The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences….

He can’t, and doesn’t try, denying the very possibility. Discovery just from experience is always contingent through the principle of induction.

…..using transcendental deduction? — RussellA

That deduction is for necessity and universality, rather than that which is either or both. The application of these is to experience, but not the derivation of them from it.

The key: transcendental is not cognition by conceptions, which arise spontaneously in understanding and condition experience, but cognition by means of the construction of conceptions, which arise through reason and find their proofs through experience.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

The possibility is given by showing how an empirical deduction doesn’t work. The justification is given by the demonstration of their place and purpose in a method, and that they are in no way self-contradictory.

In logic generally, deduction is top-down, re: from the general to the particular. Transcendental logic, then, is nothing but the kind of deduction it is, or, which is the same thing, nothing but the conditions under which the deduction is accomplished.

Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.

Also in Kantian philosophy, a priori is meant to indicate the absence of any and all empirical conditions, hence, the denomination “pure”.

A deduction in Kantian philosophy follows the general rule of logic, in which a minor premise is subsumed under a major, for which a conclusion exhibits the relation of them to each other.

From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever, insofar as it is transcendental, and second, it must exhibit reduction from the general to the particular, insofar as it is that certain type of logical operation.

Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction. It follows that without representations of objects, but requiring the general as a major premise, it must be a conception relating to the representation of any object, or, which is the same thing all objects.

So, first, that which makes cognition of all objects possible, is the “diversity in pure intuition”, which serves as the major in a deductive syllogism. But the major subsumes under itself the minor, which is said to be the synthesis of the diversity, which has already been termed the synthesis of matter of objects to their form, from which arise phenomena, a conception which represents all objects in general, or, which is the same thing, phenomena are that which are subsumed under the diversity in pure intuitions a priori.

All that being the case, with respect to the pure conceptions of the understanding, re: the categories, it is quite clear there is no experience, and no examination of the nature of experience, insofar as experience, being defined as….

“…. an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception.…”

…..and given only a diversity in general, and a synthesis of it, there is as yet no determination of a particular object, hence no cognition of an object at all, and by which experience is impossible, which immediately removes experience from any consideration regarding the origin and purpose of the categories.

“….. The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
(A79/B104)
————-

Now…..why is this the case. Hmmmm, let’s find out, shall we?

1.) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects. All cognitions must be of appearances alone, and no object that is not an appearance can ever be thought;
2.) It is in this way that noumena are impossible for this kind of intelligence, in that, while noumena are indeed objects of pure thought, they are not and cannot be appearances to which alone the categories apply, and therefore by which noumena are termed “the limitation on sensibility”;
3.) There is no transcendental conditions that are determinable by sensibility. All conceptions as representation, whether empirical or a priori, belong to understanding alone, but confining the categories, which are pure conceptions a prior only, having no representation belonging to them**, and the expositions related to them, to understanding and reason respectively, Kant removes the possibility of cognizing objects from the mere affect they have on the senses. In so doing, he justifies the ding an sich as that which is real but for which experience is impossible, along with noumena which isn’t even real, insofar as they are never to meet the criteria of being phenomena.
(**the schema of the categories are not representations; they are merely conceptions subsumed under and modifying the conception of the category itself of which they are members)
4.) If Kant deduces the categories in strict accordance with logical method, even a priori, he must limit himself to form only, pure logic being devoid of content by definition. Any conception devoid of content is empty, any empty conception cannot be ground for determining the cognition of objects. If this is the case, the third requisite remains missing, and the transcendental predication falls apart. But it doesn’t, in that there is the cognition of objects, and because that is the case the methodology stands, the third requisite must be present. All that’s left, having already denied innateness given by mere birth, and failing the non-contradiction of a pure deduction on transcendental ground, Kant’s position is simply to grant the validity of the categories as “given by the understanding”, which he then calls the exposition of the possession of them, rather than the syllogistic conclusion making them absolutely true.
5.) In which is found the subtelty behind the mention, “ so long as we are careful in the construction of our fictions, which are no less fictions on that account…”
6.) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. B276 is rife with pure a priori conceptions, hardly to be amendable to empirical conditions. “My existence in time” is a presupposition, not an observation.

Bet none of that is in your secondary literature!!!!!!

WOOHOO!!!

The greatest danger to pure reason is reification, the blaming of reason for doing, or the blaming for failure in not doing, this or that merely because reason is or is not the kind of thing suited to meet expectations. To express reason, or any metaphysical faculty, as a conception, merely in order to forge an exposition of the methodological system to which they all are necessary constituents, does not carry any implication whatsoever these are things in themselves, or are existents of any kind.

“…. This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition à priori, nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason…”

“…. Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but not determinable….

……Hence we cannot ask: “Why did not reason determine itself in a different manner?” The question ought to be thus stated: “Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a different manner?”….

……But this is a question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority—permissive or prohibitive—of reason…..

……Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each other—for these are not things and therefore not causes in themselves—but it cannot produce any difference in the relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason…..

……Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be: “Why does the transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space?” But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions….”

Sometimes, it’s more foolish to ask the question, then to expect a satisfactory answer.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

“….if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary….”
“….an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition….”

He doesn’t. There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. It may not even be possible to deduce the categories without eventually running into contradictions; maybe it’s just simpler to grant the possession of something which satisfies a specific requirement.

If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them, and determine the domain of their employment from a purely logical ground or precondition, in order to support a speculative metaphysical theory of human knowledge.

“…. Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined à priori—both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.…”

Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them.

“…. General logic (…) expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions….

….. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of à priori sensibility….

…. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind’s receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis….

…..By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition….

….the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations….

…..The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
————-

Thus, the explanation for possession as given, rather than a logical deduction from antecedents, of the categories, re: “those conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis”, as merely a constituent in a methodological procedure, all in accordance with a very specific, albeit entirely theoretical, system.
————
————

we use the Categories to make sense of experiences. — RussellA

No, we don’t. Not technically, and not with respect to CPR, which is what concerns this discussion overall. The categories make empirical cognition possible from which experience follows, regardless of whether or not such experience makes sense.

how does Kant justify the possibility… — RussellA

Justifying possibility makes no sense.

“…. Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply to objects completely à priori. These are the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this inquiry.

But a deduction of the pure à priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an empirical one; also, that….

….all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these cognitions…”
(My emphasis)

I'm sure Mww will have a lot to say — Bob Ross

Not a whole lot, truth be told. You’ve presented a worthy argument for a specific theory, blessed it with a Kantian foundation, but…..

….basing metaethics on F.P.M.M, 1785, isn’t what that treatise is about. For ethical systems, you’d probably want Metaphysics of Ethics,1797, especially considering your sections on rights and virtue, each having a book of their own in that work as a whole;
….the exchange of rational beings for minds either leaves out, or at least makes no account for the fundamental predicates of Kantian moral/ethical philosophy, re: will, autonomy and pure practical reason belonging necessarily to the former as a rational being, or person, but these need methodological justification in the latter as a simple mind;
….the conceptions means and ends, as they relate to moral/ethical philosophy, need to be determined before a FET with them as its ground, makes sense;
….you say, “FET, no matter how useful it is itself for ethics, cannot be enough for good moral discernment”, but I rather think the intent of it was precisely for moral discernment, of the pure subjectivist account.
….lastly, if one thinks ethics relates to a community of persons/minds, wouldn’t each mind need a moral disposition of his own? Otherwise, they become a hive rather than a community. And if that’s the case, shouldn’t there be some necessary condition similar to a categorical imperative somewhere in this current theory? Seems like a community must come to grips with a potentially universal law of some sort, by some method, else why consider themselves members of a community in the first place, such imperative for which there is no reason to suppose belongs to a mere hive or herd.

Anyway, I like the work that’s been done here, but it seems a little incomplete to me. I can’t help but think that upon more substance amended to the conditions, it may be found they don’t work as they are now.

True, the passage is in quotation marks and we know it is somewhere within an 800 page book….. — RussellA

I shall consider myself vindicated.

….but to locate it requires quite a lot of reading. — RussellA

So on the one hand you’re offput cuz you gotta do some reading, and on the other you’re missing the point that the quote is usually meant to indicate a relation to only that to which it is a response. You don’t need to look it up, if it is understood to be either a correction to or an elaboration on that to which it relates in the discourse.

In the case where a quote is an initial submission for discourse, as opposed to a response in a continuing discourse, there’s no need to look it up at all. Work with what’s given, simple as that, and the burden is on the initiator to append the submission as the discourse requires.

Dunno about yours, but my online Guyer/Wood is not searchable. If yours isn’t either, I’d seriously recommend obtaining a translation that is. And if you already have one…..wtf is the problem???

All that being said, I’m not changing half a century’s worth of writing habits because it’s thought I’m not doing it right. Deal with it or ignore me; I don’t care which.

sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote. — RussellA

Ooooo….15 whole minutes!!! Time well spent, then, huh?

….plagiarize.…. — RussellA

Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? I think that’s why they’re called “quotation marks”.

All well and good; just don’t confuse the nature of experience, with the experience itself.

How does Kant justify the possibility of an a priori knowledge — RussellA

By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations.

“….. it is quite possible (the presupposition) that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions (the observation), and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (the theory), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it (the LNC).

Still, regarding long practice and attentive skill….

“…. when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account….”

….leaves metaphysics a nonetheless purely speculative theory. Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies.

It is not a matter of intelligence…. — Corvus

Of course it is:

“….our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely à priori, to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically….”

And my limit on courtesy is nothing more than respect for one and his opinions.

I’ve already respected your intelligence, by surmising you have the capacity to research what you don’t know, or do know but find disagreeable. And if we stick with Kantian metaphysics in its practical sense, me doing your work for you….or any of the members of the audience, however scant their number….is disrespecting myself.
————

….use your own reason.
— Mww
You seem to be missing the point. — Corvus

I’m the one that missed the point? Really?

Using one’s own reason is what everyone has no choice but to do, all else being given.

What….use my reason to answer your reason’s questions, asked of itself?

Nahhh….I ain’t gonna do that. You’re smart enough, you got the books, use your own reason.

It shouldn’t matter that I don’t detail where the quotes come from, it being tacitly understood, from the thread title, they’re always from CPR. If a greater context, or specific pagination, is desired for a quote, do a search.

All quotes I post are in response to something you’ve said that Kant agrees with or not, as I understand both of you. If I misjudged, it’s on you to inform me as to my mistake.

but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.
— Mww
I am not sure if this is true. It sounds unfamiliar, diffuse and groundless. — Corvus

There’s a whole section on it.

“…. To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are, however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation.

Now the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us to raise a question—faculty or materials failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.

Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance—the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties—cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception...”

Dogmatism (of the rationalists = Spinoza, Wolf, Mendelssohn) was what Kant tried to fix. — Corvus

And yet, the question was…what caused Kant’s awakening from his dogmatic slumbers, which he allotted to Hume specifically.

Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.

Why not say Kant was just as dogmatic as Hume, up until he stopped to think about how that brand of philosophy wasn’t as fulfilling as it should be. So he woke up, from being a dogmatic thinker himself, something similar to the possibility I mentioned four days ago, around the top of pg 13.

So now it’s a matter of figuring out just what dogmatic thinking entails, and from there, why it’s unfulfilling, and lastly, the method by which it could be fixed.

Mitigated academic scepticism is a natural human instinct and good for understanding the world better. — Corvus

No it isn’t. It is forced upon us, by the criticism of pure reason, for without it we are apt to credit the world for that which does not belong naturally to it, can never be found naturally in it, therefore has no business being included in our empirical understanding.

Crap. Another duplicate post. How does that keep happening?????

Read on.
—————

This is a minor point, which no one really cares. — Corvus

Hence, skepticism and dogmatism in those who don’t.

set the limit of the reason for its power only able to deal with what is perceived via sensibility in empirical world. — Corvus

If that were the case, mathematics would be impossible.

We don’t care as much for that to which pure reason deals, but moreso the mechanisms by which it functions, re: the construction of principles a priori.

Again…..

“… Pure reason, then, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

(Sigh)

According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind….. — Wayfarer

Everybody knows the famous one-liners….understanding cannot intuit, intuition cannot think; thoughts without intuition are empty, intuitions without concepts, blind.

The two faculties must work together or we don’t have knowledge….yaddayaddayadda…..how they work together is given by the transcendental deduction of the categories, which…

“….is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical à priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience (….), as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility….” (B169)

So we get from the individual parts, to the unity of their working together, but the question remains as to how to arrive at the one, an internal condition, when the other is given to us, as an external condition. That which is given to us needs no explanation….it’s here, deal with it. But the origins of that which is not given to us, but arises within us, is susceptible to the possibility of having no explanatory power insofar as whatever is claimed for it, can be negated with equal justice.

In general, or, without getting too particular about it, we have knowledge of things from the union of sense and category. Cool. But the human animal can think real objects without them being sensed, re: possible knowledge of possible things. Here’s where the real question comes in….even if no object is given to the senses, but we can think it, does that mean the categories are necessary for those possible objects as equally as for directly sensed objects? The question takes the form….

“…. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible…”

…..so it seems as though the latter must be the case, insofar as the thought of possible objects, which we have, is sufficient for the possible experience of them, which we don’t. If the categories, the pure conceptions, were not necessary for the mere thought of possible objects equally with the thought of real sensed objects, we wouldn’t think them (synthesis of conceptions and all that behind the scenes stuff) and the experience of them, possible or otherwise, would be irrelevant.

So there are conceptions we have, not dependent on experience, but used for both experience and possible experience….but what can be said about them? If they are in us, the where in us can be said to be understanding, the what can be said to be that which makes cognition of objects possible, but what remains is that which states the origin of them. They’re here, they do this and that, but where do they come from?
———-

Now the fun part, where reader is left to his own devices, depending on the text he’s referencing, either original (“selbstgedachte”) or “self-thought first principles a priori”. All that being said, what is categorically denied, in addition to the empirical origin of the categories, is the validity of “subjective aptitudes” for this purpose, those being.….

“…. implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulate experience…”

…..and even though that sure sounds an awful lot like the innate which may or may not be drawn out of the original German word, depending on the translator’s justifications, the denial of it is pretty cut and dried:

“…. with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it….”

So it is that Kant grants no authority with respect to the origin of the categories to “subjective attitudes” and if one wishes to associate the innate with such attitudes, he is granted no authority as well.

Apparently, Kant wants it understood that the origin of the categories are reducible only as far as self-thought first principles a priori, and if that wasn’t vague enough, now arises the question as to tabula rasa, which seems on the one hand ill-fated insofar as there are self-thought first principles a priori residing in us, re: the mind does not come blank, but on the other it is reasonable insofar as these are not merely part of our subjective aptitude, re: the mind does come blank.

Time. When does “self-thought” begin”. When do subjective aptitudes develop? If these are not explainable, or are variable, they are not relevant. All that’s needed, for the sake of the consistency of the theory, is the logical function of pure conception within the tenets of a speculative paradigm.

“Shut up and calculate!!” held to the metaphysical fire.

…..were abandoned in the late medieval period…. — Wayfarer

Understood, and thanks. You and are much further along the philosophical evolutionary scale than I.

My point was….ideas can’t be extinguished, except by defining them out of existence, or embarrassing their proponents into submission.

Aren’t those just complementary pairs?

Are inequality/dishonesty complementary in the same degree or manner?

We don't know, likely will never know. — Manuel

Probably right. But the scientists’ll keep stabbin’ at it, hoping for a happy accident.

…..morphed into the view that there is no mind or mental. — Manuel

On the one hand, it doesn’t seem like there could be, but on the other, it seems impossible there isn’t.

It's ghosts all the way down, as far as I can see. — Manuel

Yeah, like…..whose bright idea was it to get rid of ideas anyway???

why would Kant had said that Hume woke him from the dogmatic slumbers? Something doesn't sound quite right here. — Corvus

According to Kant, because Hume used the word ideas, as an example, without proper criticism of the principle by which the conception connects to his use of it. As the lesser of the two “perceptions of the mind”, in Hume ideas are thoughts, which are hardly a lesser, and aren’t even perceptions at all.

He could have said ideas are objects of the mind, but he couldn’t intermingle the object of empiricism with object of the intellect. Kant did just that, by putting the concept “idea” back where the Greeks had it, turning it into an object of reason, which makes its relations transcendental, and not intuitive or demonstrable.
————-

To call math a science just means math follows the strictest of procedures, always consistently repeatable, always with the same result for each of its operations, and never false if properly followed.

It can't be Mathematics or Geometry knowledge Hume was talking about. — Corvus

“….Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science…”

What science would a mathematician be an expert in, if not mathematical science?
————

There wasn't anything that Kant could have fixed in CPR, was there? — Corvus

Kant fixed….

Reasoning on Relations of Ideas are "which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain." — Corvus

…..Hume’s reasoning on relations of ideas as empirical, indicated by “intuitive or demonstrable”, which indicates phenomena, to transcendental, which is merely logical, insofar as the relations of ideas is not at all phenomenal.

There’s a section in CPR where the meaning of idea is returned to the ancients, Plato in particular. So I guess Kant fixed….or at least changed…. Hume’s meaning of idea in order to change the reasoning on their relations.

Where is that quote from? — Corvus

As I said….your reference: Treatise on Human Nature 1.4.1., Of Scepticism Regard to Reason, although it should read…scepticism with regard to reason.
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Now I see you’ve switched to E.C.H.U. And “demonstrably” certain is the very criteria of experience. So yes, Euclidean figures are demonstrably certain in their relations, but it does not follow from the demonstrations, that the relations themselves are given by them.

He had done his own critical examination regarding its own powers and its capacities and limits in Treatise 1.4.1. Of Scepticism Regard to Reason. — Corvus

From your reference….

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….”

….we see the problem writ large. Math is that science by which reliability and certainty is given, and thereby should hardly be considered a mere probability. Hume didn’t grasp how it is that the human mind can originate necessary truths on its own accord, without be subsidized by experience. So if one wishes to say Hume had his own critical examinations, which he did, some additional explanation is necessary for why such examinations were not sufficient for mathematical certainty.

Hume took for granted pure reason could not provide the principles necessary to make math more than mere probability. If you prefer, we could just say Hume was skeptical reason could so provide, but if so, we must also admit he was skeptical to the point of denying the possibility, which just is to take it for granted it could not. And, of course, in the next section, he carried this skepticism over to the existence of the body, and the continued/distinct dichotomy of the operation of the senses regarding the existence of any object.

Recall this?

…..how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one,
— Mww

What is your idea on this? — Corvus

I addressed what Kant thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, that the critical examination of reason regarding its own powers for the originating and employment of principles, is a necessary prerequisite for philosophical demonstrations. Such was my idea on “this”.

Why Hume didn’t do this, and the ramifications for not doing it, resides in various Kant texts, specifically in CPR, wherein in A you’re supposed to dig it out, but in B Hume is mentioned more often in direct relation to the text, so the distinctions in the two philosophies more readily apparent.

I was asking exclusively about (….) exactly what part of Hume's ideas awakened Kant — Corvus

Didn’t sound that way to me. You didn’t ask about any exact thing. Wouldn’t matter anyway; there wasn’t any one exact thing. I gave what I thought explained the awakening in its most general sense, that being, Hume’s proclivity for philosophical demonstrations without sufficient criticism of the principles used to justify them.

Having advised me to read Hume in conjunction with Kant, I might ask if you’ve done the same. If so, then perhaps, as did I, you might have discerned the important aspect missing from Hume’s philosophy that leaves it at dogmatism, according to Kant, as opposed to his own, which is dogmatic.

What is your idea on this? — Corvus

Ask and ye shall receive, or, be careful what you wish for.

The problem:
“….as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

The solution:
“…. the Critique of Pure Reason (…) will render an important service (…), by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies….”

On the certainty of scientific method:
“….. strict demonstration from sure principles a priori….”

On the groping after results:
“…..dogmatism, that is, the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition (…) according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

“….This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, rest on sure principles a priori. (….) Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers….”

So the slumber represents the status quo of dogmatism, in which for metaphysics the strict demonstration from sure principles was demonstrated, but the dogmatic slumber awakened from, indicates the absence in dogmatism of the criticism by which those principles used in philosophical procedures, obtain the authority for the demonstrations they perform. Or, which is the same thing, how it is that the demonstrations may or may not follow from the principles, depending on a critical assessment sufficient to justify their use.
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Has Kant succeeded in what he intended to achieve? — Corvus

He intended to write a theory of metaphysics complete and consistent in itself, and he certainly considered himself as having achieved that. I think the only relevant measure of success, would be his own.

Ehhhh….been there done that. Got the coke-bottle glasses.

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him.

I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, re: reason was merely a slave to the passions, and if habit and common sense couldn’t fix it, then there isn’t a fix to be had. Kant understood the problem before his critical period, around 1750 or so, but didn’t proceed to solve it until the first edition of CPR thirty years on.

If it keeps asserting the existence without the objects in empirical reality, it would be a dogmatism. — Corvus

Yeah….one of the things he says I either didn’t bother with, or couldn’t wrap my head around, dunno which….is that he frowns on dogmatism, but grants pure reason is always dogmatic.

Clue is in the definitions, I guess. One’s a method, the other’s a doctrine, maybe. Dunno.

I’m ok with that. I don’t like the notion of psychological activities particularly, but modern times finds value therein, somehow.

Just remember…reason does not apply directly to experience, so that part of your comment that says reason only deals with objects, etc, etc,. Isn’t the whole story.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. — Corvus

That’s the whole problem: pure reason has no limit. The sole raison d’etre for the Critique of it, is what can be done about that problem.

What we can think, relative to what we can know…..THAT must have a limit.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

In Kant, this is wrong.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions — AmadeusD

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. It is the aim of the human intellectual system, that the thing-as-it-is-in-itself, and the thing-as-it-seems-to us, be as congruent as possible. That the properties assigned to the representation of the real thing of our knowledge, do not conflict with the relations observed with respect to the real thing of our perception.
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…we must infer something "in-itself"… — AmadeusD

The Principle of Complementarity, writ large. For that thing which appears to sensibility, there must be that same thing that does not appear, for otherwise, immediately upon being an effect on the senses, if the thing did not already exist in itself, our own perception is necessary objective causality for that thing. It follows that, tantamount to a contradiction bordering on absurdity, for every singe perception, for every effect of a thing on the senses, that thing was caused by the senses, or, which is the same thing, it would be damn near impossible to prove with apodeitic certainty, the senses are not causal.
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things in themselves, while possessing a real existence — AmadeusD

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing.

may offer support here, but it should be kept in mind, that in Kant’s day, Greek logic was still the rule, and Aristotle used the concepts phenomena/noumena in his way, so Kant had to, if not so much abide by the antecedent meanings, at least had to account for them, or no peer would take his philosophy seriously, insofar as the fundamental predication determining transcendental metaphysics, is purely logical.

Problem was, in the brand new metaphysics, there was no room for Aristotle’s concepts as such, on the one hand, and the brand new speculative machinations of human cognition couldn’t accommodate them both on the other.

But he had no choice but to accommodate Aristotle, somehow. Know how he did it? Cool as hell, if you ask me. He said, “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”. Now it is not self-contradictory to think noumena, from which arises a valid conception just as Aristotle professed, but there remains the need to abolish them in order they not interfere with the rest of the brand new speculative metaphysics, which would be where the contradiction of myself occurs, re: judgements in which the conception is contained relative to those judgements in which conception “phenomena” is contained.

Every notice….with all the talk of noumena, there is no talk of a noumenal object? Not one. Everyone talks of noumena but nobody wonders that there are no noumenal objects. And we can say there are none, even if it is only because we wouldn’t know of it as one if it reached out an bitch-slapped us.

If things-in-themselves give us things, shouldn’t noumena give us noumenal objects? Same thing, my ass. No where near the same, and moronic to consider them so.
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It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves — AmadeusD

They are not. There’s something amiss in your clarity, methinks.

On matter, from a Kantian point of view:

“… the real in space—that is, matter…..”

“…what we cognize in matter is nothing but relations…”

“….Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid (re: I know not what; fr: quelque chose je ne sais quoi), the nature of which we could not understand, even though someone were found able to tell us.

….For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing.

….By observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to….”.
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That human empirical knowledge is derivable from representation only, does not mean matter is not real, which it must be in order for there to be a representation of it.

That all we cognize in matter is its relations, and by which we “penetrate into the interior of nature”, re: Nature herself, is simply due to the type of cognizing capacities, having nothing whatsoever to do with matter itself, and from which it does not follow that matter of real objects must therefore be noumenal.

And the “someone found able to tell us” (of what to us is the chimera of the internal nature of matter) would, supposedly, not be human. Which reduces to…..no one is to be found to explain to us the internal nature of matter itself.

On the continued fallacious attribution to noumena, from a Kantian point of view:

“…. The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this—and which is a perfectly excusable one—lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity rests.

…..Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think something in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.

….Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception of an object in general—problematically understood and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.

….To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not therefore be held to be impossible….”
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So it is that A249 is not to be considered as pertaining to existent objects. It is the error in transcendental illusory “appearance” that “I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition”, which presupposes the type of intuition not possessed by humans, from which follows there is nothing to which an object of mere thought to be given, insofar as human intuition is always and only sensible. There can be no appearance given to intuition from mere understanding, but from perception alone.

It follows that if the matter of objects were noumena, and noumena obtain their conceptual validity from mere understanding, and understanding gives to intuition its false “appearance”, then all matter of all objects are or can be already determinable by the understanding, which immediately eliminates intuition as the faculty of sensory representation, making experience itself impossible. From whence it is clear, that if the matter of the Eiffel Tower were noumena, there wouldn’t be a tower, a contradiction.

The secondary notion of illusory appearance, irrespective of the type of intuition humans possess, is justified long before the textual evidence of the proof of its occurrence, from the proposition “….understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think…” (hence these must work together while being distinct and separate faculties). If then, I suppose to give to even a sensible intuition a conception I merely think, the system is caused to work backwards, and from which no determinable warrant to expect a proper cognition is possible, which is to say, I will know nothing from this bass-acwards procedure, including the very possibility of having accomplished it.

Furthermore….as if the above wasn’t enough….herein the justification for two and only two types of systemic representation….
……one from intuition the object of which is phenomenal representation, the origin of which is the synthesis of matter a posteriori and form a priori.
……the other from understanding the object of which is conceptual representation, the origin of which is the spontaneity of pure thought.

Now it can be, that while faculties of intuition and understanding are distinct and separate, their objects must necessary conjoin to each other through a mediary faculty that is not either of them.

On the fallacious attribution of principles to the understanding, from a Kantian point of view:

“….All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason…there is a merely formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The (real use) has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the (formal use), which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood from this definition…..

….In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.

….The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points) are general à priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles—I cognize it only in pure intuition.

…..Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general à priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their possible use.

…..But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible à priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception….

…..Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles..

….. The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

There are no principles of the understanding as such, pure or otherwise; there are only those under which the function of understanding is legitimized, the origin of which is the project of pure reason, and that from its transcendental nature alone.