Ok, thanks. While I agree sensation is ineffable, I cannot isolate ineffability from sensation with your description here. If one of the meanings of sensory terms derives from sensation, hasn’t some language been used on it? And if I read you correctly, it begs the question as to how conceptions, by which all objects are described, arrive at purely physical structures such as sensory devices.

I think it more the case sensation merely informs our representational faculty, sometimes called intuition, as to which physiology has been affected by some real object, but provides nothing descriptive per se with respect to it. This is given from the fact we are often affected by some object’s sensation, but have no immediate idea what it is. Knowing we are affected says nothing descriptive of that affect.

But this is grounded in a dualistic philosophical paradigm, so…..maybe you’re right in some other way.

At the most elemental level, we can describe the physical world in terms of the sensations that it elicits. — hypericin

I agree sensations are entirely ineffable. As are feelings, and for much the same reasons.

But if you’re right, what is it about objects that can elicit descriptive terms from sensation?

Ok then.

I wish to cross-reference. If I can’t do that, because I can’t get what I need for it, I’ll stick with what I know. Destructive because, as far as I know, that was not what he said.

dualism and conservation of energy thread — Metaphysician Undercover

I perused the thread, read some of your links. I wasn’t aware of the refutation of conservation laws, as the links stated.

As far as I’m concerned, energy loss in one exchange is a simple concept, but energy conservation in system-wide exchanges is complicated.

it is a misrepresentation to say that there is a "transfer of knowledge" between people. — Metaphysician Undercover

Conventionally speaking, it does seem that way. Technically, however, abstract systems internally complete and independent from each other, cannot exchange their individual means or ends.

Is there an issue? — Constance

Yes. Your translator’s reading doesn’t match any of the four of mine. It’s a technicality for sure, but in a system built on them, such ambiguity is either confusing or destructive.

Kant's "concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." — Constance

Whose translation is this?

You're saying here that the entity, or prompt, you end up with isn't a 'construct' because it's been constructed by sub-conscious (sub-cognitive?) processes? Is that right? — Isaac

I usually take “construct” to imply intentionality, and no sub-conscious faculty can be imbued with it. Perhaps it is that construct isn’t so much the wrong concept, but just not the better one.

There’s a hidden benefit in a subconscious facility. Because the representation by definition cannot be exactly the same as the given object, otherwise it wouldn’t be a representation, we can say even though we absolutely cannot prove anything about how matter is arranged into a useable form, at the same time we can say it is absurd to suppose it isn’t.

Science eventually solved this speculative impossibility by proving any change in the form of energy means some will be lost, justifying the notion that representations are never the same as…..dare I say….the thing-in-itself. Just the empirical proof that, metaphysically alleviates the necessity for the proving how. Which is good, because it’s already been understood it couldn’t be done from a metaphysical domain anyway, seeing as it’s all sub-conscious. It is logically sufficient to say the phenomenon contains all the sensation gives it, the sensation contains all the perception gives it, but the perception does not contain all that the real object has to give.
(Sidebar: hence the birth of phenomenology. Some people just could not abide with the idea there is a very important aspect, veritably the very ground, of empirical cognitive metaphysics that is nonetheless inaccessible to the conscious investigations.)
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I doubt there's room for probability in this metaphysical process? — Isaac

Not really. Metaphysics proper is the ways and means for knowledge acquisition. For the proverbial Man on the Street, Joe Cool, Mr. and Mrs. Rural America, they don’t want to probably know. Probably knowing gets folks killed, or at the very least, makes them look like an idiots. I imagine even the theoretical physicist, in the development of his thesis, won’t come up with experiments which would probably support it.

No……apodeictic certainty rules the day, caveats and all. Euclid understood it, re: geometric necessity; Aristotle understood it, re: three laws of rational thought; Descartes understood it, re: negation of irreducible doubt; Kant understood it, re: synthetic a priori truths.
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Your system seems to have understanding as almost binomial (is there a link or isn't there) — Isaac

Neither of us can describe these distinct systems as far as they go; we’d become stuck in the minutia which only works if the major premises are accepted across the board. The brain works physically due to the subtleties of its parts, we think metaphysically due to the subtleties of the faculties that make thinking possible. Neurology works with transmitters, gaps and receptors; understanding works with synthesis, judgement and reason. In short, understanding links, judgment says the link works this time, reason says whether it works in all times. Or, in other words, understanding conjoins according to rules, judgement follows those rules, reason says some principle has been violated by that judgement therefore those rules weren’t the proper ones to use in this instance. Think…mirage. Think….clouds that look like some object. Think…the duck/rabbit picture. That stupid dress or the shadow on the checkerboard.

Regarding the unfamiliar word, then, and in the interest of brevity, I said understanding couldn’t construct an image, but technically, it is that for every image it does construct, judgement will admit, but reason will overrule as being inadmissible. I did that in order to simplify, to circumvent the obvious question which would have followed if I’d said understanding does construct an image of an unfamiliar word.

And here is the system in all its speculative metaphysical glory. I did say “nothing is cognized”, implying no image made it out of that faculty to become knowledge. If understanding had so constructed, judgement did admit, and reason did say all’s well….the word would then be cognized as something, the word would be known, hence would not be unfamiliar….blatantly contradicting the given perception.

To say of a thing that it is unfamiliar, just is to say the cognitive system has already done its job. If this were not the case, every single perception ever, would be either always and only become knowledge or always and only never become knowledge, but not ever changing from one to the other. Either we’d know everything or know absolutely nothing, and, we’d never actually learn.
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It's all about a constant stream of best guesses — Isaac

I can see that. Assuming 1 x 10^11 neurons, each with 1 x 10^4 connections between them, (Nguyen, Thai, 2010), it would seem to be quite busy up there, yes. Given that exact measurement is rather impossible, with numbers that great it doesn’t make much difference.

This is a good example of the disregard for ontological predicates with respect to the physical world. All the mind….reason, properly speaking…..needs is that which is given to it, and although there very well may be infinite possibilities for things, a very finite quantity of them will be given. It follows the metaphysical mind doesn’t need to be as stochastically busy as the scientific brain, thus can escape the notion of probabilities in general. Or, perhaps, more accurately, reserve probability for particular things perceived by the senses. In other words, the mind doesn’t ask, what are the chances the thing I’m perceiving is this thing or that thing, but rather, asks, how shall this perceived thing be known as.

….you conclude what must take place…. — Isaac

No, not must. That’s a empirical knowledge claim to which I’m not entitled.

….or what you sense takes place — Isaac

If to sense is to form an opinion, then I admit to that.

investigation or the data — Isaac

Investigation. Of the data in topically restricted books, texts, papers. Conversations.

I’m just philosophizing, from a well-versed platform perhaps, but philosophizing nonetheless.

But you must have been able to construct it to some extent, otherwise you wouldn't have two images to compare? — Isaac

Construct to some extent, yes. Two images to compare, no.

The construct to some extend you’re referring to, in the case of perceiving an unfamiliar, is for me a metaphysical phenomenon, which you have posited as scientific “blurry letters”. The senses tell me there is something but is not the place for the telling of what the something is. Phenomena just inform the mind there is about to be something for it to work on. The blurry letters say there is a word for the brain to work on.

In the strictest sense of the word, therein is a construct in the physical system, in that one form of energy in the sensory apparatus is transformed into another kind of energy for transfer along the nerves. So too is there a kind of construct in metaphysical apparatus, in that the matter of the perceived object is arranged in accordance with its given external space. The tail of a dog is placed on the butt end and not the nose end, legs point down….and all that. In the case at hand, that it is a word being perceived is familiar because a succession of letters which are the necessary composition of any word, is part and parcel of the perception as a whole, but the unfamiliarity of the word is not given from this arrangement of these letters, for the simple reason there is as yet no conscious awareness of it as such.

Ever onward. Just as there is no conscious awareness of the information in sensory stimuli traversing the nerves on its way to the brain, there no conscious awareness of phenomena in intuition on its way to understanding. So for the sake of logical consistency it can be said there is a pre-cog construct, but is useless as such to conscious awareness, being necessary, only for the brain, in determining which neural pathway leading to which area of the brain, or similarly, only for metaphysical comprehension, in how the perceived object is to be understood.

So…because I am not consciously aware of the phenomena in my metaphysical system, I do not consider it a construct insofar as I have no knowledge or thought of it at all. In fact, I can say “I” haven’t yet constructed anything. That there is an unconscious part of my metaphysical system that does stuff for which the conscious part is entirely oblivious, is exactly the same as the physical system doing things for the brain with which neural networking has no part.

As the physical system uses electrical energy for its means, the metaphysical system uses phenomena for its means; just as the physical system uses chemical energy for its ends, the metaphysical system uses understanding for its ends. Both in their respective domains are necessary for the other, but neither in their domains can substitute for the other. It follows that the information in nerves is necessary but not sufficient for mental events in the brain, and phenomena are necessary but not sufficient for understanding in conscious awareness.

Now, after progressing from the unconscious nerves/phenomena to the conscious mental event/understanding, the question arises…do I have two images to compare. I had, up to this point, only a indeterminate something, a representation of whatever has affected my senses. As far as the brain is concerned, all there is, is some data, some electrical information that has not been subjected to the area of the brain that is capable of doing something productive with it.

And the separation in domains now becomes apparent. In the scientific system, we don’t know specifically where conscious awareness is born, but in a metaphysical system, conscious awareness is born in understanding, which we call thinking. The phrase we both used, “recalled to mind”, means just to think, to be consciously aware of something I’m supposed to do, in the case at hand, do something with an unfamiliar phenomenon. And what I’m supposed to do, is understand the unfamiliar word. I do that by comparing to what I already understand. In the physical system, the brain must direct the information along certain pathways determinable by the conditions of the information itself. In a metaphysical system, the understanding must conjoin the phenomenon with a conception, determinable by the conditions of the phenomenon itself. In each case a relation is formed: in the brain a mental event occurs; in a metaphysical system, a cognition occurs.

Now comes the time of unfamiliarity, manifesting as the understanding that the letter arrangement does not permit a conception to be conjoined to it. In the brain, the information does not enable a suitable pathway. No sense can be made of the letters, hence the word is uncognizable; no pathway is enabled, no chemical reaction occurs. I have constructed no image relating to the phenomenon just presented, that matches any image already constructed as an image of familiar letter arrangements I can “recall to mind”, which is experience of words I know. No area of the brain is activated, or some area of the brain is activated but it is not suitable to the information. There are extant images to compare by (there do exist energized pathways) but no immediate image to compare with (the information does not meet the criteria of the pathway it’s on), from which follows an empty experience of a word I don’t know (the brain returns its unused energy to whatever its depository for such energy is).

If it is true that two separate and distinct methodologies having such manifest similarities must have a common ground, is sufficient reason to ask what it would be. Here, I must say I don’t know.

try to bring to mind the image of the (unknown) word as it was written. (….) You don't actually 'recall to mind' the image you just saw of it written down, but you'll think that's exactly what you're doing — Isaac

…..agreed, I don’t recall to mind the exact image I just saw written, because I’m not familiar with it, so no I don’t think that’s what I’m doing. I have immediately understood the image from perception will not correspond to any image whatsoever I already have, insofar as otherwise, it wouldn’t have been unfamiliar in the first place. I don’t understand the word I’ve seen written, therefore, in the first instance of conscious reproduction of that writing, I can do nothing with it.
(Sidebar: buried in her mini-treatise, has make explicit why this is metaphysically so)

….you'll 'see' the page, the book colour, perhaps the desk it was on… — Isaac

No, I wouldn’t admit doing any of that. Those are not the things with which I am unfamiliar. I know them so I need not think about them. Peripherals make no impression on me when I’m presented with something I don’t know. While it is the case that things I know help me with things I don’t, there remains a categorical separation between empirical knowledge of things supplementing pure a priori knowledge in the construction of cognitions. Which is actually what I’m doing….trying to cognize something for which I have no experience.

But I understand what you mean here. There are times when recalling the where’s and what’s of the forgotten can jog the memory, but the forgotten presupposes that which is not contained in the altogether unfamiliar.

….but the word will remain stubbornly un-spelt, because you're actually constructing the 'image' as you go, not recalling it as a complete image. — Isaac

…actually, I am recalling the complete image as a perception. This represents as just this thing, one of the same matter as many other things but of a completely different form. The perception of the word, even being unfamiliar, is a complete image, which is rather known as a sensation. That which I recall in mind is itself complete, so I don’t construct it as I go, except I must necessarily fail to relate the complete image recalled, to any of the recallable images of that which I know.

The recollected image will remain unspelt, yes. Or, which is the same thing, the initially perceived image in sensation and the recalled image in mind will not correspond to each other. But again, not because I’m constructing it as I go, but because I cannot construct it at all. I may try to construct, but on that I’d most likely give up. So I open the stupid book, rest on that stupid word until I become familiar with it. Or not.

Then….I’ll have to work on what the now familiar word actually means, in conjunction with another mind that already knows.
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Don't try too hard to recall the spelling deliberately — Isaac

Right, I initially wouldn’t do that. First, I’m trying to recall a duplicate whole image, not the particulars of it. Second, subsequently having granted I can’t properly recall to mind the word, its spelling is therefore quite irrelevant. I mean….if I knew the spelling I’d be familiar with the word, but I’m not, so….
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Blurry letters? Probably so, in the strictest sense of the experiment. In attempting the recall of a whole, there’s little focus on the components.

Thing is, in the strictest sense of the attainment of the experiment…..as you say, the confounding factors…. I wouldn’t cease recalling the word at that point, although I might if I have no further interest, but rather, assuming there is an interest, I would continue by then focusing on its components. If the object of the operation is attaining the word, I have no choice but to recall the letters which comprise it, and furthermore, to recall the proper arrangement of them. The fewer components comprising the word, then, by their consequently becoming the focus, wouldn’t be blurry, but still does not address their relative arrangement with each other.

Generally speaking, I’d agree with your position, in that it is very difficult to exactly recall anything for which there is minimal familiarity. But I hear there are minds capable of it. Metaphysically, there just isn’t anything significant enough in the perception to relate it to a cognition that properly represents it. Perception gives me the word itself without equivocation, but does not give a relation belonging to it.

Thanks for the interesting experiment.

Ok, thanks.

It is absolutely fascinating, that it seems as though I myself….the entire sum of entitlement…. think in images, when in fact, there couldn’t really be any. I’m prepared to swear to a figurative High Heaven my brain presents both from and to itself a relative diorama of this or that, but in seeking for the substance or the means for all those images, it shall be found the substance of the brain contains not a single image much less a compendium of them, and the means by which the material brain functions, contradicts their very possibility.

Yet….there they are. I swear.

(Sigh)

Thanks for the interest, and please note my mere opinion on the matter.

I can agree that without language we would likely hold no awareness (…) which redness can imply. — javra

it seems to me that all lesser-animal predators will be aware of red…. — javra

lesser animals do not make use of language (…) to have experiences of red. — javra

I dunno….just seemed to smack of anthropomorphism. First to say lesser animals do not make use of language, then say they have red experiences, seems to attribute to them that which is reserved for us.

Lesser predators are not aware of red or blood, for those are conceptions that belong to language using intellects. Lesser predators are aware of that which triggers their instincts, I think is as far as we should use our language in describing beings that don’t.

I deleted because I understand what you mean; overly analytical because I think it misrepresented to say it that way. But alas…..we’re freakin’ married to our own words, and don’t employ a sufficient work-around when trying to show them impossible to use.

Not to worry….

Never mind; too overly-analytical of me.

What is your opinion on the validity, and/or manifestation, of mental imagery?

It's not that there is something left unsaid, but that there is always more that can be said... — Banno

All good enough.

What’s the significant difference in the two parts of that compound statement?

where is there word usage in the constitutional activities of brain systems? — javra

There isn’t any. Believe it or not, it’s what I’ve been saying all along. Your bit on CNS cells just is the brain narrating itself, or to itself, in the form of mental states, wordlessly. I didn’t mention any particular methodology for it, seeing as how it can only arise in one way. Yours, in fact.

My clarification wasn’t clear, apparently. Dunno, maybe it can’t be.
———-

My bad — javra

Glad I noticed that. Gave me the chance to erase a two-paragraph clarification of the previous clarification, which would have been quite superfluous.

Afterthought regarding your musings and Cantor.

Brain mechanism narratives: both inconsistent and incomplete. Inconsistent because it operates under the auspices of natural law but natural law cannot explain the conscious subject, and, incomplete because if natural law is sufficient causality for the conscious subject, the conscious subject should have empirical predicates, which conscious subject as such, does not as yet appear to possess.

Inconsistent and incomplete: the brain narrates everything except narrate how it does everything.

Ta-DAAAA!!!!

It is indeed the system doing the narration, but not of experiences so much as of mental events. Does that make sense? — Isaac

Perfect sense. Brain system does its narratives of mental events, none of which is the mental event of “experience”, yet one of its mental events is the “conscious subject”, and that mental event is that which makes sense of mental event “experience”. Roundabout way of doing things, I must say.

Which gets us right back to the damnable but inescapable notion of ineffable. Anything so farging weird as mental events that apparently don’t do certain things, creating for itself events that apparently can do the things the system apparently doesn’t do, just has to be entirely ineffable, right?

….both having nothing to do with word usage. — javra

Crap. Guess I wasn’t clear enough. I intended in ’s comment that the speaker is the narrator recounting some experience, but for ’s rebuttal, I intended that the system is the narrator accounting for any experience. Thus, the first mandates the use of words, the second not only does not, but cannot, use words at all.

Sorry about that….

so the (wordless) experience comes first and the post hoc narrative follows — Janus

No, that's not how it seems to me. — Isaac

You’re both right, but approaching “narrative” from differing perspectives. In the first, the narrative is from the perspective of recounting, which necessarily presupposes a system has done its job, in the second the narrative is from the perspective of accounting, which necessarily presupposes a system by which that same job is possible to do.

, in narrating for the object, presupposes but cannot immediately narrate for the system; , in narrating for the system, immediately accounts for the object but cannot narrate a recount of it.

For the irreducible proof, you ask? Simple: humans think necessarily, but not sufficiently, in terms of brain states, hence realism is false.

Ahhhh….but if that which is considered as mere thought is necessarily given from brain states alone, then idealism is false.

Oh dear. Whattodowhattodowhattodo…..

The original topic has for its subject external objects perfectly narrated (described/explained/viewed/comprehended). Responses to you, now, must address the topic having the narrative as its subject, which is a different topic.

This sentence is not part of the ultimate narrative — Banno

……is true but irrelevant because the object represented as a sentence is not part of whatever object is being narrated perfectly as an external object, and second it is redundant because it’s already established that no ultimate narrative is possible whether there is an object such as that sentence or not. On the other hand, the sentence is false insofar as it is possible to narrate it perfectly, as an object in itself, merely by repeating it, as it the case anything constructed exclusively by reason can be perfectly reconstructed by reason.

There’s your contradiction. A manufactured causality, and thus sufficient reason, for the validity of the notion humans are very good at intentionally confusing themselves.

If I make the attempt to tell you all there is to know about a ‘57 DeSoto…..what the hell difference does “this sentence is not part of the ultimate narrative (of ‘57 DeSoto’s)” make? What is the sentence even doing there in the first place? I sure as hell didn’t include it in my narrative. This is what I mean by instigating an informal fallacy….you know, goalposts and moving them from the end zone clean out to the parking lot.
————

The phrase stuck with me, this is the first time I've linked it to model-dependant realism. Perennially interesting thing about philosophy is where these crossovers are that one had never thought of. — Isaac

Yeah, true. I mean…even realism is a model, which reduces all models ever, to a purely subjective origin. It’s always amazed me how little the pure subject has escaped proper consideration. I know why, but I’m amazed nonetheless for it.
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….the association of a word (or any noise at all) with an expectation is mediated primarily by the hippocampus and just works by associating previous responses with a kind of 'mock up' of that response repeated (but not carried out). — Isaac

In cognitive metaphysics, hippocampus is experience, associating previous responses is reproductive imagination, and kind of ‘mock up’ is intuition. In effect, science has merely physically located that which speculative philosophy already understood as necessary. Metaphysics subjectively modeled; science objectively verified the model.

All’s well.

an "ultimate" narrative can be either consistent or complete, but not both. — Banno

If an ultimate narrative, wouldn’t it be complete? If so, an ultimate narrative cannot be consistent. But there’s nothing in a complete narrative that makes necessary it is therefore inconsistent. Paraphrasing ’s words, capturing external states in perfection makes explicit a consistent narrative, insofar as the negation of it would be a contradiction, re: an inconsistent narrative cannot be a perfect capture.

it seems pretty unlikely that there could be such an "ultimate" narrative, sicne to avoid contradiction the narrative must remain incomplete. — Banno

The contradiction here, though, regards true or false in competing narratives. For a single true narrative, to avoid contradictions, the narrative only needs to be internally consistent.

we deny realism, in such a way that the narratives have some third truth value. — Banno

Dunno so much about third truth value, but I’d deny strict and stand-alone realism in favor of an underlying predication.

What is it you say, something about being able to think what you like so long as it's not contradictory? Something like that, I think is true of social constructs. — Isaac

….so long as I don’t contradict myself. Cool as hell of you to remember that. As for its relation to social constructs, asking you to explain that would take you away from your engagement here, so I won’t.

I depart from many realists in in there being a single 'true' narrative that somehow captures external states in perfection. — Isaac

Agreed; the realist proper likes to think he can tell the external states what they are. There remains the certain kind of idealist, on the other hand, who asks those states what they might be.

I just don't see external states as being so closely tied to our modeling methods. — Isaac

Nor do I, in general. So closely tied meaning captured perfectly. And that which is closely tied, narrated near-perfectly, has nothing to do with external states, but they nevertheless serve as verifications for our modeling methods.

experiences are post hoc constructions, they're narratives we use…. — Isaac

Interesting synopsis.

our word 'red' acts as an off-the-shelf ready-made narrative — Isaac

So the child learning. Is it his teacher/parent/sandbox buddy that puts “red” on his shelf? If the sociological theme for the ground of our experiences is true, is it the case the child doesn’t need that “disparate/contradictory process” for his constructed narrative? And, of course, if he does need it, simply from the fact he has a brain and thinks for himself, the sociological theme would surely be false.

I agree “red” acts as an off-the-shelf narrative for use post hoc, along with every other possible “__” experience. But ‘tis a veritable beggar’s banquet, I say, not to consider how they were one and all put there in the first place.

C’mon, man.

When we accept that premise of human deficiency it is necessary that we believe in things which cannot be grasped by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..and when we accept the natural limitations of a given system, we don’t need to lament what it can’t do.

This, the human mind is a continually evolving system. — Metaphysician Undercover

….but can never evolve out of the kind of system it is. (Remember….dialectical consistency)

we can take your premise, that the human mind is deficient — Metaphysician Undercover

….which was never my premise.

If, whenever something appears like it is unintelligible — Metaphysician Undercover

….an unintelligible can never be an appearance. If something appears to us, it is a phenomenon, hence possibly intelligible. So, yes, I can neglect your use of appearance, because I don’t consider intelligibility and appearance related to each other.

the human mind has the capacity to know all things — Metaphysician Undercover

….an unjustified assertion, insofar as it is impossible to know all the things there are. The very best to be said is the mind has the capacity to know all things presented to it.

I posited a situation in which something appears to be unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

….and I’m arguing the conditions for what unintelligible necessarily is.

If the philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and understand all things, then what is the point to accepting a premise (human deficiency) which forces the necessary conclusion that there are things which cannot be known? — Metaphysician Undercover

….it is absurd to suppose understanding of all things. The occasions in which some things are misunderstood verifies limits. Nothing ever being misunderstood is the only sufficient ground for the possibility of understanding all things.

how do we allow for evolution of the human mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

The human mind adapts; the human body evolves. The mind adapts in conjunction with experience.
(Remember….I detest the use of “mind” anyway, always preferring “reason”).

On and on it goes. Give it up and go have a turkey leg or something.

On inconsistency:

It may be the case I should have been more attentive to the clarity of my writing, or, it may be the case you should have been more attentive to the subtleties in your reading. Call it a toss-up?
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Let's say that it is possible that there are things which could never be brought into the mind, cannot be known by human intelligence. And lets respect this as simply a possibility. Now here's the tricky part. You say that you've been advocating this possibility, yet you then say that you see no point to "believing in" it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmm….I wasn’t advocating the possibility of things.

things which could never be brought into the mind, not even though the use of mathematics? That might be the true ineffable.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. What I’ve been advocating. — Mww

I was advocating the truly ineffable, which manifests as a certain impossibility of the mind.
—————-

quote="Metaphysician Undercover;758401"]….you then say that you see no point to "believing in" it.[/quote]

quote="Mww;758343"]What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then?
— Metaphysician Undercover

I can’t think of one.[/quote]

To believe in THE ineffable is to believe in things that are ineffable. If truly ineffable is only the condition of the mind for the reception of certain things, what point is there in believing in the very things the mind could never receive?
————

Let’s say it is possible there are things…
Let’s say there are possible things that can never be known by the human mind….
Let’s respect this as a simple possibility….

“respect this” is singular, which implies a singular mind’s knowledge. If you meant “respect this” as pertaining to possible things, you should have said “respect them”. It is contradictory for it to be simply possible that the mind cannot do an impossible thing, while it is a simple possibility there are things.
————

quote="Mww;758343"]Is it possible, that there are such things…
— Metaphysician Undercover

(…) we cannot declare such things are impossible in themselves….[/quote]

To state the existent of a thing as not impossible, is not to advocate that it is. There’s no logic in positing a possible existence when it is absolutely impossible to form a judgement with respect to it. How could we ever say a thing is possible if it has absolutely no chance of ever being an object met with our intelligence? What could be said about a thing for which we couldn’t even begin to speculate? To say such is not impossible carries more truth value than to merely say such thing may be possible.

we will never know whether we can actually understand things where it appears like they might possibly be unintelligible to us — Metaphysician Undercover

We DO know we can never understand the unintelligible exclusively from the reality of that which IS intelligible. Pretty simple really. If intelligibility is this, anything not this is unintelligible. Besides…doesn’t “unintelligible” factually denote a non-understanding? Absurd to posit the unintelligible, then turn right around and say maybe we just don’t understand it. There may be a veritable plethora of reasons for not understanding, but the irreducible, primary reason must necessarily be because it was unintelligible to begin with.

THAT is what the ineffable is all about. Hasn’t a gawddamn thing to do with things, but only with the limitations on the system that comprehends things.

So, let's assume the possibility, that there is a huge part of reality which is completely undisclosed to our senses, and never comes to anyone's mind in any conception, sense image, or anything like that. Would you agree that this logical possibility validates the notion of ineffability? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Validity of the notion, not the conception itself. Point being, the notion of impossibility carries the exact same implication as the notion of ineffability. Impossibility in turn, carries the power and weight of a pure categorical conception, whereas ineffability is a mere logical construct.

Further, we have mathematics which produces evidence of this large part of reality which is not sensed, nor has it entered into human minds, concepts like spatial expansion, dark energy and dark matter. (…) It's not truly ineffable because for everything which hasn't yet entered the mind there is a possibility that it may. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. This is elaboration of ’s knowledge in practice.

Is it possible, that there are such things which could never be brought into the mind, not even though the use of mathematics? (…) That might be the true ineffable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. What I’ve been advocating. There’s even an example of what something like that would be. Those cannot be named as existents, simply from the thesis that our manner of naming things could not possibly be applied to them. It is tacit acknowledgement that we have no warrant to claim our intelligence is the only possible kind of intelligence there is, from which follows that we cannot declare such things are impossible in themselves but only that they are absolutely impossible for our kind of intelligence. And it isn’t because we don’t know how, but that we are not even equipped for it.

What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then? — Metaphysician Undercover

I can’t think of one. If a thing is already impossible, what’s the point in calling the same thing something else?
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The point though, was that you know I am referring to a particular called "the box", not because I have not pointed out this particular and given it that name, but because you know the type of thing which is called a box. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I know you’re referring to the box, but no, there’s nothing contained in what you told me that justifies I should have already known what the word you wrote, “box”, stands for. Dialectical consistency demands I work only with that which has been given to me, and from that, I couldn’t deduce the type of thing you’re talking about is something I should already know. I brought this to your attention with the parenthetical.

So in order for the word to do its job, you need to respect both, that "box" refers to a universal, and that it refers to a particular. And the need to know both is required for one specific instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I need a universal in order for a particular to be possible on the one hand, and cognizable on the other. My contention is only that “box” isn’t it. Put another way, box is a conception itself subsumed under a more encompassing conception, e.g., “container”, hence cannot be a universal, which is not subsumed under a conception, insofar as there are none greater than it.

And if I do know what the word “box” stands for, which means your signification and mine are congruent, I know what I’m expected to get.
— Mww

But the congruency in many cases is a feature of the conception, rather than pointing out a particular, and the conception is what allows you to identify the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but being feature of congruent conceptions reduces to congruent understandings, which I hinted at by prefacing my comment with the necessity for congruent intelligences, which includes understanding.

I am referring to a particular, my car, but I lead you to it through an understanding of the conceptions, "black", "Civic", "far corner of the lot", not by physically pointing out the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

And there it is: precisely the missing conceptual schema of “box”. And while the inclusive schema with respect to the car isn’t physically pointing, I have a much greater chance of locating it because of them. Besides….you didn’t point to the box either. You just told me to go get one.

Good stuff. Socrates would be happy.

Every animal has a natural limit to its intellectual powers — RussellA

Yep, and overstepping those limits determines the extend of subterfuge….self-deception….and recognizing them prevents it.
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As Javra writes, there is the unknowable in principle and there is the unknown in practice. The unknowable in principle cannot be put into words. The unknown in practice can be put into words but only after it is known, meaning that when unknown it cannot be put into words, but when known it can be put into words. It remains true that "only the unknown cannot be put into words" — RussellA

We’ve already agreed it is necessarily true only the unknow-able cannot be put into words. Anything else is either redundant or superfluous, sustained by….

…..Unknown in practice is merely a condition of experience, susceptible to possible amendment.

…..Unknowable in principle is altogether unsusceptible to any condition of experience.

…..Unknown in practice, an a posteriori condition, and unknowable in principle, an a priori condition, are completely distinct from each other and have no business being intermingled.

……The unknown in practice is not conditioned by, and does not adhere to, the principle that the unknowable is impossible to conceive and thereby represent in words.

……The unknowable in principle absolutely cannot change its state by becoming known in practice, but the unknown in practice, can.

That lightning was not manifestation of the anger of the gods was not unknowable to the ancients in principle; it was merely a matter of unknown practical knowledge.

But none of that you didn’t already know. I’m just reiterating the maxims grounding an seemingly inconsequential conclusion.

There aren't any words for the thing to be talked about, making people think that it can't be talked about, but really we're just free to make the words up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, just as we do for every single word ever. Which leads inevitably to….under what conditions is it impossible for a word to be invented, such that the object the word would represent, remains impossible to talk about. Then and only then, does the notion of ineffability attain its logical validity.
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The word representing a universal conception won’t refer to a particular example of it.
— Mww

The issue though is why, or how. Suppose I write here, the word "box", and I tell you that this word signifies something, it stands for something. How do you know whether it signifies a particular which I have named, or whether it is a concept which the word refers to. You say it can't be both, but why not? — Metaphysician Undercover

That you are communicating with me presupposes congruent intelligence.

That being the case, and under the assumption I don’t know what “box” indicates, nevertheless, by perceiving the expression itself and alone, I immediately understand “box” presupposes a conception you have denominated, however arbitrarily, by that particular representation. Otherwise, I surmise you couldn’t have expressed the word, insofar as, due to our congruent intelligences, I couldn’t if it were me. If left at this point, I may or may not consider “box” a universal conception, because I don’t know what the word indicates.

On the other hand, if I already know what “box” means, I also understand it isn’t a universal conception, because I know it is a particular thing and the Principle of Complementarity tells me the one can never be the other.

If I say "get me the box", I refer to a particular, but you know what thing to get me because of the concept — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. Depends on the extent of my experience. As before, if I don’t know, without experience, you informing me that “box” signifies something, while reducing the conception to a particular in the class of things, doesn’t inform me as to what kind of particular thing in that class it is. So I wouldn’t know what to get merely from the signification of something.

And if I do know what the word “box” stands for, which means your signification and mine are congruent, I know what I’m expected to get.
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Suppose I write here, the word "box", and I tell you (what this word signifies) that this words signifies something, (what it stands for) stands for something. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you’d written the parentheticals rather than the crossed outs, I wouldn’t have that argument to make.

HA!!! Nice try.

Isn't "ineffable" reserved for stuff that we cannot in principle say? — Banno

I’m gathering that’s the consensus opinion, yes. Just seems rather silly to overburden what was already impossible, with another word that doesn’t change anything.

Anything at all, that cannot follow from principles, is impossible. So why does it need to be ineffable too?

I can't put that "knowing" into words that could communicate what she looks like such that you could, on the basis of what I told you. recognized her on the street. — Janus

To your personal subjectivity, your experience is unrelatable to me. But you’re not relating an experience, you’re relating a certain understanding of the properties you have already thought as belonging to an object I will eventually perceive. If our intelligences are sufficient congruent, which they very well should be, I should be able to transpose your words back into my standing intuitions, such that I will perceive exactly what you are enabling me to do.

As for generalities, the more properties you relay to me, the less general the description becomes, hence the easier to recognize the person.

Still, in one respect, you’re correct, in that merely perceiving the correct person in a crowd is very far from knowing the person. But, technically, that wasn’t the knowledge you enabled me to acquire with a mere descriptive appearance.

So I submit that you can put your knowing into words, at least for that which you want me to do with it.

See? — Banno

If we were playing ball, I’d have to concede a score.

if I know how to describe a painting but also know that I don’t know how to describe the particulars of how the painting makes me feel, then the painting’s properties will be effable to me but not the precise aesthetic experience which the painting provokes in me. — javra

Understood, and that’s the common argument, yes. The counterargument is that feelings per se are not cognitions, hence that part of understanding from which conceptions and the words representing them arise, and from which cognitions follow, is inactive with respect to feelings. So, while it is the case feelings cannot be put into words, the aesthetic judgements which follow from them, can, and those are to which we put words.

Simply put, we don’t speak apodeitically of feelings because understanding doesn’t treat them as objects of reason. Another way to look at it, feelings regard the condition of the conscious subject, whereas understanding regards the condition of the conscious subject’s intellect. This has support when we consider that sometimes it just doesn’t make sense to feel a certain way about a certain thing, e.g., doesn’t make sense to cry over beautiful music.
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….need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge?
— Mww

It need not be unknowable in principle, just unknown in practice - and we would need to know that it is so. — javra

Doesn’t the unknown in practice still require an explanatory principle? I should think that if it is the case that knowledge is only possible in conjunction with principles, the criteria for the unknowable must be either the negation of those, the validity of its own, or the absence of any. But principles at any rate.

Only that which is unknown cannot be put into words. Only that which is unknown is ineffable. If it is known, it can be put into words and is expressible. — RussellA

All well-said.

Do we….or do we not….still need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge? Seems like that would be the logical query to follow, “only the unknown cannot be put into words”.

It's not the conception that's ineffable, nor any part of the conception. It is the difference between the conception of what the word refers to, and what the word really refers to in a particular instance of use, which is ineffable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok…..need the rest of the paragraph to unpack this.

There is a number of ways to look at this. If the conception is a universal, and what the word refers to is a particular, there is a difference between these. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure there’s a difference, but there’s nothing ineffable about it. The word representing a universal conception won’t refer to a particular example of it. The universal conception represented by the word “change” says nothing about particular instances of that which changes. The manifold of conceptions involved in the proposition, “the branches swaying in the wind make a joyful noise” has no need for, and forwards no cognition of, “change”.

If the conception is a representation, and there is something represented, then there is a difference between these. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough. Herein is the limit of metaphysical reductionism. Conceptions represent thoughts….but there is no justifiable hypothesis for the origin of thoughts. If one wishes to call the origin of thought ineffable, insofar as there are no words to describe it, that’s fine, but we’ve already understood we just have no idea from whence come thoughts, so why bother with overburdening the impossibility with ineffability?
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The problem is that we try to talk about things which we cannot conceptualize The lack of conceptualization is what makes it so we cannot talk about it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, well….proof positive folks generally put more stock in their talk than their thought. Pity them, I say.

That is the ineffable, we try to talk about something which we cannot talk about, due to a lack of conceptualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

Truth be told, I don’t agree that’s what we’re doing. You say the problem is we try to do this thing we can’t do, I say we can’t even do, in any way, shape or form, what you say we’re trying to do, so the problem itself you say we have, should just disappear and along with it, the very notion of ineffability.

This is just as much fun as trying to fathom why some of us are right-handed and some are left. Why some of us like spinach and some of us gag on it. Only product there can be is fun; we ain’t gonna solve anything here, are we.

I don't think it's usually about greatness. — frank

Ehhhh….just one of several predicates in a definition. Any qualitative superlative would work.

It's just that words are sometimes like fingers and some of experience falls through the open hands of language. — frank

Oh, you silver-tongued devil, you.

This inability to account for the entirety of the context is what validates the claim of an "ineffable". — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it not follow, if all that’s needed is sufficient context, rather than entire context, that the claim “ineffable” is invalid?

If it is the case that all thoughts are conceptions, and all conceptions are represented by the word(s) that refer to them…..how can any conception be too great to be described? The representation just is the description. How can any conception, then, be ineffable?

So that which is ineffable has no word by which it is referred. For that of which there is no word, there is no conception that is the necessary presupposition for it, for otherwise, there must be conceptions without representation, which is self-contradictory, hence, unintelligible.

Imagination is that which presents objects without there actually being one. Imagination can present any thinkable object, which makes explicit imagination can present any thing that can be conceived, can be represented by words, can never be too great to be talked about.

Ineffable: a useless euphemism intended to obfuscate the fact it is impossible to conceive anything too great to be talked about. It merely indicates a way to escape the explanatory pigeonhole.

Well enough to make the list of only three choices. I’d say he still doing quite well.

Also, depends on which main question is asked about. For instance, for “a priori knowledge”, for which Kant is the more or less established authority, 72% find it acceptable.