In this sense, the shoelace question is not a moral consideration: it has nothing to do with our social biology. However, "One ought to wear black shoelaces to the market", as espoused by the elder, is a moral claim in the sense that it is a claim about what our morality should be, even if it has nothing to do with what our morality is. — Kenosha Kid
You can make an ethic of what you like — Kenosha Kid
Moral claims that don't match the majority do not lose their status as moral claims. — khaled
Let us take the question: Ought I to wear black shoelaces or brown shoelaces to the market? I would say this is 100% not a moral consideration. However an elder of the Latter Day Church of Black Shoelaces might strongly differ with me on this. — Kenosha Kid
I think that my definition of a moral premise perfectly fall within that range. At least one other guy here thinks so: — khaled
I think you're conflating "morality" in general and the specific morality we have going on at the moment in particular. — khaled
Moral claims that don't match the majority do not lose their status as moral claims. — khaled
The society and biology determine which moral positions become most prevalent. — khaled
Well no, they don't, that's the shame of it. I would say they seem to be largely sculpting the trend of morality in some places to some extent at the moment. We are tending toward egalitarianism in most countries (not the middle east which has largely moved away from it) and I think people are encouraged to be more empathetic. We are increasingly progressing toward responsible social behaviour in many quarters.
But that's in the background of history of slavery, military expansionism, genocide, and other injustices, and it's not difficult to see how antisocial behaviours are again becoming not just normalised but lionised, i.e. ethics are made out of them. Likewise any arguments for such are not well-grounded, not because they fail to meet the theoretical criteria for a moral theory, but because they are contrary to what morality really is in its pre-theoretical sense. — Kenosha Kid
it's literally just you trying to say that antinatalism is not a moral theory. — khaled
Any definition of “morality” in the descriptive sense will need to specify which of the codes put forward by a society or group count as moral. Even in small homogeneous societies that have no written language, distinctions are sometimes made between morality, etiquette, law, and religion. And in larger and more complex societies these distinctions are often sharply marked. So “morality” cannot be taken to refer to every code of conduct put forward by a society.
In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.
As we’ve just seen, not all codes that are put forward by societies or groups are moral codes in the descriptive sense of morality, and not all codes that would be accepted by all moral agents are moral codes in the normative sense of morality. So any definition of morality—in either sense—will require further criteria.
Yeah, your argument is slipping. If history is the battleground of human ideas playing out, it's got a lot of horrible examples of what humans do. Thus this argument that some particular set of morality is "the" true or essential human biological behavior just seems cherry-picking. — schopenhauer1
Reduction of harm seems a good place to start, as I think both parties agree that in some respect, this makes sense. It is more about the context and circumstances and thresholds of how much that difference start taking place. — schopenhauer1
I’m assuming your formulation of moral consensus based on natural
grounds wouldn’t be accepted by someone like Rorty because he would consider the notion of the natural
to be itself ungrounded in anything but contingent pragmatic use. — Joshs
'Moral' is just not the right word to describe a desire to remove all suffering even at the expense of there being no one to benefit from having done so — Isaac
The bases by which a moral proposition can be well- or ill-grounded are not just those "we have going on at the moment". — Kenosha Kid
So antinatalism is a perfectly coherent false moral claim. But it is not a claim about what morality is. — Kenosha Kid
Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. — Isaac
my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics. — Isaac
So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.
I don’t get the purpose of the second sentence there, seems to be included in the first the way you use it. — khaled
And, indirectly, it's a messed up value system. — Kenosha Kid
Of course, antinatalists can say the same of natalism... — schopenhauer1
Not sure how "Not harming a future person" doesn't count as moral. — schopenhauer1
The whole social group benefit definition is too narrow a claim regarding ethics, and it's purposely created to exclude antinatalism — schopenhauer1
The most basic definitions usually read something like this: concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character. That's just from a quick Google search even. Don't have to go too far to see this is a mischaracterization of what moral means. — schopenhauer1
By natalism do you mean normal people just naturally procreating without theorising about it? Because I can't imagine much more redundant than a moral theory that says it's okay to have kids. — Kenosha Kid
First, creating a person that might one day be harmed is not the same as harming that person. Second, if a person does not currently exist, one cannot behave immorally toward them. — Kenosha Kid
That "concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character" is not what moral means? We can take it for granted we'll disagree on what morality is just on the basis of the fact that you believe antinatalism addresses moral concerns, but I'll confess I'm curious. — Kenosha Kid
Fair enough, natalists and typical views on procreation. — schopenhauer1
if the a person is born, and that person will then have a lifetime of X amount of suffering, that is the result — schopenhauer1
But, then when antinatalism does actually address issues of "other people" — schopenhauer1
Sorry, "this" in that quote was your mischaracterization by too narrowly defining morality. — schopenhauer1
So "natalists" (i.e. regular humans going about their business) almost certainly do not make such value judgments at all. I've never come across anyone who said, "Well we pondered whether or not it's right to bring a child into the world but agreed in the end that everyone, future people, has a right to see Succession." In place of such value judgments, "natalists" have biological imperatives (and nagging mothers). — Kenosha Kid
Sure, among other things (there's more to a life than suffering) but that is not equivalent to harming someone. — Kenosha Kid
Real, existing people, not just the possibility of future people. The former is a concern for morality. The latter is not. — Kenosha Kid
My definition of what morality really is is based on what capacities and impulses we have as a species to behave socially. Anything else is fiction. — Kenosha Kid
based not on moral considerations but on personal entitlement — Kenosha Kid
But it has nothing to do with how we treat others in our society, and therefore nothing it presents as a problem is a moral consideration. — Kenosha Kid
First, creating a person that might one day be harmed is not the same as harming that person. — Kenosha Kid
Second, if a person does not currently exist, one cannot behave immorally toward them. — Kenosha Kid
My definition of what morality really is is based on what capacities and impulses we have as a species to behave socially — Kenosha Kid
are you saying that you would not accept any of these historical justifications for anti-natalism as a proper moral argument, or are you focusing exclusively on the the ones in this thread? — Joshs
Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. — Isaac
Agreed. Which is why antinatalists don’t see not having children as a good thing (most don’t). They see having children as a bad thing. The latter does not imply the former. — khaled
my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics. — Isaac
Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”. — khaled
So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.
And I already proposed that the extra thing is that the instruction has not ulterior practical motive. — khaled
I’m still curious what this “public” from which you get your consensus on the definition is, because it’s definitely not the members of this site. — khaled
The argument there wasn't about the label, it was about the objective — Isaac
Simply claiming something is a moral theory does not make it one. — Isaac
you keep avoiding the private language angle here. I can go through the argument if you're not familiar with it. — Isaac
It does not eliminate maxims which are not considered 'moral' by anyone. — Isaac
You regularly invoke such emotive judgement s as 'disgusting' to lend weight to your position. — Isaac
Regardless of your protestations to the contrary, you are both expecting a common sense of right and wrong which you are appealing to to carry your arguments. — Isaac
It's only when your position is shown to be contrary to them that you resort to some faux claim of the arbitrariness of moral axioms. — Isaac
The reason you do not cause harm is because causing harm makes things worse than not causing harm. — khaled
Wrong. I always say "I find that disgusting". I make sure to always include the "I find that", specifically so that people don't say what you're saying here. If you are emotionally affected by my opinion that's on you not me. And since when is emotive judgement a basis for a moral argument anyways? — khaled
Wrong. I always resort to the claim that moral axioms are arbitrary. Find me a quote where I did not. — khaled
Notwithstanding that, you've still not answered the charge of there being no reason to follow the maxim. — Isaac
But it absolutely evidently does not. Surgery being the obvious example where causing harm does not make things worse than not causing harm. Which is why you have to go through all these additional caveats and addendums to make your position fit your pre-determined conclusion. — Isaac
Yeah...bullshit. That sort of thing might carry elsewhere, but not here. "I'm just mentioning that I find your behaviour disgusting out of idle interest, I don't mean to influence you in any way by such a choice of words...". Sorry, but that's just disingenuous. — Isaac
Sure. I don't think so though. And I find that justification disgusting.
— khaled
I think that disgust has a lot to do with the disagreement we have. Can you elaborate on what you find disgusting? — Echarmion
'Faux', as in an affectation. — Isaac
Agreed. I keep saying this. Moral premises are arbitrary. The only reason you see this as a "charge" is because you believe I'm trying to sell the belief no matter how many times I tell you I'm not and I don't understand why. — khaled
do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac
I don't see a reason to do the same song and dance again. We've gone over surgery before I think. — khaled
You seem already set to believe I am trying to spread an ideology no matter what I say or do. — khaled
You completely dodged all of what I said about antinatalism being a moral claim though. Is it or is it not? The majority seem to think it is, you think it is not. Furthermore, you think the public meaning of morality does not allow it to be, (even though the public think it is a moral theory). Why? Or did you give up on that demonstrably false claim? — khaled
do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac
invalidates the ad populum argument. — Isaac
On the one hand you want to say "harm is bad - everyone agrees with that" — Isaac
But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. — Isaac
in the same paragraph you try to pretend we've no shared ideas of right and wrong and it's all just arbitrary. — Isaac
I'm not arguing that all of antinatalism is not a moral claim. — Isaac
I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. — Isaac
The idea that "mankind" and other such concepts should be favored over a single human's actual concrete suffering. Things like "For the country" "For mankind", etc always rubbed me the wrong way. If you can't point me to a person getting harmed, then I couldn't care less about "the country being harmed" or "going against mankind's interests". — khaled
It does. I should go into more detail. The test is more like "Had X not been around would Y have still suffered and if not could X have predicted this?". If the answer is yes then it's not X's responsibility to help. If the answer is no-no then again, not X's responsibility. You have to judge people actions based on the info they had at the time. There are other rules but I don't want to overcomplicate things for now. — khaled
Had the driver known that he was going to run over a kid by speeding out of town, then he is responsible. However, he did not know that. Furthermore, it is just as likely that that child would have ran behind the parked car 10 minutes later, meaning if the driver did NOT speed up out of town he would have ran him over.
In other words: At no point did the driver commit an act he could reasonably predict would harm someone, as speeding out of town and NOT speeding out of town have a basically equal chance of causing an accident as far as the driver can predict. — khaled
Agreed. But from where comes the justification to create happiness at the risk of suffering for others? — khaled
No matter how much I like a videogame for example, I can't go around taping people to chairs and forcing them to play it. And I definitely can't justify it by giving all these people a button they can press to instantly kill themselves then saying "I'm not even forcing them to do anything, if they don't like it they can just kill themselves. The pleasure and suffering are two sides of the same coin". I find it apphaling how often I hear that as a legitimate argument by otherwise rational people. Heck with life, you don't even get the "quit button" and have to make your own. — khaled
You still haven't answered my question though. — khaled
I don't know who parents think is responsible for suffering. — Andrew4Handel
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