That the noumon can't be known is questionable. — Hillary

Possibly, of course. Just not as Kant’s noumenon.

We might say that some kind of inferred causation is logically necessary — Janus

I’d go so far as to say....objects must relate to one or more categories, cause is a category, therefore inferred causation is logically necessary for human empirical cognitions.

And of course, physical causation in the world is meaningless without an intelligence to apprehend it, which makes logical necessity under such conditions of absence, moot.

.......it's hard to remain Kantian. — Hillary

If he left metaphysics as he said....

“....by this critique it has been brought onto the secure course of a science, then it can fully embrace the entire field of cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work and lay it down for posterity as a princi­pal framework that can never be enlarged...”

....then why couldn’t one remain Kantian in his thinking, no matter the advances in empirical science?

exactly what Kant proved, in several tens of thousands of words. — Wayfarer

.....and summed up in five: “...intuitions without concepts are blind...”.

(As I turn the page I see already said it. Gives new meaning to.....you guys need to get on the same page!!!!)
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An inference can be derived from observation alone — Janus

Not if “.....intuitions without concepts are blind....” is true.

You know the drill: “....understanding cannot intuit, intuition cannot think....”.

I think the rest of your comment supports the drill, but if it does, the first statement contradicts the support, in that an inference cannot be derived from observation alone. An inference is a logical relation......yaddayaddayadda......

what are the attributes of a Kantian, exactly? — Tom Storm

Oh, that’s easy. Exactly? The prime attribute of a Kantian is the recognition and development of, and the absolute necessity for, the dualism of his transcendental intelligence.

You seem to be describing..... — Harry Hindu

Good that it only seems.

if naturalism is true….

.....and naturalism is.....

That everything which happens in the universe is a physical play out through time.

......it does not follow that....

the laws that govern the universe are what make everything happen.

The metaphysical naturalist rejects that the universe is governed by natural law, re: governance is not causality. Laws don’t cause the happenings of physical plays; laws merely describe relations between plays, and then only to the intellect that constructs them for itself.

That every object in the universe attracts every other object in the universe is a physical play. That every object in the universe attracts every other object in the universe according to their relative masses, etc, etc, is a law that describes how the play works, but only to the originator of the description.

The metaphysical naturalist posits that which governs the physical play of the universe is certainly not impossible, but that such governance should translate to a law, is a strictly human construct. And if a human gave that translation its name in calling it a law, why shouldn’t it be the case that he also gave it its descriptive power?
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I wonder.....but not very much....exactly which law ultimately governs the physical play of the guy at The Center For Naturalism writing that humans are not ultimately responsible for their actions, while he sits there ultimately responsible for it being written. Betcha a million dollars he can’t tell me. Nor can he tell me about laws that contradict each other, which is precisely what laws are not supposed to do.

many people use the term "a priori" to mean something that can be known without justification. — T Clark

Again, technically, nothing can be known without some kind of justification, the possible exception being knowledge acquired by sheer accident, which merely indicates neither experience nor logic suffices.

The Greeks liked to divide knowledge into knowledge of and knowledge that. Russell called it knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. Either way, the dichotomy reduces to knowledge before submission to the cognitive system and knowledge as a result of the system. Like..... I know I just got bit, but I don’t know what bit me. That I got bit is not something the least a priori knowledge, for it is an affect of some kind on the senses, and if I don’t know what bit me, that can’t be a priori because it isn’t anything.

Regardless, if one thinks knowledge to be a relative condition of certainty, that is only possible by being justified by something.

Or so it seems.....

So Kant's pure reason is a priori reason? — Haglund

Kant describes what he means by “pure”, that being absent all elements of experience. Even if describing a priori with it, I think it safe to apply the term to reason as well. I don’t recall Kant defining pure reason as such, but usually just meaning how reason itself is to be understood from its use.

To be somewhat technical, understanding is the faculty of rules, reason is the faculty that unites the rules under principles. All principles are a priori and all rational deductions are free from empirical conditions, so.....

pure vs. impure. — T Clark

The pure/impure is Kantian terminology specifically, meant to show the distinctions in what can be considered a priori. The thing with the keys shows there is a kind of a priori in common usage but hardly recognized as such, but it is the other kind of much more importance, that being, absent any element of experience whatsoever, that is, pure, which if not from experience, must the be from reason itself. Your list of a priori conditions on pg 1 are both kinds, but without the distinction of which is which. Conventionally speaking, that is sufficient, insofar as conventionally no one cares, but both scientifically and metaphysically speaking, it is very far from it. And, of course, you did ask a metaphysical question after all, so......just thought I’d weigh in. Or.....wade in, more like it.

Anyway.....of much more importance is the analytic/synthetic distinction, a priori being given. There are no analytic statements that are not a priori, which leaves synthetic statements. The whole scheme evolved from Enlightenment academia, as to whether or not there is any such thing as a synthetic a priori condition, and if there is, what is it for, what would it do, what can we get out of it. Believe it or not, the long and the short of it is.....and you know....for what it’s worth....., the question was asked about such things, because the question was first asked.....how is mathematics possible? Which is hardly as silly as it seems, insofar as an entire paradigm shift from Renaissance intelligencia in the ways and means of human knowledge, still in force to this day, resulted from such a simple question. Einstein, it goes without saying, did the same thing, except for the natural scientist rather than the philosopher.

One of Kant’s many claims to fame is the logical proof for them, and from it, the absolute necessity for what they do. Since, of course, there have been refutations of both the proof and the use, on the one hand, and deductions of them under other premises on the other, but nevertheless, the first and the most readily understandable iterations of them, are his.
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My preference would be that we focus on the general question of what can we know without empirical knowledge — T Clark

Do you think there has been a satisfactory answer to that?

So I know the keys are on the table because I remember leaving them there. — T Clark

Technically here, what you know a priori is in the remembering of what you did, so the conventional iteration would be, I know I left them there. Here is where the element of experience makes your a priori knowledge regarding the keys, “impure”. In effect, your knowledge at this time, is the memory of putting the keys on the table, given from the original experience, but not the experience itself. It is knowledge of the same object, but at different times. This was Kant’s refutation of Hume, nutshell version.

Another way to look at it: you know the keys were on the table because you put them there, that activity is in itself an experience, giving a one-to-one correspondence between knowledge and experience. Given that procedural necessity, you can not know the keys are still on the table, because you don’t have the experience of perceiving them as being there. But the initial knowledge doesn’t just disappear, so it must be accounted for....sorta like entropy, donchaknow.....so you are entitled to say your knowledge is now of the memory of the prior experience, which you certainly wouldn’t deny. You know the memory is just as certain as the initial activity, the former is properly intuition, the latter is experience.
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What you are calling pure a priori sounds like analytic. — T Clark

All analytic propositions/judgements/principles are pure a priori, but not all pure a priori propositions/judgements/principles are analytic. The distinction resides in the relation of the concept in the predicate to the concept in the subject of such proposition/judgement/principle constructions. A further distinction is that analytic constructions are tautologies, they are true necessarily, hence require no empirical proof. Synthetic constructions, on the other hand, are not necessarily true, hence require experience for such possible proofs.

As I said....for whatever that’s worth.

It doesn't make sense to call knowledge a priori if it's dependent on knowledge based on experience — T Clark

This is correct, to a point. You put your keys on the table; there is then the experience, so you know you put the keys on the table. You know it because you did it. This is knowledge a posteriori.

You’re going to go get your keys, you know beforehand and therefore a priori the keys are on the table because you put them there, but you have yet the experience of picking them up from the table, so you don’t yet have the knowledge a posteriori that in fact they are there. This is what Kant calls “impure” a priori knowledge, insofar as there is an element of experience contained in it...you put them on the table before you went to get them from the table. This is the only form of a priori knowledge Hume grants, which he calls “constant conjunction”....a fancy word for “habit”......indicating simply that there never has been an occasion where you put keys on the table and they weren’t there when you went to get them. End of the simple story.

In Kant but missing from Hume and Enlightenment empiricists in general, on the other hand....and for whatever it’s worth....is the notion of “pure” a priori knowledge, that in which there is no element of experience whatsoever, and these are principles, most obvious in geometry and propositional logic. The beginning of a very complex story indeed, and to some hardly worth the effort and consternation, considering the result.

Pretty good philosophizing. That being said, I rather think the title might be better said as completion of Kant’s ethical approach, insofar as his moral philosophy is a complete approach in itself.

I say this because even in “The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics”, a purely subjective moral disposition is given as antecedent, which tends to make me think Kant meant the moral and the ethical to be two separate doctrines, interconnected only under certain conditions.

I see where the first sentence says “Kant’s ethics”, so maybe that’s what you had in mind anyway.

Just my opinion, of no particular consequence, so....carry on and good luck with your discusssion.

One can think of noumena any way he sees fit, as long as he makes sense of it, if only to himself. Still, if originating in a specific domain, and concerning a specific iteration, probably best to stick with it, rather than mix them up. As my ol’ buddy Dexter Holland used to say, you gotta keep ‘em separated.

“....But there is one advantage, which can be made both comprehensible and interesting to even the dullest and most reluctant student of such transcendental investigations, namely this: That the understanding occupied merely with its empirical use, which does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may get along very well, but cannot accomplish one thing, namely, determining for itself the boundaries of its use and knowing what may lie within and what without its whole sphere; for to this end the deep inquiries that we have undertaken are requisite. But if the un­derstanding cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, then it is never sure of its claims and its possession, but must always reckon on many embarrassing corrections when it continually oversteps the boundaries of its territory (as is unavoidable) and loses itself in delusion and deceptions.

But right at the outset here there is an ambiguity, which can occasion great misunderstanding: Since the understanding, when it calls an ob­ject in a relation mere phenomenon, simultaneously makes for itself, beyond this relation, another representation of an object in itself and hence also represents itself as being able to make concepts of such an object, and since the understanding offers nothing other than the cate­gories through which the object in this latter sense must at least be able to be thought, it is thereby misled into taking the entirely undeter­mined concept of a being of understanding, as a something in general outside of our sensibility, for a determinate concept of a being that we could cognize through the understanding in some way....”
(CPR A238/B297, in Guyer/Wood)

Noumena: that which comes from understanding while it’s twiddling its cognition-generating thumbs, waiting to do what it was actually meant to do.

I have to be aware with respect to what I learn, but I can relax with respect to what I already know. And that from exactly this......

when one's goal is to dispel illusion, digging down is much more productive than climbing higher. — Metaphysician Undercover

....insofar as if one way to dispel illusion is to regulate.....technically, to legislate..... circularity, then logical reductionism to analytic truths.....technically, laws.....serves as ground for trusting the system from which my knowledge is given. The complexities are merely speculative, of course, and themselves circular if over-reduced, re: MU’s digging down too deep, but it does work.

Which gets you your answer: if what I claim as knowledge is predicated on analytic truths, my rational circularity is abated. Conversely, if what I claim as knowledge depends on empirical conditions, for which analytic truths are impossible, such knowledge is always derived from potential circularity, hence, potentially unsupported.

The solution? That which stands in stead of analytic truths, such that potential circularity from empirical conditions can be abated with as great a certainty as analytic truths, in order that I might trust my epistemological system regarding the world in general as much as I trust my own thinking.

You know its name.

Yeah, pitifully....for my knowledge, I have no choice but to trust an intrinsically circular explanatory system, the very one that tells me to never trust circular explanatory systems.

I started out with potential and actual. (...) Which was your first one? — frank

For me, sheer interest. Nothing more or less. Simply put.....how do I know stuff. What explains how I know stuff. What is the knowing of stuff? Any fool can learn practically anything, given enough time, which I was already pretty good at, but....what happens between my ears that explains how that happens to me?

Simple, really.

Sure, one can start in the middle, as usually happens. Then what? Depends on what the objective is, I suppose.

Did it work?

HA!!!! Just like that, although any critique needs internal support consistent with it.

Even observations of how we think presupposes something, is reducible to something.

Critical.

There's logical, metaphysical, epistemic, and physical possibility. Necessity usually has to do with a priori knowledge. — frank

And what underpins all of that? And everything else? Without exception?

Anybody else? — frank

Probably. Usually, some definition is subsequently undermined in order to justify that which didn’t belong to the original in the first place. All in the name of mandatory originality.

Nobody is paying attention to what "logical" necessity actually is, so we may as well drop the logic part. — frank

I think it plain redundant, so we lose nothing but dropping it. Necessity is a logical condition anyway, right?

.....we were talking about Philosophical Investigations, folk might be using the notion of rules from there. — Banno

Perhaps they are. Beside the point, still, insofar as notions of rules merely presupposes them, and the discussion remains lopsided argument from example, which is....truth be told.....all analytic philosophy in general, and OLP in particular, grants as meaningful.

Which is fine, people can talk about things any way they like, except herein (glancing up at the category title), for the inconsistency with where the discussion is taking place.

Have you been using the word 'rule' thus far in your (...) lifespan thus far by just winging it? — Isaac

Yep, but irrelevant. Most of the time I’m just as conventional as the next guy. I have to be, in order to get along with them. But in places such as this, no one should be conventional.

Ohfercrissakes......all this beating around the proverbial “rule” bush.

Without ever once stating what a rule is, its origin, or its import......

the parlour-game which passes for philosophy in today’s culture. — Banno

....yeah, sorta just like that.

I'd gently commend Quine to you, to help you along your path. — Banno

Ehhhhh.....Quine. Been there, done that, back when cars had fins and penny-loafers were exactly that, finding a near-perfect exhibition of apples (representation) and oranges (meaning), which was, I must say, of great help on my path. I nonetheless appreciate your concern for my well-being.

Grade? 1 - 10?

Philosophy via concept analysis. Always a good idea.

The thesis:

.....laws..... — frank

......rational constructs derived from the principles of universality and absolute necessity.....

.....natural laws...... — frank

......rational constructs that act as explanatory devices for occurrences of a specific kind in Nature.....

.....happening by natural laws...... — frank

......that in Nature determinable by that rational construct.....

X is (...) happening by natural laws..... — frank

.....that as an occurrence of a specific kind in Nature determined by that rational construct....

X is logically necessary if it's happening by natural laws. — frank

....X is an occurrence of a specific kind determined by the principles of universality and absolute necessity, therefore because X occurred, it is necessary that it occurred, iff such occurrence is determinable by law......

Given the above, is not mistaken.
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The antithesis:

That isn't true, (X is logically necessary if it is happening by natural law), because we can imagine the counterfactual: our universe with different laws. — frank

.....therefore is mistaken.
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The theorem:
Even if we imagine different laws, they are still laws, by definition. Otherwise, something must be constructed that doesn’t adhere to universality and absolute necessity, in order to permit happenings that are not necessary merely because they happened, as natural law demands. In which case, it isn’t a law that is constructed, which leaves the truth of the original proposition is unaffected.
(Propositions regulated without universality and absolute necessity shall be deemed as rules, and depending on which predicates are assigned, deemed only convictions, and of ever lesser power, mere persuasions)

The proof:
Counterfactual indicates fact that negates established fact. You’re imagining our universe factually different. Regardless, facts are predicated on law, law is predicated on principles, but imagination is predicated on mere inclination. It is classically irrational to exchange the legislative power of principle, for the indiscriminate power of inclination, which are conditions of conviction or persuasion. It is therefore permissible to imagine anything to which one is inclined, but he has no business immediately addressing it as lawful. It follows that even if one images our universe as explainable by different laws, the universe in itself cannot be explained as being different in itself merely because our explanations relative to it, are.

In effect, there is no epistemologically legislative profit in imagining counterfactuals in opposition to established law, absent the exchange of imagination for law. Our universe as it is but explained by different laws is an empty conjecture until we actually have the different laws with which to explain it, to determine that it is possible to still understand our universe as well as or better than we do now, however different such understanding may be.

The conclusion:
That the universe may be explainable by different laws is not sufficient to falsify the truth of the proposition that X is logically necessary if it happens by natural law.
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Epistemic possibility has nothing to do with that. — frank

How could it not? It is our human epistemology alone, which immediately makes any epistemic relation inescapable. We create the doctrine, we subject ourselves to it, therefore it is us. Nature, on the other hand, has nothing to do with our epistemic possibilities, but is only the occasion for its exercise.

Yes. Was it supposed to be a wiki thing? That’s what came up.

I think you're talking about epistemic possibility. — frank

With respect to what we’ve been talking about, yes. I can only converse within the limits of my knowledge and this world as I understand it.

You didn’t answer the question: “you don’t consider.....”

What can be imagined' is all that's being talked about when we say Nixon might not have been elected or that the universe might have had other laws. — frank

True enough, but at the expense of what we know.
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You don’t consider actuality/determinism and possibility opposites? Is it not true that if a thing is determined, its being other than that determination, is impossible? And if a thing is merely possible, or a thing is possibly this or possibly that, no determination as yet relates to it?

Actualism > Determinism > “could have-ism” (possiblism). One of these is not like the others.
— Mww

You're being kind of cryptic..... — frank

Wasn’t intending to be; just pointing out doctrinal and logical oppositions.
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I think you're suggesting that you never think about what might have been and I think you probably do, so... — frank

Sure I do, you’re correct. I just like to separate what can be imagined, from what I know.

From the wandering inexplicability file, Kant treats imagination as a full-fledged cognitive faculty, so you know I’d never deny my use of it.

Your view is along the lines of actualism, which I'm also fond of. It's hard determinism. It's an altered use of "could have" though. — frank

Actualism > Determinism > “could have-ism” (possiblism). One of these is not like the others.

If it's not meaningless, it's either true or false. — frank

Agreed. In the case of Nixon, then, it is not true that if he had lost he wouldn’t have been disgraced.

The fact of his disgrace is not determinable by his win or loss; it is possible he could have been disgraced even in losing, albeit under a different set of conditions, but disgraced nonetheless.
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DOH!!! I just got it. Meaninglessness due to grammar. What a dope, me.

"If Nixon had lost the election, he wouldn't have been disgraced" ?

Is that a meaningless statement? — frank

I would say, no. I mean....he wasn’t disgraced because he won, which implies a meaning contained by the statement. Rather than meaningless, I’d say....moot. He didn’t lose, so, in the immortal words of the great James Hetfield....nothing else matters.

In juxtaposition to statements about the universe, say, this statement is conditioned by “if/then”, as opposed to “is/is not”, which permits a play of imagination in the former for eventualities with respect to different occurrences, which cannot hold for the latter.

To make the statements logically consistent, for “the universe could have been different.....”, you’d have to say, “Nixon could have lost....”, but then we’re back to the universe statement, insofar as it is the case Nixon couldn’t have lost, because he didn’t.
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Meaningless: that proposition in which the conceptions in the predicate and the subject have no relation to each other, re: grass is measured in temperature.

Meaningless: that conception in a subject or predicate of a proposition, that is undefined, re: all speezles are goops, but not all goops are speezles.

I’m Sister Mary Elephant, and.......CLASS DISMISSED!!!!!.....
(Grin)

I think Kant was arguing that Leibniz' monads..... — Manuel

Thanks. I was sure you’d hepa brutha get his mind right.

Agreed. What I did could only have been what I did. That I could have done otherwise is completely irrelevant, with respect to what I actually did.