That's what the representation is, an object of perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The object of perception is that which is perceived. It is external to the senses, and is merely that by which they are affected, depending on the mode of their presence. Technically, empirical representation is an object of intuition, which is called phenomenon. Herein lay the proverbial “veil of perception”, from which arises indirect realism, and in which much ado is made of nothing.

Of the vast possibilities available to be represented….. — Metaphysician Undercover

That there is a vast quantity of objects possible to perceive, and therefore become possible phenomenal representations, is true, but irrelevant.

……there is a specific representation which is produced which represents a particular portion of the available possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep….represents that particular portion of all possible objects that is actually perceived, and is therefore relevant, insofar as such is the necessary ground of experience itself.

Obviously it is not random as to what will be represented, so don't you think there must be some sort of decision as to which possibilities will be represented? — Metaphysician Undercover

That which determines the possibility of being represented, is the type and structure, the physiology, of human sensory apparatus. No decisions need be made; if an object is present to perception and a sensation follows, there will be a representation of it. And the need for decision for mode of sensation is already determined by the physiology itself, in that it is impossible to see with the ears, and so for each of the senses.

The decision on the form the representation will acquire, as opposed to whether or not there will be one, is an entirely different consideration.
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So consider what you say here "phenomena represents only what the senses provide". There must be something which determines "what the senses provide". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. The senses can provide nothing that has no relation to both space and time.

You see the body is composed in a specific way…. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we can say we see the extension or shape of its composition, as a specific condition of its space. And we can say we see the changes in the composition, as well as its motion, as a condition of its time.

…..but the question is how could the body get composed in this way without some decisions, judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough, but the question of how an object is composed in such and such a way is not possible from the mere fact it has a certain extension in space, which is all that can be represented in a phenomenon. The questions of the how of composition require conceptions relatable to the object, and intuition contains only two conceptions of its own, space and time.

Take the process of trial and error for example, this process can only proceed through judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, but that doesn’t say trial and error occurs in intuition, which is the source of phenomenal representations, or that there is trial and error going on in the first place, anywhere. Rather than an object having its composition somehow represented, trial and error then suggesting attempts to find out what that composition entails, why not just attribute properties to objects in conjunction with its representation, in which case the object’s composition conforms exactly to our understanding of its representation. If this is the way it works, this certain thing of this certain composition, is called a sun comprised of hot burning gas only because we say so, hence how that thing is to be known by us.
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quote="Metaphysician Undercover;797591"]Instead of being distracted by the idea that a judgement is defined by the necessity of thinking, we can put that requirement aside, and look at what "judgement" really consists of[/quote]

Judgement isn’t defined by the necessity of conscious thought; it is conditioned by it. That conscious thought is necessary for judgements regarding phenomena, says nothing about what judgement is or does in this regard.

Would you agree that judgement requires possibilities, and is in some way a selection from possibility? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. There are possibilities and selections from them, but they been examined and selected by the time judgement intervenes. This is what conscious thought is for and why it is antecedent to judgement, hence a necessary condition for it.

Here it becomes clear why the presence of an object removes possibility for it, but still leaves possibility for what it is. This moves possibility to being considered in thought, which is not that there is an object, which is never questioned, but what possibilities are there for how the object is to be cognized such that it accords with its sensation. Turns out, judgement is that by which the relations are validated.

I hear a loud boom, so it cannot be denied I heard something, from which arises a mere phenomenon. I have no immediate understanding of what made the boom, insofar as I am never conscious of my phenomena, but depending on the range of sensations appearing in the boom I perceive, I can conceive a range of boom-causing things conditioned by my experience of booms in general. Here the phenomenon is subjected to the rule of the categories, to which the conception of possibility properly belongs, by which the sensations of which I am conscious is subsumed under a range of conceptions which set the rules by which an object conceivable as sufficient for the phenomenon, is determinable, and is thereby the product of conscious thought. So it is that I have been given the phenomenon via sensibility, but I must think the conception that relates to it via understanding, in order to cognize what caused the boom I heard, which is experience.

Singular judgements, then, regarding perceptions or any empirical cognition, is the correctness, or the validity, of the relation between the phenomenon given to me and my knowledge of its cause. There are other subsets of empirical, discursive judgements, but they all operate under the same general principle.
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That you think you can stipulate, necessarily, what irrationality is, indicates that you misunderstand irrationality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t need to stipulate what irrationality is, for it is nothing but the complement of rationality, which I must stipulate in order to know I haven’t contradicted myself under the conditions I am given. If I know the one, which I must, the other is just not that.
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I used those examples to demonstrate the possibility of judgement without thinking, so that you might allow this as a possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said every judgment required conscious thought, but only those judgements having to do with empirical cognitions. Those judgements concerned with knowledge of real physical objects. The reason I wanted us to get away form perception, sensation and implied deceptions thereof.

Hence the question back on pg 6, hinting at the domain of judgements grounded on how a subject feels about that which he thinks, and while conscious thought is still present, it is no longer a necessary antecedent condition and judgements of this aesthetic form are therefore not validations of it.

As an aside, do you believe in free will? If so, do you see that a true, freely willed act would necessarily be free from the influence of thinking? — Metaphysician Undercover

There ya go, getting close. It shouldn’t be an aside at all, insofar as judgements connected with this purely subjective domain are part and parcel of the overall human condition.

But no, I reject the notion of free will as a conjoined conception. There is freedom and there is will, but it is the case the will is not free in regard to the objects representing its volitions in accordance with laws, but in another, absolute autonomy, which is a type of freedom, by which the will determines the laws by which it shall legislate itself.

Now it should become clearer that discursive judgements concern themselves with the condition of the intelligence of the subject, but aesthetic judgements concern themselves with the condition of the subject himself, his intelligence be what it may. Under these purely subjective conditions, judgement validates that which the subject does, in accordance with his inclinations, which are therefore contingent, in relation to what his obligations prescribe him to do, in accordance with his principles, which are therefore necessary.

Are we done now?

Cool. I was hoping someone would mention looking at the shadow to switch the rotation. Doesn’t happen all the time, but often enough. Could just blink, too, like that hollow cube that switches orientation.

Might be me, but reflection or shadow, I can’t get it to mesh with the movement.

Fun anyway, so, thanks for that.

The shadow’s wrong.

Cute. New one on me.

are you going to explain, how something can make a representation without some sort of decisions or judgement as to what the representation will be of — Metaphysician Undercover

Did that already. Sort of. Gave you the what, even if not the how. Doesn’t matter; we’re not concerned right here right now with how it’s done, insofar as we’re not conscious of it, but only with how it can’t be done because we’re not conscious of it.

What the representation will be of? Hell, that’s a given: an intuitive representation, a phenomenon, can be nothing other than whatever is an object of perception, or a manifold of objects. And the reason that there is no deception here. Phenomena represent only what the senses provide, regardless of what that provision is. Hence…..imagination. That we make mistakes is also given; just that we must be conscious of them in order to know them as mistakes, which makes explicit we don’t make them right here right now.

Remember….we’re still stuck in the domain you forced us into, by restricting the dialectic to perception, sensation and the deceptions therein, general sensibility. I’m trying like hell to get us out of it, but I’m not dragging you out kicking and screaming; you gotta get yourself out. Go into the light, kinda thing, donchaknow.

….you've told me… — Metaphysician Undercover

….I've shown you… — Metaphysician Undercover

demonstrate that what you belief is not the case. The evidence shows your belief is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The evidence both of us show, is that it is incomplete. There’s more going on here than either of us have put forth, me because it hasn’t come up yet, you because you don’t get the full implication of what you’ve shown me.

The "methodological self-contradiction" which you refer to is the result of your faulty definition of "judgement", which makes conscious thinking a necessary requirement for judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven’t defined “judgement”. That conscious thinking is a necessary condition for the activity of judgement, does not serve as definition of it. Speaking of definitions, or, which is the same thing, asking about what it is…..silence, for which I have an excuse because I was never asked but you do not, because you were.

If you would divorce judgement from thinking, as the evidence of illogical, irrational, emotional, and random judgements necessitates, then this "methodological self-contradiction" would disappear. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, fine. All those are still judgements. We don’t care about kinds; we want to know what any kind is, what all kinds are. What is it that makes any kind of judgement, a judgement. How did this kind come about; how did that kind come about, which inexorably reduces to how does any kind come about, or, how do all kinds come about. Only then can sufficient reason be given for why a self-contradiction might disappear, which would seem to require from you a proof that thinking is not a requirement for any kind of judgement, in spite of at least a logical proof I gave that conscious thinking is a necessary requirement for at least one kind, that being with respect to phenomena.

So you’d have it that, e.g., an irrational judgement, is that judgement entirely divorced from thinking, but I would maintain that an irrational judgement is that judgement concluded from improper thinking. Your way cannot explain the irrationality itself, whereas mine stipulates it necessarily. You, therefore, haven’t alleviated a methodological self-contradiction, but in fact enforced it.

How do you not understand this? — Metaphysician Undercover

And there it is. Right in front of you the whole time. I wasn’t going to use the word until you did, which sooner or later you must. No silver platters for you, though, nope, no way. Get there on your own, only way to the possible epiphanic moment.

you make the inconsistent conclusion that there is no form of judgement present. — Metaphysician Undercover

(Sigh) I said no form of judgement present…..in sensibility. But if I made an inconsistent conclusion, which is a judgement, but necessarily beyond, outside, other than by means of, sensibility……fill in the blanks for yourself.

How do you think that something could make a representation without some form of judgement as to how this will be done? — Metaphysician Undercover

Been telling you all along how I think judgement as you use it could NOT be done, which presupposes I think how it can. It could NOT be used as you’ve been suggesting because eventually it leads to methodological self-contradiction, exemplified by, regarding phenomena, the notion of my concluding something when I’m not conscious of that which I’m concluding about. That I’m not conscious of the construction of my intuitive representations, is a fact, even if such construction being necessarily the case for the operation of human intelligence, is not. Point being, such construction is nowhere contradictory, neither naturally nor logically, so while there may be no satisfaction with respect to empirical knowledge, there is complete satisfaction with respect to reason.

Horace Greeley: “go west, young man!!!!”
Me: “Go deeper, young man!!”

We’re not talking about the location of a system, but only the location of a faculty within it.
— Mww

Now "the system" refers to something physical, the material body, so you've restricted us to a materialist premise by saying that this faculty must be within the system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Another unwarranted deductive inference. Excepting perception, no concept used thus far in this dialectic can be associated with a material system. In fact, I stated for the record I’m working with abstract conceptual analysis, which makes explicit an isolated metaphysical system.

This excludes the possibility that the faculty is related to the system, as cause to effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a closed physical system, it is the material that is necessary cause for metaphysical effect. But in the metaphysical system itself, any faculty contained in it is necessarily related to, but may not be caused by, some other faculty in that same system, re: cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical inconsistency.
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we can consider the effects of a judgement, and we might consider the causes of a judgement. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in so many words, no. Given a purely logical metaphysical system, the consequence of judgement is determined by its antecedents. Cause/effect doesn’t say enough, and there is an argument, perhaps too obscure for this particular discussion, that because cause/effect is a category and the categories are only applicable to empirical conditions, cause/effect does not apply to purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content.

You say, that a judgement presupposes "that which makes it possible". By using the word "possible", this does not necessarily refer to the cause of the judgement, but more like the physical conditions which allow for a judgement to occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case, cause is better than physical conditions, but again, with respect to a purely logical system, antecedent is better than cause. An effect presupposes its cause but does not presuppose any knowledge or understanding of it. In judgement, which is a logical conclusion, the antecedents are also presupposed, but they are always understood, in accordance with their respective placement and functionality in the system.

That there is an absolutely necessary physicalism involved here is given, but it is irrelevant with respect to metaphysical systems. The former we can’t talk about because we don’t understand enough about it to answer all it is possible to ask, we can talk about the latter because its very invention, from which its understanding is given automatically, was in order to talk about all it is possible to ask.

Would you agree, that as well as "that which makes it possible", there must also be an actual cause, that which makes the judgement actual, and this we could call the agent in the judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The agent is not in the judgement, the agent is of the judgement, although you might get away with agency is in the judgement. Judgement relates to an agent, insofar as the one belongs to the other, but an agent does not relate to a judgement, insofar as the agent does not belong to the judgement. Judgement relates to agency as the one is only possible from the other, and agency relates to judgement as the one is necessary for the other.

Why do you think that we do not care about the reality of judgements? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said….they are inescapable. It is impossible that there be no judgement. Again, in accordance with the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysical system. Which of course, has absolutely NO WARRANT FOR BEING RIGHT. Logically coherent and internal consistent, yes; correct….not a chance.

Take a hint, fercrissakes!!!!
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If sensation is simply a determinist cause/effect relation, then there is no mistake in sensation, it simply is what it is. But that's what I see as clearly wrong, because it leaves the human being without free will, and completely determined. Then judgement is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no mistake in sensation. Determinism from human sensory physiology grounded in natural law.
In a strictly representational cognitive system, on the other hand, in which the natural determinism of sensory apparatus, re: Plato’s “knowledge that”** or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”, Kant’s “appearance”, is translated into purely logical explanations immediately upon loss of empirical explanatory knowledge, the loss of which occurs as soon as consciousness of the operations of the physiological system is lost, leaves the human being to fend for himself, but still legislated, not by natural law, but by logical law in the form of the LNC.
(**quotation marks here indicative of attribution to the respective author’s terminology, to nip that in the bud)

The loss of consciousness of operational conditions and therefore empirical knowledge in fact occurs, but only at the faculty of intuition, an altogether abstract conceptual device, which is the point where real physical objects become represented as mere phenomena. We are not the least bit conscious of this activity, however physiological it still is, re: peripheral nervous system constituency, hence can say nothing about it with respect to empirical knowledge. Even more importantly, without this conscious awareness, we can say nothing whatsoever about the effect the real object has on the subject himself, which in turn reflects on the absence of subjective agency, which in its turn, eliminates any form of judgement being present in the faculty of sensibility.
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it might be helpful to know what you think judgement is.
— Mww

That's what I'm working on bringing out. It seems you might already regret being involved in this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nahhh, I got nothing better to do. Beats the shit outta these woke social-media oriented dweeb’s topics hereabouts.

Anyway….editorializing aside…..I’ve posited some boundaries/limitations on it, but I’m going to wait til you work on bringing out what you think it is, before going further. I’m sure you’ll bring along your own necessary presuppositions in support, cuz you’re gonna need ‘em.

“….. When we try to discover the nature of the reality behind the shadows, we are confronted with the fact that all discussion of the ultimate nature of things must necessarily be barren unless we have some extraneous standards against which to compare them. For this reason, to borrow Locke's phrase, "the real essence of substances" is forever unknowable. We can only progress by discussing the laws which govern the changes of substances, and so produce the phenomena of the external world. These we can compare with the abstract creations of our own mind…”
(James Jeans, “The Mysterious Universe”, 1930, in “Quantum Physics and Ultimate Reality Mystical Writings of Great Physicists”, Michael Green, 2013)

Big doings back in those days, for sure. The ultimate Humpy Dumpty.

I do not know exactly where, within me, this system lies. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again. We’re not talking about the location of a system, but only the location of a faculty within it.

So the question of where this faculty is, which makes the judgements, is not even relevant at this point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Man, your system is nothing like mine. Not only do you not know where a faculty is within a system, it is irrelevant where it is. But you’re still going to insist this faculty does something, despite not knowing the influences on it given you don’t know where in the system it is found.

All that is necessary now is that we recognize the reality of those judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using your parlance, the reality of any judgement just is that judgement. Even basic understanding grants judgement to be merely a conclusion of some kind, which immediately presupposes that which makes it possible. So not all that is necessary is the reality of a conclusion, which wouldn’t even occur without its antecedents. Besides, we don’t care about the reality of judgements, insofar as we cannot possibly escape them. What we care about, is their validity, which cannot be determined by the judgement itself.

Odds are I’m going to regret this, but it might be helpful to know what you think judgement is.

The gist of what I said…. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not work with gists; proper dialectics require I work with only what is given to me, and that subjected to my own understanding.

All you’ve said here most recently, makes no mention of that which I take particular exception, that being where in the system this “judgement”, where that which “decides for me”, resides. You’ve maintained its residence to be in intuition, subsequently broadened its residence to sensibility in general. Hence, my objection that whatever you think this “judgement” is, sufficient for it to “decide for me”, being necessarily a conscious activity insofar as unconscious or subconscious decision making is inconceivable in accordance with the human intellectual system, the business of both this ambiguous form of “judgement”, and proper judgement itself, do not belong to sensibility, said objection expressed as “tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks”.

I addressed the "sensibility thinks" issue by stating that this is not a form of thinking — Metaphysician Undercover

You said this form of “judgement” in sensibility “decides for me”. You’ll have to forgive me for thinking that the making of a decision requires some sort of conclusion derivable from some antecedent conditions, which is for all intents and purposes, a logical relation, in fact, a syllogism. If such is the case, it requires that sensibility be equipped for the construction of logical relations. So either sensibility thinks in the construction of logical relations, from which is given the necessity of two thinking faculties in the same system (what a mess that would be), or, “judgement” in sensibility which “decides for me”, is patently absurd.

By saying “judgement” which “decides for me” is not a form of thinking, thereby attempting to relieve the two thinking faculties dilemma, matters are made even worse, for now it must be told how a decision can be made for me which requires no logical relations.
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I used the quotations to indicate that my usage might be one which you are not very familiar with. That would be the case if you haven't done the analysis required to find the thing which the term refers to in that context. — Metaphysician Undercover

Imagination is the thing I found in the analysis of your term in your context. I analyzed “judgement” and rejected it as philosophically ambiguous. Of course I would be unfamiliar with “judgement”, given the established abstract conceptual system to which judgement necessarily belongs. To use it, or any of its derivatives, no matter how disguised, other than as that system demands, is to destroy it altogether.

I think of it as a courtesy which I afford for you…. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nahhhh, you don’t. You’re presupposing I have no idea what you’re talking about. I say that because at the end of our first set of comments here, pg 6, there’s a question for you left unaddressed, which would have given a different perspective entirely for what was initially a general agreement between us.

With that unanswered question, combined with my mentioning something about a form of judgement related to intuition and you changing that into a form of “judgement” contained in intuition…..we’ve digressed into irreconcilable differences.

All else is superfluous.

However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition — Metaphysician Undercover

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me — Metaphysician Undercover

I explained in detail why it is necessary to conclude that there is some form of "judgement" occurring at a subconscious level — Metaphysician Undercover

These are declarations, mere assertions, with no detailed explanation accompanying them. And I reject anything needing quotation marks that merely substantiate its ambiguity. It’s judgement or it isn’t, such a thing as “judgement” just doesn’t say enough to be taken seriously.

Everything in general about what you call the form of “judgement” inherent in intuition, inasmuch as your exposition of it has entailed, has already been rendered in the pertinent literature as imagination, which meets the explanatory criteria for the human intellectual system as a whole in much more satisfactory manner, and, first, eliminates such notorious ambiguity as “judgement” altogether, and second, serves as sufficient reason for not realizing you are right. Like…..my employment of methodological imagination is much right-er than your employment of methodological “judgement”.

‘Nuff said.
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the inclination to restrict "judgement" to conscious mental activity is a misunderstanding of the nature of living beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an unwarranted presupposition that the nature of all living beings is imbued with conscious mental activity, all that being completely irrelevant anyway, for all I care about properly understanding, is the living being that is me. I for one, have no problem restricting judgement to conscious mental activity, for I assert without equivocation that is impossible for me to judge anything whatsoever, if I am not conscious of what is being judged.

Surely you must understand that subconscious mental activity is just as much a part of the human psyche as conscious mental activity. Why not acknowledge that this subconscious activity involves some form of "judgement" just like conscious mental activity involves judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

The validity of the one does not necessarily follow from the validity of the other. There is no necessary relation between a form of subconscious “judgement” in intuition, merely from judgement as a given conscious mental activity in understanding.

Of course, because you realize I'm right. — Metaphysician Undercover

Day-um, man!! How big is your ego, anyway??? You got “you realize I’m right” out of “have it your way”? Like….the only possible analysis of the one reduces to the other? If I made such a preposterous deduction, I would not be so inclined to admit to having a degree in philosophy.

Be interesting to see what has to say about your claim that it’s….

…overwhelmingly obvious that I am right. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bet it won’t be pretty, and justifiable so, insofar as the causes of the disrespect on both our parts is so easy to present. One little sample among many:

Me: two thinking faculties in one system;
You: two “faculties” in one system.

From which it becomes obvious to you that you’re right, not by correcting a wrong, but by changing content to force a right.

So…..have it your way.

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks, from which follows that given that understanding is the faculty of thought, there are now two thinking faculties in the same system. What a mess that would turn out to be.

What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

You tell me. Something tastes good, turns out to make you sick, so……what, it really didn’t taste good?

Have it your way.

I do agree if the pictures of those objects being outside the skull are intended to demonstrate that the objects, exactly as they are perceived, exist outside the skull. — Janus

Agreed, but does to exist carry the same meaning as to be named? I maintain that the objects in pictures meant to demonstrate human perception shouldn’t have names. Objects don’t come pre-named, right?

The philosophically discerning mind realises its own judgement is central to the generally taken-for-granted nature of the sensory domain — Wayfarer

My sentiments exactly. The average Joe isn’t philosophically discerning, but he could be, given proper instruction.

….an acknowledgement of the limitations of empiricism. — Wayfarer

And the limits of empiricism is not tacit approval for some relative increase in idealism’s authority.

However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nice. Something not often brought about, but a metaphysically….logically….valid premise nonetheless, we generally being more concerned with knowledge.

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition.

Oooo and Ahhhh and HOLY SHIT!!! and the whole plethora of exclamatory representations, the spontaneity of which requires no conscious thought, hence are not proper cognitions, yet are judgements relating to a change in the subject’s condition all the same.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. It can change, obviously, but in its duration, it is as certain as any truth he can ascertain. Furthermore, his feeling regarding some perception may remain consistent even with a change in the knowledge of what caused it, which sustains the distinction in kinds of judgement, discursive or aesthetic.

The foremost exposition of the notion of aesthetic judgements resides…..where, do you think, assuming you accept it isn’t foremost in intuition?

Why "mere" presence? — Manuel

Because the presence of something is pretty much insignificant. Means to an end is all.

Ahhhh….the Treatise. Ya know, and in no way to (not much) pat myself on the back, re: appearances, even ol’ Dave says, “… Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.…”

If the two superior Enlightenment philosophers agree on a thing, while not immediate peers to each other, it is reasonable to suppose by the term appearance is meant mere presence, by them both.

Another thing, while we’re at it: Kant says concepts without intuitions are blind, thoughts without content are empty, or something like that. Hume says simple impressions have their own ideas and all simple ideas are accompanied by impressions, or something like that. Funny how very similar these two grounding conditions are, innit?

As to properties, I’ll trust your higher exposure. I myself don’t recall much being said about properties per se in either the ”Treatise…..” or E.C.H.U.. Lots more readily available in Kant, though, insofar as for his brand of metaphysics, empirical conceptions just are the properties objects are said to have.

Anyway…..ever onward.

Do you want me to argue against that or to comment? — Manuel

Only if I’ve misinterpreted your comments in general. I don’t expect agreement as much as I appreciate correction.

I don't care what words one uses to refer to the colours one sees. — Michael

When Hume suggested a human with otherwise correct vision can install a missing shade of blue, he has already granted that the name of the color doesn’t reflect the capacity. Could have been any gap in the spectrum, which makes the name of it irrelevant.

…..for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

If I may, in conjunction with your quote as it concerns the empirical side, I submit that the only need to make sense of appearances being deceptive, is if they are mistakenly treated as “looks like” as opposed to the intended notion of “present as”. That there is something present to sensibility cannot be deceptive, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

…this from the B preface, which sets the stage for the rest of the changes in that edition.

In addition, deception with respect to empirical cognition resides in discursive judgement, for which sensibility in its role as representing external objects as phenomena has none, and by which the subsequent “looks like” appearance is determinable.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350)

The final nail in that Hume-ian coffin, is the condition that if the so-called “Copernican Revolution” holds, in which the human intellect assigns properties to objects rather than objects come already imbued with them, then it is impossible to be deceived by an object’s appearance….presence…. to sensibility, insofar as at that point, no object has a property from which it obtains a “looks like”, or behaves like, hence nothing whatsoever by which to be deceptive, on the one hand, and the absolute impossibility of denying the effect of human physiological sensation caused by the presence of objects to sensibility, on the other.

You, and I honestly think , and perhaps may well agree, that all those pictures on this thread that show objects outside the human skull, depicted as actual named objects, is catastrophically wrong. Anything in those indicators, must be represented as mere matter, some as yet undetermined something, which is impossible to illustrate, so folks imbue the indicators with any ol’ thing that is already known, a blatant contradictory methodology with respect to the human intellect logically explainable by transcendental philosophy.

Which probably explains why it’s pretty much disrespected these days, and perhaps why you feel reiteration of its conditionals are worthwhile for critical thinkers, however lapsed they may be according to their arguments. People insist they see a tree, and they are correct, but only as a consequence, without knowing or caring about the antecedents necessary for how it is a tree, only a tree, and not any other thing.

(Descends soapbox, exists stage right….but still muttering to himself, accompanied by the snaps of assorted Greenwich Village pseudo-bohemian fingers)

there is a world that is not dependent on our understanding of it. — Banno

Which world is that? Existent worlds depend on human understanding, possibly existent worlds depend on human understanding. Even those cursed damnable noumenal worlds depend on human understanding, fercryinoutloud. What other kind of world is there?

To say “there is” is a positive existential inference, to say “there is a world” makes explicit an object related to the inference necessarily. To call out “world” presupposes human understanding as necessary for both the conception the word “world” represents, and the judgement on a given (“there is”) and its relation to an object conformable to it (“a world”).

Still, conception does not imply existence necessarily, so it is that there may be existent or possibly existent worlds not dependent on human experience in order for there to be knowledge of what such worlds entail. But we can think any possible world we wish, every single one of them entirely dependent on the understanding of it, which reduces to….there is no possible world that is not dependent on human understanding of it, but there is no inclusive authority in the understanding, that grants its reality. And do we really give a crap for that which isn’t?
————

…..few have the courage to set out an argument. — Banno

….but not all. And because of this…..

It isn't as convincing as you suppose. — Banno

….arises this….

(probably to no avail) — Wayfarer

Same as it ever was….

only through the way objects affect us are there objects at all. — Banno

Which objects do you know of that exist, but do not affect us? — Manuel

These say very different things. One is more the case than the other.

This is the man wherefrom I get my name — Bob Ross

Cool. Guess the sidebar wasn’t that irrelevant after all.

Guess you get to blame me if I got it all wrong, then, huh?

That’s fine; I’d be blaming me too.

We have direct, but mediated access to objects through representations. What then are we to do with indirect? — Manuel

Hence my favored position, calling a false dichotomy, insofar as it concerns realism. Direct mediated access (to real things, as sensation), yet indirect knowledge (of real things, as experience).

Even if someone called themselves an indirect realist, I don't know what that means — Manuel

Nor I.

So the substance, as I see it, is either there is something going in my brain/mind that plays a massive role in my experience of the object, or there is minimal activity going on inside. — Manuel

HA!!! I’ll see your massive, and raise you a complete!!

Pretty silly of ol’ Mother to endow us with a most seriously complex intellectual machinery, then limit its function to putting one foot linearly in front of the other, or not stabbing ourselves in the face when eating with a fork.

I think this whole debate is better thought of in terms of "mediated" vs. "unmediated" perception. — Manuel

I like mediated/unmediated over direct/indirect, but should they relate to perception?

You’d know better than I, but it seems to me like the same false dichotomy dressed in finer robes.

I'd say, that's much better. — Metaphysician Undercover

Look again. Still much better?

You have no way to assess how the construction of your own CNS compares to the source of the stimulus. — frank

There is a way. Observation for empirical constructs, the assessment from which is experience; logic for rational constructs, the assessment from which is contradiction.

There’s only one way that painting makes sense, right? Actually, there’s two, but one is a whole lot easier to accomplish.

I like it!!!!

Shades of Plato’s Republic: at the point/moment of perception, we know THAT it is, but we don’t know WHAT it is.
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After the edit, I don’t like it. In fact, it’s ruined. Or I missed the point. (Sigh)

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production — Bob Ross

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? — Bob Ross

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

That's not direct realism tho. — frank

Most likely not. But, as I said, from analysis of the concepts themselves, the notion is reducible to mere unmediated objectivity.

We can't stand outside ourselves in order to answer it. — frank

Right, but the answers aren’t outside ourselves anyway, so all’s well. For better or worse, the answers are what reason says they are.

I’m cool with that.

I rather think the whole shebang is a false dichotomy anyway, so….

A direct link of causal efficacy is necessary, but that is a different proposition than direct naive realism. — prothero

So is anything necessary regarding direct naive realism? If we’re already given that which is necessary, with respect to an answer to a question concerning some particular dilemma, what else do we need?

Direct realism doesn't makes sense, but it's necessary. How do you deal with that? — frank

Easy. Accept the intrinsic duality of human intelligence, regardless of the various suppositions for its methods.

Direct realism…..merely from analysis of the conceptions….is just unmediated objectivity, despite the mess post-Enlightenment philosophy has made of it. So, yes, it’s necessary for one part of the duality, the purely empirical, but has no business being involved in the other part, the purely rational.

The only way out is to prove the very nature of human intelligence is not intrinsically dualistic, which is fine, as long as whatever replaces the logic that proves it is, is sufficient to entirely falsify it.

How I deal with it…..the senses are directly affected by real things. I need nothing else from the notion of direct realism.

So you have a contradiction on your hands. — frank

Yikes!! Can’t have that. Point it out for me?

…..because as Mww noted, direct realism doesn't make any sense on its face. — frank

Doesn’t make any sense with respect to the central nervous + peripherals system from a physical point of view, nor with respect to some theoretical cognitive system from a metaphysical point of view.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view.

To finesse the noted…..

But your comment does say something about this topic. You can quickly get lost with the representations that people see, except the tree is in their head, but it can't be, so what's that in the guy's head? Is it a representation or is it a tree? — frank

Yeah….something said is the superficial silliness of it all on the one hand, re: the implicit absurdity involved in denying there are real basketballs in my head (like…you know…well, DUH!!!), and the fascinating complexity of an organ that can present itself as, or make it seem like there is, a subject present, that the subject has images of things……when (gasp) there never really is either subject or image to be found anywhere in that organ.