Sure you’re not thinking of Voltaire? — Wayfarer

:lol: Voltaire has his place, but Descartes is our guy. How would you feel if you get stabbed (in the back) by the very knife you gifted your "friend" to protect himself? :cry:

As often I have no idea what you’re on about, but please don’t try to explain, it will probably only confuse things further.

As often I have no idea what you’re on about, but please don’t try to explain, it will probably only confuse things further. — Wayfarer

Descartes made us philosophers and we're using philosophy against him. :chin: The invention kills the inventor. Frankenstein's monster, to wit us.

Philosophy long pre-dates, and post-dates, Descartes. I have respect for Descartes - certainly I don’t want to ‘cancel’ him! But the discovery of the particular acts under discussion here does change my opinion, not so much of Descartes the man (though there is that) but of the overall credibility of Descartes’ philosophical model. That discussion upthread about Descartes denying that animals are in any way different to rocks or earth - Aristotle's ontology was better than that! He recognised that animals possess attributes which mere matter does not, even if he also acknowledged that they lack reason. Something really fishy about all this.

I started the thread as a kind of :yikes: - so far, the most significant further discovery has been the article that Hanover linked to on the Friesian school website. There's probably a lot more to be discovered.

I'm kind of a dualist, myself - but as far as I understand it (which is probably not far), I'm much more persuaded by the matter-form dualism of 'A-T' (Aristotelian-Thomist) than by Descartes'.

I suggest we treat Descartes' as a lesson, to be learned - as we judge him, our children will judge us and our children by their children. Aristotle would've surely vivisected animals if only it had crossed his mind (El Rachum); someone who considers other humans as subhuman (slaves) wouldn't have any qualms about flaying dogs I gather.

Anyway, yeah, Descartes made a silly mistake, a mistake which implies he didn't quite grasp skepticism. So much for radical doubt. He also didn't write any ethical treatises to my knowledge, being more interested in the natural sciences, perhaps betraying his ineptitude on the subject.

Aristotle's ontology was better than that! He recognised that animals possess attributes which mere matter does not, even if he also acknowledged that they lack reason. — Wayfarer

:up:

If it is right to judge the morality of a philosopher writing 400 years ago by today's standards, then we should expect the morality of philosophers writing today to be judged by the standards of societies 400 years from now.

For example, in a possible future world, it may well be accepted that plants feel pain and should not be picked and eaten whilst still alive. Not an unlikely scenario, as many people discuss this situation even today. That well known left-wing and progressive newspaper The Guardian included the following in its notes and queries section: "A number of studies have shown that plants feel pain, and vegetables are picked and often eaten while still alive. Animal rights activists are often in the news, but has anyone ever protested for vegetable rights?"

This raises the question whether veganism should be promoted today if in a possible future world the eating of plants is considered by society to be morally reprehensible.

"A number of studies have shown that plants feel pain, and vegetables are picked and often eaten while still alive. Animal rights activists are often in the news, but has anyone ever protested for vegetable rights?" — RussellA

Perhaps we could all become Jains

Perhaps we could all become Jains — Wayfarer

Or, as an article in The Guardian newspaper proposes, perhaps we should talk to our plants rather than, as the vegans propose, eat them.

"As we edge into 2021, my orchid is still thriving. And because my fingers are not yet green, I can only attribute this to our daily interactions: the adoring looks, the greetings and check-ins, and the attention (both intentional and incidental). She listens in on my telephone conversations and is often my only audience for pre-dinner renditions of I Will Survive. She doesn’t join in, my orchid, but I think she’s feeling the love. I know I am."

Well talking to orchids sure is preferable to torturing dogs, I’ll give you that.

Well talking to orchids sure is preferable to torturing dogs, I’ll give you that. — Wayfarer

True, in that talking to dogs is preferable to torturing plants.

Descartes reasoned that as animals didn't speak or philosophise, they lacked souls and minds and so were mechanical objects that didn't feel pain. With 400 years of hindsight and accumulated knowledge, today's prevailing view is that animals are not mechanical objects and do feel pain.

Today, the prevailing view is that as plants don't speak or philosophise they lack souls and minds, and so are biologically mechanical objects that don't feel pain. In 400 years from now, in a possible future world, the prevailing view may be that plants are more than biologically mechanical objects and do feel pain.

Is it right that today vegans in eating plants should be judged evil, in the event that in a possible future world, and after 400 years of accumulated knowledge, the prevailing view may be that plants are more than biologically mechanical objects and do feel pain.

Well talking to orchids sure is preferable to torturing dogs, I’ll give you that. — Wayfarer

:up:

And so we must eat in silence.

.

Sure. And what's a bit ironic is that if you look at modern physics, say, quantum physics, it does look rather ghostly and weird. Yeah I can see how Dennett misreads the situation and ends up with his weird views.

That sounds interesting, but I don't think we need scientific experiments to confirm the dualistic nature of human thought; all we need to do is look at language.and its formalization in propositional logic.The dualistic nature of human thought says nothing about the nature of reality in my view. — Janus

Of course, the nature of reality is different from our intuitions. Just that it's good to have some experimental evidence to back up our intuitions.

Right, but I don't think he is denying that we see red or experience pain. He is rejecting qualia which, as he says, an additional 'thing': is the redness of red, the painfulness of pain; these are reifications of post hoc conceptualizations, not something we experience. We experience red and pain, not the redness of red or the painfulness of pain. — Janus

This sounds to me as word play. The red thing or pain and the speaking about the "redness" or the "pain-ness" is simply to highlight the quality we see or feel. If I say "look at how beautiful the ocean looks
today" - I'm highlighting the various aspects of the ocean, which includes blue-ness. But if you want another term, then I'm happy to say blue.

Do you think most people think of consciousness in these qualia-type terms? Even if you think they do, do you think they experience consciousness this way or just unreflectively think of it this way? Also Dennett is quite clear that he is rejecting the folk-conception of consciousness, which is naive in a very similar way that naive realism is naive. You could even call it naive realism about consciousness, where that which is reified is not objects of the senses but qualities of experience. — Janus

Sure, I do.

I don't think the naive argument works so well with experience as it does with naive realism in terms of how the world is.

I think the way we experience consciousness is the way it is. However, if you want to find out how the brain produces this property, you can do neuroscience of psychology of perception. Doesn't alter at all our experience in the least.

I think the main reason people reject Dennett's philosophy is that they think it rules out spirituality, meaning personal transformation and altered (non-dual) states of consciousness, but I don't see why that would necessarily be the case at all. — Janus

I mean, if you were correct, there would not be SO many articles arguing against Dennett's view, including Searle, Block, Zahavi, Tallis, etc., etc.

So either he is being deliberately tricky or he can't explain his views well. He explains his views well, so I think he's being tricky.

I talk to thin air, that's how advanced in ethics I am. Plants? I talk to atoms and quarks. :rofl: However, they don't talk back! Jainism is a religion for 4053 AD and Buddhism for 3023 AD. Christianity is the religion for the 2000s. Thank god I'm a Christian. I'm s(h)aved!

…..a lot more to be discovered. — Wayfarer

Perhaps not so much discovered, in that you may already know of it, but I’m thinking Part V “Discourse on Method of Rightly Conducting….”, prior to the paragraphs quoted in the link, might be entertaining for its gross inaccuracies, but I’m also thinking that in the time of its publication, and with respect to those few academics exposed to it, must have been absolutely fascinating. I mean….generation of animals spirits like very subtle winds….musta given them something to talk about over mead and mutton.

As to discoveries, I finally found the 3rd objection to the 6th Meditation, and reply, to the section on animal thought, in which we see the background for some of the early modern thinking that seldom, if ever, occurs to we post-moderns:

“…. As for dogs and apes: if I conceded that they have thought, that would imply that ·in this respect they resemble men·, not because in men as well as in animals there is no mind distinct from the body, but rather because in animals as well as men there is a mind distinct from the body. This was the view taken by the very Platonists whom my critics were taking as authorities a moment ago, as can be seen from their following the Pythagoreans in believing that a soul could move from one body to another….”
(https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/Rationalism/Descartes/Descartes%20-%20Objections%20VI%20and%20Replies.pdf)

Odd innit? We think in terms of space, time, quantum probabilities, while they think in terms of gods and older philosophers, which is merely a reflection on the state of empirical knowledge.

f it is right to judge the morality of a philosopher writing 400 years ago by today's standards, — RussellA

How about by the constant standards of cultures that understood the evident kinship of humans and other animals long before gentlemen in stiff collars cerebrated that radical idea?

This raises the question whether veganism should be promoted today if in a possible future world the eating of plants is considered by society to be morally reprehensible. — RussellA

Did Descartes eat the dogs he tortured? I really don't think he was forced to choose between that and starvation. Even if people of the future are able to produce all their food directly from sunlight and earth, they will know that we didn't have that capability. They will know that we had to choose from a range of sentient life to sustain us, and a range of methods whereby to kill them. Will they then decide which of us made the more reprehensible choices.

Of course we will be judged by our descendants, if we have any. And most of the statues we erect will be knocked down a lot sooner than 4 centuries hence. All the big elaborate tombs were looted, and all that loot in modern museums will someday be trashed. Which is one reason we shouldn't waste resources on idolatry.

I also don't think the modern world benefitted all that much from Christian schizophrenia or obsessive Eurocentrism.

How about by the constant standards of cultures that understood the evident kinship of humans and other animals long before gentlemen in stiff collars cerebrated that radical idea? — Vera Mont

It seems a pity that the father of modern philosophy is being discredited for something he probably never did.

In the article Descartes on Animals in the Philosophical Quarterly, Peter Harrison argues that the view that Descartes denied feelings to animals is mistaken.

Apparently Descartes had a pet dog called Monsieur Grat who used to accompany him on his walks, on whom he lavished much affection and probably loved quite dearly.

As Descartes's philosophical starting point was to consider everything a matter of doubt, we should perhaps start by doubting unsubstantiated stories about the man himself.

As Descartes's philosophical starting point was to consider everything a matter of doubt, we should perhaps start by doubting unsubstantiated stories about the man himself. — RussellA

Where do they come from?
Britannica says

In his physiological studies, he dissected animal bodies to show how their parts move. He argued that, because animals have no souls, they do not think or feel; thus, vivisection, which Descartes practiced, is permitted.

and Richard Watson, the author of the article, seems to have some pretty thorough background work, to go by the bibliography.

Where do they come from? — Vera Mont

The sentence from the Britannica: "He argued that, because animals have no souls, they do not think or feel; thus, vivisection, which Descartes practised, is permitted" gives a different impression to the OP whereby "They burned, scalded, and mutilated animals in every conceivable manner".

As vivisection is still legal, can we attack Descartes for a practice that is still carried out today.

Peter Harrison writes "The view that Descartes was a brute to the brutes is, above all else, historically myopic" and "Descartes is commonly portrayed as one whose view of animals is morally repugnant. Such moral indignation is misplaced".

Descartes position regarding the soul is more complex that suggested by The Britannica. The Britannica writes "He argued that, because animals have no souls, they do not think or feel", however Peter Harrison writes " Descartes, we must understand, did not deny the existence of animal souls per se: animals might well have "corporeal souls". It was this view that animals had spiritual souls, of "substantial material forms" that Descartes was at pains to refute".

Before cancelling Descartes and tearing down his statues, I think first the truth should be discovered regarding his position on animal testing.

Then we can judge him having 400 years of hindsight.

As vivisection is still legal, can we attack Descartes for a practice that is still carried out today. — RussellA

YES. And all his acolytes.

Before cancelling Descartes and tearing down his statues, I think first the truth should be discovered regarding his position on animal testing. — RussellA

Actions speak louder than 'positions'. The father of modern science gave moderns science license to torture, degrade and use all other species to serve its own ends.

It's kind of futile. I agree with your correct characterization.

If people want to feel morally righteous with people that lived 400 years ago, that tells you something about them.

If people want to feel morally righteous with people that lived 400 years ago, that tells you something about them. — Manuel

Not really. Descartes was not 400 years ago: Descartes is among us, still exerting influence. As you have seen in this very thread.
What you characterize as 'moral righteousness' is something quite else. The father of modern science gave moderns license to torture, degrade and use all other species to serve their own ends. He provided the philosophical [moral, ethical] basis for much of the atrocity that has taken place ever since his time and continues today.

I'm sure people who torture animals have Descartes in mind, and his conception of body too.

Thanks for that! Jonathan Bennett's editions are always very helpful. I'm nowhere near really understanding the background to these disputes, I will admit.

Quite what Descartes means by 'thought', why humans have it and animals don't - I have a rough idea, but I'll do some more reading. But one point is that I'm sympathetic to the idea that the faculty of reason is (in Descartes' terms) 'an incorporeal power', i.e., something that cannot be explained in physical terms (contra the philosophical materialists.) Reason comprises the ability to grasp the relationship of ideas, and is not reducible to any notion of physical causation (a theme I'm exploring under the 'argument from reason'.) I'm of the view that when h. sapiens evolved to the point of being able to reason, speak and tell stories, then a new horizon of being opened up which is not reducible to the physical domain, including the biological domain. In other words, that humanity transcends biology. I think that is a modernised version of Descartes' belief.

But it seems to me that Descartes' understanding of the mind or soul is too narrow. It's not that I would rather say that 'dogs have souls', but my conception of what 'the soul' stands for is much broader than Descartes allows. There is mention of the Pythagoreans belief that souls transmigrate between different species (there's a famous anecdote that Pythagoras recognised the departed soul of a friend in the bark of a dog), which Descartes dismisses. He's on firm ground there, of course, because reincarnation is anathema to the Church. But me, I'm not so certain......

In the article Descartes on Animals in the Philosophical Quarterly, Peter Harrison argues that the view that Descartes denied feelings to animals is mistaken. — RussellA

It is not available for free online reading, but I do know and respect Peter Harrison's work.

Before cancelling Descartes and tearing down his statues... — RussellA

Please notice I've already stated that:

I'm not someone who wants to tear down statues of famous people connected to the slave trade, for instance.... — Wayfarer

and also

I have respect for Descartes - certainly I don’t want to ‘cancel’ him! — Wayfarer

Criticism is not cancellation! In fact the inability to make this distinction is one of the primary drivers of 'cancel culture'.

This sounds to me as word play. The red thing or pain and the speaking about the "redness" or the "pain-ness" is simply to highlight the quality we see or feel. If I say "look at how beautiful the ocean looks
today" - I'm highlighting the various aspects of the ocean, which includes blue-ness. But if you want another term, then I'm happy to say blue. — Manuel

So you think we experience redness in addition to red or painfulness in addition to pain? The point I'm making is that Dennett doesn't deny that we experience red or pain; I think he's arguing against the reification of those experiences as redness or painfulness, causing us to imagine something additional to the experience of red or of pain.

I don't think the naive argument works so well with experience as it does with naive realism in terms of how the world is.

I think the way we experience consciousness is the way it is. However, if you want to find out how the brain produces this property, you can do neuroscience of psychology of perception. Doesn't alter at all our experience in the least. — Manuel

Naive realism says there is a world of objects "out there" independent of us, which is a reification of the concept of persistent and invariant objects which follows naturally from our visual and tactile impressions. Naive experientialism says there is an inner world of qualia, which is a reification of the concept of felt qualities of experienced visual and tactile impressions. I don't see much difference between the two reifications: one "outer" and one "inner".

You say "the way we experience consciousness", and I think the only way we can hope to get any idea of how we experience consciousness, as opposed to how we naively think about it is via meditation. And my experience, and the extensive literature about meditation tells me that consciousness is non-dual, and that there is no "we" experiencing it at all, which means that our naive intuitive, dualistic views don't capture the nature of consciousness any more than our naive dualistic views of reality capture the nature of reality.

I mean, if you were correct, there would not be SO many articles arguing against Dennett's view, including Searle, Block, Zahavi, Tallis, etc., etc.

So either he is being deliberately tricky or he can't explain his views well. He explains his views well, so I think he's being tricky. — Manuel

I'm just talking about how I read Dennett, not about how others read him. Only Dennett could say who is reading him more accurately, or maybe even he could not, since the subject is so murky through and through.

Perhaps try watching this video of Dennett explaining why he thinks the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is misguided, and then see what you think:

Perhaps there are no "correct" views of consciousness, since consciousness is non-dual and all views are necessarily dualistic. In that case the whole debate is just the airing of different perspectives, all of which are under-determined and inadequate.

For what it's worth I am no materialist...or idealist...or pragmatist...I don't hold any metaphysical views...but I do think some things make more sense to say than others do in the dualistic context of our discourses and arguments.

I know I'm the one who introduced Dennett into the conversation, but let's try and keep the thread on track, or else I'll split it into a new topc.

So you think we experience redness in addition to red or painfulness in addition to pain? The point I'm making is that Dennett doesn't deny that we experience red or pain; I think he's arguing against the reification of those experiences as redness or painfulness, causing us to imagine something additional to the experience of red or of pain. — Janus

If I talk about redness, I am talking about an aspect of the experience, which includes other factors such as smell, sound, distance, etc. Though I usually speak of red, blue, etc.

Of course, I'm not going to say that there is something red-like on top of the colour red, that statement has no meaning.

Naive experientialism says there is an inner world of qualia, which is a reification of the concept of felt qualities of experienced visual and tactile impressions. I don't see much difference between the two reifications: one "outer" and one "inner" — Janus

That's not how my intuition of experience feels at all. I don't think of an inner world of qualia, I think of objects having colours.

Just saw Wayferer's comments, we can continue this on another thread.



On to the OP, I think there is significant amounts of nuance, involved in Descartes view. Which interestingly enough, is being revived by fanatics of AI, who apparently think we know enough about the mind to build a computer that can mimic it.

Of course, I'm not going to say that there is something red-like on top of the colour red, that statement has no meaning. — Manuel

So, you agree there are no red quales?

That's not how my intuition of experience feels at all. I don't think of an inner world of qualia, I think of objects having colours. — Manuel

Then I'm not seeing where you disagree with Dennett. If you want to make another thread I'll participate.

I'm sure people who torture animals have Descartes in mind, and his conception of body too. — Manuel

All the generations of vivisectionists and sponsors use his philosophy as their justification, yes. Plus:

“[My] view is not so much cruel to beasts but respectful to human beings… whom it absolves from any suspicion of crime whenever they kill or eat animals” (reprinted in Penguin Classics’ edition of Mediations and Other Metaphysical Writings,

(@Janus, @Manuel - if you do create another thread I'll move the relevant comments from this one if you like.)

That is rather chilling! You can see how it dovetails with the Biblical 'dominion over beasts' dogma. (I think I prefer pagan philosophy, overall.)