.....it was a sensible approach. — Manuel

True enough. Nowadays we call it reification, in that mind per se isn’t reducible to substance, therefore thinking substance is moot.

Kant fixed all that....kinda sorta.....by calling mind or reason, and other similar abstracts, conditions for a particular kind of substance but not a physical constituency of it.

But do you think Descartes treated res cogitans as a principle, or an actual substance? In First Principles 1, 52 he defines substance, then in 1-53 qualifies the differences with the attributes each can have. The attribute of a thinking substance is thought, so....is he calling it out as the case, or a principle which grounds the case?

I just never thought of cogitans or extensa as principles. Maybe I should have....dunno.
————

I happen to think that his dualism is often misunderstood. — Manuel

As do I. But what can ya do, huh?

If the source of all certainty is "I think therefore I am," then all there is, is what I think. — PhilosophyRunner

Descartes’ cogito was never meant to indicate the source of all certainty. That which is impossible to doubt is therefore certain, and there is but one irreducible instance for which the doubt of it is impossible, and from that, only one irreducibly certain “is”, is given. For whichever “I” there is that thinks, there is that and only that “I” that is certain absolutely.

Which serves of course, to prove being certain is inherently possible, and from which an upheaval in metaphysical doctrine ensued, insofar as there can now be something other than pure mathematics on which to ground truth, and even more importantly, how there can be truth without the empirical verifications mathematics requires.

From that, it does not follow that all there is, is what I think (there is). It is absurd to claim there is nothing other than what I, or humans in general, can think.

All that could possibly mean anything to me, is what I think, while true in itself, is a different story.

Time again to let thought speak for itself. — Pantagruel

It always has, can’t escape it. The early 20th century OLP knuckleheads were the first to seriously degrade the significance of it, finding it measurably easier to critique what’s said, it being right there for all to witness, rather than the thought from which it came, which only one can.....while missing the irony in doing it.

But those guys, thankfully, are the current philosophical artifact, hopefully soon to be joined by those who weren’t happy with the obscurity of human though, deciding it worth being listed in peer-reviewed publications by writing on something even more obscure.....consciousness. Again, only by drowning in the same irony.

It took the better part of two millennia to get from the first great thinker to the second. For the third to come about anytime soon.....ehhhh, not holding my breath. Still, the advancements in science proper may well provide him the message in the next Critique, which....ironically enough.....may well be that science cannot tell us what we want to know regarding the absolute primacy of human thought.

......we have elevated it too far; that in so doing, something has been lost. — Pantagruel

Yep. Just like that.

My thoughts, metaphysically speaking for themselves.

There are only two feelings, pain and pleasure, each with varying degree.
— Mww

You start off with a false premise. "Feelings" are sensations and there is many different sorts of them, often involving neither pleasure nor pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your “feelings” related to sensation are not my feelings related to emotional status.
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How does objectivity enter morality in your mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Objectivity doesn’t enter morality itself, but only manifests as a determined physical act occurring in response to a subjectively determinable moral situation.

what do you mean by "the judgement for what objectively is to be done"? — Metaphysician Undercover

What is to be objectively done, is performance of some physical act. In the same way that we judge what an object is, that which is given to perception from the world, for which it is the cause, so too do we judge what we put in the world, for which we are its cause. In the former we are affected by the world, in the latter our acts are effects on the world. In both circumstances are found congruent empirical conditions, insofar as both are directly related to the world, which makes explicit....logically explicit, that is.....they both follow from the same kind of judgement, which is called discursive.

Do you see the classic “is-ought” moral dilemma here?

I agree. — creativesoul

Good.

Possible world semantics is fraught. — creativesoul

Better.

Logical possibility alone does not warrant belief. — creativesoul

Best.

There's too much I disagree with here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I write to express an understanding, not to convince of its truth, so disagreement is to be expected, especially considering the non-scientific nature of the subject matter. Actually, I appreciate intelligible disagreement for its complementarity.

There is some merit to your position though..... — Metaphysician Undercover

Then all is not lost. Might’ve been a significant step forward if the respective causality had been unpacked from my Earth/Iranian women comment the other day.

There are only two feelings, pain and pleasure, each with varying degree. The causality of some pain/pleasure is beyond our control, an instance of that which is done to us, the causal objects or circumstances of which are possibly avoidable. The causality of some pain/pleasure is ourselves, given from our own control, an instance of that which we do to ourselves, therefore are impossible to avoid. These alone are reflections of our moral constitution, which presupposes we are moral agents by our very nature. Which in turn makes morality a valid conception a priori, representing the irreducible and absolutely necessary condition for the being of a moral agent.

There is no knowledge involved herein. None whatsoever. There is pure speculative reason alone. Knowledge has no warrant in its attempts at reification of an abstract a priori conception; reason, on the other hand, has perfect warrant for the providing of it.
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I believe that morality consists of judgements of good and bad, not feelings — Metaphysician Undercover

Conventionally speaking, that’s fine; most people would agree. As a metaphysician, on the other hand, you should know better, insofar as a mere condition has no constituency. That which makes something else possible, is just that. Just as causality, possibility, necessity, community, and so on, is each a singular representation unto itself, that is to say, has no other representation subsumed under it, so too is morality. Whether or not all that is granted, it nonetheless authorizes us to say judgements are limited as constituents of our moral disposition, in that because we are this kind of moral agent we will judge good and bad in this way.

Now, again, best to keep in mind this kind of judgement is aesthetic, representing a feeling, as opposed to discursive, which represents a cognition. We often do good things that feel bad, as well as do bad things that feel good. From that it follows that the judgement of how it feels subjectively to do something, is very different than the judgement for what objectively is to be done.
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but there are many subtle forms of dishonesty, like withholding information. — Metaphysician Undercover

All that shows is dishonestly relative to another person, which happens all the time. To withhold information from oneself, presupposes it in that same self. Can’t withhold what was never there. That which is presupposed is impossible to deny, which is the same as the impossibility of withholding.

We are dishonest with ourselves in many subtle ways when we follow our feelings and proceed into doing what we know is morally wrong. Sometimes this amounts to what is called rationalizing. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough, but is the purview of empirical psychology. The subject matter we’re discussing properly resides in the doctrine of metaphysics. Which is probably why we disagree so much. You have not reduced the concepts far enough for metaphysical issues; I have reduced them too far for psychological issues. Meeting in the middle doesn’t appear likely.

So instead of claiming that all decision making uses logic, I say it uses something else, which logic also uses, but we do not really understand what it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

As is your prerogative. Still, under the auspices of “if/then” theoretical constructs, just seems the more instructive to choose that “if” which lends itself to being understood enough to permit whatever “then” may follow from it.
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you seem to think that moral knowledge is itself innate, what one feels is right, is right. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not need to know a feeling is right, if rightness is already given by the feeling of it. What it is possible to know, is that thing which justifies the feeling.

Best to recognize that I cannot reject that this is a bus when I already have experience of busses, which manifests as a blatant self-contradiction, in just the same way I cannot reject the feeling of moral reprehensibility, but without ever having the experience of an object by which a self-contradiction would arise. This is sufficient to prove feelings are not cognitions, from which follows that moral knowledge is a misnomer. Further support resides in the fact that I may know this is true now yet find later this is no longer known as true, a function of experience in which I must cognize something, but that for which I feel as moral will always be what I feel is moral, as a function of personality, for which no cognitions are necessary.
————

I see the starting point as honesty, because this is a common use of "truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ll grant half of that, re: honesty, but, if we go back to the subject himself as the starting point, which is the both necessary and sufficient ground, we should find that it is impossible to be dishonest with oneself. It is certainly the case we can be wrong in our judgements regarding a thing, but the means for obtaining them are determinable by logical law, re: “if this, then that”, and of course, law, under the assumption of predication by the principles of universality and absolute necessity, does not abide dishonesty.

Now it should be clear, that truth is that in which a cognition conforms to its object, and it is the case truth is reducible to the subject in which the cognition resides, and, dishonesty from such cognition is impossible.

While we may be intentionally dishonest in our representation of judgements, that will manifest naturally as a.....yeah, that’s right.....a feeling.

Not to mention, a common use of truth doesn’t give proper representation of what it is.

now the issue is how are logical rules grounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the human intellect is itself a logical system, there’s no reason to ask and invites infinite regress when it is. Rules are grounded by the nature of their originating system, affirmed or denied by experience a posteriori or reason a priori. Simple as that.
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logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations......
— Mww

I think you have this backward. Logic is a highly specialized, formal way of thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seems an awful lot like the same thing, doesn’t it?
————

What would be the point of moral training if morality is innate? — Metaphysician Undercover

Same point as just the innate capacity for empirical knowledge doesn’t contain any.
————

I believe it is very clear that morality is not based in what feels right. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s fine; it isn’t a law that it should be so. But there is nevertheless a philosophy that does. Wants/needs, desires/interests, aesthetic/discursive judgement and such.

Besides....what sense does it make to get angry that, e.g. the Earth is third from the sun? By the same token, what sense does it make that, e.g. the women in Iran, by wanting to be free of headwear, are thereby violating natural law? The human being has feelings, which should be accounted for in a metaphysical exposition of the complete beast.

I suppose these opinions are outside the scope of this thread. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not when considering or stating one’s position for what truth is. Truth, as such, is every bit as subjective as one’s moral disposition and experiences.

.....obtain that status of being the conventional rules, because they are useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, insofar as these kinds of rules are taped to the wall in high school, assembled in a code of conduct in the office. The reason for stop signs and traffic lights. Tax tables. Sales contracts. The manifold of objects conforming to....

......the particular rules which become accepted by people — Metaphysician Undercover

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The issue being a question of what a particular set of rules is useful for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. Conventional rules are for private use by a subject in a communal domain, compliance with them being judicially motivated, their usefulness predicated on merely staying out of trouble relative to those rules, as judged by his peers. Moral rules, on the other hand, are for private use by a subject in a personal domain, compliance with them being obligatory, their usefulness predicated solely on staying out of trouble with himself, as judged by himself.

That being said, I agree moral rules are much more important than conventional rules, but that alone says nothing with respect to their logical ground.....

We need to follow the rules of logic to understand, or for any other purpose we might use logic for. — Metaphysician Undercover

....which does, and quite well at that.

If it should be the case that the human intellectual system, in whichever metaphysical form deemed sufficient for it, is entirely predicated on relations, it should then be tacitly understands that system is a logically grounded system, insofar as logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations. Hence it follows, it being given that all rules are schemata of the human intellectual system, and the human intellect is relational, then all rules are relational constructs. From there, it’s a short hop to the truth that, if all rules are relational, and all relations are logically constructed, and all logical constructs themselves are determinations of a fundamental procedure, then all rules are logical rules.

Under those conditions, there is no procedural difference between rules determined by committee for the administration of a community and rules determined by each individual for himself, insofar as a committee is nothing more than a plurality of individuals, each one operating within the confines of an intellectual system common to all.
—————-

If the most personal one can be, is demonstrated by his moral convictions, and if logical rules are the ground for particular goals.......
— Mww

Yes, but this assumes that there is no immorality inherent within the logical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logical principles are neither moral nor immoral. Morality is an innate human condition, determinable by logical principles which relate a purely subjective desire to an equally subjective inclination. In other words, this feels right, therefore it is the right thing to do and I shall will an act in accordance with it.

Immorality only manifests when an act is willed, even if that willed act never becomes an empirical event, that conflicts with that subjective relation. In other words, this volition feels right, but I’m going to will an act in non-compliance to it, or, this volition feels wrong but I’m going to will an act in compliance with it anyway. If I act, you may judge my morality with respect to yours. If I do not act, you will have nothing to judge, but I am left to judge myself

And so it goes....opinions galore.

Communion would be (....) communication and working together. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh. Social anthropology. Not interested.

(...) logic (...) is (...) in its foundation, a private activity, like strategy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Sort of.

usefulness is defined relative to particular goals, which are personal, and this is what supports these rules — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it the same to say logical rules are useful in support of the attainment of personal goals?

the rules of logic are fundamentally inconsistent with the rules of communion (human interaction), which are moral rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the most personal one can be, is demonstrated by his moral convictions, and if logical rules are the ground for particular personal goals, then it follows that logical rules are not so much merely consistent with, as in fact necessary for, the dispensation of him toward his moral activities.

All rules developed and used by us, in private, rational decision-making, re: judgment, without exception, are reducible to logical rules.

Ok. What is communion as you’re using the word?

there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting. What other rules might those be?

Regardless, it is "the sum of the possible" which is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhhhh.....I don’t have a problem with it. The notion of adding to the totality of the possible is quite absurd, from which I can deduce the sum of the possible is given.

The idea that the possible can be summed can be shown to be incoherent, because the possible can be assumed to be infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

What’s incoherent in the successive accumulation of the real? When the accumulation is the content of the possible, the quantity is irrelevant. It is whatever it is.

incoherent to say "that which exists is the sum of the possible" — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. That in quotation marks and taken from my comment, indicates I said it. But I didn’t. I said that which exists is in the sum of the possible.
————

Aristotle (...) demonstrates that in an absolute sense, the actual must be prior in time to the possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. The entire human system of experience is predicated on perception, which makes the real temporally antecedent to the experience of it.

It just isn't the same sort of actuality which is known to us — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. The real of perception isn’t known at all, insofar as that real thing, whatever it may be, has yet to be subjected to the system that determines how it is to be known.

this sort is contingent actualities — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is merely a given real something, and is contingent on the system for its identity.

It's a special type of actuality known by theologians. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle restricted it to theologians, but since then, it’s been opened up to every human subject, in accordance with a specific metaphysical theory. On the other hand....what was a theologian for Aristotle, compared to a theologian for us? If the concept changed over time, then probably the applicability changed along with it. Dunno......

What we believe as "actual", is what is, of necessity..... — Metaphysician Undercover

1.) considering real objects, and 2.) confining the possible to what may be, and 3.) what may not be and belief both being utterly irrelevant.....

Aristotle says so...that which exists, exists necessarily. That which exists cannot not exist.

.....and therefore not one of the possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant says no....That which exists is in the sum of the possible. The sum of the real, the actual, cannot exceed the sum of the possible, therefore is contained by it.

You’re correct in a way...the actual ascends from the sum of the possible, therefore is contained in the sum of the real. Even if the particular real is no longer listed in the merely possible, it remains a member of the modal class of logical categories. It just switches over to the necessary.

The schema of necessity is existence in all time, the schema of possibility is existence in any time, the schema of the real is existence in a determined time.

You know....for clarity.

Spellchecker. That’s my story and I’m sticking to it.

On factive verbs, or, ordinary language use gone irredeemably haywire:

“we believe every foot deserves a comfortable pair of shoes”

....says so, right on the door into the self-proclaimed oldest shoe store in America, opening in 1832 in Belfast Maine.

What can ya do, huh?

Thanks for the gentle correction.

And.....what benefit in them is there for me?
— Mww
— Srap Tasmaner

If I know that P, then it follows that P. That’s helpful for you, because it means you can learn about the state of the world from my reports of what I know, without having to go see for yourself. — Srap Tasmaner

Helpful, I suppose. If your P is the bridge is out, and the bridge is out....might be helpful fo me to know that iff I’m on the road the bridge is out of. If I’m not even driving....your P tells me about a state of the world for which I have no interest, hence is not helpful.

But I get the point.
————

Above I spoke hypothetically of having a stack of boxes one of which I intended to mark. How do you conceptualize what we are doing when we reason in this way? — Srap Tasmaner

Intention alone cannot afford an determined end, that isn’t a potential post hoc ergo proper hoc logical subterfuge, yet herein we’re providing an exercise for imagination, which can. What we should be doing, so says this armchair (which after all these years has earned the right to speak for itself).......mark a box or don’t, leaving intention out of it, or on the other......intend to mark a box, leaving a marked box out of it.

As stated, I can’t conceptualize what we doing, insofar as it appears we’re operating under two separate and distinct conditions forced somehow into relating to each other.

there is no opposite to "possible". And to use "impossible" as the opposite to "possible" is to stray from the definition "what may or may not be". — Metaphysician Undercover

I use a different definition, but the ends are the same. Possibility is merely one of the ways to think about things; a thing is possible or that thing is impossible, but that does not make the conceptions themselves opposites. All they do is condition the thought of the thing. Just as cause is not the opposite of effect; just as necessary is not the opposite of contingent.

On the other hand, I would agree they are complimentary, in that if one is given, the other follows immediately from it.

My two cents .....which I had to borrow, by the way.

....it’s that any factive instance of one of the others is necessarily also an instance of knowing. — Srap Tasmaner

Cool part about watching these discussions is the pleasure of finding finding things out (tip of the pointy hat to Feynman). To wit: I never heard of fractive verbs. Is there any verb that isn’t fractive? How would One become apparent to me? And.....what benefit in them is there for me?
———-

the old argument (...) against any analysis of knowledge, was that there is no non-circular way to carry out such an analysis. — Srap Tasmaner

Then don’t analyze it. Rather, call it an end, and analyze the means. Nevertheless, circularity is a given, recognized as such, like....forever. At the end of the day, though, it is reducible to the very nature of the investigating beast, and therefore inescapable when the investigative program (the finding out of things) undertaken by him, exceeds its warrant.

in knowledge-first terms, Alice knew that it was raining because she looked out the window and saw that it was raining. — Andrew M

In knowledge-first terms, I know it is raining because I already know what it is to be raining.

A precise reduction to the thread’s original question. I know what is true because I already know what it is to be true. I know what is true because I already know what truth is.

The relation between real and unreal needs to be distinguished...... — Mww

Your thoughts and feelings themselves are real. But it is what they are about that is in question. — hypericin

If thoughts are real, then everything thought about must be as real as the thought of it, insofar as an empty thought is a contradiction. But the real in thought is never sufficient for the empirical existence of its object in reality. Hence, the thought of the rock of yesterday is a thought just as real as the thought of this rock today, but the existence of either rock is not given by mere thoughts about it.

The validity of things real in thought is a determination of logical reason a priori, and is called a cognition (of); the proof of the reality of the things real in thought, is a determination of practical reason a posteriori, and is called experience (of).

Perhaps now it is clear the original argument is grammatically flawed, insofar far as the existence of “this rock” in a particular time and place, is regulated by its mode of reason, but the existence of “the rock”, which is not necessarily “this rock” but merely signifies any rock in general, of arbitrary past or future time and place, is regulated by its mode of reason. It is therefore unjustifiable to say the same thing about those by which the determinations of each depends on non-congruent modes.
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When you say "my thoughts are real", you are thinking about your thoughts. — hypericin

The saying is not the thinking, but merely presupposes thinking for its antecedent, and represents thinking as its consequent. The only reason for language is the impossibility of communication by thinking. When I tell you my thoughts are real, all I’m doing is informing you about something of which I’ve already informed myself.
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You will have thoughts whether or not you think about having thoughts. ↪Mww — hypericin

Of course. And.......??? Not sure how this tautological truism relates to what’s been said.

Timothy Williamson’s “knowledge first” program — Srap Tasmaner

“.....Methodologically, Williamson (....) defends instead the use of ‘armchair’ methods to answer substantive questions....”
(https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/williamson-timothy-1955/v-1/sections/knowledge-first-epistemology)

I like this guy.

The distinction between "real" and "unreal" is the distinction between mind independence and mind dependence. — hypericin

Can you talk about anything at all, that isn’t dependent on the thought of it?

How can anything at all be mind independent, when mind is that which determines what independence is? How can anything be said to be mind independent if the mind has already thought of it?

Just to assert a distinction of anything presupposes a necessary relation which cannot be given from the assertion itself. Even to merely perceive a difference presupposes that which recognizes that there is one, whether entailment of what the difference is occurs or not.

The distinction between the real and the unreal is given merely from the principle of complementarity a priori, but the principle itself is mind dependent. Whatever is real is not unreal, and whatever is unreal is not real. The relation between real and unreal needs to be distinguished long before the relation of either one to its dependence on the mind. Oooooo.....the irony.
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“.....Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal sense, are real....”

.....which just suggests, whichever philosophy is used determines what mind independence means.

Something like that? — Janus

Yep, just like that.

I was talking about inter-subjective and cross sensory corroboration, not collaboration. — Janus

Oh damn. I never once noticed that, until you just brought it up. What a dumbass.
(Note to self: make more effort to distance braincase from anal cavity)

The rest...all good.

Empirical evidence in itself does not justify a belief, what is required is empirical evidence plus logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, and shouldn’t be contentious. Empirical evidence is contingent, therefore any empirical belief legislated by it, is also contingent. But each empirical belief, in and of itself, in its own time, is nothing but a logical conclusion regarding relative certainty, determinable only by empirically given premises antecedent to the conclusion but concurrent with the evidence.

But it’s more than just that. The premises themselves, being of the subject/object propositional construct, must have had their subject/object relation already determined logically. If I believe X about Y, I must have already concluded something under logical conditions about X, such that the relation of it to Y, makes my belief coherent. The premises X and Y must logically relate to each other, or I end up with what’s called “...pitiful dogmatic sophistries”.

Empirical evidence is what there is presented to me; justification is the manner by which the evidence is treated, belief is one of three possible results of the treatment, the other two being opinion and knowledge.

Regarding the rejection of the idea of intellectual intuition, would you say that is on account of the impossibility of inter-subjective and cross-sensory corroboration? — Janus

Easy part first....cross-sensory collaboration is a physiological impossibility, and inter-subjective collaboration is impossible within the reference frame of its occurrence. We do inter-subjectively collaborate, which is at that point merely a euphemism for post hoc relative agreement.

The denial of intellectual intuition I don’t think involves either of those. The objects we know about are external to us, but the knowledge we have is of representations of those external objects, and we are not conscious of the transition from one kind to the other. All we know is that it happens and happens necessarily, that is, it is impossible that it doesn’t happen. If we are not conscious of what happens, we are permitted to speculate about it, legislated by the LNC alone. From that, in the speculative construction of a system.....
(Overlooking the fact the system under construction in speculation, is concurrently in use for the construction)
......when this does this and that does that, it is necessary that this cannot be allowed to do that. When the system for knowing things is constructed, and a part of it is of this type, it is self-defeating to then say that part is of a different type, because it then becomes possible that this can do that in violation of the LNC. The idea of an intellectual intuition is reject-able simply because the system has already been constructed in which intuition is governed by the senses.

Technically speaking, with respect to Kant, that which is intelligible is that which is presented to understanding of a non-material nature, which simply means presented to understanding by itself, absent sensibility, which makes explicit, absent phenomena. In other words, we can think it, which is exactly what noumenon are, re: objects of the intellect. But intelligible, intellectual, does not necessarily imply conceivable schema, that is, representations, subsumed under the thought, which are necessary in order to for a judgement to be forthcoming regarding such intellectual object. We can judge the concept of noumena, because it is a valid conception, but we have nothing by which to judge a noumenal object, because there is nothing by which it is represented.

Going back to the development of phenomena, the arrangement of matter into a specific form, in conjunction with object of the intellect in which there is no matter to arrange, it is clear that for a representation to become schema for an intellectual object, requires that which does not consider matter, making the arrangement of it moot. This, then, would be an intellectual type of intuition, the type, in accordance with the method of the constructed theory, we do not have.

All it amounts to in the end, is that we cannot have an intellectual intuition because if we did, the theory itself is logically self-contradictory and internally inconsistent....the very cause of its own destruction. So saying, intellectual intuition, intellectual representation, and therefore a particular noumenon derivable from that, cannot be considered impossible, insofar as the entire speculative system as it belongs to us could very well be wrong, and furthermore, it cannot be said our type of intelligence is the only intelligence there is, which implies noumena are possible conceptions with their own empirical representations, in some other kind of intelligent being.

One thing I wish I’d accomplished here.....is that over the years of our communications, I had convinced you, or at least persuaded, to disassociate noumena from the ding an sich. In all honesty, on the other hand, I almost wish you’d have convinced me why you haven’t.

This isn't to disagree (...), but to complement.... — Moliere

This....

So thing-in-itself is more like a place-holder concept to guard against treating metaphysical (non-empirical, and unbounded by the categories) judgments about objects as knowledge..... — Moliere

.....complements rather well, I must say.

The way I'd put it is that the thing-in-itself is a noumenon — Moliere

While I can’t refute that, as people are certainly entitled to think whatever they wish, but I’m reluctant to agree with it. Standing prejudices, doncha know.

the transcendental/ empirical dichotomy opens up paths for whole suites of different ways of traversing the territory. — Janus

Funny, innit? Dude spends 700-odd pages telling us how there is but one way to traverse the territory toward knowledge, but his one way requires an abundance of cautions about what we’re not supposed to do in order to get there. Which makes sense in its own way, for what we’re not supposed to do is what the philosophers before him told us to do.

Try this on, see how it fits, as to why neither the ding an sich nor noumena can be transcendental idealities.

Just take as accepted we cannot know anything of noumena because they require a non-sensuous intuition, yet ours is always and only possible from perception, which makes our intuition necessarily sensuous. So....regarding the path to knowledge, scratch noumena.

Now, objects of perception are given, so no need to look at those. But those objects are said to affect us, but they really only affect our sensing apparatus. Sounds objects make affects our ears, odor of objects affects our nose and so on, and we call these sensations. Each one of us has his own sensing apparatus; I can’t see with your eyes, so we can say that which affects the senses changes only the condition of the subject to whom the apparatus belongs. I hear something you don’t, my subjective condition is changed relative to yours.

But you could hear what I heard, everything is in place to make it possible, except the occasion for it. All this is physically determinable in its entirety, as any medical doctor will tell you, so this part ends here. Nonetheless, your subjective condition is changeable, even if it doesn’t change, so there is that which makes changes in your subjective condition possible, whether or not there is an occasion for it, and therefore this cannot be counted in the physical part.

Just take as accepted, anything not counted as physical is not counted as empirical, and anything not counted as empirical in some way is counted as a priori, and anything not counted as empirical in any way whatsoever is counted as pure a priori. It follows that whatever is there that makes changes in one’s subjective condition merely possible, is pure a priori. But it must be something, and thus is established and justified, a precursory condition.

The sound a lead ball makes is different than the sound a rubber ball makes, and the sound a ball makes is different than the sound a trash compactor makes. That all these make a sound is determined by the the matter of each, but the matter of these, while affecting the senses with sound, do not carry the information of what form the matter has. It is impossible for us to get “ball” out of the sound an object makes when it hits something solid. Without antecedent experience, you cannot get “telephone” out of some arbitrary ringing/clanking/buzzing sound.

Just take as accepted, there is now what we call phenomenon, which is only a representation of a change in subjective condition caused by the affect of an object on sensory apparatus. OK, so...eventually we get to know what these objects are, but there still needs be the matter arranged in a certain form such that the present phenomenon subsequently becomes a specific experienced, known....named....object. But don’t forget...we’re still in the early stages, just past having been affected by an object of perception. In Platonic fashion, we know that there is a sensation, but we do not know how the sensation is to be represented because as yet It hasn’t been. It happens that just as your subjective condition can be changed, so too can the matter of objects be arranged into a certain form, which must be the case, otherwise we’d never be able to distinguish one from another. Thus, all matter is arrangeable, which makes explicit there is that which makes the matter of an object arrangeable in its particular form, again, even if there no object present to affect the senses, which makes whatever that is, a pure a priori whatever. And this whatever must cover everything perceived, from the matter of the object of the moon arranged as a mere simple circle, all the way to, e.g. a pine cone, the matter of which is arranged in the form of a complex Fibonacci sequence.

But there are virtually innumerable objects, any one of them distinguishable from any other and any one of them possibly an experience, which suggests there is something common to the arrangement of matter, common to all objects without exception. So it is that the pure a priori whatever can be given a certain name, can be thought as a certain conception, can pertain to nothing else at all, and has no other purpose, except the possibility of arranging the matter of every single object of a possible experience in accordance with the manner in which we are affected by them.

Because we have constructed this entire scenario in a speculative, or intellectual, fashion, it is pure a priori. Because we have constructed it with absolutely singular purpose, that is with respect to our subjective condition alone, it is ideal. And due to the mode of its construction, from pure reason alone, it is transcendental.

That conception which meets these criteria is space; space, therefore is a transcendental ideality. And at the same time, because it has to do with empirical conditions of real physical objects, logically space has empirical validity. But there’s still something further along to consider, because all that’s been accomplished so far, is the exposition of the relation of an object to us, which says nothing of the relation of objects to each other, for which account must be made insofar as we actually can be simultaneously conscious of more than one object. And, while we always sense an object as it is in one space, we can also sense the same object in a different space. Something lurks in the shadows of the mind.....

Neither the thing-in-itself nor noumena, while being transcendental conceptions a priori, never affect our subjective condition sufficient to change it, their matter is never subjected to the ideality of space such that representation as phenomena are given necessarily, hence neither can ever be a possible experience, which thereby makes them unknowable in its most exact sense.

Cut and dried. Obvious to even the most casual observer. Yeah, right.

Now....about that rational part of the system. No? Maybe in another life, then. With an endless supply of gin and tonic. Or maybe some serious Matanuska Thunderfuck ganja maan. Play Black Sabbath at 78, talk to Lord Immanuel Himself. (Sigh)

Our perceptions are in themselves perspectival biases. — Joshs

I understand this to be the psychological consensus. If such is the case, we are at a loss as to which to blame for our mistakes, our perception because they are biased, or our judgements because they are irrational. We have enough trouble with ourselves, without Ma Nature making it all the more troublesome.

I would agree with your quote, if it had said, “Whatever understanding we have of the world.....”, as this is certainly influenced by our subjective inclinations as well as our reason.

you would say the ding an sich, being the empirical object, is empirically real? — Janus

Yes, it is an ontological given, real in the sense of being necessary for our perceptions. But to say it is empirically real is to say we can know something about it, contradicting the predicates of the philosophy to which it belongs. Space and time are attributed empirical reality because we can say something is known about them, to wit: we can know how and why they relate to the possibility of experience.

Ooooo....transcendental ideality. If noumena are tough, this one is damn near incomprehensible. Transcendental anything is the mode of pure reason from which synthetic a priori cognitions are given necessarily. Transcendental this or that simply means a priori conditions are necessary for judgements on them. A concept is transcendental merely from the very restrictive mode of how we think about it.

Given all that, we cannot arrive at a priori cognitions with respect to the ding an sich, insofar as any knowledge whatsoever about them is itself impossible. Therefore, they cannot be attributed transcendental ideality. Same with noumena, which can be thought a priori, so are knowable merely as a transcendental conception, as are all the categories, but still cannot be considered as have the attribute of transcendental ideality.

In keeping with the text, there are only two transcendental idealities, our ol’ pals, space and time. Some, in particular Schopenhauer, say causality too, but Kant does not.

Anyway....this is far too complex to get into here, because the concept is spread out over so much stuff. And sorry this doesn’t help much.

I am inclined to think that Pilate's question about truth was not about logical propositions at all, but about various perspectives and biases in the process of perception. — Jack Cummins

That’s fine. We often do assert, or claim to know, what is true....or not true, or undeterminable, but only one of those, mind you.....and our own perspectives and biases do influence those assertions or claims. Thing is, our various perspectives and biases are not contained in our perceptions, which only informs us there is something to which an assignment of a truth value, is possible.

On the other hand, you’d be correct to say the verification, or, the proof, for the truth values we assign, is through the process of perception. But this presupposes a truth value to which the proof relates, therefore cannot be the reason for the assignment, nor the methodology by which it is determined. You can’t verify something that isn’t there to be verified.

How big can a can a’worms get anyway, right?

rather than being a straightforward principle. — Jack Cummins

Ok; thanks.

the significance of the principle of 'truth' — Jack Cummins

Does he say what the principle of truth is? Wouldn’t its significance depend on that?

which would seem to suggest equating the empirical object with the ding an sich, if not the noumenon? — Janus

Close enough. To get closer, change “if not” to “but not”.

You must be a Kantian scholar — val p miranda

Hardly; I never even went to college.

My view of immaterial space is certainly less exotic than yours. All I need for space to be understood as immaterial, is the fact that I’ve never experienced bumping into it, and I’m pretty sure no one else has either.

but I am curious as to why you believe space is immaterial. — val p miranda

The satisfaction of your curiosity resides in my non-scientific satisfaction with The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ch1, Remark 2, 1786. Which has the added bonus of logically proving the relativity of space, both contra Newton’s absolute space, 1687, and as precursor to Einstein, 1905.

This rock exists cannot be said of the rock of yesterday nor the rock of tomorrow,
— Mww

No, but you can say, "the rock of yesterday exists", "the rock of tomorrow exists". — hypericin

Of course you can; you just did. Nevertheless, the rock of yesterday exists isn’t saying the same as this rock exists.

(Sigh)

This rock exists.

To say the same thing is to say this rock exists.

This rock exists cannot be said of the rock of yesterday nor the rock of tomorrow, which is the answer to the question of whether or not it can be said this rock of yesterday or this rock of tomorrow exists.

The me of yesterday can say this rock exists, and the me of tomorrow can say this rock exists, but.....well, that ain’t happenin’, so.....

I am wondering more about what it is saying about the person who says it and in what situation saying it would be of any use. — Fooloso4

.....yep, just like that.

an open question (which we can investigate the truth of). — Andrew M

Gotta love a 3500yo tradition, huh?