Ok, thanks.

Everything humans do is a product of culture and society, and always has been. — Jamal

Dissent seconded. Everything a human does is “related to….” more than “a product of…..”.

Logically, the implication is that a culture or society is necessary for a human to do anything, which is quite absurd, insofar as the notion that humans did things before there were cultures or societies for their activities to be a product of, is hardly self-contradictory.

I have found a passage in the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" that, in my opinion, can serve as evidence that Kant justifies the categorical imperative with self-interest, thus contradicting himself. — Jacques

Nahhh….that’s not what he’s doing. He’s showing how the moral subject contradicts himself, by subsuming “meritorious” duties, re: conditioned by inclination, under the same principle which should only legislate an “inflexible” duty, re: conditioned by law. The paragraphs immediately following those four examples should clarify.

The Enlightenment era not only categorically rejected all Religious doctrines, it also rejected all philosophical beliefs that "go beyond" actual/factual descriptions of the world based on the five senses (meta-physics). — Gnomon

Enlightenment philosophy may have demystified established doctrines of the era, but at the same time, initiated its own doctrines under religious, or at least theological, conditions, so the Enlightenment didn’t categorically reject all religious doctrines.

And the general Enlightenment philosophical arena certainly didn’t so much reject metaphysics altogether, but rather, merely created a new way of doing it, in which the a priori domain as subjects, rather than the five-senses descriptions of the world as objects, assumed primacy.

It isn’t so much what the Enlightenment rejected, but what it initiated; not which forces were diminished as much as which forces were empowered.

Our star, sol, is one of these so called sacred ones. A god really does inhabit our star. The responsibility of this god is to maintain, guide the entirety of our solar system. — Varnaj42

What would be the responsibility of a lesser god inhabiting a star with no solar system to maintain?

…..this kind of rationality makes explicit the intrinsic duality of human nature.
— Mww

Yes, we cannot split our brain in physical two, the duality cannot be real, only simulated. — Christoffer

Sure. It’s an explanatory device, and nothing more. That we’re capable of such speculations, though, that’s the wonder of it all, methinks.

— Kurt Tucholsky — Jacques

“…. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the laws of nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of the human will, so far as it is affected by nature: the former, however, being laws according to which everything does happen; the latter, laws according to which everything ought to happen. Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not…”

—Not Kurt Tucholsky. And a few more than two sentences, to say the same thing.

Which, leads to us seeking out the comfortable ideas that can explain it, even when unexplainable. — Christoffer

Wouldn’t that be bias in its conventional sense? Or perhaps, if not conventional, then psychological? Being the red-headed stepchild of metaphysics, rational psychology is a poor substitute for critical reason a priori, but at the same time, the implementation of the one presupposes the misuse in the minor but the utter neglect in the major, of the other. I should rather think the value immeasurably greater in recognizing the rules for critical thought, than the mere occasions for the exceptions to them.

“…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

But you are right, in that all-too-many do invoke comfort at the expense of reason.
———-

I have never met a single entity that does not fear the unknown. — Christoffer

That may be true, and you would fare none the worse for it. But you’re forced to admit the possibility of those that do not hold such fear. Makes sense, doesn’t it, that if there is no knowledge, empirical knowledge that is, of something, then how can it be known as sufficient to cause fear? With so much being unknown, just seems quite wasteful to fear it all, so why bother deciding which is worth fearing and which isn’t, when all of it is equally unknown?

Besides, if it be granted knowledge is experience, then to fear the unknown is to fear an experience never had. I’ve been both remorseful and quite happy regarding experiences I’ve never had, but I’d categorically deny being afraid of them.
———-

Then there is the master, who have trained their mind to function in a detached and distant perspective from their emotional identity. — Christoffer

It’s much simpler than that. To understand the impossibility if such detachment in the first place, is to recognize a different set of conditions which determines the mental space in use for any given circumstance.

I get what you’re aiming for, but I submit there is no escape from oneself. There is, not the detachment from, but only the relaxing of, one mental space in order to favor the other, and the space being called upon is determined by the certainty required.

I’ll admit though, that this kind of rationality makes explicit the intrinsic duality of human nature. If one doesn’t accede to such duality, then he’s welcome to philosophize under conditions where it isn’t necessarily the case.

Anyway, carry on.

We don't embrace not knowing or non-knowledge as comfortable. — Christoffer

Perhaps you’re right, but that in itself is a bias, re: embracing a mere comfort, albeit in the negative.

“… Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and void..…”
————

…..how can you distinguish good biases from bad if you don't form arguments in a mental space where biases do not exist? — Christoffer

Biases are themselves arguments, properly referred to as conclusions of aesthetic judgements, formed nonetheless in a mental space, a non-cognitive mental space. It is thereby self-contradictory to suppose a bias-free mental space, when it is in a mental space where all biases reside. It follows that the determination of good or bad relative to an aesthetic judgement, itself merely a judgement contingent on the first, still presupposes the mental space in which it occurs.

All that being given, it is then the case the object of the judgment, and the object of the bias which follows from the judgement, may not even relate to each other. In the former is found a objective conviction with respect to the conclusion of a judgement, in the latter is found a subjective persuasion regarding the validity of the conclusion, i.e., “I know this is correct, but I don’t like it”.

The real problem manifests in instances where the conviction is not so much met with opposing persuasion, but with outright rejection, i.e., “I know this is right but I am not going to accept it”, and this may be referred to as pathological stupidity.

Assuming sufficient rationality, while there are mental spaces in which there are no biases, the good/bad relation of standing biases are not determinable in them. Which stands to reason, insofar as to judge a relative quality makes explicit the necessity for maintaining a consistency in that which is being judged, by that which is judging. In other words, to judge the good or bad of a bias makes necessary being in the very arena…..in this case the mental space…..where good/bad and the bias itself, are relatable to each other. Which, ironically enough, reduces to the judgement of good/bad with respect to biases, is itself a bias.

How can you deconstruct something if it is essential to the human existence? That would imply that all of philosophy is circular reasoning, one bias following the next ad infinitum. — Christoffer

With the exception to “human existence”, which is necessary for, but utterly irrelevant with respect to, circular reasoning, it is the case philosophy in the form of pure metaphysics is circular, iff it is not held to a logically regulatory critique. One bias will naturally follow from its antecedent conditions, and because….

“….education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse….”

….. judgement is a peculiar gift, which does not and cannot require instruction but only exercise, biases are often as easily overcome as they are established.

A few thoughts, from a more limited perspective.

D’accord.

…..hidden layer of meaning in the texts themselves. — Wayfarer

I was introduced to Steiner a few years ago. Figured out halfway through “Philosophy of Freedom” esoteric theosophy, re: occult science, wan’t the ticket.

Does it even make sense to quantify knowledge? — Moliere

No, not if it is the case it is impossible for an otherwise rationally competent subject to have no knowledge.

To quantify knowledge of, or knowledge that, is readily admissible, but that’s not the same as quantifying knowledge in and of itself.

How much knowledge is there? Only as much as there are subjects to which it belongs.

I had some pretty momentous acid trips, which were revelatory in their own right….. — Wayfarer

Oh, man, the stories to be told, but only significant to those that already know them. (Sigh)

Ahhhh, ok, gotcha.

Steven Pinker wrote a book on it….. — Wayfarer

Ehhhh……he’s a psychologist and a computationalist to boot, so not to be invited to the Cool Kids sandbox.

In what world is that not a singularly foolish notion?
— Mww

It is writ large in today's world. — Wayfarer

Sadly yes. But not so much in the Cool Kids sandbox, ammiright?
————

….But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible…”

What are 'our best' theories, and why do they entail that such knowledge is possible? — Wayfarer

Edit?
————

Given the innate human capacity for intuiting quantity, and the innate human capacity, not only for the use of conceptions but also the a priori construction of them, in relations….why do we need an indispensability argument with respect to mathematical objects?

There’s no need for a science to inform us that the intersection of two lines immediately facilitates the conception of a relation between them, which is then represented as “angle”, and there’s no need for a mere belief in the validity of the conception “angle” as a mathematical object, when such object is necessarily given as a principle hence contradictory to deny.
————-

Worthy reflections, as is usually the case. Benacerraf notwithstanding.

Not picking a fight, honest.
— Mww

I was hoping to start one. — Wayfarer

Well then. Couldn’t have chosen a better battleground than the suggestion that reason has been, or is being, eclipsed. In what world is that not a singularly foolish notion?

This isn't just a supposition of the Enlightenment, but a core component of ancient and medieval philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Core component, yes, but more than a supposition for Enlightenment doctrines. If it, that is, reason itself, is already supposed, it only needs be theoretically demonstrated as the case, and if it is a logical proof should be sure to follow, sufficient to justify the theory.

I think the Enlightenment (…) failed to take a systems perspective of the logic of societies and failed to recognize the risks of not-yet-rational institutions havening sway over society. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wouldn’t a systems perspective of societies fall under the purview of anthropology? I’m not sure how much a discipline anthropology was in the 16, 17, 1800’s, there still being minor kings, clan chieftains and whatnot doing the job of a soft science. Maybe the Enlightenment failed as you say, but I rather think the liberation of the individual mind, as you also mentioned, wouldn’t be a failure.

What is a not-yet-rational institution?

It was believed that the rational soul was immortal… — Wayfarer

I think I understand that as indicating the direct correlation between medieval philosophy and period-specific religion. Religion says there are Great Benefits Hereafter, philosophy says here’s how you’ll know it when you get there. Archaic indeed.

….we know now, thanks to science, that the principle behind all our faculties (including reason) is successful adaption and procreation. — Wayfarer

Hmmmm. The principle behind our successful adaptation and procreation is instinct, but does it follow that all our faculties, including reason, are instinctive? Wasn’t that the manifest point of the Enlightenment, to prove the human beast is naturally equipped for considerations beyond the capacities of the lesser, merely instinctive, beast?

Not picking a fight, honest. Just thinking out loud.

Thanks, and respect, to both

Reason as an organ, vis a vis, heart, lung, liver? Reason as an instrument, vis a vis, o’scope, meter, spectrograph?

Things progress or die, sometimes one is the other. Philosophy progresses, terms and conditions are given new meanings, in attempts to say something nobody else has, tantamount to mere academic oneupmanship.

Can’t do anything about it, but also don’t have to like it.

….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought. — Mark S

To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”.

If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. — Mark S

I’ll try to keep that in mind; it’s an awful lot like unlearning simple arithmetic, after all these years. Might be interesting to see what you end up with.

Quick one-liner, or so…..what did you get out of The Eclipse of Reason? What is it the author wants to say, bottom line kinda thing?

….what do you think? — Jamal

Sapere aude!!!

Isn’t the conclusion an exercise in your own petitio principii, insofar as the initial premises regarding the origin of the universe are not shown to relate to the heaven from which the revelation issued?

Was that the whole point?

Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4

First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.

I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect? — Mark S

There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.

There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.

Your wording is confusing I think.

Rhetorically speaking, as a simple matter of interest, Pierce may have laid it out….

“…. The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach it….”

….or, he may have merely polished someone else’s coin:

“…. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress.…”

If we replace matter (….) can something change? — Eugen

Yep. Our sensory apparatus wouldn’t work.

If we replace matter with another fundamental substance (….) can something change? — Eugen

Yep. Every experience ever by anybody. Then our heads will surely explode.

Guy looks at a picture, sees what used to be a dump truck, back before matter was replaced.

But wait….when matter is replaced, pictures and dump trucks disappear, along with eyes and humans and….

“…..To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger—not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it—of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) “milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve.”….”
(CPR A58/B83)

Just sayin’…..

if you imagine a green bird, nobody will find that image in your brain. But that's a refutation of materialism, not a refutation of fundamental-emergent. — Eugen

Not sure what to do with that. Things I imagine are not real things, but my imaginings don’t cause real things to not exist. In humans at least, imaginings are incorporated in brains, brains are material, therefore materialism is affirmed by imaginings, not denied or refuted.

I hope you’re not extending the notion that because all imaginings are immaterial in themselves, that there are no material things. If so, I must refer you to the immortal missive of dear Dr. Samuel Johnson via James Boswell, circa 1791. As second-hand as it may be, not to mention dangerously painful.

On the refutation of the fundamental/emergent dichotomy: can’t be done. In the human cognitive system legislated by the Principle of Complementarity, which says that for every conception the negation is given immediately (up/down; left/right; wrong/right, yes/no, true/false, ad infinitum), and for every application translates to, if it isn’t this, then it is necessarily that. It follows that any human cognitive activity in general, as well as every component thereof, is either one or the other of the fundamental/emergent complementary pair.

Nature of the beast, donchaknow……

….truth on the matter remains a subject ripe for (….) just plain old metaphysics. — invicta

Pretty much, yep. Same as it ever was….

Is there a real fundamental difference between the interaction between atoms in a chair versus the interaction between atoms in our lungs? I don't think so. — Eugen

Nothing wrong with that; I wouldn’t think so either. But what are you trying to say with it? What’s the point?

It's a silly idea that playing with words (….) will somehow change the reality. — Eugen

Agreed. Nothing has changed regarding the circumstances of sitting in a chair, since the discovery of elementary particles. Even though I now know socks are comprised of molecules of this or that, I put them on exactly the same way my great granpappy did back a coupla centuries ago. More to the point, perhaps, even though I now know of neurons and activation potentials and whatnot, anyone looking in my brain is never going to find my consciousness, nor will he find the words I use to express my distaste of Lima beans.

Chairs is concept, it is language. It can also be a process — Eugen

Ohfercrissakes. Must I preface every comment using a word, with the admonition I’m representing an object with it? The use of a word is supposed to indicate the speaker and the listener congruently understand the object common to them.

A porocess IS totally reducible (i.e. weakly emergent) to interaction among particles — Eugen

Ever reduced a process to its particles? Known anyone that has? Ever heard anyone talking about a method by which reducing the process of human cognition to its particles, is accomplished? Not to say it can’t be done, but if it hasn’t in the totality of human existence, perhaps there’s a reason for it. And what do we do in the meantime?

Concepts might or might not be reducible to matter. If they are, materialism is true. If they aren't, materialism is false. You can't have it both ways. — Eugen

If conceptions can’t be reduced to matter, then objects known as basketballs, aren’t?
If the objects known as basketballs is the case, which implies concepts are reducible to matter, we’re right back to where we started: the impossibility of finding where and what are they.

But that kind of thinking invites infinite regress (where does the thing conceptions emerge from, emerge from)
— Mww
- that is the case if you consider noting being fundamental — Eugen

There’s the reason for stipulating consciousness as fundamental, to eliminate infinite regress. If it’s fundamental, its emergence is moot, no need to ask where it comes from. Only what it does because of the conception it is, what it stands as the representative of.
————-

It can exist in a fundamental way, like being the foundation of reality, or it can exist like chairs, processes, concepts, i.e. emergent from a material foundation. — Eugen

If reality is a fundamental conception itself, it won’t have a foundation because it already is one.

Chairs have properties, they don’t have processes or concepts. They can and do emerge from a material foundation, just as any real object must.

Chairs exist, processes do not exist in the same way as chairs, re: processes do not have extension in space, hardness, or weight.

If concepts have a material foundation, it can only be the human brain. Where in the human brain can the conception representing a ‘57 De Soto be found, such that upon perception of some object, it is determinable whether or not that object is one? Positing that conceptions emerge from the brain, while almost certainly the case, gets you nowhere.

Consciousness is a purely metaphysical derivative, so the only certainty allowed to it, is logical validity, never any empirical existence.

how can it exist if it doesn't have properties? — Eugen

In what sense can it….consciousness….be said to exist? If we don’t require that consciousness exists as do other things, then we don’t need to consider properties.

Which gets us to…..what do you think properties do?

conceptions definitely emerge, I agree. — Eugen

Fine. Where does that from which conceptions emerge, emerge from?

I deny consciousness as an entity because it is not identifiable by a set of properties.

Still, consciousness, even if only a conception, could be said to emerge from that by which any conception emerges, if one wants to insist conceptions come from somewhere. But that kind of thinking invites infinite regress (where does the thing conceptions emerge from, emerge from) and by that the cancelation of any productive metaphysics. It’s much the more parsimonious to just let consciousness be fundamental, so to eliminate the need for determining stuff about it, which we couldn’t know apodeitically anyway.

….would you agree with me then that these activities are (1) not "entities”….. — 180 Proof

Half and half: I don’t hold with minding (aka consciousness), such minding activity I would stipulate as reason, but agree that none of those is an entity.

Conscious-NESS…..a quality, a condition of the state of being conscious.

….and therefore (2) that they are neither "fundamental" nor "emergent" (objects / properties)? — 180 Proof

Again, half and half: none of them are objects/properties, but consciousness and reason are both fundamental, as mandated by what is represented by them.

….point out where you think my thinking goes wrong. — 180 Proof

When push comes to shove, it must be admitted all your {as x is to y}’s are correct, the problem arises in the fact I can know the empirical cause/effect relation between the first two, but I cannot know the empirical cause/effect relation between minding/thinking/reason-CNS/brain. If I accept it on equal footing with the other two, there’s nothing left to discuss regarding it, because I just don’t know what to say because I don’t know how it works.

And you understand as well as I, that absent empirical knowledge, all that’s left to work with in the pursuit of that for which there is no possible empirical knowledge, is pure logic, which invites us to begin with something we do know, or, something the negation of which is contradictory, and theorize towards something that at least makes sense.

As well, you understand as well as I the rampant fallacy of reification of metaphysical conceptions, and the dreaded cum hoc ergo propter hoc rabbit hole pervading modern “vulgar”, re: common, philosophical thought.

Before, you asked for one or the other. Here you’re asking if something other than one or the other.
— Mww

No, I didn't. — Eugen

quote="Eugen;d14278"]I. ''absolutely anything you could think of":
A. is fundamental
B. is not fundamental[/quote]

Sorry. That was a supposition, not a query. Nevertheless, anyone perceiving that supposition is going to ask himself which he thinks is the case. Anyone holding with 1A will consider 1B moot, and anyone holding with 1B will deny 1A and then consider the merits of the logical argument which follows.

I was a 1A kinda guy, regarding consciousness anyway, even if not anything I can think, so….there ya go.

Time exists regardless of rational agents, otherwise you’d claim nothing exists without rational conscious agents. — invicta

I would not affirm either of those things.

How could it possibly be comprehensible, that time exists without the intellect that uses it? Actually, how is it comprehensible that time exists, at least in the same manner, under the same conditions, as real things exist? If it doesn’t exist as real objects exist, how can it be said to exist at all?

My point is….it’s all too easy for the human intellect to contradict itself.

If space is everything that exists…. — invicta

Reality is everything that exists; space is that in which everything that exists, is found.

Time is not a quality that belongs to rational agents only, it’s on objective concept…. — invicta

And what other than rational agents, conceive?

That’s a lot simpler question than the original, isn’t it? Before, you asked for one or the other. Here you’re asking if something other than one or the other.

Metaphysically, consciousness can’t be other than fundamental or not fundamental.
Scientifically, consciousness can’t be other than strongly or weakly emergent.
Logically, consciousness could be nothing at all, which is other than fundamental or emergent.

Objects in space must also exist in time correct? — invicta

Yes, as far as we’re concerned anyway.

Take away time then WHEN does space exist ? — invicta

You’ve conflated the time of objects with the time of space. That notwithstanding, while it is the case objects are necessarily conditioned by both space and time, that necessity, which is the method by which we as humans relate to real objects, does not carry any implication that space is conditioned by time, which could have no relation to us whatsoever. Objects related by both to something else, does not imply they relate to each other.

The question, then, is unintelligible.

Without a when there is no material world….. — invicta

All when’s belong to rational agents. Without a when belonging to rational agents, there would be no material world for them, but that is not authority to deny the material world altogether.