Would you agree that thinking space and time as the "pure forms of intuition" and discovering the categories of judgement do both entail reflection on experience? — Janus

Sure. Thinking about the doing, and setting the doing to theory, is one thing.The actual doing, in and of itself, as an intrinsic modus operandi, is quite another.

Nature is the boss, no doubt, and our experience is governed by it, which has never been contested. We still wish to understand what it is to experience, what may be the conditions by which it is possible for us, which puts us in somewhat of a jam, insofar as we ourselves determine those conditions, but whatever we come up with cannot be in contradiction with Nature.

Are there pure intuitions? Probably not, but experience informs us that objects have a relation to each other and to us. Are there pure conceptions of the understanding? Probably not, but experience informs us of quantities, of causes, of intensities, and so on. Or, does understanding inform experience of the specifics of all those because our intelligence is naturally disposed to recognize the universal form of each of them? It can only be one or the other and however we seek to explain all that makes no difference, as long as Nature remains uncontested.

“…..The understanding gives to experience, according to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible….”

There probably aren’t any of the metaphysical conceptions. No such thing as reason, judgement, knowledge and whatnot. They’re inventions, meant to explain in the absence of truth, but never intended to prove in the absence of fact. I’m sure you must see the problem, that historically takes so much care in exposing, in that it is we that propose to Nature the rules by which it operates, but in doing so, we should have prohibited ourselves from the capacity for proposing, re: the absolute determinism of natural law with respect to the brain, should not allow the indeterminate possibility of subjective inference.

We’re left with doing the best we can, in not making more of a shitstorm of things than we already have.

an example of pure a priori knowledge and explain how it could be gained in the absence of any prior experience? — Janus

Mathematics. And because not only are its conceptions created by us, but so too are the objects subsumed under the conceptions. Not the rote instruction in mathematics you got since you learned to keep the pointy end of the pencil down, but rather, the principles legislating mathematical operations, which to know you must think.

I may have interpreted Kant in ways which make sense to me….. — Janus

What else could you do? Same as everyone, right?

Yes, I know. But ’s argument is just as valid in its own right. The major difference being, the one, yours, relates to and supports transcendental philosophy, the other, not so much.

You’re both right. There is a priori knowledge derived from extant experience, but in Kant, the stipulation is made that when he talks of a priori knowledge, he means absent any and all experience. The first is “impure”, the second, “pure”, and the second is the meaning throughout. This stipulation is on the first pages of the entire treatise, indicating its importance.

“….. Knowledge à priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge à priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is, through experience....”

The synthetic/analytic dichotomy, however, relates to judgement alone, insofar as these distinguish only the relative content of conceptions in a proposition to each other, which is a function of understanding. We can say we have knowledge based on synthetic a priori cognitions, but that is not to say we have synthetic a priori knowledge. Case in point, that every change universally and necessarily presupposes a cause, is a synthetic proposition understood purely a priori, but change is itself an empirical conception entirely dependent on intuitions, which makes explicit any knowledge derived from it, is empirical.

And if that doesn’t work for you, check out his simple arithmetic brainstorm.

Hope that helps, at least a little….

Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions — RussellA

Good onya for the reference. Exactly the one I would have used.

Not so good in calling out red and left as things given to us in perception. What sensation do you get from left? What does up feel like? Why does a thing look red to you but the very same thing look some crappy shade of pink to me?

perception allows for an awareness of what specifically distinguishes an object from others. — RussellA

Perception allows for awareness, is just another way of saying perception is that by which awareness is possible, but says nothing whatsoever of what that awareness entails. We would never be physically aware of things if we didn’t have a sensation of them through perception.

You’ve admitted the sensation of an itch doesn’t give you the cause of it. An itch is the perception which serves as awareness of an object. But you can’t distinguish from the sensation what the object is, only that there is one.

And finally, the one thing that specifically distinguishes one thing from another, is the one thing that doesn’t belong to either, and is not perceived in our awareness of the sensation the thing gives us.
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Anything with the slightest hint of anthropology or psychology isn’t proper metaphysics.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain…. — RussellA

Oh. Well alrighty then. Which state would that be, that relates to the representation of space, and to no other representation in the least? From which neural pathway would that originate? There are 3.6b neural connectors per mm3 in the human brain, any one considerable as being itself a state of the brain.

So what we have heah….in best Strother Martin imitation….is a tautological truth: everything a human does mentally reduces to a brain state, which, of course, tells us not a damn thing regarding what we really want to know.

And brain states aren’t Innatism; they’re cognitive neuroscience. Or quantum biology maybe. Sure as hell ain’t proper metaphysics.
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For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds. — RussellA

Yes, as I said. Pure cognition in our minds, is understanding.

It comes down to the meaning of perception. — RussellA

As it should. Since it is Kant’s notion of space and time being discussed, we would use Kant’s notion of perception. Which is……?

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. — RussellA

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception.
————

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, — RussellA

C’mon, man. If Innatism, indicating a dedicated doctrine in itself….it is an -ism, is it not???…. was so much a part of historic philosophy, why is not the term nor the doctrine as such, found in it? That there are innate ideas or notions or subjective conditions in the human intellect goes as far back as rational discourse, but as a topic in its own right, it is modern psychology. Those that followed, deemed historic philosophers to be intimating Innatism, even if they themselves never described it as an -ism.

“…. It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of preformation system of pure reason—a middle way between the two—to wit, that the categories are neither innate and first à priori principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence….”

I, speaking only for myself, would never be so presumptuous as to suppose…..well, this is what he said, but this is what he really meant.
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As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ? — RussellA

Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone.

Following the yellow brick road gets you to the conclusion there is no such thing as a non-empirical intuition; such is pure a priori, which only denotes the mode of the cognition for its place in the system, and not its function.
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Your claims are not groundless, I must admit…..

“…. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name of space….”

….in which it does seem as if the subjective condition is itself innate. But don’t confuse a subjective condition from which departure is possible hence is contingent, re: the means by which we are affected by objects given a different theoretical system, for a necessary one from which no departure is possible, re: the logical predicates of one particular system. Which just says….if this then that necessarily, but your this may be different than mine.

……both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism. — RussellA

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. Nevertheless….

“….. Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined à priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in general…”

…...gives the impression of a form of standing henceforth classified as Innatism. On the other hand, one must be cautioned against obtaining Innatism as a formal capacity of the subject in general, from the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects. I think Kant would attribute pure reason and pure practical morality as innate formal capacities in subjects as such, leaving the formal capacity of being affected by objects, to sensibility.

Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person. — charles ferraro

“…. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)….”
(A143/B183)

The determinations of the changeable is the same everywhere for every person. Time is not that.

All Einstein did was show the determinations of the changeable is the same for everyone iff they are each in the same everywhere as the change being determined.

I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time. — RussellA

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind. — RussellA

Yes, sure seems that way, donnit? Conventionally speaking, its what Everydayman accepts as the facts. If you’re ok with it….so be it.

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended.

The space and time we perceive we must also experience — RussellA

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception.

The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience. — RussellA

That which exists independently of us is that which can be an affect on our senses and is thereby a possible representation in us as phenomenon. Space or time, because they are not perceptions, are not affects on our senses, therefore are not possible as a phenomenon, therefore are not that which is known as an existence independent of us.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us. — RussellA

Kant says we don’t perceive space or time, space and time do not exist independently of us insofar as they do not exist at all, so your interpretation is not what he’s arguing. To argue an objective validity is not to promote an existence.

Where the difficulty in understanding occurs generally, is the mediate conclusion derived in the transcendental thesis, that an objective validity without an empirical reality accompanying it, is the same as being an ideal. Further exacerbated by the method by which the former is necessary yet the latter is not even remotely possible, with respect to knowledge a posteriori, which seems contradictory. Which reduces to understanding exactly how, in Kant, the origin of space and time as ideal conceptions is accomplished, irrespective of their employment regarding the possibility of experience itself, and thereby granted as metaphysically legitimate conditions.

Kantian space and time are not experiences.

Understood.

I’m listening.

the importance of an "ontological commitment" validating that a belief is genuinely held. — Pantagruel

Sure. To hold a belief presupposes the something to which it relates. There must be something that serves as the object of the belief, hence the necessary ontological commitment. Nevertheless, to hold a belief says nothing about the means of its origin.

I agree belief is constitutive of consciousness. But then, in humans, everything rational is constitutive of consciousness, so in that respect, there is nothing particularly significant in merely holding some belief or another.

Nahhh…I’m not getting into the belief/knowledge mudhole. I favor what you said about intuition, that’s the important part.

….knowledge (…) contains the framework of its own validation. Intuition doesn’t. — Pantagruel

I’ll disagree with that. Insofar as intuition is a faculty, it must contain its own framework from which it obtains its validity. Knowledge, by the same token, is not a faculty, hence does not contain a framework at all. Knowledge is an end; the means are elsewhere.

We’re saying the same thing for all practical purposes, in language two centuries apart.

Except for the trust part; that I can’t reconcile with disparities in language. My problem, not yours.

So intuition is what bridges the gap between the cognitions made possible within discursive thought, and the reality that is being cognized. — Pantagruel

YEA!!! Best rendition of the nature of intuition yet, I think.

In essence, it is about making estimates that are based on information that is extracted from an idealized model of your perceptions. — Pantagruel

BOO!!! Extracted from a model? To build a model requires information, so, what….information is put in to build it, then extracted from it? Why not extract information from perception and build an idealized model from that?

Actually, this is probably what you meant to say. There is an idealized model of the information received from perception, it even has its own name; intuition constructs the model but does not use it, hence, the notion of being a bridge.

…..allowing yourself to trust that faculty…. — Pantagruel

Might I suggest the trust is misplaced?

Ok. Thanks.

It is a fine ideal, that requires one to be honest with oneself about ones' motivations, but modern reporting is inclined to be motivated most of all by fear of appearing biased — unenlightened

Agreed. Fear of appearing biased is almost worse that actually being so. Peer pressure, job security and the like overriding intrinsic personality.

Or that there is some irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated? — hypericin

Under the assumption of any form of report by an individual subject, cognitive prejudice is an irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated. But its conflicts can be recognized and subsequently guarded against.

As I listen to music I "know" implicitly the many contexts that are there — Astrophel

I think I know what it is to know. — Astrophel

Why is it, and what does it mean, that know is given two significations here? What do the scare quotes in the one but missing from the other, indicate?

The cow has been grazing for years, say, and it looks up a sees what memory informs her to be 'good eating over there" but not conceptualized, obviously. She moves over there. To me, this bears the mark of reason's conditional proposition. — Astrophel

For me, it is self-contradictory. Reason’s conditional proposition just is conceptualized. If there is no conceptualization, there is no mark of reason, in humans. To speak of any other cognizance or possible cognizance, is anthropomorphic and thereby “….exhibition of pitiful sophisms quite beneath the dignity of philosophy…”
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In the world, what authorizes logic, so to speak, is some kind of a posteriori presence…. — Astrophel

In the world, what validates logic is some kind of a posteriori presence.

metaphysics needs to be conceived as an essential part of our existence — Astrophel

Metaphysics needs to be understood as an essential part of our kind of intelligence. Existence is necessarily presupposed, but metaphysics has no part in it.

….this presence itself stands beyond classification. I hold that presence is metaphysics… — Astrophel

Self-contradictory. Presence beyond classification is contradicted by being classified as metaphysics.

It is wrong to think of rationality in terms of the abstract "authoritative" logic it produces — Astrophel

Backwards: logic produces rationality, under the auspices of a particular speculative metaphysical theory, insofar as the human cognitive system is itself a self-sustaining tripartite logical system, manifesting as rational or irrational thought, pursuant to the proper or improper use of its authoritative grounding principles.

If it is the case rationality produces abstract authoritative logic, and it is wrong to think in terms of it, what is there left to think of rationality in terms of?

Logic is actually "of a piece" with affectivity, and the open ended nature of this is not the impossibility and foolishness of reason grasping beyond its means, but a desire that seeks consummation. — Astrophel

I personally have no use for the conception of “affectivity” with respect to a priori methodological predicates, and even less use for the notion that the open-endedness of logic, is a desire. The subject is that which desires. If logic desires, can it also want? Can it need? Can logic possess an interest? Logic is merely a cognitive method in itself, and to associate an aesthetic condition to it merely weakens its place as ground of the system to which it belongs.
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The idea here was that when reason is set upon something to "understand" it, it tends to produce something of its own abstract utility, a conclusion qua conclusion, which is simply a logical function. — Astrophel

Reason is not set upon something to understand, even if it does produce a conclusion qua conclusion, which is certainly a logical function. Hence the notion that the human cognitive system, in and of itself, is inherently logical.

The conclusion qua conclusion reason sets itself upon, resides in the relation of the abstract utility of understanding in its synthesis of conceptions, to the series of such synthetic conjunctions in judgement, such that the one does not conflict with the other, or, to show that they do. In this way alone, is it therefore possible to learn about a thing only once a posteriori rather than upon each occassion of is perception, or to think by means of the construction of conceptions not influenced by phenomena, re: mathematical objects and fundamental grounding principles.
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Do I have that right? — Janus

As far as what you said, yes. Or close enough. But what you said doesn’t properly address the unity of apperception, which was itself misrepresented in what you were responding to. The transcendental unity of apperception is a principle and nothing more, by means of which human understanding as an independent faculty, is even theoretically possible.

“….. The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception…..”

In addition, that the understanding has the capacity to think objects on its own accord yet without being conditioned by the categories, which are noumena, understanding does not think the synthetical unity of apperception as an object so unconditioned, hence there is nothing whatsoever noumenal about it.

As an aside, transcendental the conception, reduces ultimately to the possibility of a priori cognitions. That which is transcendental, then, is that from which anything purely a priori follows, or is derivable. Transcendental this or transcendental that merely indicates a logical function of understanding in conceptions, and reason in subsuming conceptions under principles.

The why of this, is found in the necessity for accounting for how it is possible to come up with stuff never to be found in Nature originated by Nature. It is an irrefutable observation this is done by humans generally, and always has been, but no account for it had even been given from the perspective of the very same intelligence that is actually doing it. Attributing to the supersensible (pre-Enlightenment theologians) or denying completely (Renaissance/Enlightenment empiricists) the validity of pure a priori cognitions the ground and origin of which resides in the cognitive power of the thinking subject himself, met its demise in 1781. At long last. But not that we’re any the better off for it.

I agree, it is inherently and irreducibly a personal condition. — Judaka

YEA!! That means I interpreted the title correctly. Or at least, sympathetically. Morality is personal.

Objective moralists will indeed disagree with me, as you say. But an objective moralist is an ill-disguised behaviorist, which means he begins by barking up the wrong tree.

Anyway, problem solved, and…..thanks.

Morality can have a social effect, certainly, but I don’t think that makes morality any less an irreducibly personal condition.

Yes I read the OP. Interpreting the title as I did, I questioned whether the initial argument was sufficient support for it.

I am arguing that morality is always both personal & social, and never just personal. What you've said doesn't indicate whether or not you agree with that. — Judaka

I wanted a better understanding of what you mean by personal morality is just morality.

I disagree morality is both personal and social. Morality is personal as a function of will, ethics is social as a function of behavior. A decidedly minority opinion, to be sure, but I’m ok with it.

Is all doing thinking?…… — Astrophel

I’m going with an unqualified yes, except for sheer reflex or accident.

…..Implicitly, yes; I would say a cow standing in a meadow "thinks" when it sees taller more tempting grass. — Astrophel

If implicitly yes, as do I, but…..a cow??? And a cow “thinking”. Is that different than a cow thinking? Maybe “thinking” is a euphemism for instinct. Dunno, but I seriously doubt a majority of lesser animals, if not all of them, have any conception of relative heights as a function of temptation. He goes to taller grass because he doesn’t have to bend his neck so far, not because its tempting.

I agree with you, in that I know what it is to know. One thing I know, is that I don’t know what goes on in a cow’s head, and therefore wouldn’t ever suggest anything about it.
———-

….reason, left ungrounded in worldly confirmation, moves to inventing metaphysical nonsense. — Astrophel

Absolutely. But that isn’t so much a Kantian fallacy as the prime example of the human disposition to think beyond its logical authority. As true these days as it’s ever been.

….when reason conceives of what it is to be a "rational truth" according to its own model, it creates an abstraction out of reason. — Astrophel

Yeah, the intrinsic circularity of reason herself. Nothing to be done about the way Nature made us.
———-

Truth as a philosophical idea requires actual occasions of truth to be revealed for what they are PRIOR to analysis, not after. — Astrophel

I don’t think occasions of truth are antecedent to the philosophical idea of truth. How would we know a thing is true if we didn’t already know what form any truth must have? Are not universals prior to particulars? How could particulars be analyzed without the universal to which it necessarily relates?

If all truths are contained in propositions, and the simplest possible proposition that cannot possibly be false is the gauge by which all other occasions of truth would be judged, it follows that the idea is before the occasion.

I’ll grant that occasions of truth must be revealed for what they are prior to analysis of possible truths.

You begin with the idea personal morality is just morality.

If I begin with the idea morality is personal, would you say we’re beginning with the same general idea?

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

On second look, perhaps it has.

philosophy conceived as "feast of thought" (….) and while it certainly is this, it begs the question, what is thought? — Astrophel

What if it could be said what thought is by what it does? If only this can be done by thinking, then the doing of this is thinking. If I think of, or cognize, a dog as fur, teeth, a tail, a nose, in a certain arrangement, and if fur, teeth, tails and noses represent conceptions I’ve thought, than I should be authorized to say….thought is cognition by means of synthesis of conceptions to each other. And its negation works just as well, insofar as if I cannot connect a set of conceptions to each other, then I have no authority to say I’ve thought anything at all.
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but thought is never simply thought; it is inherently aesthetic (see Dewey on this — Astrophel

What does he mean by aesthetic? Something like a feeling? If so, I call that a subjective condition, but deny thought as a subjective condition while maintaining that feeling is. Thought, then, would revert to a condition of the faculty from which it arises, which is understanding.
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Truth isn't, nor has it ever been, just a propositional affair — Astrophel

Why not? What would prevent it from being just a propositional affair? What is truth such that it cannot be merely propositional? Propositional implies a relation, so what if everything the human intellect does, is relational? It follows necessarily then, that truth must be a propositional affair.

Having suggested that philosophy, as you say, is an affective, makes explicit a relation between it and that which is affected. So….there ya go: truth, insofar as it is a philosophically determinable judgement in accordance with the laws of logical thought, is indeed a propositional affair. With the obvious caveat that we’re not talking about what is true, but only what being true, is.

you don't really mean it's inconceivable that you are not thinking…… — Srap Tasmaner

Right.

….you mean it's impossible for you to think, "I am not thinking" — Srap Tasmaner

Wrong.

Good luck. Just remember it’s only a theory. If this, then that kinda thing. Whether or not there ever is a this….ehhhhh, you’ll have to decide.

Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.

Don’t hate the messenger.

We only know of thinking as something organisms do. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s a logical inference, the negation of which is possible, but nonetheless vanishingly improbable.

I only know of thinking as something of which I do, the negation of which is impossible.

Are you saying that cognitive neuroscience is misguided? — Joshs

No. I’m saying cognitive neuroscience is irrelevant to my self, insofar as even if it proves its point, the fact remains the self does not operate in terms of the physical laws by which science necessarily operates. It may in fact be the case that 47 phosphorous ions traversing a set of 7nm clefts at 12pv activation potential manifests as my perception of a civil injustice, but it remains that the civil injustice in and of itself, is what presents to my self.

Nietzsche’s view is correct, in that thought, and talking about thought, are very different, while thought and thinking about thought, are exactly the same.

I do find it a little puzzling that comments I made were in no way suggestive of "a mutually profitable dialectic." — Astrophel

Yeah, well, they weren’t. When I returned comment, it became so. The mutually beneficial part kinda fell by the wayside because of those damnable concepts inspiring little to no agreement. But forget them, I say.

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

I find myself agreeing with most of your writings, so the point of a dialectic is established already.

What changes would be required in your thinking about what the self is in order for the possibility of self to make sense? — Joshs

That’s just it: that I think presupposes the means for it, which makes explicit its possibility is already established. That self is its representation is merely a conceptual device given from the type of intelligence which contains it a priori.

The changes required, then, reduce to the fact that I do not actually think in the way that seems to me to be the case. Hence…..psychology on the one hand and cognitive neuroscience on the other.

Would any notion of self be possible without the ability to experience self as object? — Joshs

To experience self as object requires a whole different set of preconditions then those that affirm that experiencing the self as object, is absurd. Subjective, or non-empirical, experience has a different name.

The notion of the possibility of self makes no sense, insofar as the even the inception of it presupposes what is asked about.

At best, the human intellect can think the self as object in propositional logic, in which case the subject that thinks the proposition treats itself as a content of them. Nevertheless, that which thinks must antecede the representations which manifest as thoughts, from which follows the thought of self as object, is contemporaneous, re: in relation to, rather than coexistent with, that from which the proposition, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, arises.

Under the assumption the question pertains to my self and the treatment of it by me, recognition of other selves is irrelevant.

Pure metaphysics: both the bane and the blessing of the human condition.

how do you see the 'self' as coexisting as subject and object? — Jack Cummins

I see that such coexistence is not the case, under a certain set of preconditions. Consciousness of self as subject is very far from a cognition of self as object.

the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. So either your conclusion isn’t as radical as you supposed, or, your conclusion is as outdated as the original.

If it were me I’d have said judgement instead of interpretation, but other than that I’m in general agreement.