And he ends it.....

“....From this we can draw two conclusions: (1) All motion or rest must be merely relative; neither can be absolute. That is, matter can be thought of as moving or at rest only in relation to •matter and never in relation to •mere space without matter. It follows that absolute motion—·i.e. motion that doesn’t consist in one portion of matter changing its relation to another portion·—is simply impossible. (2) For this very reason, there can’t be, out of all the ever-wider concepts of motion or rest in relative space, one that is ·so wide as to be· valid for every appearance. ·To have such an all-purpose concept·, we have to make room in our minds for the thought of a space that isn’t nested within any larger space, i.e. an absolute space in which all relative motions are nested. In such a space everything empirical is movable,. . . .but none can be valid as absolute motion or rest. . . . So absolute space is necessary not as a concept of an actual object but as an idea that is to regulate all our thoughts about relative motion. If we want all the appearances of motion and rest to be held together by a determinate empirical concept, we must put them within the framework of the idea of absolute space...”

....in which is found the last resort, absolute space as a mere idea, not a conception, not an empirical reality. If all motion, therefore all space is relative, then absolute motion and space is impossible.

Simple as that, that something can be thought, exhibits Kant’s propensity for complementary dualisms writ large. More familiar to us as e.g., phenomena/noumena.

I was thinking about this, just before my internal shut-down kicked in.....did Leibniz actually call out monads as noumenal, or did Kant merely accuse him of it? I know the latter is true, but if Leibniz didn’t, then perhaps Kant was barking up the wrong side of the tree.

What say you, Good Sir?

The universe could have been different. — frank

The line 12” long could not have been a line 14” long.
Add 2” to a 12” line there is a 14” line, but there is no longer a 12” line.

Take this universe as it is, change something in it, it is no longer the same universe. It isn’t a universe that is different; it is a different universe that is.

That there could have been a different universe is true; that this universe could have been different is not true.

.....and thank you as well.

Never mind. I’m rather past the end of my day, so....more rambling than sensible.

Ok, fine!!! With/without equipment. For the benefit of those who wish logic and mathematics to be considered as tools.

Science cannot be done without tools, metaphysics cannot be done with tools.

I don't really know what Kant is saying. It seems like a bunch of balloons. — frank

Here’s a great big one: science needs something other than itself to prove; metaphysics contains its own proof. Science is never complete; metaphysics is self-contained, thus can be complete.

Me, I favor being both satisfied, and done, at the same time with respect to the same thing.

I’m sure you’re aware of Kant’s destruction of Leibnizian Monads. Seems he didn’t appreciate the idea of putting form before substance, and if that wasn’t bad enough, which is indeed very bad, to have matter be self-representative.

But you’re right. Leibniz did consider monads as noumena.

You mentioned wandering, so....

Hey!!! ‘Sup?

So....you cryin’ uncle? Tossin’ in the dialectical towel?

HA!!!! That’s why I changed it.

Ehhhh.....little challenge ain’t nothing to be afraid of.

So the mind is phenomenal. It's a product of itself. — frank

Ya know...here we go again...I disfavor “mind” as well. Reason says all we need mind to say.

Mind is a convention of speech; reason is what humans do. That makes it easier to say mind is an object of reason. Not much of an improvement, I suppose, but that every human can justify he thinks much simpler that he can justify he has a mind. Everybody says, “I think.....”; nobody says, “my mind thinks....”

A toss-up. There’s no philosophy of reason in university curriculum, and there’s no critique of pure mind in philosophical literature.

But neither mind nor reason are phenomenal, insofar as these are derivatives of perception.

Ahhhh.... thanks. I might be inclined to say the pure part of physics, rather than pure physics, but that might be taking unwarranted liberties with The Esteemed Professor’s magnum opus.

Wouldn't he say it's wrong to think in terms of a noumenal world? — frank

Oh. That. Ya know....folks just need to get over this noumenal stuff. To a human, and as far as anything whatsoever concerning human intelligence, they have no standing whatsoever. No human can even THINK a particular noumenal object, much less perceive one, and if neither of those are possible, they do not even enter the cognitive system. They are merely a logical distinction a separation, and the text that describes the notion of them, is very brief, indicating Kant didn’t intent the should ever be included in his philosophy.

But, being Kant, he leaves room for his readers to make something out of it. If you like, I can post the pertinent discourse. Specifically, he says they are not impossible, but doesn’t say they are possible. So to answer...yes, it’s wrong to think in terms of a noumenal world.
————-

Human causes, or acts of will would be distinct from natural causes. — frank

Oh. Yes, acts of will. A definite human causality. My oversight. I’ve been stuck on empiricism the last few pages, so talking about mind-independence in science threw me a curve-ball. Sorry.

Yes, acts of will are distinct from natural causes. Another Kantian logical separation. Another search for the unconditioned. The transcendental conception covering causality by humans is “freedom”, and only applies in moral doctrines, determined by pure practical reason, as opposed to pure speculative or theoretical reason, which covers the empirical doctrines.

One good thing....that book has a whole lot fewer words. Which is kinda odd, in that Kant attributes to pure practical reason, and hence moral philosophy, much more importance that the speculative.

How is Kant not doing the thing he says can't be done? — frank

I’m not sure I understand the question. What have I said he’s done, that he himself said couldn't be done?

But what's the setting for this mind that constructs worlds? — frank

In a word, the setting is “transcendental logic”, a condition of human reason, albeit quite speculative, needless to say, hence not mind-independent. The mind....or more properly, reason....doesn’t construct worlds; it constructs a world to which all empirical objects are thought to belong.

“....we form to ourselves, by anticipation**, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it (...) concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects....”

(The parenthetical denotes an exposition of what transcendental logic can’t do, when we want to know what it can. It can explain how the thought of a world as transcendental object of pure reason is possible, and why it is fitting that we should thereby confine our understanding to it.)

**Anticipation herein reflects the proclivity of pure reason to seek the unconditioned, in this case, to seek the limit for that which contains all empirical objects, just because it’s something we might want to know. Pure understanding (the categories) and rational cognition (synthetic a priori judgements) inform us such a limit can be represented, and transcendental logic informs of the conception (which schema of which category) by which the limit is represented...... “world”. Unconditioned, in its turn, meaning that outside the objectively valid.....not objectively real, mind you.....conception of “world”, there can be thought no objects whatsoever. Or, put another way, it is impossible for “world” to be subsumed under something else, just as it is absolutely necessary for all empirical objects to be subsumed under it.
————

would Kant say that when we talk about mind-independence in science, we're talking about non-human causation? — frank

Damned if I know. Talking about mind-independence in science? Not sure what that means. Isn’t all causation non-human? What does a human cause, just by being a human? I suppose a human causes a certain quantity of space and a certain duration of time to be occupied. Dunno. Help me out?

Nobody said this stuff was easy, which gives the inevitable....why even bother. Maybe it’s just fun to think about, even if it won’t pay the bills or get you laid.

So a world is always a construction. — frank

Yes. “World” is an object in general, comprised of and representing a multiplicity of other objects subsumed under it. All objects in general are objects of reason therefore constructed a priori by it in accordance with rules, which.....for better or worse....it also constructs. Perils of the game, donchaknow.

All that subsumed under such general conception, on the other hand, the constituency of it, as given members of a world, which must necessarily exist of their own accord, that is to say, by means other than reason, and by which we are presented with the material of our empirical cognitions, is not a human construction.

As might concur, the objects as such in a world we can either think or experience, but a world as such we can only think.

I'm interested in the fact that Kant acknowledges 'pure physics'. — Wayfarer

He does? I don’t recall. Doesn’t seem quite right.

So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around..... — Wayfarer

“Pure” physics as a self-contained science is a misnomer, I think, at least without reference to a specific text. Math is pure only insofar as reason itself constructs the objects of it, whereas physics has its objects already constructed in and by Nature. Mathematics is entirely pure in its constructs and the relations between them, because the human intellect is responsible for the inception of both, whereas physics is only partially pure, insofar as while the objects of physics are already given in and by Nature, it is only with respect to the relations between them and between them and us that reason constructs its principles. Apparently, nowadays, these different forms of constructs are termed prescriptive regarding mathematics, and descriptive regarding the physical sciences. Altogether superfluous if asked of me.....but it wasn’t, so.....

.....as it seems to me physics is always a combination of the analytic with the experiential. — Wayfarer

Yep. Just like that. Except synthetic rather than analytic, for a couple reasons. Maybe, depending on how you intend the meaning of the word. First, because you’ve admitted to pursuing the Prolegomena, you’ve found that “analytic” in Kant is not the analytic of common usage, and second, because the context herein is Kantian, “analytic” should be left to pure logic, the truths of which are deductively certain, while the truths of anything empirically grounded, such as all physical sciences, is merely inductively certain, re: fn 6. Properly speaking, then, again with respect to Kant alone, physics is a combination of the synthetic a priori (legislative principles given from reason), with the experiential (objects given from observations to which the principles apply).

So...agreed. Pure physics is unintelligible, ain’t no such thing.

So we end up with two meanings for "world". — frank

Maybe under the auspices of something like phenomenology, but not in metaphysical doctrines before that. “World” is a singular conception, defined as “that which contains the objects represented only as phenomena”, which implies there can only be a single word that represents such a thing. And if meaning belongs to words, and words belong to conceptions, then “world” can only have one meaning.

Even if you might be saying there is the world as it is and there is the world as we think it is, we are nonetheless referring to one conceptual representation when we use the word, even if under different conditions.

On the other hand, you might be thinking the world of real things external to reason, and the internal world of objects of reason itself. Which is ok, if one defines “world” to suit. Problem is, everybody’s world of objects of reason is necessarily different depending solely on that which they think about, which is a quality, while everybody’s world of real things is only contingently the same, depending solely on the extent of their experiences, which is a quantity. So we’d have to contend with that categorical distinction somehow. Technically, then, the “world” of objects of reason, is properly termed a manifold, or something similar, leaving “world” to represent empirical objects.

Besides....if there were two meanings, we would need something to inform us which meaning pertains in which case. Seems like over-complicating the issue, that.

never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to
— Mww

And that's one way to reunite the boundaries of thought to the boundaries of possibility as long as we recalibrate "reality" to the world as we know it, right? — frank

Hmmmm...not quite sure. If you’d said, “reunite the boundaries of thought to the boundaries of the world as we know it”, I would have agreed outright, insofar as that’s pretty much what Hume, and his Enlightenment empiricist peers in general, didn’t do. Hume denied both the possibility and the validity of pure a priori conceptions, which are the boundaries of thought, yet granted the empirical certainty of mathematics, which is a reality of the world, an impossibility according to Kant and fellow transcendental idealists, because Hume didn’t first derive the conceptions that can only belong to the faculty of understanding itself, outside and beyond the examples of it in experience.

The philosophical argument is, one cannot even conceive of the predicates of mathematics or the contents of the world, if the pure conception of “quantity” with respect to the former and “reality” with respect to the latter, didn’t already reside in understanding as a natural condition of the human intellect itself. And THAT, is Hume’s problem: the conception of A cause, or THE cause, is impossible if the human intellect didn’t already possess the pure conception of “causality” as a natural precursor. We would never understand that a thing is possible, if we didn’t already possess “possibility”. And this thesis continues with ten more pure conceptions of the understanding, which are called the categories.

If I misunderstood what you meant, and went off on a useless tangent....let me know so I can adjust accordingly.

On Kant’s response to Hume. Dogmatic slumbers, and such Prussian colloquialisms.....

“....The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive it cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object—and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it—he was forced to drive these conceptions from experience, that is, from a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective—in one word, from habit. But he proceeded with perfect consequence and declared it to be impossible, with such conceptions and the principles arising from them, to overstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these conceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics. The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance**; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism—a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy.....”
(CPR, B128, in Meiklejohn 1854)
**enthusiasm in Kemp Smith 1929
(My emphasis)

Simply put, Kant’s predecessors agreed humans understand, but no one considered how it is that humans understand. What it means to understand, how is understanding possible and how it works. Transcendental philosophy is nothing but a speculative, albeit logically consistent, exposition of understanding in general, and from it, the possibility and validity of a priori cognitions.

So from the Kantian perspective for example, we should see that these fundamental limitations are described as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These base intuitions inform the way that we see and apprehend things, in a way which we cannot avoid. When we come to understand this basic reality, we can move beyond these intuitions, to a deeper level, to see how these intuitions themselves, might be altered toward something more real, by locating the basic limitations at an even deeper level. — Metaphysician Undercover

Grant, for the moment, that the notion of the a priori base intuitions space and time is the case for the way we see and apprehend things, which is, after all, just the same as experience itself. It follows necessarily that if the base intuitions might be altered, the way things are seen and apprehended must also be altered. If the way things are seen and apprehended change, the experience of those things must change. If the experience of things change, and I have experience of a thing at one time and place, what am I to experience in another time and place, when presented with exactly the same thing? And if it is the case I am not presented with exactly the same thing because the base intuitions might be altered, then how am I to explain, e.g., my experience of a pencil that is subsequently, merely as a condition by some other time and place, experienced as something not a pencil?
———-

ust wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable?
— Mww

I think experiential consistency is questionable....... — Metaphysician Undercover

But it isn’t; the human intelligence is experientially consistent. For any individual, a pencil apprehended today is apprehended as a pencil tomorrow, all else being given. It must be that either the Kantian notions of a priori intuitions as the unavoidable way we see and apprehend things is false, or, such notion is the case but rather, the idea that alteration of those intuitions into something deeper and more real, is false.

.......That's why we have difference of intuitions, differences of preference, and so on. These are the peculiarities of the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

You and I will have a difference of intuitions upon being presented with things not in common between us, yes. But that is not because we have deeper levels of our basic intuitions of space and time, but because we have not been presented with the same object. This merely represents a difference in intuitive quantity, not an altered deeper level of quality.

Yes, there are indeed peculiarities of the individual, but these are judgements made on things, as a consequence of intuitions of them. It still must be considered, how it is that you and I, and humanity in general, no matter the particular word used to represent it, see and apprehend this one thing, say, a pencil, and agree that it is an experience common to all of us. That cannot be the case if the basic conditions common to all humans, those being intuition of space and time, are susceptible to alteration toward something more real, or reducible to a deeper level. In other words, if your base intuitions were altered to a deeper level but mine were not, what would each of us see and apprehend upon perception of any one object?

I’m surprised that you, of most participants herein, would advocate the alteration to a deeper level, of that which is already given as a basic foundational conception. To suggest the reduction of a fundamental is self-contradictory, is it not? Furthermore, and possibly even more surprising, is what could space or time be altered to, such that there is a deeper level to them?

Then, too, if basic a priori intuitions are given as limits for seeing and apprehending things, which does seem to be the case, then to alter them to a deeper level implies the possibility for removing such limitations, which is also self-contradictory, insofar as we are certainly limited.

All that to say this: space and time do set the limits to what we see and apprehend, but we do not have the capacity to move beyond them, they are not alterable to deeper levels, and we cannot make them more real than they already are.

Still....I’d be interested in an exposition that suggests otherwise, or that I misunderstood what you meant.

Just wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable?

Kant was a Newtonian. He thought there was absolute time and space. — Jackson

Yes he was, but no, he did not, at least in one sense of “absolute”, that being irreducible physical reality.....

“...Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which form the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms of all intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions a priori possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present objects as things in themselves, but are applicable to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phenomena. The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further objective use can be made of them.

On the other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real. If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in space or succession in time), abstracted from experience, though represented confusedly in this state of separation, they find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical doctrines a priori in reference to real things...”

....which still leaves room for “absolute” in the sense of irreducible transcendental ideality. But that isn’t Newton, so....we are left with an ambiguity with respect to the term itself, between your meaning of the word, and his.

And even if one leans on Kant’s granting “empirical reality” to both space and time, as indicating “absolute”, it behooves him to recognize the further qualification of that condition, as being merely “objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses”, which reduces the conception of “absolute” to no more than pertaining to possible experience, and therefore hardly absolute in Newtonian terms, the reference frame for which being the Universe in general.

As if CPR wasn’t sufficient introduction, we can then be referred to “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, particularly the chapter “Phenomenology”, in which Kant refutes the notion of Newtonian absolute time and space, re: Friedman, 1992. How well he refuted....well, that’s been suspect since 1786. Then comes Einstein, a self-proclaimed non-Kantian, who elaborates successfully a strictly Kantian argument.

Go figure......

Every empirical knowledge claim in this world is derivative of the intuitive and cognitive foundation that is set before us. — Constance

How about.....derivative of the intuitive and cognitive foundation that belongs to us. If not, yours works.

Well said in the first, my sentiments also, in the second. Although, the beginning might be in Descartes, Kant then being the standard by which all others in the class, are measured.

Awww, shucks Mr. Bill. Y’all just too damn smart for me. I bow to your superior intellect, and hereby remove myself from further embarrassment.

assumptions assumptions assumptions — Nickolasgaspar

Yep. So?

can you prove our ability to produce concepts validates the existence of "originals". — Nickolasgaspar

Yep. Logically.

You are posting metaphysical beliefs that aren't based on knowledge. — Nickolasgaspar

Yep. Your brand of knowledge anyway.

No apologies.

unfortunatelly people try to address their frustration by going over those limitations. — Nickolasgaspar

Yeah, true enough. Funny thing about human reason, the ability to come up with fantastic stuff on the one hand, then turn right around and confuse itself on the other. Nature of the beast. Can only be guarded against, but never eliminated.
————

All three of which are antecedent to knowledge, or, which is the same thing, knowledge presupposes all three of those strictly human a priori capacities.
— Mww
-Obviously the dude who stated that has never studied other animals. — Nickolasgaspar

Why would anyone study other animals when investigating strictly human conditions? Who gives a shit that dolphins appear to surf, when such appearance is a mere anthropomorphism anyway? Crows use tools? Big deal. No crow ever got himself to the moon.

Apple, meet orange.
————

are you aware of a Non real world where we can not exercise them???? — Nickolasgaspar

Yep. So are you. And not so much can not, but simply don’t. But we probably have differing ideas regarding what it means to be real.
————

I don't know why this is so difficult for you...you literally described the process. — Nickolasgaspar

C’mon, man. If I literally described the process, how could it have been so difficult for me? But I didn’t describe anything; I just asked a question, which wasn’t answered.
————

you fail to practice when a concept isn't founded on knowledge. — Nickolasgaspar

Not sure what that means. Fail to practice? All that aside, a concept only arises in relation to what we don’t know, as a representation of it. You are confounding the inception of a particular from a general. It is equivalent to saying the conception of a thing arises because we know it isn’t that, and it isn’t that, and it isn’t that, ad infinitum, which is absurd.

Our ability to reproduce a concept plays no role to its validity lol. — Nickolasgaspar

You laugh, but also think we have an ability that reproduces concepts. Why in the world would we need to reproduce a concept? Where did the original go? Produce, of course; reproduce.....nahhhh, I don’t think so. And the production IS the validity, otherwise there is no logical relation upon which a judgement could ensue. And don’t mistake validity for truth, for only experience can prove the truth of a judgement, and even that only contingently. It’s how we know we got something wrong if experience shows a false judgement. You know....like....lightning, a perfectly valid conception that still remains, doesn’t really come from angry gods despite the judgement of the time that it did.

A central metaphysical idea, intuition, sufficient to explain why no one has to reproduce concepts.

We could do this all day, but I got post-winter lawn duty. Not high on my list of pleasures, but duty nonetheless.

The Philosophical Method is an exercise in frustration..... — Nickolasgaspar

......which disappears as soon as the limitations of it are realized. A central metaphysical idea.

Making up answers and assuming things you don't know..... — Nickolasgaspar

.....serves no purpose, as opposed to making up answers and assuming things that do not contradict that which is known, which does. A central metaphysical idea.

What makes experience possible is you existing..... — Nickolasgaspar

.....which is absolutely necessary, but not sufficient. The mere fact of existence does nothing to explain that by which experience obtains. A central metaphysical idea.

.....start from things you don't know and you push a narrative as if it was right..... — Nickolasgaspar

Speculative metaphysics starts with things known, and uses that to arrive at logical arguments for that which is sufficiently explanatory in keeping with internal consistency and non-contradiction. Right or wrong is completely irrelevant with respect to proper philosophy, insofar as no one possesses the rational authority to know he is philosophically wise, while he may very well think himself to be.
—————

.....criticizing the concept of the pure witness.....
— jas0n

(...) this made up concept....
(...) concepts that are isolated from reality don't offer wisdom....
(...)our understanding — Nickolasgaspar

If a made up concept isolated from reality, what is this “our” of which you so readily speak? In the affirmative, have you not displayed your own wisdom in not denying the validity of that very same made up conception, in the proper use of a derivative of it? And in the negative, how wise would you be, to deny the validity of that made up conception, when it is impossible to express your denial without using it? Understanding is itself a made up conception, which does nothing more than represent a speculative human cognitive faculty, while leaving open a congruently speculative methodology for its operation.

Caveat: I would have said critique rather than criticize, but that’s just another one of those split-able hairs.
————

The metaphysical version is part of a machinery that (...) allows us to discuss the form of all possible experience, provide the space where pure-exact language-independent and culture-independent meanings live, safe from the ravages of time and relativism.
— jas0n
-None of the above are legit philosophical ideas. — Nickolasgaspar

I would have worded it a little differently, but still, I submit that’s exactly what they are.
—————

Without knowledge you can never be sure of how wise your conclusions are..... — Nickolasgaspar

Knowledge is always contingent, from which follows the surety of conclusions is just as contingent, which makes explicit I may be wise now regarding something I know but unwise later regarding that something I once knew. Wisdom resides more in judgement of difference, a logical relation writ large, than the knowledge of differences themselves.

Reason or better Logic is an essential tool for wisdom to be possible. — Nickolasgaspar

Exactly right. While wisdom resides in judgement, that wisdom is possible in order for it to be contained in judgement, is predicated solely on reason and logic, the real world being merely the occasion for the exercise of them. All three of which are antecedent to knowledge, or, which is the same thing, knowledge presupposes all three of those strictly human a priori capacities.

Point/counterpoint.....

......a central metaphysical idea......may be a central metaphysical idea but it has zero ties to Philosophy..... — Nickolasgaspar

Again the issue is not with metaphysics but with pseudo philosophy parading as such. — Nickolasgaspar

These two assertions do not have the same truth value.

A central metaphysical idea must only and always have ties to philosophy, and whether or not it is judged by a second party as proper philosophy or pseudo-philosophy, is predicated solely on the exposition its internal construction to which the second party has no access whatsoever. That which is deemed pseudo-philosophy may be merely proper philosophy misunderstood.
————

How can science inform as to what we don’t know, if we don’t ask of it questions it alone can answer"
-Science.....uses the same theoretical toolkit with any other Philosophical category. — Nickolasgaspar

No, it actually does not. Empirical science uses validation from experience, whereas some categories of philosophy are not amendable to any experience, therefore cannot use that toolkit for its validation. As that famous Enlightenment adage goes, “....though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience....”.

Of course, this presupposes a mutual understanding and tacit agreement of what knowledge is, the relative validity of its possible variations, and how any of it accrues in the human intellect.
————

-". Except for sheer accident, no science is ever done, that isn’t first thought."
-Actually you are wrong...all philosophy is triggered by observations and data first — Nickolasgaspar

Be that as it may, the doing of is not the same as triggered by. Observation and extant knowledge merely serve as occasion for the doing, and that only conditionally. Consider, as well, that philosophy which has for its validation no observation or data whatsoever, re: moral philosophy. I shall trust you not to mistake merely objective behaviorism for the subjective metaphysical principles of moral constitution.
————-

Without knowledge(science) philosophy could never know if its conclusions were wise while without philosophy science would never know what our data mean. — Nickolasgaspar

Now THAT I like. I might say...... without empirical knowledge theoretical philosophy would never know if its conclusions were justified, specifically logic and mathematics, but that’s a hair that doesn’t need splitting. In the interest of technical precision, maybe, but, I get your point nonetheless.

So....not a fan of abstract reasoning, huh? Science is the best way to do philosophy kinda guy?

You must be aware that our primary interests reside in what we don’t know, right? How can science inform as to what we don’t know, if we don’t ask of it questions it alone can answer? Science tells, it doesn’t ask, so....where do the questions come from?

Must be something above/beyond/outside science, that causes it to do the one thing it does.

Metaphysics is that philosophy that causes science to tell us what we want to know, which makes explicit metaphysics is the only way to do science. Except for sheer accident, no science is ever done, that isn’t first thought.

Embrace, and thereby revel in, your humanity, man!!!!!

I think the transcendental ego is mostly a failure....., — jas0n

Yeah, true enough. As long as transcendental philosophy fails, so too will the transcendental ego.

would you say that reasoning is ultimately independent of language? — jas0n

Yes. Reasoning is what the human intellect seems to do, by its very nature, pursuant to brain machinations. Language, or objective signage in general, merely stands as representation of the intellect expressing the reasoning it appears to do.
————

Is 'thought' a kind of content which is clothed in words? — jas0n

I prefer the doctrine that the human intellect functions in the private domain of images. In that regard, yes, thought, which is reasoning proper, is clothed in words, insofar as it is impossible to inform similar intellects by means of images.
————

the transcendental ego could be invented as a concept and shared? — jas0n

Invented as an explanatory device in accordance with a theory from which its possibility arises, yes. No empirical theory is in principle provable with apodeitic certainty, but theories with purely logical predication at least obtain their own kind of “if this, then that necessarily” certainty, so sharing a purely logical conception presents its own difficulties. You get a whole boatload of blank looks when you say a guy’s entire rationality is determined by his transcendental ego. Hence, Berkeley’s “vulgar caste”, Hume’s “vulgar understanding”, Kant’s “most commonplace reason”.
————

Husserl is eccentric perhaps ? — jas0n

Nahhhh....I wouldn’t say that. Ed just wanted to be a better Kantian than Kant. Or a more complete Kantian, perhaps. But he was never the metaphysical paradigm shift as Kant, even while presenting stuff for his peers and successors to think about.
————-

Question, if you don’t mind:

The ruling metaphor here is the eye which can see everything but itself. — jas0n

How would you translate the ruling metaphor into a definition? Or is the metaphor sufficient for a definition?

OK...two questions.

All of modern philosophy, (....), breaking through in Berkeley, Hume, and Kant.

Is it the specific wording in the quote, that makes Descartes not important enough to include with the others? Descartes was the first in modern, re: post-medieval, philosophy to separate the objective from the subjective, but Kant was the author of the transcendental ego as such. Just seems like ol’ Rene got left out for some reason.
—————

The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no constitutive meaning. — jas0n

Absolutely, and should go far in making analytic language philosophy only that which is mere leftovers from the real philosophy already done.
—————

calling it 'science' flatters something that doesn't prioritize its own correction, confident already in its own completeness. — jas0n

While science as a doctrine, without regard to its objects, is complete in itself, it is logic that prioritizes its own correction. Now if there was a science predicated on logic, and that purely logical science could ground a metaphysical theory, there would still not be a transcendental ego given from it necessarily, but there may arise a purely speculative system by which it is represented, and that can be given to members of the public as an opportunity to look at themselves.
————-

Interesting topic, all in all. If I had a problem with it I couldn’t let go of, it would be including Hume. That guy was an card-carrying, dyed-in-the-wool, unrepentant empiricist, with all the negative implications with respect to pure subjectivity that philosophy entails.

Neither a proper maxim nor an example of a Kantian universal law.

I'm trying to interpret it in today's terms. — RussellA

Oh. Well, alrighty then. Carry on, by all means.

we experience the empirical world (the software) through a "meta-empirical" world (the hardware). Our a posteriori knowledge (the software) is transcended by our a priori knowledge (the hardware). — RussellA

Software? Hardware? Pre-existing in the brain? Why are these, with their modern scientific predicates, contained in a treatise under the title of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? If the deterministic brain is fully involved at the expense of logical metaphysics, it isn’t idealism, and if some knowledge is pre-existing in the brain, it isn’t necessarily a priori in strictly Kantian terms, which makes explicit it isn’t transcendental.

Can’t critique the philosophy not given to us, using conditions not known to the author of the one that was.
————-

Kant was not able to benefit from Darwin's insights. — RussellA

Evolution being such a slow process, he would probably not even considered it with respect to human knowledge, insofar his speculative methodology for our being conscious of it, wouldn’t have changed, in general, noticeably for millennia. He would have readily admitted that knowledge about things changes all the time; the way knowledge occurs in humans, does not.

If the certainty of natural law is really not sufficient to explain natural causes and effect.....
— Mww

Natural laws are not sufficient to explain the existence of the universe, — EugeneW

Not yet, but that’s beside the point of whether or not they are certain enough to explain the natural causes and effects in the universe.

Maybe dreaming is meant for divine communication. — EugeneW

Could be, but why only in dreams? And why would gods communicate with us in dreams, then not make it so we can remember what the dreams were about? Seems like a rather pointless enterprise. I guess I should say, if a god communicates with me via my dreamstates, he damn sure outta enable me to remember it.