…..what you think of space/time fabric? — Bob Ross

It isn’t a fabric, it’s a mathematical model of a gravitational field under specific conditions. The Universe, reality in general, in and of itself….whatever there is that isn’t us…..doesn’t need space or time. We as calculating intelligences, do.

But then, the Universe doesn’t need mathematical models or gravitational fields either, so……
————-

……space and time are a posteriori (since we only understand them better via empirical investigation)? — Bob Ross

Thing is, we’re investigating objects a posteriori, in order to understand them better, not space or time. All we need from those two, is the understanding, the recognition, that because of them, things don’t happen all at once, and things aren’t all in the same place.

Are they still a priori insofar as they are forms of our experience….. — Bob Ross

Technically, forms of the representations of objects, or phenomena, but, a priori, yes.

…..but their behaviors are a posteriori? — Bob Ross

Space and time don’t behave, don’t possess behavior. Things possess relations between themselves or between them and us, which is what we’d loosely call their behavior, but is really our representations of their responses to force.

Long ways from moral realism, aren’t we?

there absolutely no way for a person to willfully obey a moral principle in and of itself without having a taste to do it. — Bob Ross

There is an established metaphysical system in which this condition is precisely descriptive of true moral agency, re: Enlightenment deontology. The only limitation therein with respect to a moral act, is the physical accomplishment of it, which makes explicit obligation to a willful principle, the ground of such system, has no regard for the contingencies of taste, but only the necessities of law.

Of course, established is one thing, practiced is quite another.
—————

as a transcendental idealist, do you deny Einstein’s general/special relativity? — Bob Ross

Oh heck no. The science is good. Far and away beyond the bounds of my possible experience, but good science nonetheless. Time dilation, which held for our flight to Rome a couple years ago, is….what, a couple picoseconds? My sons here in their frame, and me there at a 500mph frame, a difference in age disparity noticed by some dude with the most sensitive time device available but not the least noticed by me or them.

And ya know what? I don’t have the slightest need to locate Bobby’s Badass Burger Barn with a 3-foot margin of error, but I recognize that I might want that precision if I’m planting a Hellfire on it. Like….after one too many messed-up orders.

If anything, I’d take exception to Einstein’s dismissal of the transcendental nature of pure mathematics, as Kant authored the notion. He stated for the record mathematics is discovered, but in fact I rather think the proofs of mathematical relations are discovered, but math, in and of itself, is a purely rational construction by, and manifestation of, human intelligence.

Shall we chalk up the disparities to a mere domain of discourse?

so are you saying that there is an ‘interest’ devoid of ‘will’ which is a part of the structure of being a will? Is that the idea? — Bob Ross

That’s not what I’m tying to get across, no. Interest…..you know, that certain je ne sais quoi, that which underpins a consideration, a focusing of attention specifically. So, yes, interest is devoid of will insofar as having an interest is not to will anything, nor is it the structure of will, which is reducible to pure practical reason. Accordingly, before anything is to be willed there must be an interest in the manner in which it is to be done, hence, interest in a principle which grounds the will’s determined volition.

If there is really an ‘interest’ (i.e., a desire) which pertains to the structure of being a will and not to a will itself, then I think that would be, by definition, a moral fact (in its own right). — Bob Ross

That may be right. If a structural component of will is desire, and if will is the source of moral behavior, then it follows desire serves as possible ground of such moral behavior. However, desire takes no account of good in the attainment of its objects other than the satisfaction of the agent, but mere ‘feel good’ satisfaction can never be deemed truly moral behavior, which is ‘good’ in and of itself regardless of the feeling derived from it.
————-

But under Einsteinien space/time fabric, they are not synthetic judgments—they are not isolated ‘pure’ forms of one’s experience (like Kant thought): they do pertain as properties to the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s true, and further instance of space/time conceptual irreconcilability of the two geniuses. In fact, in the 1920 essay, he wishes his system to be understood as paying no attention to space, but rather, to relations of objects to each other. Kant does that as well, but stipulates relative to each is meaningless without the space n which they are extended.

For an interesting read, see…..

https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/58/12/34/394660/Albert-Einstein-as-a-Philosopher-of#:~:text=By%20the%20age%20of%2016%2C%20he%20had%20already,on%20Kant%20in%20the%20summer%20semester%20of%201897.

….and find it isn’t the relative space/time distinctions that distinguish these guys, it’s the mathematics by which space and time are useful, that does.

On strong indications…..agreed. Seems reasonable.

Yeah, Kant is my go-to philosopher.

At what point should we abandon the metaphysical assumption that matter can be conscious and/or generate consciousness? — RogueAI

I’m not aware of a metaphysics assuming that. If it doesn’t, it can still be abandoned, just not for those reasons.

If there is a subjective condition by which behaviors are legislated, and these conditions come into conflict which results in argument, does it then follow that they are in some sense objective? — Leontiskos

I would say the argument is objective, the conditions in conflict be what they may. On the other hand, here is an proposition that states any cognition or series of cognitions shared by all members of a set capable of them, are for that reason, objective cognitions. I’m not so sure about that myself, but, it’s out there. Some folks rejecting that form of objectivity favor a thing called “intersubjectivity”, which just looks like subject/object version of Frankenstein’s ogre.

What categorical error were you thinking as possible?

…..all interest is of a will, but the desire to do something irregardless of whatever surface-level pleasure/pain is better, correct? — Bob Ross

The interest isn’t of the will, which is the autonomous faculty of volitions. The interest residing in the agent, is in a principle, with which the will determines a volition. The desire to do something, regardless of pain or pleasure, still needs to be informed as to what is to be done, which returns to will.

I also, nowadays, find the moral facts, if they do exist, to be irrelevant as long as the person has committed themselves to being rational. — Bob Ross

In a way that’s fitting, but I’d probably say….as long as he has committed himself to being moral. If there are moral facts, however subjective they may be, and one adheres to them by his actions, he would be deemed moral antecedent to being deemed rational.

Maybe that’s the key: subjective moral fact equates to moral commitment; objective moral facts equates to rational commitment. Or is that just adding yet another chef to the kitchen?
—————-

….how do you reconcile Einstein’s general/special relativity with Kantian notions of space and time? — Bob Ross

They can’t be reconciled, because Einstein invoked a geometry Kant didn’t use in his construction of the conceptions of space and time. Which is odd, in a way, in that Kant taught mathematics, which implies he knew of spherical geometries, so it is more likely he used plane geometries as examples in his theoretical tenets in CPR merely for simplicity, to only go as far as he needed to prove a point. In other words, it doesn’t matter one whit that the interior angles of a spherical triangle add up to more or less than two right angles, if it is still necessarily true the interior angles of a Euclidean plane triangle equals two right angles, and it is also quite true the thought of that sum cannot ever be found in the mere fact there are three interior angles.

“…. Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall consider the extent of its limitation….”
(Einstein, 1920: Einstein’s equivalent to Kant’s Prolegomena: relativity for dummies in one, transcendental philosophy for dummies in the other)

Einstein had a problem with Kant’s derivation of true propositions more than his notions of space and time. Just as SR and GR took Newton’s physics further than Newton himself but didn’t disprove what was originally given, so too did Einstein demonstrate that Kant’s notions of mathematical truths were limited, but also didn’t refute them as given.

Nevertheless, there is a clandestine categorical error in Einstein’s claim. Kant derived true propositions in order to prove their possibility, and because the proof of their possibility stands, they can be employed as ground for something else relative to them. Einstein disputed the propositions as being true in any condition, but they were never intended for any condition, but only for one.

Another thing. Einstein didn’t like Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori propositions….the ground of all mathematical proofs….yet had to use that very philosophical derivation for his own gedankenexperiment, which he drew from Ernst Mach, 1883, who was……waiiiittttt for it….an acknowledged Kantian.

Go figure.

I am just curious: is she a transcendental idealist too? — Bob Ross

Nahhhh….oil and water. She’s a retired Fed in the intelligence services with U-Dub Masters in history and library science, for her, it’s facts and nothing but the facts.

….both a “interest” in a “principle” and a “desire” in a “’good’ feeling” are both mere acts of “taste”, just separated semantically by what it is directed towards. — Bob Ross

Conventionally, I suppose that’s close enough, insofar as either may be reducible to aesthetic judgement. Still, in proper philosophy, I submit it is not so much the directed towards, but rather, the arising from. The difference manifests, and for which philosophical account should be taken, in those occasions where one feels pleasure for doing a bad thing, or, conversely, feels pain or displeasure about doing a good thing. Simply put, it follows that interest in a principle it that by which a moral act is given and its negation impossible regardless of circumstance, but mere desire for a good feeling is just as likely to invoke an immoral act as a moral one, which makes negation of one by the other not only possible, but increasingly probable, conditioned by the difficulty inherent in the circumstance.
————-

So is “shall”, for you, a command with literally no alternatives (e.g., a person being forced to do something, etc.)? If so, then that doesn’t seem like the word is too often applicable. — Bob Ross

Yeah, humans: sorryful bunch, to be sure. Even if they know what’s right, they’ll sometimes manage to talk themselves out of doing it, or allow someone else to do the talking. A command of reason is always applicable, but not always effected.
———-

I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”. Is morality a real thing? Even if it isn’t, per se, it seems the case there is in all humans a condition by which certain behaviors are legislated, so if the behaviors are real in one sense of the term, wouldn’t that condition by which behaviors are caused be real is some sense? I dunno….it’s a fine line between granting the realness of behavior but denying the realness of behavior’s causality.

I think there must be as many moral facts as there are acts in accordance with subjective moral commands. But that is not sufficient reason to grant objective moral facts in general, to which one is morally obligated. While I am perfectly entitled to say my act is in fact a moral act, am I thereby entitled to say my act is derived from a moral fact, and if I am not so entitled, by what warrant is my act, in fact, moral? If I then fall back on moral command as necessary causality, am I then forced to deem a mere command of reason, a fact?

Leporidae excavation if there ever was one.

when the object of perception are the mental contents such as images in the past memories or imagination, which doesn't need space and time — Corvus

Every object of perception, no matter its name after its perception, is conditioned by space and time and is a mental content. Images in memory were once objects of perception, hence so conditioned. Objects of imagination may or may not be conditioned by space and time, insofar as objects of the productive imagination reside in intuition, hence are, but objects of the reproductive imagination found in understanding do not, hence are not.

Kant said, or would say that space and time still applies to the memories or imaginations for their content? — Corvus

Yep. Almost just like that. Got to keep all this in relation to time. An object in memory was at one time an experience, but as a post hoc memory, it is not. In that case, it is a thought alone, the object which was an experience a posteriori is then of consciousness a priori. Imagination is quite different, as noted above.
————

Would you not agree that space and time only applies as the precondition of perception, only when the objects of the perception are the external material objects? — Corvus

I see what you mean. We’re not going to perceive anything that isn’t an external material object or caused by it. But still, there are external material objects that are not objects of perception, which sort of demands they be disassociated from each other. And when connected to the strictly internal intuitions of space and time, dialectical consistency demands that to which they apply be internal as well. External material objects are not internal…..DUH!!!!!…..so the disassociation must arise somewhere else.

In Kant, then, the external material object is that which appears, and the object of perception is the sensation afforded by that which has appeared. Now perhaps it is clear space and time have nothing to do with any of this, insofar as all that has happened thus far are simply physical manifestations, not yet subjected to intelligence.

So….no, I do not agree space and time apply to the preconditions of perception, nor that the objects of perception are external material objects.

…..Experience is a far too wide concept…. — Corvus

It may be too wide for all that the human intellect can do, sure. But with respect to space and time, experience is only ever going to be whatever they allow.

If perception is predicated on physiology, wouldn’t perception be possible even without things to perceive? Wouldn’t the senses still work, even if there wasn’t anything to sense? Otherwise, it would have to be the case, e.g., the mechanics of sight are caused by things rather than the physical structure which makes them eyes in the first place. If it is really the various physiologies that make the various corresponding perceptions possible, space and time do not.

Might I suggest Kant meant for space and time to be the pre-condition for experience? They are that which makes experience possible?

What I want is often in conflict with what I think I should do. — Wayfarer

True enough, and the bane of humanity in general. That notwithstanding, if you ever come to know what you shall do, or what you shall not do, then you must have understood your own will.
———-

….just mentioned Kant's "Thing-in-Itself" to criticise him…. — Corvus

“…. For as the world is in one aspect entirely idea, so in another it is entirely will. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignus fatuus in philosophy.…”

So, yeah, one might call that a criticism.

Couple questions: — Bob Ross

Sure, but at the risk of detouring the thread topic? Up to you, of course; it’s you that called the meeting.

Moral obligation relative to interest, indicates the employment of practical reason in determining a willed volition. That obligation relative to an interest in a principle, then, indicates practical reason determine a willed volition in accordance with the subjective disposition of the moral agent himself. A principle in a moral agent that accords with his subjective disposition, is called a maxim. The point being, to eliminate outside influence with respect to moral considerations in general.

Taste, on the other hand, represented by aesthetic judgement, indicates merely a desire, which is always relative to sensation, re: attainment of that which corresponds to, and thereby satisfies, a desire, which in turn is always influenced from outside. Influenced from outside eliminates employment of practical reason, without which there is no proper moral consideration.

Morally speaking, acts willed according to good principles are more powerful than acts willed by mere good feelings.
—————

What are you semantically distinguishing with "shall" vs. "should desire"? — Bob Ross

Dunno about semantically. I positively detest, and refuse to engage in, so-called “language games”.

Shall indicates a command of reason offering no alternatives; should desire indicates a conditional want which implies a plethora of alternative inclinations.
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……there would be facts of the matter about morality that society could strive towards independently of tastes….. — Bob Ross

There would be facts of the matter about ethics that society could strive toward, re: administrative codes.
(independent of taste: hey, you wanna speed through a marked-off school zone, go right ahead. Makes no difference to me)

Personally, I think as soon as society enters the conversation, morality becomes group morality writ large, which is ethics. So maybe there is a form of realism in society, but it isn’t moral as much as ethical, realism. I mean, it is documented, e.g., that the speed limit in a school zone is 15mph, which seems pretty factual.

Anyway….obviously I survived 6 days in the bush. She with the whistle and spray, me with the .44. No need for either and good times for all.

We know nothing better than we know our own will. If the world is will, then there is nothing we couldn’t know about the world. Kant’s “epistemic limitation” disappears.

While it may indeed be a credible philosophy on its own, it is an altogether illegitimate transfer of conceptual correspondence when juxtaposed to Kant.

Are you agreeing that moral obligations begin with tastes, but that one should desire to abide by some set of categorical imperatives? — Bob Ross

Negative on both. Moral obligations begin with interest in a principle, and one SHALL, not merely SHOULD DESIRE to, abide by a categorical imperative the principle determines….in order to declare himself an moral agent that is worthy of his happiness.

Heading into the bush for a few days; not sure of cell coverage, so…. forewarned.

…..so there's at least two ways we might read a text…. — Moliere

….and both are no more than mere experience. Philosophy is a system, and a system is not an experience, even if all experience is by means of it.

IknowIknowIknow….I’m in the minority set, which I make up for by being boisterous about it. (Grin)

….we can never really get away from doing philosophy. — GRWelsh

Same as it ever was, huh?

“…. Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as speculation itself; and what mind does not speculate—either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion?….”

While I agree morality is a covenant, I reject morality as having any connection with religion, insofar as the covenant holds with one’s self alone. If one acts in disrespect of the will of a god and its laws, he is a sinner; if one acts in disrespect of his own predisposed values that manifest in his will and its laws, he is immoral. A sinner dishonors his god but may not consider himself as dishonored; an immoral agent cannot escape the dishonor of himself.

And, yeah, always best to avoid the devil.

So we likely have different cognitive faculties working in different domains of life, with one that overlaps on both of them, the notion of "truth". — Manuel

I can see that. Technically, we might say one is the aesthetic domain, one is the discursive domain, truth overlapping both, from pure practical reason in the first, pure speculative reason in the second. In the first, the truth is in the form of subjective principles called maxims, in accordance with laws of the will, in the second truth is the correspondence of cognition with its object in accordance with mere rules of the understanding.

General Relativity is, once established, considerably easier to verify. — Manuel

Considerably easier to verify, but not going to be ever entirely proven by direct experience. I mean….what’s the chance of attaining the SOL or entering a black hole? That’s where the equations lead, right? Gotta do the extremes in order to nullify the principle of induction. The Twins Paradox, however, witnessing that is within reach here pretty soon, I bet.

Tell me a little about Sellar’s Images? And how it relates?

Fun times at ridgemont high.

And where are such principles to be sought? — Quixodian

You have the searchable CPR, so for your own sake, check out “Of Reason in General”, around A299/B356 or so. For your own sake because I probably won’t explain it worth a damn.

Briefly and hopefully somewhat coherently, principles are to be sought in reason rather than understanding, because principles, while synthetic cognitions a priori, do not apply directly to experience as understanding does in the unity of phenomena according to rules. The point being to distinguish a cognition employed as a principle, which understanding can do, from a cognition that is a principle, which it cannot. In the Kantian tripartite logical system, sequentially understanding, judgement, reason, and, synthetic a priori cognitions barred from either of the first two, and at the same time being absolutely necessary for syllogistic reasoning, reason is the only faculty capable of them, and makes them the criteria for being principles.

Thanks for not asking what they are. Dodged a serious bullet right there, no doubt.

Shall we start over? I inject moral as a qualifier for obligation, because the topic is concerned with moral facts. I thought to continue the moral condition, but that’s not actually what you asked for regarding obligation in and of itself.

My bad.

take into account what are the cognitive conditions such that we can establish such a category as "truth" and be somewhat confident it is correct. — Manuel

That’s kinda the whole can of worms, innit? We’re going to bother with establishing a category, calling it “truth”, demand a certainty from it….then only be somewhat confident in it? Nahhhh….I want my truth indisputable, at least at the time I determine it, and from the same system from whence it came. If your truth is better than mine, on the other hand, then I got a whole different set of problems.

But that we are able to establish truth…..is…very trivial — Manuel

Absolutely. We do it all the time without ever granting to ourselves the very power by which it is done. Apparently, we’re satisfied understanding no truth from empirical conditions is at all possible, thereby no truth at all is possible. Which is catastrophic in itself, for in such case, there is no legitimate reason to attribute moral agency to humanity in general.

As for one theory over another….parsimony? Whichever has initial exposure? Whichever has prevalent exposure? And I agree no one theory can explain it all, but…ahem…..there is one theory that lays the groundwork for where to start.

Oh. And thanks for being so kind. Most of the time I get, or most of the time I’m more apt to get, you’re so full of shit there’s no way your eyes can’t be brown. (Chuckles to self…they’re not. Neither of ‘em)

I welcome your learned steerage.

Kant, Lectures on Logic — Quixodian

Gotta be careful here. The nominal definition of truth, indicating merely an example of what may be a truth, is not the same as the logical criteria indicating what truth itself must be. What is true is not the same as what is truth, insofar as the former presupposes the latter. This shouldn’t be, and probably isn’t, the least contentious.

The key here is “compare the object with my cognition”, which makes explicit the object being compared is the perceived object, re: the “object outside me”. On the other hand, the agreement of a cognition with its object, is a product of understanding, for as empirical cognition necessarily follows from the perceived object, it is never of it.

And what of principles, which are necessary truths proven post hoc by but not derivatives of, empirical cognitions?

The problem here is enormous for some monistic metaphysics, re: Leibniz, in that experience alone can never give the answer to what is truth, but logic alone can never give the answer to what is true, and any theoretical doctrine which attempts to dismiss the rational a priori/empirical a posteriori dualism must overcome this problem. Or, typically post-modern, pretend there isn’t one.

Not that important; just sayin’……

Ok, but why are desires not simply synonymous with tastes?

Moral obligation: that interest of will, by which the worthiness of being happy is justified.

Your quote hits the sweet spot in me. Which is sort of a euphemism for spending a long time in the dark between the ears.

But you and I both may have missed the mark, insofar as the OP asks how to start philosophy, not so much how to actually do it. In which case everyone else is more correct then we are, for to start philosophy presupposes someone else has already done it, and left a record to be subsequently treated as a mere experience, like any other.

Nahhhh….if philosophy is to be done, shut the hell up and go dark, I say. Otherwise, all that’s being done is recounting history, and any ol’ fool can do that.

As you say, it’s not impossible that someone will claim they are his.

I hesitate to call my reveries of thought philosophy. — Moliere

I might go the other way, and surmise that all my reveries of thought have philosophical implications.

…..some demon making us think 2+2 is 4…. — Manuel

Yeah, those damn demons. If one of ‘em wants to make me only think it’s me counting my own fingers, not much I can do about it.

I am arguing for the de-valuing of moral facts — Bob Ross

….with which I am in total accord.

Do you believe, then, that obligations do not begin with a desire? — Bob Ross

I agree with the proposition that moral obligations do not begin with desires.

Why not take up that fundamental obligation and deploy the objective implications thereof? In other words, the fundamental obligation is a hypothetical imperative of which one has already committed themselves to and, thusly, why not simply obligate oneself to whatever is implied from that commitment? — Bob Ross

All good, nevertheless my only objection is here: fundamental obligation is categorical, represented as a command of reason, re: shall, whereas hypotheticals are mere ought’s.

If one acts in accordance with the c.i. his morality is sustained, even if he feels abhorrent because of the action taken pursuant to it. If he acts via a hypothetical, he may only possibly be moral, but it remains equally possible that he is immoral, for here he may have allowed his practical inclinations, re: desires, to override his own principles.

Why not take up…..? Mostly because it’s all-too-often very much easier not to.

Demonstration can be an extremely high standard to meet in philosophy. — Manuel

According to You-Know-Who, only mathematics affords demonstration, as opposed those propositions that are “immediately certain”, which, I guess, just means those propositions that don’t require demonstration.

I'll echo Banno in saying philosophy is social — Moliere

Philosophizing is social.

is doing the approach to philosophy; when such introspection arrives at a conclusion, philosophy is being done.

Haven’t you ever noticed how much you can get done when nobody’s bothering you? “In the zone” ring any bells?

I'm not sure that I could climb to those heights. — Moliere

No heights. Depths. My thought for defining element was the intuitive use of pure reason.

Step down: subsuming a possibility under a principle;
Step down: the possibility of mathematics;
Step down: the construction of conceptions a priori to validate the object of the possibility;
Step down: the construction of objects a priori representing the constructed conceptions;
Step down: intuit the phenomena representing the constructed conceptions;
Step down: create the objects the phenomena represent, which is the intuitive use of pure reason.

Divisions of time, same thing. Quantities of space, yep…same thing.

Something only the human mind can do, hence a defining element of it, as far as we know. Added bonus, because you asked a couple days ago….it’s how we know 7 + 5 =12.

Anyway…just to put this to bed.

It's that intuition which "sensible intuition" is being defined against, rather than animal knowledge — Moliere

Yes, I get that, but the ask is….what is a defining element of the mind.

I guess I don’t get how something every human mind can do, or there is something for which every human mind has the capacity, is a defining element. Just seems more apropos to claim for a defining element as not found anywhere else, rather than found everywhere else.

Anyway….idle thought, while remaining in a non-collapsible box.

The defining element of our mind is its possession of a sensible intuition….. — Moliere

I was wonderin’…..like…..why should we attribute to our minds a defining element given from our senses, when it is certain other animals have senses? If we grant other animals have senses, we cannot immediately deny they have sensible intuitions of some kind. It would appear some form of sensible intuition is merely one element for any animal with sensory apparatus, hence not so defining an element for just our human mind.

So….what is a defining element of a human mind, implying that which belongs to no other animal, insofar as none of them offer any indication they possess it.

Without a comprehensive catalogue of what and how many elements there are in a human mind, it defies possibility for picking out a defining element. And if possibility is defied, what chance does certainty have? As well, being human, how to alleviate the privileging associated with examining our own minds, carrying the inclination to vainglorious elemental composition.

So not only is it being asked what element is definitive, but what are the choices for it, and given the choice, how is it the case it belongs solely to humans.

Care to bid on another defining element?

I mention the problem of other minds…. — Banno

And I commented to the contrary, with consistent generality, the highlighted relevance not on rules. Your originating mention, as stated, is, ipso facto, false.

it should be set before us clearly. — Banno

Ehhhh….only you says it wasn’t. At this point, it’s a tie, I think it was both clear and relevant and you apparently do not. Or at least question whether it is. For the sake of a mere tie, I see no reason to change anything.

Actually, Frank called one of the quotes an insight, which implies it was both clear and relevant to him, so it’s two to one.

I'm not seeing the relevance of your quotes. — Banno

Can you trust me that there is one, otherwise I wouldn’t have posted them?

Jamal and Mww have taught me much….. — Moliere

Thanks.

All I know of Quine is the Two Dogmas essay. Do you have some short article where he states, or some second order literature that recounts, the argument?