This depends on how one understands "the object". From the perspective of what I've been arguing, objects are a creation of the sensing system..... — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, that’s fine, if you like. I hold that objects are material substance with extension in space and duration in time. With that, objects cannot be created by the sensing system, but exist as physical things independently from it.

......You call (what I call) the object, a representation, but what it represents you cannot really say, though you assign "object" to that...... — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I assign “phenomenon” to that, but exactly what it represents I cannot say, is true enough, because there are no cognitive abilities in the sensory sub-system. This is classic Plato “knowledge that” (there is something present to my senses), as opposed to “knowledge of”, which informs as to what the presence is. Or, more accurately I suppose, informs as to how the presence is to be known.

So there is an appearance in the mind, the appearance of an object, you say it is a representation, I say it's the object, but what it represents, we don't know. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhhh....technically I wouldn’t say here appearances are in the mind, insofar as we are not conscious of the creation of these representations as phenomena. This has support in the physical sciences as well, so....all is not hopeless metaphysical handwaving. It is here, also, I find agreement with your sub-conscious system that creates its “object”.

This is the Idealism described in Plato's Republic, and Berkeley's Dialogues, the reality of objects is within the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, exactly, but such idealism is rendered obsolete by late-Enlightenment transcendental idealism.

"Representation" I believe, is a way of using symbols which evolved from communication, when we assume an external object which we both may apprehend and talk about. — Metaphysician Undercover

Representation is that, but much more than that. Think scientifically: for any exchange of energy dissimilar systems, there is a loss. If there is a loss, the output of the exchange cannot be equal to the input to it. As such, the output merely represents the input.

Symbols, then, are representations, but not of the kind given from sensibility, which merely determines something about the physical presence of some external object, but are representations given from the next stage, which is the reasoning system proper.

Besides, if, as I maintain, the sense system has no cognitive abilities, it cannot assign symbols, insofar as, on the one hand, there is no faculty or repository from which to withdraw symbols, and on the other, there is no conscious logical system in sensibility which authorizes which symbol to draw in relation to a given perception.

I submit, one must understand what he perceives long before he can talk about it. I mean, if one doesn’t understand.....what could he say about it?
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It isn’t my eyes that are deceived by hallucinogens or mirage or delusions in general.....
— Mww

I don't agree with this. I think it is the sensing system itself which creates the hallucination. So it is a fault within the sensing system, and this in turn deceives the cognitive power. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, fine. How does a system that receives sense data create something that falsifies what it receives? If this were the case, what prevents us from always being deceived? How does the sensing system distinguish a deception from a valid appearance?

We do not exactly know what the "creative power" is, and the extent of its creative capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, and a perfect reason to require the actual conscious system to ride herd on it, to regulate it, by synthesizing conceptions to the objects created by the sensing system, in order to make them understandable, and hence, to permit knowledge of them.

But you are correct, in a truly metaphysically undercover way: we have no way of knowing exactly anything at all, except that by which the system itself informs. I am sufficiently informed that the thing I just tripped over was a tree root, but was it really? I have no good reason to ever think it wasn’t, and I do myself no favors by going through the motions of attempting to come up with one.

So I do not think we can conclude logically that it is limited by what it is sensing. — Metaphysician Undercover

“It” understood as creative power of the sensing system, if what you say is the case, then it is possible the creative system can create its objects without anything being perceived. If not logically limited by what it is sensing, it follows it is limited by itself, or it has no limits at all. Which, in effect, if true, makes the creative system a self-contained causality.

While I tacitly agree with the validity of a self-contained causality, I hold that it is not in the creative power of the sensing system, but in the synthetic a priori manifestations of pure reason. So...you are basically on the track, but you’ve got the cart before the horse.

The creative power has evolved so that it is adapted to the world it is sensing, and the needs of the sensing being, but that doesn't mean it couldn't have developed a completely different sensing capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover

If by sensing capacity you mean the functionality of the sense organs, you’ve invoked a logical question-begging. We have THIS sensing capacity, which makes explicit the creative power couldn’t have developed any other kind, and doesn’t give sufficient ground for allowing that creative power, in and of itself, developed anything except itself, which excludes sensing capacities, which are strictly predicated on physiology. While it is true we would have a completely different experience base if the creative power evolved differently, but.....it didn’t, so what we have is all we’re logically permitted to discuss.

Unless I misunderstand, you’re saying a different creative power could have developed our senses to sense differently, which is a function of natural evolution alone.
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But the living beings cannot remove what's already there deep within the sensing system, developed when the "object" was completely unknown. So this makes the fundamentals of basic sensation very arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say arbitrary, I say undetermined. It is true humans....the only living beings I care about.....cannot remove what already there deep within the sensing system, such is just an admission that the use of it is inescapable. Extending that necessity, we find that, at this stage of the reasoning system as a whole, anything perceived is as yet undetermined, which is precisely how a thing is completely unknown.

So sensing is fundamentally based in a not-knowing system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. Thing is, of course, we’re so used to repetitive perceptions, a.k.a., experience, we just grant we immediately know what we perceive, and don’t need to consider the operation of the whole system. It’s like it’s in automatic, but in fact, the system operates exactly the same way for each and every single thing we perceive. Just does it oh-so-much faster when the conscious system recalls from itself rather than constructs for itself.
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Nevertheless, without the object, there is still imagination....
— Mww

See, I do not respect this proposed division between imagination and sense perception. I don't think it's real or true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well then, you’re reeeaaalllllyyyyy gonna have trouble accepting the notion of aesthetic as opposed to discursive judgement, with productive as opposed to reproductive imagination. Which is to say, there’s a lot more to this “deeper system” than we’ve encountered so far in this dialectical foray into the sublime.

Real metaphysics is in books of hundreds of pages covering everything pertinent; modern metaphysics is in a few peer-reviewed pages covering minor incidentals.

I hold that these sense organs have no cognitive power....
— Mww

....But the power which receives information from the senses (...) is not properly a "cognitive power". — Metaphysician Undercover

So we end up in the same place. Good enough for me.
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What I am saying is that we need to account for the system which gives the object to the cognitive (conscious) system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except the object is never given to the cognitive system, that being merely a representation of it. So yes, we need a sub-system that accounts for the creation of representations.

This system is intermediate between the object itself, and what appears in the mind as the sense image of the object. This is the sensing system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes....sorta just like that. In my language, that is sensibility, and subsumed under it, is the faculty for the reception of impressions, better known as intuition, the purview of which is the creation of phenomena, which are the intermediate representations between the object itself, which is only perceived, and the conscious system, which only thinks.

So it's somewhat inaccurate to say "the impression the object gives me", I have to say that it is 'the impression that the sense system gives me'. — Metaphysician Undercover

To say the impression the sense system gives me, says nothing about the object that caused the sense system to create the impression. Which leaves us with.....impressions of what? At best, an impression given by the sense system merely says which sense, or combination of them, made the impression possible.

Then I can understand that the sense impression in my mind is not "given" by the object sensed, it is given by that deeper system, and it is faults within the system which are causing me to hallucinate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except the sense system has no cognitive power, only creative, the object itself determining the limits of such creative power. It isn’t my eyes that are deceived by hallucinogens or mirage or delusions in general, it is that fault within the conscious system, that is. Sense system does this job but not that; the conscious system does that job, but not this.

The representation in my mind is certainly given by the object, but I understand that representation only by a deeper system. Understanding is the deeper, cognitive, system. Hallucination resides right there, merely a misunderstanding of that which the sense system gives to it. One word: imagination.

Still, I see what you’re getting at. If the sense system creates a faulty impression, and the mind works with that alone, you would be on firm ground. In which case, all you’d have to do is account for how a hallucinogen can change the impression of an object from it’s actually sense. Or, how a hallucinogen manipulates creative powers in the sense system, which requires an account of exactly what creative power entails, such that it can even be manipulated. Which is the advantage from my view, in that the sense system can’t be manipulated by that which is a consequence of it. (Remember...this does this, that does that) In other words, the system as a whole cannot work backwards.
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We can see when something is outside of the norm, (....) but we really cannot say that the norm is "real", or even how things "should be represented". — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, we can, at least the norm with respect to “should be”, that being experience. Anything that appears as it should not be, contradicts experience. Besides, to see something outside the norm presupposes the norm, which is, again, experience. As for the “real” I suppose that’s more the purview of logic than experience proper. Maybe we can only say the real is so for us, which makes it true we cannot know the real otherwise than as we say it is.
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Consider that the representation could be extremely arbitrary, like the way we use symbols and words to represent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the sense representation could be extremely arbitrary, but only when under the influence of an object completely unknown to us. In such case, we can say only what the object is not, but cannot say what it is. Otherwise, we’d know it, hence not arbitrary at all.

The word, or symbol, has no necessity to bear any resemblance to the thing represented, it may be a completely arbitrary assignment, for memory purposes or simple facility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, not so much to the sense representation, but to the concept representation, the word stands for the conception, and while arbitrarily assigned, in your words, no necessity to bear, initially, Gel-Mann’s “quark” being a prime example, henceforth actually represents exactly how the concept should be represented. Your “simple facility”.

If the conscious mind uses symbols in this arbitrary way, (no real reason why this symbol represents that object), then the subconscious could behave in a very similar way. — Metaphysician Undercover

If left to its own devices, possibly, sure. A very good reason why it isn’t; it is utterly dependent for its creative powers, on the object perception gives to it. Nevertheless, without the object, there is still imagination, which does not depend on perception, in which case, we can manufacture any damn thing we want. Even logically contradictory objects.....dogs with wings. But no matter what, we can’t seem to imagine impossible things. Impossible experiences, yes, but not things we cannot think, which is all that makes a thing impossible in the first place.

Still, if the sub-conscious does all this....how would we be made aware of it?

Good stuff. Fun to play with. No right or wrong here, just musings galore, right? Or...musing run completely amok. (Grin)

So, is the claim that we have that idea from the moment of birth? — Janus

Perhaps, but not developed enough to be useful. covered it well enough, I think.
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The body has its inherent capacities, no doubt, and we are not born as "blank slates". — Janus

D’accord.
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Are we able to think of anything that is not something we have heard of, or at least a composite of things experienced and/ or heard of? — Janus

I would say yes, in a logical cognitive system, predicated necessarily on relations. Isn’t this the method of doing science?

I’m a 20th century Swiss patent clerk. I took the train to Berlin a month or so ago, dropped my fork on the floor, obviously landing right at my feet. Went straight down. Bounced once or twice. Couple days later, I was standing on the platform, train went flying by, guy dropped his fork, and I’ll be damned if it didn’t occur to me that fork landed 10 feet further down the track from where it got dropped.

Even us common folk....ever used a butter knife for a screwdriver? Experience with the one has no relation whatsoever with the experience of the other, yet there resides in understanding the possibility of substitution. It must....otherwise, why would the cognition manifest at all? Similarly, while it may not be so conceptually far-fetched to use a butter knife to spread axle grease, it is quite another matter to use a twig.

Furthermore, that someone else has combined red and blue on a paint palette and I have absolutely no knowledge of it, such antecedent experience has no relation to me. If I think of doing it, then I have met the criteria which affirms your query: yes, I can think something that is not an experience nor composite of them. That I should have experience of mixing this paint or that paint, doesn’t in itself give me the thought of mixing together different paints. But here you would be kinda right, in a second-step kinda way; experience tells me merely adding them to each other is not going to cut it, I need to mix them.

I won’t state the theoretical justifications, unless you’re interested.

But I get what you mean. In this day and age, with the world seemingly so small, so many damn people, so much information, so much new stuff all the time.....seems like it’s impossible not to be influenced by it all. Think about it, though......what gets lost in all that noise?

Folks are generally empiricist and realist by upbringing and cultural inclination. — Wayfarer

Yeah, which generally leads to intellectual laissez-faire....let it be, don’t bother me with the details, kinda thing.

I am sure I remember.....a priori judgements are independent of any particular experience, but not independent of experience in general. — Janus

If you should happen across it again....
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(You couldn't conceive of causality, for example if you had never experienced constant conjunctions of events or number if you had never experienced different objects). — Janus

This reflects post of Magee’s position. It seems the norm nowadays, to put the cart before the Kantian horse, which is fine, if one is comfortable with it. The theory goes....and of course it is only theory.... that a human rational agent only understands because the conditions for it are already contained within that agency. Long story short...we understand stuff because we’ve come equipped to do it, and one of the ingredients we come equipped with, is the idea of cause/effect.

(Not technically an idea as commonly thought. We call it that because “transcendental conception of pure reason” is just too far out, and misleading, because that conception is developed by pure reason in order to talk about it, but the idea doesn’t belong to reason at all; it belongs to understanding, which is just makes it.....er......further far out)

In fact, we only have the effect of the experience of objects because those objects are the cause of it. From there, it is a short hop to understanding the effects of objects themselves as having a cause. It is clear, then, we don’t have to conceive causality; it is the natural order of our understanding, and antecedent to any use of it.

Take “possibility” for instance, another intrinsic condition. That idea doesn’t represent our ability for understanding might be possible, which is a non-starter because our understanding is given by the type of intelligence that makes us human, but instead, represents that for a thing to be presented to us, that thing must at least be possible. Obviously, things we perceive must be possible, else we wouldn’t perceive them, but that doesn’t hold for things we merely think. As such, Nature....or sheer evolutionary happenstance if you prefer.....has ensured we don’t waste time thinking about things that are impossible, in our pervasive reach, and sometimes over-reach, for knowledge.

So no, we don’t conceive causality, or the cause/effect dichotomy. We conceive individual representations of it.....because that’s how it’s done, dammit!!!!!

Sorry.....not so short after all.

All the rest is good philosophy, so it doesn’t really matter that I can counter-argue many of its points. Because you’ve done a worthy job of self-expression, it becomes now a matter of minutia.

You place the "cause" of the sense impression in the external object, rather than within the human being, and you conclude that the "impression I get from an object is determined by that object". The human body is very finely tuned, and a slight alteration in the chemical balance will change the sense impressions greatly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hold with materialism with respect to external objects of perception, yes. All external objects are substance, or, material, and the material of the object is that which affects my perceptive apparatus. In conjunction with that, I hold that these sense organs have no cognitive power, they merely relay the presence of material, upon which that part of the reasoning system having to do with sense impressions, functions. Do my eyes qualify as chemically imbalanced upon hallucination, or is it in the brain, where the impressions are received, that the chemical changes occur? If in the brain, and the philosophical equivalent of brain is a theory of cognition, in which comparable manifestations appear, then it is in the reasoning process where judgement is affected, that stands in for chemical changes in the brain.

So no, the sense impression does not change; what the reasoning process makes of it, does. It is the cognition of the object given from the reasoning process, not the impression the object gives me, that tells me I’m stoned.

The human body receives information from the object, but it is this human body which creates, and determines the impression, not the external object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, in that the body (actually, the sub-conscious process you favor, which I call intuition) creates a phenomenon that determines how the impression should be represented. In this respect, then, causes are always and only internal, but only regarding the reasoning process itself, having nothing whatsoever to do with causes of objects, or that which objects cause.

We might agree, on the other hand, that objects cause, are the raw unprocessed material for, perceptions, but then, perceptions (raw material) alone are not impressions, which are the purview of sensation (representation of raw material). Again....minutia.

A priori means before experience, or a condition of experience. — Jackson

The foregoing conversation is in reference to Kant, so.....

“....By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. (....) If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori....” (...) Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an à priori origin manifest....”
(B3-6, A2 says something a little different, but always go with the latest)

....which is not to say there is no other reasonable criteria for the conception, but any such is useless in this transcendental context.

Kant acknowledged that a priori judgements come after experience. — Janus

I think Kant means the validity of a priori judgements are demonstrated by experience.

“....The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to all our à priori cognitions....”

An a priori judgement is an a priori cognition, insofar as a judgement is the synthesis of representations from which a cognition follows. As such, then, an a priori judgement is valid iff a possible experience may follow from it. All this is intended to show, is that we can synthesize all the representations we want, but if they don’t lead to an experience, or a possible experience, they are generally useless. Or what he calls “without sense or meaning”. Which is the conventional way of describing the ever-dreadful transcendental illusion.

We’ve been here before, and honestly, I can’t find anything to substantiate Kant’s acknowledgement as you’ve posited it. I’d understand if you’ve no wish to pursue this line of disagreement; to each his own, etc, etc.....

It's one-way. — Wayfarer

Of course it is; couldn’t be otherwise.

Forgive them, for they know not what they say. If they did, no citation would be necessary, it (the “experiment” you mentioned) being the foundation of the entire systemic transcendental enterprise.

(Sigh)

we don't make reality as Kant and Berkeley did — val p miranda

What do you mean by “make reality”? Something like...make reality out to be? If it is considered that the closest synonym for “to make” is “to create”, the statement reads, “we don’t create reality as Kant and Berkeley did.” Surely that is not what you wish to convey.

Just wondering, and from which would follow...how do we make, or, what do we make of, reality, if not as Kant and Berkeley did.

If the mind recreates the memory each time it remembers it.....what would prevent each memory being a little different than the object being remembered?
— Mww

I think that's actually very common. We have to work hard to ensure that a memory doesn't change. This requires constant effort. It takes effort to memorize something, that is a method of repetition, and a similar method of periodic recollection is used to ensure that the memory doesn't change. The longer the duration of time between the acts of recollection, the more substantial the change in the memory is likely to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all that common, but occasionally, sure., especially in the case of individual particular objects. I have no idea exactly what I held in my hand at any given time four years ago, but I remember full well a trip I took to Yellowstone four years ago, and most, but not all, of what I did on that trip.

We don’t work on memories. A memory modified is a new memory.

Memorization is a method of repetition, yes, but we don’t memorize memories; we memorize cognitions that become memories.

We don’t recall memories merely to refresh them; we recall them to compare to a current cognition.

The longer between recall of a memory the less it may relate, yes, but that is not a change in the memory. If a memory no longer is accurate recollection, it’s simply because we’ve more with which it no longer compares. At ten y.o. my memory of going fast was 50mph; at 30 y.o. my memory of going fast was 100mph. My memory of 50mph is still an accurate recollection and hasn’t been replaced; it just doesn’t accurately relate to going fast.
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I think, that in reality, the mind must recreate the impression or idea every time it supposedly retrieves it from memory. (...) The mind must recreate the memory each time it remembers it.
— Metaphysician Undercover

If you remember an object often enough, it becomes possible you haven’t remembered the original object at all. — Mww

That's exactly the point, you are not remembering an object at all, you are learning a process. And what I said is that there is no content, or material aspect of this process at all, so there is no object. Your sub-conscious mind just repeats a process, and the process creates the material or content, as "the memory". — Metaphysician Undercover

But I don’t know what my sub-conscious mind is doing, so what grants the authority for it to do what you say it is?

And why does it seem like I’m remembering objects?

So the sub-conscious is repeating a learning process, the results of which is a memory. What are the ingredients, the constituency, the composition, of this process? What is learned and what learns it? I can see a comparison being created, maybe, but what is recognizing it as such?

I can see having no material properties, but the content is still an object as “memory”, right? Gotta be a memory of something. I agree my memory of an object is mere convention, insofar as there is no material object being recalled from memory, but there is still a representation of one, which should, for all practical purposes, be a replica of the original material object. So it would seem to have a material aspect.
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While the degree of identity of the recall is determined by the degree of accuracy in the original, the error in the recall is not impossible, but so vanishingly small as to be disregarded....
— Mww

I don't agree with this at all. In my experience there is a heck of a lot of inaccuracy in recollection. We have to work extremely hard if we wish to try to avoid inaccuracy, and this is called memorizing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you memorize your favorite birthday present, or do you....you know....just remember what it was? If you don’t remember what it was, then you didn’t work hard enough memorizing, in which case you conventionally say you don’t remember, but in fact the truth is, you just don’t know.

I agree, though, that there are times when you tell yourself something is really important and it is a great benefit for you to remember it. Maybe it is in these cases where continuous recall is the method by which the memory becomes embedded and readily available. But I don’t see a repetitive sub-conscious process at work, if you have to tell yourself to repeat the impression in the reasoning process.
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.....post hoc memory recall, then, is merely a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation, and the error in recall of an extant representation the object of which is known, is negligible.
— Mww

This makes no sense to me. You must recall first, before you can make a judgement on the thing recalled. How can recollection itself be a judgement? Recollection cannot be "a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation", because judgement is a conscious act, and the pre-conceived representation must be recalled to the conscious mind before a judgement can be made on it. I agree that there is a judgement made to recall a specific representation, but the recollection is not itself a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Recall first, yes, but the recollection is not itself the judgement. The recalled memory is in relation to your experience, which is judged. No, this impression doesn’t represent what I got for my birthday; no this is doesn’t.....yes, this does.

No, this impression doesn’t represent how I remember Stephen King’s antagonist in The Shining. No, this doesn’t, yes this does. The object brought up from consciousness meets general criteria first, becoming more particular as the reasoning process examines that which is given to it. Each object is brought up and discarded or not depending on your experience from which the original object became a memory in the first place.

It is usually the case that the reasoning process helps itself by bringing up several objects, all of which were pre-conceived representations related to the past experience.....who was there, what your brother was doing, what kind of cake, and so on. These aid the reasoning process in giving the conscious mind the impression it’s looking for.....your favorite birthday present.
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The process is indeed very formal and entirely free from material content, but is necessarily conditioned by it when such material affects sensibility, from which is given the affective representational content.
— Mww

This is why the process which deals with sensations, and creates sense impressions within the conscious mind, must be completely different from the process which recollects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe, dunno how that process works, exactly. In the system I know, sense impressions are given to us, not created by us. The impression I get from an object is determined by that object. I can’t tell an object it is round; it tells me.

I don’t see why the recollections can’t be dealt with by the same system. They’re all representations.

But it's true, we need a different process for every new thing that comes along, otherwise we could not remember each one as different. I suppose that's why we have so many neurons. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reject it’s true. If you ca convince me it’s possible, I’ll work with it.

and without reference to neuroscience, which is the point. — Wayfarer

Reification of metaphysical predicates with empirical principles, destroys both.

because I don’t have a clear idea of your meanings of mind.....
— Mww

I think the issue here is not what "mind" means, but what it means to be in memory. We tend to believe that the mind takes an object, an idea, sense impression, or something like that, and places it somewhere, holding on to it, to be referred to for later use. Under this belief, the thing remembered, the memory would be in the mind somewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t think the mind does anything, except serve as conceptual complement to “body”. Just sayin’.

I think, that in reality, the mind must recreate the impression or idea every time it supposedly retrieves it from memory. If this is the case, then we cannot say that things in memory are actually in the mind. The mind must recreate the memory each time it remembers it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You know how when you need, say, a dozen boards 12” long, you mark off 12”, cut it off the long board, then lay that 12” piece on the long board, mark and cut that piece, then use that second 12” piece to mark the third? If the first cut was off a little, then using that to mark the second, use the second to mark the third.....each time the cut gets longer by the error in the first cut. If the mind recreates the memory each time it remembers it.....what would prevent each memory being a little different than the object being remembered? If you remember an object often enough, it becomes possible you haven’t remembered the original object at all. And if you haven’t remembered the original, what is it you’re remembering? Now the ground is set for, say, by the time you got to 6th grade, you should have failed to remember at least most of which you learned in first grade. But, of course, you have not. What do we do about that?

Besides....is there anything in memory you don’t know? If there is, you’re gonna have a hellava time explaining how it got there.
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If mind puts the object, sense impression, in a storage place, to be pulled out later, then the remembered thing is always in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it recreates the object (the memory) each time it recalls it, then the object is not in the mind, in the mean time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, the remembered thing is always in the mind, the thing remembered remains where it was put. Whether remembered or re-created, there is a representation of a representation, which I agree is susceptible to fallibility of identity, but is not necessarily so.

The mind is not making it up as pure fiction, but it is attempting to replicate something — Metaphysician Undercover

For empirical conditions, by which a real object becomes an impression of experience subsequently a content of consciousness, the faculty of representation grounded in sensibility is necessary. For the re-creation of an impression recalled from consciousness, in which there is no immediate impression grounded in sensibility, makes explicit the faculty responsible for handling sensibility is not necessary. So it appears there is a difference set of faculties for one method as opposed to the other.

In the case where the impression by an object becomes knowledge of it by the synthesis of intuition and concept into a cognition of that object, post hoc memory recall, then, is merely a judgement made on a pre-conceived representation, and the error in recall of an extant representation the object of which is known, is negligible.

While the degree of identity of the recall is determined by the degree of accuracy in the original, the error in the recall is not impossible, but so vanishingly small as to be disregarded. That is to say, if the one is somewhat wrong, the latter will be exactly the same somewhat wrong, but if the original is correct, so too will be the recalled impression. Usually fault is predicated on fault in the entire system as a disfunction of age in the form of electro-chemical brain disability. But we’re concerned with the rule, not exceptions to it.

In the case of re-creation, with the impression of the object of sense already established, what is being used as the source, if not the impression in consciousness? And more importantly, how does that source make itself usable to the system? In the former case, the impression is right there, the faculty being used in recall knows where to find it, and just goes and gets it. In the re-creation scenario, some faculty constructs, but apparently without being told where to get its construction material. Or at least, you’ve haven’t yet posited such a source.

You say that memory can provide content to fill gaps in the input raw material, but what is this content which the memory is providing? — Metaphysician Undercover

A posteriori knowledge for objects in the world; a priori knowledge for objects of reason.
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I think it's just a pure process, with no content. The mind learns a process, and it can repeat this process. It's entirely formal, a process free from material content. The process creates the impression, whether or not there is any input from the senses. In its fundamental "pure" form, there is no sense input, no raw material, just a formal process. That process allows itself to be affected by raw material. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the process allows itself to be affected by raw material, then the affect is the content. For there to be a process makes explicit that which is processed. Otherwise is to claim there are thoughts without that which is thought about, a contradiction. Or experience without that which is experienced.

The process is indeed very formal and entirely free from material content, but is necessarily conditioned by it when such material affects sensibility, from which is given the affective representational content.
—————-

The difference between this type of impression, and the ones which use sense input, is that the mind uses the sense input to learn new processes and techniques, because the sense input is stimulus which excites new feelings, and new challenges for the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nature would have ruined us if making it so we needed a different process every time something new came along. Before learning what the something new is, we’d have to learn the process by which learning something new becomes possible. Rather more efficient to use one process exactly the same way for all instances, while compensating for that which Nature herself doesn’t provide.
———

How could the mind store an impression? — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn’t. All my representations reside in consciousness. Each and every otherwise rational human agent’s personal spare parts bin. All that of which I am conscious in in one place. Obviously, because for each and every single representation ever of mine, “I” is that which brings it forth. Consciousness, a passive faculty, is not part of the active reasoning process, so not subjected to its rules.

But then what is remembering? Surely it's an essential part of the reasoning process. — Metaphysician Undercover

Remembering is, certainly. The distinctions reside in which parts of the process is used under corresponding conditions. Nothing is ever added to the process itself under any conditions whatsoever....it being, as a whole, as our kind of intelligence demands of it....but some parts of it may not be required under some conditions.

The human is a dualistic creature, no matter how such duality is represented. Metaphysics is all about the representation, the explanatory theory, the less complicated and confused the better.

Same as it ever was......

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An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know.....
— Mww

Things derived from memory are manufactured by the internal process and presented to the conscious mind in a way similar to the way that things derived from sensation are manufactured and presented to the conscious mind, but the difference is in the raw 'material', content. You are saying that the content of the internal (non-sense) process uses 'knowledge' as the content, but I am saying that this supposed 'knowledge' has a high degree of fallibility and ought not be called 'knowledge'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Things from memory are not manufactured by the internal process; they are recalled as pre-manufactured impressions of things from the spare parts bin, called consciousness, by the internal process to bridge a gap in some subsequent raw material processing, or just to give the process something to do in the absence of raw material to process.

So, yes, there is a difference in raw material content, in that there isn’t any raw material at all in things from memory. Having already been worked on by the internal process, we may treat things from memory as impressions of resident experiences, which by that token the conscious mind receives those things known to it. But not being received directly from sense impressions, being called up as post hoc impressions to bridge a gap in a current internal ad hoc manufacturing process, the recalled impressions are known a priori to the conscious mind.

The internal process is a chain of events determining an output relating to the input raw material. If a memory is being recalled to fill a gap in a current process, the impression dropped into the gap will either allow the process to continue to its conclusion, or cause the process to stop manufacturing, culminating in no output. Therefore, there must be an authority responsible for which memory to recall from the huge manifold of spare parts in a lifetime’s worth of consciousness.

But the internal process could be just in idle, energized and waiting for the next raw material to process, operating under the condition where there isn’t any. The process doesn’t stop operating in the absence of raw material, for the conscious mind is stil conscious even in idle mode. The process can still recall impressions of things from memory to present to the conscious mind, using that, not as raw material.....because it isn’t raw material, that being the input from sense alone....but as mere impressions as such. In this case, there isn’t any gap to be dropped into, so there isn’t any ceasing of the process because the wrong impression was recalled.

The internal process by which the conscious mind gets its pre-manufactured impression of objects of sense from consciousness, is nothing but pure thought. But what of the authority that determines the validity of the memory to be recalled? If the memory is being recalled to fill a gap in order for there to be a determined relation, the authority must be more strict than in the case where the process is in idle and for which, on the one hand, a determined relation has already been given, re: extant experiences, or, on the other, is not even being sought, re: possible experiences.

In all cases of raw material of sense, discursive judgement calls up memory, reason is the authority, from which is obtained a relative truth. In all other cases, aesthetic judgement calls up memory, imagination is the authority, from which is obtained a relative pleasure.

Intuition can now be the one thing it is, and logic hasn’t even made a functional appearance.

Easy-Peasey......

Two distinct impressions the mind gets, yes. The immediate from perception, the mediate from the mind itself...
— Mww

The point though is that to be in the memory is not the same as to be in the mind (the reasoning process), because things which are being thought about are in the mind, while things in the memory are not necessarily being thought about. — Metaphysician Undercover

After working on this seemingly forever, I find I can’t offer a conclusive response, because I don’t have a clear idea of your meanings of mind. The mind may be conceived to contain a reasoning process, but if it contains it, it cannot be it, so why not remove the reasoning process from “mind” and just let the reasoning process be itself? Then it can have all the constituent parts it needs to be a proper method, and even if things in memory are not being thought about, they wouldn’t be in memory if they weren’t thought about at some time. From which follows to be in memory is the same as being in the mind, in the reasoning process, just at a different time than the other distinct impression the memory merely represents. Besides that, things that are currently thought about may be impressions from memory, which is the very same thing as my recollection of appearance.

Much easier for me to grasp, if we just say every impression ever, are all merely the contents of our consciousness, and were each and every one worked on by the reasoning process, either first, by being put there, which we might call an impression of an object of experience, or subsequently, by being recalled from there, which we might call an object as an impression from memory of the object of experience, or some object as an impression from that which is not an object of experience.
————

So we have to assume a different sort of intuition involved int the creation of these impressions which do not utilize immediate sense input, they are created from an internal source. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which type of impressions are not created from an internal source? And don’t say real objects of sense, because they are not impressions. That which makes an impression cannot be the impression it makes.

Using my terms, we have to assume a different sort of faculty involved in the creation for our impressions which do not utilize immediate sense input (because the faculty that creates impressions that do utilize sense input can’t operate unless there is one).
————

An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know....
— Mww

The problem now, is that if you use "knowledge" in this way, you allow these varying degrees of fallibility into what we are calling "knowledge". — Metaphysician Undercover

In your words, my conscious mind gets an impression but the reasoning process can cognize nothing from it, then it is impossible for me to know what that impression represents. I may still be left with an opinion about the impression, but an opinion does not imply correspondence with the actual object the impression represents. To express this I would say, “I think the impression might represent a (____).” No fallibility in knowledge, insofar as I would never rightfully say, “I know the impression represents a (_____)”.

On the other hand, if my conscious mind gets an impression created by me in an internal faculty without any input from sense whatsoever, the certainty of the knowledge derived from that impression is automatic, because I myself am the author of it. This type of impression on the conscious mind given from the reasoning process, is a thought cognized as a singular conception, or a series of united conceptions cognized in the form of a completed proposition. I know with absolute certainty anything I think. It is impossible for me to think something, then turn right around and tell myself I can’t know the thought I just had.

It doesn’t matter if the object my conscious mind gets from the reasoning process is an object in memory, insofar as my knowledge is just as certain that it is an object impressed on me from memory, and I will swear up and down the memory and the original object are perfectly related. What could possibly tell me they were not? Again, no hint of a fallibility in my knowledge.

The fallibility resides in judgement, the only part of the reasoning process susceptible to fallibility. This makes perfect sense in a cognitive system that is itself purely a logical system. Not based on logic, but IS logic. The reason we know things logically is simply because reason is logic.

This reduces to...how can logic make mistakes, which answers how can judgement be fallible. Dunno. We make mistakes but don’t know the irreducible cause of them. Hence.....wait for iiiittttttttt....transcendental metaphysics, which cannot prevent mistakes, but can show how to guard against them.
—————-

We need to look directly at intention, to understand our intuitions of future things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whole lot less complicated, whole lot less susceptible to mistakes, if we just don’t bother with understanding the intuitions of future things. We grant possibility, which is always contingent, which makes explicit knowledge from contingency it itself contingent. I can look directly at any intention I wish all day long, and tomorrow may very well thwart every one of them. Nature helps me out here, because I don’t need to directly look at my intention to breathe, for my blood to circulate, and stuff like that. Nature removes control of absolute necessities from my intentions. All the others.....ehhhhh, intend away, and merely hope for the best. Which gets us to reasonable expectations: I expect my legs to work, I expect the sun to still be there in order to intuit it tomorrow exactly as I did today.

Psychology. What a waste of brain cells.
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Logic improperly employed is still logic.
— Mww

No, it really isn't still logic, unless we can demonstrate the logic which justifies the judgement of "improperly", and show that this is somehow proper, therefore still logic. And this is the mistake made by Janus. If the process is invalid, then it is not logical and cannot be called logic. If you say that it is "improperly employed" then you are saying it is illogical, therefore it cannot be logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, your principle of identity writ large: break down the syllogism into its subject/copula/predicate composition, you get....logic/is/logic. The conception contained in the predicate is exactly the same conception contained in the subject, which makes it an analytical a priori judgement, the same thing as a tautology, which is always a necessarily true statement. And, is exactly what Aristotle indicated with the Law of Identity.

Logic improperly employed merely indicates the conceptions in the premises, or the conceptions in the syllogism itself, don’t belong to each other but are conjoined as if they do, which makes the conclusion drawn from them illogical. The conclusion is illogical, the statements/syllogisms are nonetheless logical constructions.

Second, regarding the validity of the process, “There may be some dogs that have wings” is a perfectly constructed logical syllogism, exactly following the valid logical process. The logical form is correct; the logical content conflicts, so the statement is illogical. I prefer irrational, but....whatever. But the statement illustrates your requirement so can be called logic. Bad logic, but still......

Anyway, sorry for the delay.

that Kant passage supports my earlier response to @Mww. (...) We don't necessarily have to think that mathematics is nothing but synthetic or nothing but analytic. — Janus

Correct. We don’t have to think that math is nothing but this or that. All we need from math is the validity of it as a certain science. But we’re not looking to prove that. What is being asked is, are synthetic a priori propositions and whatnot, valid explanatory devices, and if math is a possible way to show that they are, and subsequently can be used as validations for something else, then we need to know, not that math is this or that, but how math can be a proof of the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions. Because math is already a certain science, if math can ground the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, then those propositions will necessarily be as certain as the science of mathematics, the validity of them thus obtained.

So no, all those as usual folk don’t have to think of math as anything but a tool. Only the unusual folk, on the other hand.....ehhhh, they’re off in Never-Never-Land anyway, operating in the realm of pure logic, so.....

Well, I know I’m against to populist flow of things with my belief that Kant misinterpreted Hume - in spite of my respect for Kant. And, though I don’t much want to bicker on the subject - unless there’s reason to - I’m so far not convinced to the contrary. Basically, just wanted to express this for what its worth. — javra

Screw the populist flow. As my ol’ buddy R. Dubbya said, “to be a man one must be a non-conformist”.

As for Kant misinterpreting Hume, if you think it so, more power to ya. Me....all I’m qualified to do is philosophize regarding either one or the other, but only a Master is qualified to critique another. “Master” being just somebody talked about scholastically centuries after they’re no longer around to appreciate it.

Bickering is pathologically stupid, and, it’s worth whatever you think it is.

I'm not entirely sure what you're saying here. It seems to me that the "possibility of actually doing it" would have been realized quite early in human evolution — Janus

Sure, but we’re not talking human anthropology, we’re talking a method of reason in individual human subjects.

Backtracking a bit...

Perhaps once we have the symbols to represent numbers and the four basic arithmetical functions the rest of mathematics is analytic, meaning that it just logically follows — Janus

....which relates to how we find the numbers, “cognition” here tacitly understood as merely a number, numbers in general, which we could envision as “what is it that represents some quantity”, from which follows that because there is no such thing to answer the question to be found in Nature, which must be the case otherwise we wouldn’t be looking for it in reason itself, we make up that which is sufficient for the job.

“....Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the presentation à priori of the intuition which corresponds to the conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite, which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as a general representation, it must be seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under that conception...”

So it is that we construct a symbol, an individual intuition, which then represents every empirical quantity of that measure. One apple, one house, one star; a million of anything all represented by the same constructed representation cognized as a unit of measure.

I think the realization of the possibility of grouping things together would plausibly have long before any "conception of synthesis" in the evolution of human understanding. — Janus

Except the realization of the possibility of grouping things together just is the conception of synthesis.

“...The mathematical conception I should construct, that is, present à priori in intuition, and in this way attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power is presented to my mind***, I find that it does not relate to or indicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions. (...) The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed à priori to the intuition which corresponds to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition, they can never present more than a principle of the synthesis of possible empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method, and it renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical cognition, though it cannot present us with any intuition à priori....”

This is saying that although we already constructed the conceptions representing quantities, they in themselves have not the capacity to form composite mathematical propositions, which is where your....

basic actions of grouping what is separate (addition) and separating what is together (substraction) are fundamental with division and multiplication being slightly more abstract. — Janus

....comes in, and where the transcendental nature of synthesis itself is required, which is not a cognition as is the mathematical proposition, but rather, merely, as a transcendental principle.....hey, it just there, dunno/don’t care how or why, it just is so deal widdit...... makes that synthesis into a proper mathematical cognition, possible. And what Kant is indicating with my *** in the quote above.

I know all that is sometimes hard to swallow, and most people just even try, even taken with the proverbial grain of salt or perhaps the dumptruck-ful. I mean....we don’t really gain anything whether we actually agreed with it as intellectual magnificence or reject it as unintelligible philosobabble.

Still, if “at least it made me think” has any positive meaning, then there is some significance to be found here.

I'll state very clearly and concisely the reason why I believe there must be two types of intuition for the two types of objects whose impressions are received into the conscious mind. (....) From the senses the mind gets an immediate impression, one not yet worked on by the conscious mind. From the memory the mind gets an impression already worked on by the mind. So we have right here, two very distinct forms of impressions, the virgin, and the ones already worked on. — Metaphysician Undercover

I shy away from use of “mind”, preferring to use “reason” instead. But I can work with mind, in order to be on the same page as you.

Two distinct impressions the mind gets, yes. The immediate from perception, the mediate from the mind itself. The impression the mind presents to itself is not immediately sensed, so in that respect, they are not the same type of impression. Technically, then, we can say the impression from sense is an appearance, the impression from the mind on itself, is a recollection of an appearance.

But distinction in impressions on the mind is not the same as distinctions in intuitions given to the mind. Not yet worked on by the mind implies no knowledge; worked on by the mind implies knowledge. Otherwise, why have a working mind? An impression we know must be very different than an impression we don’t know, but that doesn’t qualify intuitions themselves as being of different types, or, there being one type of intuition for this impression and another for that impression.

I grant that, as you said before, intuition is hard to pin down, and linguistic convention has tended to obfuscate the irreducibility of it. Accordingly, in the theory I favor, your hypotheticals just don’t work, but there’s nothing whatsoever to establish my theory as an irrefutable certainty, which means I can never prove your hypotheticals are wrong. So we can just argue the pros and cons of each til Doomsday. Or intellectual boredom, whichever comes first.
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We can only get a true approach to the inside by turning the cognitive system toward the inside of the self of which it is a part of. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is a perfect rendition of the intrinsic circularity of the human cognitive system. We use reason to examine ourselves, ourselves being that which reasons. We can never examine the inside of the self. We merely call it self-consciousness, represent it to ourselves as “I”, and reason from it, to everything else, by using a system reason itself invents. Like it or not, we’re stuck with it because we’re human. Or, we need to come up with a better explanatory, albeit speculative, methodology. Which hasn’t happened since 1787.
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Now, when you say you can think any object you like, even ones you've never experienced before, place future things in this category. — Metaphysician Undercover

Place future possible things in this category, yes. I can place existent things in this category just as well, insofar as experience only qualifies my condition, not that of the object. There’s millions of existent things I can think about and never hope to experience.

The future thing has a degree of reality which is comparable to the past thing which has been perceived through the senses. In fact, there is no reason to affirm that one is more "real" than the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, in an off-handed way you may not appreciate, insofar as the object I perceived is “real” in a way the object I haven’t perceived is “real”, because, for me, they are both equally represented by my cognitive system, the past thing “real” as a phenomenon, the future thing just as “real” as a mere conception. Again....differences in source faculties within the system, not differences in logic used by the system.

Now, the actual reality of the thing may be quite different, insofar as the past thing certainly existed, whereas the future thing may not, so it is correct to say I have no reason to affirm one is more REAL....that is to say, more existent....than the other, and I am in fact logically prohibited from claiming such is the case. Logically permitted is exactly the same kind of logic as logically prohibited, the difference being merely the conditions manifest in the premises and not its operation by means of them.
————

The internal object, being based in goals and objectives, is somewhat indeterminate. But I would argue that the difference is not simply a difference of source, but a fundamental difference in the type of object. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a fundamental difference in the type of internal object, sure, but why not simply because of the fundamental differences in their respective sources? If the different types of internal objects came from the same source, in what way could we say they are different? All conceptions represent different objects, but all conceptions, as internal objects of the faculty of understanding, are all the same type, just as phenomena represent different objects but are all the same type of object of the faculty of intuition, or maybe we could say the same species, respectively.

Even the goals and objectives are different respecting different types of objects. If the goal is empirical knowledge of the world because it is always objectively conditioned, we require both kinds of internal objects; if the goal is proper moral activity, which is always subjectively conditioned, we have no need of the type of internal object found in intuition. Although, post hoc, we will need intuition to determine whether or not our moral activity is in fact properly moral.
————

All without a necessary difference in logic as such.
— Mww

Yes, this is the difference I'm talking about. But I surely do not see how you draw your conclusion "All without a necessary difference in logic as such". Do you recognize the difference between is and ought? If so, do you think that the same logic which we apply to "what is", will work just as well if we apply it to "what ought to be"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep, I surely do. The logic is the same; what the logic concerns, doesn’t have to be. It is the difference between the form of logic as such, and the conceptions contained in its propositional architecture.

For that which is, “If A then B” is the form; “All events are in time” is the content of the form. If event then time adheres to the form exactly, hence the soundness of the logical form is served by the content, and we have an analytical, therefore non-contradictory proposition, which is true. Doesn’t matter what A and B are, or even if they’re valid conceptions themselves. As long as they don’t contradict the form into which they are entered, the conclusion is a sound logical inference. When the conceptions conflict, the form of the logic remains exactly as it was, but the soundness of the logic disappears.

For what ought to be, “the will is always and only good and immediately diminishes desires” is the form; “my will is good and my desires ought to be diminished accordingly” is the content. While the content serves the form in truth, it doesn’t always serve it in fact. Nevertheless, the logic by which one does not follow from the other, is just the same as if it did. This shouldn’t be that hard to grasp, if one grants that even irrational conclusions are nonetheless logically derived. Logic improperly employed is still logic.

While the content of logic can be of real-world things, the content can also be of things thought and felt, with equal justice, from which follows that logic itself cannot belong to any faculty of mere perception, which justifies the idea that logic is a purely formal condition of human understanding and reason.

the concept of addition is also required. If so, true enough, I suppose: but if you have seven apples and you have five apples in a separate grouping, then if you put them together you get twelve apples. — Janus

And the putting them together, just is that requirement, which represents the conception of synthesis. Maybe that is a modernized version of a philosophy predicated on intentionality. I suppose a guy putting seven things in series with five other things does it for a reason. But below that intention, is the consciousness of the possibility of actually doing it. Hence, the pure transcendental form of a priori justifications.

Otherwise stated, the generalized relation between cause and effect is instinctive in us, and hence not acquired via experience; only the particular concrete relations between cause and effect are acquired via experience. — javra

I think Hume wants it understood that the generalized relation between cause and effect is always given by experience. The principle grounding the relation is constant conjunction, and constant conjunction is itself merely an instinctive condition of human nature. If so, then the particular concrete examples merely represent the general principle.

Kant denies that principles can be given from experience, but must be derived from reason and then applied to experience. His rationale being, because principles are the logical ground for law, than all our experiences should conform to law if they are grounded in an empirical principle. If our experiences are grounded in law, every experience must be a necessary replication of that which it is an experience of, rather than a derivative of a mere representation of what we think it to be.

once experience has established it (the "synthetic" part) it is no longer dependent on subsequent experience. — Janus

Kinda odd, isn’t it? Hume used constant conjunction to reference the future, Kant used it to reference the past. I think you’re right, but maybe only regarding, as you say, the synthetic part of propositions....

“....But now I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and say, “All bodies are heavy.” Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions....”

....but Kant wanted to extent those to a priori conditions, which must have nothing to do with experience.

“....But to synthetical judgements à priori, such aid is entirely wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want...”

Everything that happens has a cause is something I am perfectly justified in thinking, whether or not I actually think it true, but I’ll never find the justification for my thinking in experience. My all time favorite, though, is so simple and oh-so obvious: you just cannot get to twelve, if all you have is a seven and a five. Experience proves the validity of the synthesis, and rote instruction embeds in it me, but I must first do the synthesis before the empirical proof is even possible in the first case, and there isn’t any a priori reason involved at all, in the second.
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his excessive focus on the visual faculty blinds him to the fact that we feel the effects of forces; the wind, the sun, the rain and so on, on our bodies — Janus

True enough, but there is a section in E.C.H.U. where he posits feelings as just another kind of experience, which, naturally, Kant denies.

You ok with all that?

framing of causality as something we bring to the world — Manuel

Yep, that’s what I get out of it, too.

distinctions he draws between inner and outer sense — Manuel

Ehhhhh...I just let it go with my sense of “in here” which is permanent, and my sense of “out there”, which comes and goes. Not clearly laid out, though, is it?

How do you make sense of it in relation to this: — javra

First off, the SEP article reconstructs what Hume’s thesis is, whereas the Kant quote represents how Kant thought the thesis at least incomplete.

Second, Hume was correct in that we should expect one thing to follow from another if only because our experience has never shown us anything else, but Kant criticized him for leaving it at that, which is found in E.C.H.U. 1.5.1.36.....

“....By employing that word**, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity****. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects....”
**custom/habit
***constant conjunction

.....which he made worse by insisting....

“....All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent....”

But he came close, admitting in fn7 that it is always the case in philosophy to separate experience from reason, and even goes so far as to grant that reason acts a priori with respect to Nature, which is the same as with respect to experience. Kant is just saying......well, then why the hell didn’t you go ahead and do that?

“...I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition...”, says ol’ Dave, “....which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation** is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other...”
(**cause and effect)

And of course, Kant ain’t having none of that, chastising Hume soundly....but nowhere near as soundly as Schopenhauer laid into Hegel....with this.....

“....Against this assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions à priori—an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him....”

Thing is....Hume couldn’t have had “our problem” before his eyes; Kant was the one that brought the “problem” up in the first place. Hume had no notion of synthetic propositions as Kant stipulated them, and most certainly never considered the validity of synthetic a priori propositions given from pure reason, having, as well, not given the faculty of understanding the power it must have, with respect to the categories, one of which is....TA-DAAAA.....cause/effect, at least according to transcendental metaphysics. Which, it is obvious, Hume knew nothing about, because there was not as yet any such cognitive methodology.

This is what woke Kant up: there’s got to be a way to show the relationship between cause and effect doesn’t have to come from experience, that understanding itself can show the relation as universally necessary. So he invented a way to make it so.

That’s how I make sense of it, at a minimum.

...after much fear and trepidation, am reading Kant's Critique — Manuel

,,,,and how’s that going for ya?

I'm aware there is likely more about Hume here... — Manuel

Then you must have read this by now, although it’s in Sec II not III.

“.....David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an à priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object—and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it—he was forced to drive these conceptions from experience, that is, from a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective—in one word, from habit....”

Have fun!!

But not all intuitions represent physical objects, some represent internal feelings, like emotions. — Metaphysician Undercover

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Intuitions represent the object the feeling is directed toward. I love my car, the car I can intuit because it is an object, but I do not intuit the love of it. In short, love, hate joy, disgust and feelings in general, are not phenomena, those being the objects of intuitions. We can accede to this, because sometimes we have feelings, but either cannot describe them (because the object to which they relate is unknown), or, we simply don’t know why we even have that feeling in the first place (because the object to which it relates contradicts your experience).

The key is the notion that feelings are not cognitions, but are just some condition in which the subject finds himself. You were all fine and dandy one minute, somebody stepped on your toe the next, and POW!!!....your condition.....the condition of yourself....immediately changes, directly proportional to the feeling in your toe and your reaction to it. And you never cognized a single thing in that briefest of instances. That there is something wrong with your foot is far systematically antecedent to the cognition of the cause of it.
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Any particular cognitive system, when directed inward, needs different principles of understanding, from when it is directed outwards...... — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, which makes explicit the natural duality of the particular human cognitive system. On the one hand, as you sit there looking out the window, you perceive all that is presented to your senses. But if you shut off your senses, or make it so nothing is given to them, or just not pay any attention to those that get through, you can still think any object you like, those you know from experience and those you might know if you ever do experience them. But you can also sit there and think objects you will never experience, either because they exist but are nonetheless beyond your capability, or they don’t exist at all. But either way, you understand something about each and every one of them, and judge them accordingly, otherwise you wouldn’t be able to explain how they were thought.

With respect to what you said, though, I submit there are two conditions under which the system can be directed inward, one in consideration of the world but without the sense of it, when you sit there and only think about it, and the other is with nothing whatsoever to do with the world. To direct the cognitive system inward without any regard for the world at all, is to employ the faculties of the system on itself. But if that is the case, and all the objects of experience and thought related to experience are eliminated from contention....where does that which we are inwardly directed toward, come from? What do the faculties of the system employ themselves on? Even to say they operate by different principles, principles are meaningless without something to which they apply, so we still need the something.

......The two types of "objects" to be understood by these two different directions are so vastly different, that I think they require fundamentally different forms of "logic". — Metaphysician Undercover

You went from different principles to different “objects”. But that’s ok; we would have ended up at different “objects” eventually anyway. So....one kind of object is given from sense, the other kind cannot be given from sense, so must be given from within the cognitive system itself. The former will necessarily be imbued with properties in order for it be know as a certain thing, the other can have no properties, but is nonetheless known as something. Hence, “object” as opposed to object.

One of the “vast” differences, then, is that the one object is empirically determined when the cognitive system is directed outward, the other “object” is rationally determinable when the cognitive system is directed inward and examines only itself. It would seem to be the case that for determinable rational objects, principles different from those which ground the propositions containing conceptions longing to objects of experience. But granting the differences in principles is most readily accomplished by granting differences in their source, rather than the form of their logic, in that it is possible for two differing sources can operate under one logic, if both the sources and the logic are all contained in and used by, a single unified cognitive system.

There are differences in objects and principles, but they arise from differences in reason, not differences in logic. These all belong to a far different philosophy, the outer world of sense being epistemological, the inner world of feelings being moral. In the former Nature is the causality of its objects and they belong to it alone, in the latter it is we who are the causality of the objects and they belong to us alone. Just as there is no real physical basketball in our heads, there is no real physical beauty in the world. Reason in the former is pure theoretical, reason in the latter is pure practical. Judgement in the former is discursive, in the latter it is aesthetic. Imagination in the former is productive, in the latter it is re-productive. The former is conditioned by space and time, the latter is conditioned by our innate constitution. The former defines our intellect, the latter defines our character. The former concerns itself with what is, the latter concerns itself with what ought to be.

All without a necessary difference in logic as such.

There’s my take on the topic. I’d be interested in yours, assuming your take is as sufficiently explanatory as mine, the correctness of either being irrelevant. We’re in the realm of speculation here, after all. Although they both should be equally intelligible, I should think.

So.....your turn.

External intuition simply refers to the possibility of an external object...
— Mww

OK, now if we can say external intuition refers to the possibility of an external object, can we say that "internal intuition" refers to the possibility of an internal object? And if these two types of "objects" are fundamentally different, then the two types of intuitions will be fundamentally different. And if the two types of intuition are fundamentally different, then we need two types of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

A saw cuts a board, a hammer nails the board to a wall. Can we use the saw to hammer the board? We are, necessarily and without exception, given external objects by the senses. Are we given internal objects by the senses? We are not, so if there are internal objects, they certainly cannot arise from the senses. The external objects we are given are represented as phenomena and are derived from the faculty of receptivity for impressions, which is called intuition. Internal objects not given to us but instead given by us, are represented as conceptions and are derived from the faculty of understanding.

Do you see we don’t need logic for that which is given to us? For anything merely presented to the senses, there is no cognition, there is not yet any understanding, no judgement, and the mere presence of an object to our sensing apparatus is very far from knowledge of it. Remember the scientific equivalent to this metaphysical premise: we are not aware of information transfer on our nerve cells on the one hand, and we have no consciousness of the inception of phenomena from sensations of physical objects, on the other. If the application of logic is a conscious activity by a rational agent, how can logic be applied to that of which he has no conscious awareness?

So we have one type of representation as intuition, another type of representation as conception, and if we synthesize these in a faculty sufficiently enabled to do so......do you see that this is precisely the same modus operandi as imbued in the construction of a logical syllogism? Intuition would be the major premise, just because it is first in the procedural system, a conception would be the minor premise, just because it is after any impression on sensibility, the synthesis of them by the faculty of understanding generates a conclusion, which we call a judgement.

I don’t think anyone doubts that we are imbued with these faculties, the difficulty arises from what they are and what they actually do. Regardless, it is clear logic as a systemic necessity only applies sometime in the overall process after the premises are made available on which it can be applied. While logic can be applied to a single premise, all we will get from it is a tautology, which is not what the system is seeking when presented with an external object. It that were the case, we remain with...there is an object, full stop.... but without the means to determine a knowledge of what the object may be.

Sidebar: the counter argument is, objects tell us what they are, so we know them immediately by the properties by which we are impressed. The nonsense of this should be quite apparent, even to the “most common understanding”.

Anyway, all that to say this: you are correct in saying there are two types of objects, external and internal, but incorrect in saying these are two types of intuitions. The two types of representations corresponding to the two types of objects are united into a single type, which is called cognition, on which only one type of logic is needed in order to determine the validity of it, which is called judgement. As an oversimplification, it is in this way that perception of something with wings, known as such from antecedent experience, is immediately cognized as what it may be, but as yet with insufficient judgement for what it is.

Further affirmations: the senses don’t judge, and understanding doesn’t perceive. Everything in its place, this does this job and that does that job, putting things in the wrong places, subsumed under faculties not equipped to deal with them, defeats the entire system.

Ever notice, that for something you perceive but have no experience of, after you figure it out, you’ve added nothing at all to what you perceived? If you added nothing whatsoever to the perception, but you went from ignorance to knowledge of that very same perception......where did the change occur? It could not possibly occur in any faculty having to do with the perception alone, which is precisely the realm of intuition. For instance....a tool. A specially tool. Guy shows it to you, you have no idea how to use it, or even what to use it on. Hell....even that it could be used for anything, but you merely assume, logically, it can because somebody made it for some reason. But you have no real justification for even that assumption, insofar as he could have just been puttering around the shop and threw together some junk and wanted to see how you react to it, which releases the object from even being a purposeful tool per se, exchanging it for a tool the intent for which belongs to purposeness of the guy alone.

So say it is a tool, and he shows you what it does.....you still perceive the object in exactly the same way as when you didn’t know what it was for. If the object itself didn’t change, then the intuition of it couldn’t have changed, which makes explicit the understanding of it must be the sole factor in whatever judgement you came to for its use.

Now, under the conditions you propose, you are using one type of logic for your ignorance, and a different type of logic for your knowledge. Wouldn’t it be the more parsimonious to suppose ignorance is the inability to use any logic, than to suppose ignorance uses a logic of its own kind?
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If our goal is to understand, why leave the best part alone? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because we can’t get past the initial stages. It’s a system, after all, so we should come to accord on the simple parts before moving onto the hard parts. Simplest of all is....we sense things. Problem is, sensing things is the more simple, but it is at the same time the less prevalent. If the goal is to understand, wouldn’t be better to come to an accord on what it means to understand? To do that, best to eliminate what understanding isn’t, which is anything to do with perception, including intuitions. And apparently, you’re not ready to do that, and, perhaps more importantly, you haven’t convinced me we can’t.

Just not quite right.....
— Mww

..... the person who doesn't agree with you, as not right. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not that you disagree with me, it’s that you disagree with my interpretation of Kant, which you brought into the dialectic. Even if I’m wrong in my interpretations, if you were wrong in the same way, I’d say you were right and we’d agree more often than not. I didn’t mean to imply I was right point-blank, and you should agree with me and because you don’t you are not right. Only a fool would insist he gets Kant right, without fault of any kind.

I should have worded it better. Or left it out. My bad. Sorry.

We must dispose of the most basic principles of logic, such as identity, and non-contradiction, and we are left with zero, nothing as a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

But if it is the case we don’t function at all, in any way, shape or form, when we dismiss the basic principles of logic, then it is reasonable to suppose we couldn’t do that in the first place....
— Mww

I don't agree with this at all, and I've argued it in many places in this forum. We do not need to assume replacement principles to reject principles which we find unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

These two comments of yours say different things, and the second doesn’t respond to mine.
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However, the nature of logic, and it's ground in intuition...., — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, but the nature of logic is in judgement, not intuition.
— Mww

That's not what I said though, I said it was grounded in intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand you said the nature of logic is grounded in intuition. I’m claiming it is not.

And the grounding of logic, substantiation, what makes validity work for us, is fundamentally different from logic itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

....and you’ve done it again. First it was the ground of the nature of logic, now it is the grounding of logic itself in substantiation. Easily reconciled by admitting the nature of logic has to do with its form, substantiation of logic has to do with its content. The form is given in the construction of principles, the content is given in the construction of propositions conditioned by the principles.
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The problem of course being that we cannot apply logic directly to the external world, all we have is the in between, the information received, the intuitions, to apply logic to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Half right. We don’t apply logic directly to the external world, all we have is the in-between, but the in-between consists of more than mere intuitions. We still should consider the role of the cognitive system as a whole, of which intuition is but the initial stage.

So even if logic is something created by human beings for the purpose of understanding the external world, we are stymied in our attempts to apply it because all we have is intuitions about the external world to apply it to. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is the case that we are not conscious of our intuitions, in some strictly metaphysical sense, then it follows we do not apply our logic to them. Nevertheless, we are not stymied, insofar as we do apply logic to something, so even if we do not apply logic to our intuitions, then it must be the case we do apply them to that which arises from them. Under empirical conditions, that is. Again, because we do apply logic to that which is not under empirical conditions, the ground of empirical conditions, which is intuition, does not qualify as a condition of the nature of logic, but merely the employment of it with respect to understanding the external world.

Truth be told, I don’t think it proper to say logic is something human beings create. Logical principles, yes, logical conditions, logical this or that, sure. But logic itself, I think, is just the natural modus operandi of the human being himself. We just are logical creatures, from which we can say the nature of logic just is the nature of human beings.
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This is why we need to distinguish internal intuitions from external intuitions. This I think is very important. If we simply say that logic gets applied to intuitions, and if internal intuitions are fundamentally different from external intuitions, then we'd need different logic for internal than we need for external. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true he uses those terms, but in context, I think you’ll find they have much different connotations than you’re attributing to them. The importance disappears if it is the case that all intuitions are internal, which they would be if all they do is represent physical objects, and those only given by a particular cognitive system. And if logic doesn’t apply to intuitions anyway, then we have two instances for canceling the notion we need distinctive logics. Distinctions in that to which logic applies, yes; distinctions in the logic that is applied, not so much, no.

External intuition simply refers to the possibility of an external object representable as a phenomenon, and that internally as a function of the system. There is no external intuition per se; there is just explanatory liberties. Kant presumes the reader already understands and accepts the preliminaries, and if he were to then posit some intuitions to be external to the system from which he already posited they are born, he contradicts himself and immediately destroys his entire thesis.

Kant, I believe outlined this division, space as the condition for understanding external intuitions, and time as the condition for understanding internal intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Technically, Kant speaks of understanding from an external sense or from an internal sense. And in that formula, is found the fundamental differences in how space and time are to be understood, if only with respect to transcendental philosophy. But that stuff is deep and convoluted as hell, and requires a whole bunch of blind head-nodding I’m here ta tell ya, so...best maybe leave all that alone here.

Still, I’d like to say I know where you’re going with this, and if I’m right, it is here:

“...We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense, namely—how this sense represents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in the systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception, while we***, on the contrary, carefully distinguish them....”
(*** “we” being him, of course, informing us of what “we” are actually doing)

After wading through five pages, we arrive at, in a damn footnote, of all things....

“....For this purpose intuition of self is required, and this intuition possesses a form given à priori, namely, time, which is sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now, as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought...”

...which is supposed to explain the reason why there is no intuition of anything that isn’t first perceived and to which the categories may apply, which is itself, a logical requisite. In other words, there is no intuition of the objects of the system, which includes one’s self. Nowadays, this all has been reduced to the notion that we are our thoughts, the “I think” represents the manifold of thoughts, “I am” represents consciousness of the manifold, and “I” merely represents the spontaneity of it.

Anyway....you have great thoughts and you’re not entirely wrong. Just not quite right. But then....is anybody? And by “right” I just mean we’d agree more often than not.

Subjectivism — Wayfarer

.....in all its various and sundry and altogether private iterations.

As explained in my post, intuitively, time is logically prior to space. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah....about that. I suppose you’re directing me to this....

This places the intuition of time as deeper than, and prior to, the intuition of space. It manifests as the most basic of mathematical principles, order. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not intuit time or space; we intuit objects in time and space. To intuit is to follow from sensation, and the sensation proper of time or space is impossible, insofar as both are conceived as infinite and empty.

While I agree space and time have a mutual exclusivity with respect to functionality, I see no reason to grant one with priority over the other under empirical conditions. As a concession, on the other hand, I do grant that time has priority under none-empirical conditions, insofar as thoughts are never represented in space yet are always and only represented by successions in time.

Second, the most basic mathematical principles are subsumed under the schema of quantity, not relation, or, in your terms, order.
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But if we assume that our fundamental (base) intuitions are wrong, then we have nothing left to go on. We must dispose of the most basic principles of logic, such as identity, and non-contradiction, and we are left with zero, nothing as a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough. But if it is the case we don’t function at all, in any way, shape or form, when we dismiss the basic principles of logic, then it is reasonable to suppose we couldn’t do that in the first place, insofar as we must use them in order to assume their dismissal. It follows that if we cannot assume to dismiss them, we are left with merely getting them as correct as we can.

Gotta be careful here, nonetheless, because to juxtaposition fundamental (base) intuitions to our basic principles of logic involves separate functions of human cognition. This is most apparent iff it is the case that intuition does not involve judgement, while basic logical principles is predicated on it exclusively.
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However, the nature of logic, and it's ground in intuition...., — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, but the nature of logic is in judgement, not intuition. Think of it this way: you know how when we perceive something, when we are affected by some imprint on the senses, we are never conscious of the information that flows along the nerves? We sense the beginning, we cognize what the beginning was, at the end, in the brain, but all that between, we know nothing about whatsoever. THAT is intuition, in the proper, albeit metaphysical, sense. And because we are never conscious of our intuitions, but we are certainly conscious of the judgements we make on our sensations from which the intuition is given, and logical determinations are the objects of judgements alone, it follows necessarily that intuition cannot stand in any relation to the nature of logic. It may be said intuition is the ground for the possibility of logical determinations, but that is not to say they determine the nature of logic.

Besides....there are those occasions when we employ logical principles even without an intuition, without an object making an impression on the senses. Case in point....the guy that invented the Slinky. Sure, springs and stuff falling are sensuous impressions, but you can’t get a Slinky as such, from those two intuitions. To connect those into an object that doesn’t yet exist requires more than the antecedent intuition of each. In just the same way, you cannot get to 12 if all you have is a 7 and a 5.

So sayeth the blue pill, and I got a whole bucketful of them little devils. Lucky for me, cuz I’ve grown accustomed.....ok, fine.....addicted.....to their intoxication.

How this intuition of time, manifesting as order, is itself grounded, whether it is grounded in experience, or something more fundamental than experience, as prior to experience, and a condition for the possibility of experience, is probably an issue of how we define the terms. — Metaphysician Undercover

The whole comment was pretty good, but it all comes down to this, for which I can find no fault. As great and wonderful as human reason is, each of us has his own and he is at the mercy of it. Hence, you take the red pill in defining terms in one way, I take the blue pill in defining terms another way, while trying to find something in common. Which hardly ever works.

You said...at least as far as our kind of intelligence...
— Mww

What other kind is there? — Wayfarer

As many other kinds as there are other kinds of brains? Other kinds of CNS’s? I’m not about to say ours is the only kind of intelligence there is, but it is certainly the only kind that’s of any use to us.
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I'm beginning to see why there is this dogma that logical necessity and physical causation belong to different domains. It's the underlying mind-body dualism that is still at the basis of our modern outlook — Wayfarer

Different domains/mind-body dualism....ok. Nature of the human beast, methinks.

Dogma....ehhh, sorta ok. Dogma with proper criticism, fine; dogmatism, use of dogmatic systems without the built-in mechanisms for proper self-criticism, dangerous.

Depends on how you mean the term to be used, I guess. Most use it with pejorative connotations, and I don’t want to imply that’s what you’re doing.

Are you saying our modern outlook shouldn’t have a basic underlying mind/body dualism?

'Our kind of intelligence', compared to what? — Wayfarer

Hmmmm....dunno, really. I don’t think comparisons are possible. I mean, all we have to compare with, is our own, so what we we learn from it, except what ours tells us?

‘Quantum mechanics is a law of thought.’ — Wayfarer

I like it!!

I believe there is no such thing as "pure" a priori. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s fine, no problem. In effect, you’re dismissing, or at least disputing, the fundamental ground of Kantian metaphysics, which has been done since he published it. Buried in the subtleties, though, is the “first time for everything” qualifier, which, because people know so much about the world these days and science has taken us merrily down the empirical path, we tend to overlook as cognitive prerequisites. It’s like....boiling water. Big deal. Boiled water since I was a kid. That I gotta put water in the pot first just comes with the territory. And turning on the stove. And making sure I got electricity. And making the electricity that runs the stove. And building the dam. And mining the gypsum.

How boring. The real fun starts in going the other way. Everybody thinks; no one knows how thinking happens. So...there ya go, ripe for theoretical musings.

What is the import of 'not only is the necessity...'? — Wayfarer

The importance of necessity resides in the condition Kant requires for pure a priori manifestations in his transcendental system. Necessity, along with universality, are the conditions determining whether or not some conception/judgement/cognition/knowledge is a priori or empirical.

“....Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other....”

The synthetical part comes from the relation of conceptions in a proposition to each other, but that is beside the point of the grounds for determining what kind of proposition is under consideration.

This is all just groundwork, setting the stage, for the rest of his speculative metaphysics. Ever notice how little time he spends on stuff like this, compared to the non-empirical stuff on which he did elaborate, seemingly to no end, that the empiricists of the day utterly neglected? He writes for 98 pages on the empirical, but writes for 610 pages on the non-empirical. All set up by a mere 14 pages in the introduction, from which all the above is a part.
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Is that not that such propositions are actually both a matter of logical necessity and also of physical principle? — Wayfarer

This has to do with origins, not examples, or proofs. The matter of physical principle in play here is induction, which lessens the importance of “strict universality”, relegating it to “as far as we know”, but leaves necessity to condition the proposition as a priori as opposed to entirely empirical.

Referencing the quote, have to keep in mind “the science of natural philosophy” is merely that which the human does in accordance with certain criteria he himself constructs, in order to make sense of observations. The physical doesn’t contain principles, it abides by them, at least as far as our kind of intelligence decides it does.

Hey.....

I remember. I generally agree, taking exception only to your referring to “pure physics” in a Kantian context. As brought to light by , it is clear there is a pure part of physics with respect to the a priori principles which make the science possible, but “pure physics” as a general conception, has not the same distinction as....

“...Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and à priori....”

....in which we see how he wishes “pure” regarding the “theoretical sciences of reason” to be understood.

Minor point to be sure, but.....you know.....in the interest of the straight and narrow.....
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discovery of the rational structure of Nature which gave the a priori foundations to the modern experimental science

That says more about us than I would ever allow.

Can we agree that what might be thought to be logically necessary for our rational thinking (what is psychologically necessary) can be distinguished from what is logically necessary per se? — Janus

Logically necessary per se. In my mind, that translates to....what is logically necessary because it is logically necessary. What is logically necessary just because it is. I honestly don’t know what to do with that.

I can easily enough distinguish what is logically necessary for our rational thinking from logical necessity per se. What is logically necessary for our rational thinking is that which justifies it as such. Logical necessity is merely the rule by which the justification is given. But that’s taking unwarranted liberties with what you said. Unless what you said just makes no sense, which I wouldn’t dare say.

So, we have.....my rational thinking is “stones have physical causation”. The question then becomes, what do I think is logically necessary in order for the thought I had about stones to be a rational cognition. Initially, I might think something like the principle of induction is logically necessary, insofar as I have never thought about any thing that didn’t have physical causation. Next I might think the LNC is logically necessary, insofar as if I think a stone doesn’t have physical causation I contradict my aforethought principle of induction. Then I might think imagination is logically necessary in order to circumvent the LNC because I can imagine what I damn well please. After those, I probably wouldn’t bother with any others.

But these logical necessities I think are sequential, one rather than the other in a series of thoughts, each of which are mutually independent and logically necessary per se, so I haven’t distinguished any particular one from the general, but merely given instances of it.

Dunno if I can agree or not, but I’m leaning towards not. You know.....cuz of what I dare not say. (Grin)

But there is no strictly logical contradiction involved in thinking that a stone could have randomly popped into existence for no reason and caused by nothing — Janus

This is of course, correct given certain premises. As the saying goes, “...I can think whatever I please, provided only I do not contradict myself...”. To think that which exits without a cause is unconditioned by antecedent causes, so.....there ya go. I have not contradicted myself. That is the correct form of transcendentally thinking an unconditioned effect. But you’re stuck right there, you can’t do anything constructive with a mere form.

Another way to look at it is....it is impossible to prove all that exists has a reason for its existence. There may be that which exists that we cannot know anything about, that cannot be called out as “things”, which makes explicit we cannot know anything whatsoever regarding their causality. Thus, logically, we are not authorized to say that which has no cause is impossible.

Neither of these will work for stones, though, or any possible experience of ours. We know stones, so we are restrained by the logic of physical causality because of that knowledge. If we deny logical necessity for that which we claim to know, we jeopardize the very conception of entailment for empirical knowledge itself.

The inescapable dualism of human reason. Can’t live with it, can’t kill it.

it (cause) is not an obvious attribute of objects. — Janus

It is good to divide out cause in this way, insofar as attribute implies identity of an existence while cause implies the relation of an existence. In this regard, I would agree cause is not a primary category for what an object is to be known as, but would add...neither is existence.
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Trivial sidebar: existence has to do with representation of each object in general in a time, cause has to do with representation of objects in general in successive times.
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Not-so-trivial sidebar: given the above, cause is not the form, re: .....

form is a category of objects — Janus

.....but rather, time is. And we already know this, because time is already stated in the transcendental method as the form of all phenomena, to which every single category subsequently applies.
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Second....and final, promise..... trivial sidebar:
The schemata of the categories of understanding are conceptions or compound conceptions, whereas the schema of the categories of judgement are cognitions.
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a stone is not in itself a cause, — Janus

But can it be said with equal certainty, that a stone is not an effect? If it cannot be said, or it is said but contradicts empirical conditions, therein lay the validity for those categories with complementary, what Kant calls “dynamical”, nature. As opposed to “mathematical”, which do not have complementary conceptions belonging to them.

Edible noumenon. Guarantee that won’t sell. Hell...couldn’t even give it away. I mean....how would it be packaged? Pretty hard to shrink wrap something impossible to perceive, right?