then I think there are close analogies between moral standards and scientific theories, if you take a Kuhnian position as I do. Cultural definitions of
morality change constantly throughout history, and each one , like a scientific theory, has to begin somewhere, typically with a tiny community, or perhaps a single individual ( Einstein first conceived e=mc2 as a private thought experiment). — Joshs

I disagree with this framing. I can see where you're coming from, but moral theories are not like scientific theories. Firstly, our moral theories are trying to frame something post hoc. We already have moral imperatives, before we're born in some case, but certainly by the time we're old enough for serious reflection, so, unlike scientific theories which we're free to incorporate into our behaviour or not, moral theories are our behaviour. We're not so free to choose to incorporate them or not.

Secondly, with scientific theories we're trying to model the world outside of our own minds and those models have to at least be slightly useful. One can navigate assuming the world is s cylinder, or even a flattish square (so long as one sticks to equatorial routes) but presuming the world is a triangle simply wouldn't work. It's a non-starter. Moral theories likewise must model our feelings and interpersonal relationships at least slightly accurately. That limits the range of possible moral theories to those which have at least a feasible change of being accurate.

That said, I can certainly see the merit in having a broad enough definition to allow the exploration of new ideas. But then, that's what we're doing here. I'm not simply declaring that these maxims are not moral, I'm actually presenting quite a lengthy argument to that effect, so I've not kicked "Such maxims are 'moral' ones" out of the 'marketplace of ideas', we're very much discussing the notion here.

do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac


Because it works everywhere else and I don't like making exceptions for something because it is "natural". — khaled

What do you mean "it works". What would it not working look like? This is a fundamental axiom we're talking about here so there's supposedly no more fundamental one to check it by.

invalidates the ad populum argument. — Isaac


I am not making an ad populaum argument. — khaled

You are - frequently...

The majority seem to think it is — khaled

the public think it is a moral theory — khaled

everyone here except you considers antinatalism a moral theory. — khaled

everyone here (the public) thinks it does. You're the one that has to explain that. — khaled

Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”. — khaled

...come on!

But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. — Isaac


Agreed — khaled

Right. That's literally all I'm arguing here. Your maxim is not a moral one. It's just a thing you want to achieve - an objective - for...seemingly...no reason at all.

I reason with someone from some premises we can agree on. Upon reaching a premise or caveat we do not agree on, I stop. — khaled

It really doesn't sound like it. are you not familiar with the meaning of the word 'stop'?

I am saying that our shared ideas of right and wrong are arbitrary. Again, arbitrary =/= there is no natrualistic reason we believe them. — khaled

No this is not all you're saying. Your claim requires the additional feature that these naturalistic reasons are sufficiently wide to derive absolutely any maxim whatsoever. It's that part of the claim I'm questioning. By analogy, the weather is a result of naturalistic forces, but what the weather will be like tomorrow is somewhat arbitrary (we could say for sure). It can't, however, be just anything - being caused by natural forces limits the options to those resulting from a causal chain initiated by those natural forces, it can only be some kind of weather. Admitting (as I hope we have) that your moral imperatives derive from naturalistic forces means that the range of possible moral imperatives is constrained to those which can feasibly result from those naturalistic forces. as far as the evidence we have is concerned, that means that they will be overwhelmingly the result of some biological broad constraints fine-tuned by the culture an religion you've been brought up in. Since unconstrained probability spaces are the exception rather than the rule, the onus is on you to support such an extraordinary claim.

But antinatalism does not lead to a flourishing community so how come it is a moral claim by your definition? What makes a "moral claim" exactly for you because you seem to me to be hedging. — khaled

Let me try and be clearer then. There's two issues which you seem to be getting confused over. There's the meaning of the word 'moral' and there's the things I personally consider to be my morals. Two sets. the one is necessarily a subset of the other. Like {all the clothes in the world} and {the clothes I wear}. One is necessarily a subset of the other. I can say "I wear trousers, but skirts are an item of clothing" without contradiction. What I can't say is "I don't happen to wear them myself, but elephants are an article of clothing". Whether I personally wear them is irrelevant here - elephants are not an article of clothing. Us debating whether elephants are an article of clothing doesn't mean I'm committed to wearing them if it turns out they are.

I'm arguing that "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences" is not a moral claim by definition. "Risk no harm to others where you cannot obtain their consent", however, is a moral claim, but not one I subscribe to. The question of which maxims are 'moral' ones and which I personally subscribe to are two different questions.

I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. — Isaac


Which one would that be exactly just so we're on the same page. Consent? Asymmetry? Not causing unwarranted harm? Something else? All of those seem like moral claims to me, and I suspect everyone here except you (not that I agree with all of them being valid). — khaled

As above "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences". Morality is about people. No people, no morality, It's not about reducing some poorly specified platonic form to zero. I doubt you'd get a single person to agree that reducing the number of bananas in the world is a moral imperative, or ensuring that there's no electricity, or no number 7... What do all these patently ridiculous examples have in common, that moral imperatives to reduce something do not. They all have nothing to do with people.

Agreed. I keep saying this. Moral premises are arbitrary. The only reason you see this as a "charge" is because you believe I'm trying to sell the belief no matter how many times I tell you I'm not and I don't understand why. — khaled

No, it is explained in the rest of that paragraph which you've ignored.

do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac

I don't see a reason to do the same song and dance again. We've gone over surgery before I think. — khaled

It's because your argument fails without them, but including them invalidates the ad populum argument. On the one hand you want to say "harm is bad - everyone agrees with that" to lend this popular weight to your argument, then when pressed on the details (such as surgery), you add all the caveats. But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. So it's crucial they are mentioned.

You seem already set to believe I am trying to spread an ideology no matter what I say or do. — khaled

It's not about spreading an ideology. It's about recognising our shard social experience. You choose a word like 'disgusting' because you know I'll know what you mean by it. You rely on our shared social experience to communicate, and then, in the same paragraph you try to pretend we've no shared ideas of right and wrong and it's all just arbitrary. That's what I find disingenuous. Using emotive language to describe arbitrary emotional reactions is a performative contradiction.

You completely dodged all of what I said about antinatalism being a moral claim though. Is it or is it not? The majority seem to think it is, you think it is not. Furthermore, you think the public meaning of morality does not allow it to be, (even though the public think it is a moral theory). Why? Or did you give up on that demonstrably false claim? — khaled

I'm not argueing that all of antinatalism is not a moral claim. In fact, in my reply to @Joshs I've explicitly said that such an argument would be impossible to make. I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. The mere existence of antinatalism within the topic of ethics does not impinge at all on that argument. If one were to show, for example, that antinatalism arose from following some scripture from an accepted religious text, that would indeed be a moral claim (not one I'd agree with), because concordance with common religious scripture is one of the common public meanings of 'moral'.

The reason you do not cause harm is because causing harm makes things worse than not causing harm. — khaled

But it absolutely evidently does not. Surgery being the obvious example where causing harm does not make things worse than not causing harm. Which is why you have to go through all these additional caveats and addendums to make your position fit your pre-determined conclusion.

Notwithstanding that, you've still not answered the charge of there being no reason to follow the maxim. Even if we were to accept your claim that moral maxims are arbitrary (which seems very obviously not the case given the very broad agreement as to general topics within the range)...do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one?

Wrong. I always say "I find that disgusting". I make sure to always include the "I find that", specifically so that people don't say what you're saying here. If you are emotionally affected by my opinion that's on you not me. And since when is emotive judgement a basis for a moral argument anyways? — khaled

Yeah...bullshit. That sort of thing might carry elsewhere, but not here. "I'm just mentioning that I find your behaviour disgusting out of idle interest, I don't mean to influence you in any way by such a choice of words...". Sorry, but that's just disingenuous.

Wrong. I always resort to the claim that moral axioms are arbitrary. Find me a quote where I did not. — khaled

'Faux', as in an affectation.

Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. — Isaac


Agreed. Which is why antinatalists don’t see not having children as a good thing (most don’t). They see having children as a bad thing. The latter does not imply the former. — khaled

The argument there wasn't about the label, it was about the objective. It makes no sense. why would you want to reduce harm if no-one benefits from the world thus freed from it?

my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics. — Isaac


Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”. — khaled

Simply claiming something is a moral theory does not make it one. so the mere existence of such claims can't be held to show such a definition is flawed. A definition is not required to encompass each and every use. it has to be possible to misuse a word, otherwise words have no meaning. you keep avoiding the private language angle here. I can go through the argument if you're not familiar with it.

So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.


And I already proposed that the extra thing is that the instruction has not ulterior practical motive. — khaled

The article points out how that is insufficient. It does not eliminate maxims which are not considered 'moral' by anyone.

I’m still curious what this “public” from which you get your consensus on the definition is, because it’s definitely not the members of this site. — khaled

again, simply declaring something to be the case cannot be held as sufficient argument that it is, that would render all discussion pointless. That the anti-natalists here claim to be falling back on such relativistic axioms is not sufficient to show they in fact are. You regularly invoke such emotive judgement s as 'disgusting' to lend weight to your position. @schopenhauer1 has used 'smug'. Regardless of your protestations to the contrary, you are both expecting a common sense of right and wrong which you are appealing to to carry your arguments. That is the 'public' sense of the terms. It's only when your position is shown to be contrary to them that you resort to some faux claim of the arbitrariness of moral axioms.