all other things being equal, we have no more warrant to suppose that they don't operate the same way than that they do. — Janus

Yeah, that universal consciousness, mindful matter nonsense has been around as long as man has succeeded in persuading himself toward contradictions. Methinks self-consistent speculation doth far surpass under-powered conviction. But at the end of the day, we are left with the reality that although reason is necessary for our knowledge, it is at the same time the source of inquiry for which there is no possibility of knowledge.

Taste, indeed, at least for the initial premises in a dialectical argument. Accepting a conclusion predicated on mere taste, is just lazy, wouldn’t you agree?

we could reasonably infer that the cosmos is, always already, prior to human experience, logically structured, or "conceptually shaped" — Janus

That’s the very trap I referred to. If it is the case that the human system operates on logical structure and conceptual shaping, it then becomes the proverbial “transcendental illusion” to suppose systems not anything like ours, operate the same way. Just because some method is an absolute necessity for us doesn’t warrant that method’s infliction anywhere else.

But you’re right in a way. We can infer anything we like, as long as we have sufficient reason. Problem is, we could never have sufficient reason, with respect to the cosmos in general. Hell.....we don’t know hardly anything about it, so what warrant do we have for supposing its antecedents?

The whole dialectic I’m involved in concerns perception, so I’m not sure what you’re asking. No one ever senses “me”, and nothing sensed is ever “made”, so......help a brutha out here?

It might have been a configuration of microphysical particles or energy fields, but then even that is part of our experience. — Janus

Yes, overall, but not initially. By the time we get to the experience of molecular structure, trees, as such, are already presupposed. Experience of constituency follows from experience of the object to which the constituency belongs.

But it doesn't follow that it is nothing sans our experience. — Janus

An object of perception can never be nothing, so....

So its manifestation as a tree depends on both its percipients and on its own structure, whatever that might be. — Janus

Yes.

But how could we have logic without empirical experience? — Janus

We could, without experience, iff the human cognitive system is itself logical. We think logically for no other reason than that’s the mandate of the system with which we are equipped. Which explains why we can never use logic to explain logic, insofar as a necessary condition of a thing cannot at the same time be an explanatory device for that thing. Maybe why we don’t know how the brain presents subjectivity.

Kant acknowledged that the synthetic a priori requires the schooling of prior experience — Janus

Yes, for their proofs, their empirical validity. Not for their construction, which are merely logically non-contradictory. Logic alone cannot teach us facts of Nature.

Are you saying that it is knowledge of a tree only because of us? — Janus

Yep. Think about it. What was it before it was a tree? And that thing, why is it a “tree” and not some other named thing? That thing always was a thing, it just wasn’t a tree until some human said it was.

Besides, if it always was a tree, why do we have to learn it as such? Why didn’t we already know it as tree before having to be instructed about it?

I don't think the notion of internality is helpful here. — Janus

Working from the proposition, “present via us....”, internality is not only helpful with respect to theoretical predicates, it is absolutely necessary for epistemic operations. Via “US” makes it so.

Necessity is not sufficiency. The world and us are each necessary, but neither in itself is sufficient. This with regards to perception alone. The world is neither necessary nor sufficient for pure a priori cognitions, under the assumption there are such things.

It isn’t a tree until the intellect gets done with it, somewhere downstream in the mental process.
— Mww

Yes, and the notion of a tree is an intersubjective agreement, unlikely to be a concept we would acquire unassisted. — Tom Storm

Agreed. WE would not require an unassisted conception, but somebody did. Which reduces to, every conception was somebody’s unassisted baby.

I think it makes sense, in different senses, to say it both is and is not a tree prior to the cognitive workings. — Janus

Before cognitive workings, yes, we could say that. But if the prime human pursuit is knowledge, to say that and include the cognitive workings, we must abandon the principle of identity. There may be two senses, but only one ends in knowledge. Possible knowledge.

so yes the making present via us is not merely perception. — Janus

But if you follow this out to its logical end, that which is present via us, can only be because of us, which makes the collaboration internal, eliminating the world from it entirely. Entirely, post-perception, that is.

I see a tree, it's a representation. — Manuel

Depends on your chosen epistemological theory. Your eyes don’t tell you there’s a tree, they only tell you there’s an object. If your eyes don’t tell you anything but that there is an object, it is up to the cognitive system to render that something into that which can be known as one thing. And that rendering is called phenomenon. Platonic knowledge that (there is a thing present), not yet epistemic knowledge of (what the thing is).
———-

You'd say that we (see) a tree directly? — Manuel

Nope. We see.....sense..... something directly. It isn’t a tree until the intellect gets done with it, somewhere downstream in the mental process. Even get a tickle on the back of your neck, and sometime between energizing your arm to swap it, you flash on a big fat bug you’re about to splatter all over yourself? Same conditions for any and all perceptions; you perceive the sensation, but have no immediate knowledge of its cause.

A list of the uninvited?
————-

We can’t know the thing represented by its phenomenon directly, that’s true, but it is nonetheless directly presented to us.
— Mww

Or it could be said differently as "there is nonetheless a direct presentation (as in "a making present) via us". — Janus

Perhaps, but then comes the notion that we are necessary causality for empirical realities. And if subjectivity is true, there can be no account for why a dog isn’t sometimes a ‘57 DeSoto.

There is a making present via us, but it isn’t perception.

I agree with you that there needs to be something which grounds the phenomena we are interpreting. It's just that we can't go directly to these grounds. — Manuel

We don’t need to go directly to those grounds. They come to us, as undetermined, but determinable, somethings, by means of perception. We can’t know the thing represented by its phenomenon directly, that’s true, but it is nonetheless directly presented to us.

Nobody is wooing any gaps. — frank

Rudolph Steiner.

Oh. Wait. Nobody here is.

Never mind.

So it's a mental construct on the occasion of a stimulus. — Manuel

Yes. The representational cognitive system intrinsic to the human condition, writ large. Really difficult to theorize, or even speculate, its negation. It is still necessary to account for that “objective” thing, otherwise representations have no ground, the well-worn yet hardly acknowledged, “we are presented with the absurdity of an appearance, without that which appears...”. (Not Russell)

My contention is only that there is no need to develop a distinction between mind and matter, because the absence of that distinction, is impossible, with respect to our human system of rational agency. It follows that without the development of a distinction, any illusory predicates assignable to it, disappear, which is where this whole dialogue began.

Granting that doctrinal conclusion, mind and matter are already necessarily distinct, Russell’s neutral monism, which says mind and matter are indistinguishable, re: “Analysis of Mind”, 1921, is invalid, for it reduces ultimately to the paradoxical conclusion that whenever one is conscious he is aware of his own brain, (secondary literature, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, Vol.7, pg 241. Sorry).

Logically, it’s quite simple: develop theories of mind, develop theories of matter, the distinctions between them fall out as a consequence.

The only way around this, such that neutral monism is viable, is to defeat the theoretical predicates sufficiently enough to falsify the representational cognitive system. As far as I am aware, Russell didn’t take that bait. But he did wrap, or rather, smother, himself in language, which is just as ill-begotten.

Anyway.....as I said. My only contention.....

I had one all written up, it I couldn’t access proper references to support it. I have some books by Russell, just not pertaining closely enough to this topic. And, of course, without them, my recourse is the inevitable cognitive prejudices, which, while loosely pertinent, isn’t fair.

Ok. Fine. Regarding this......

why does the necessarily given need to be developed?
— Mww

Because if one isn't careful, they will begin to think that they are looking directly at a brain and that non-mental activity (neuronal and electrochemical activity) is mental activity. — Manuel

.....in a nutshell, the professional already is careful, due to an irreducible given, and the commoner doesn’t need to be, due to mere disinterest, so why the necessity to develop the distinction between mind and matter.

Ok. Thanks

Ok, that’s fine. Russell is saying the development of a certain point of view for the distinction between mind and matter, gives an illusory result. The development of a different point of view may be sufficient to relieve the illusory distinction, but it may just as well raise another one.

Which begs the question....why does the necessarily given need to be developed?

Curious......how much of this Russell do you support? Re: is the conclusion that the distinction between mind and matter is illusory, true?

I do have a philosophical source I've found helpful - "Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. — T Clark

You might have made the happiest man in the Bay State.

I regret the flippant tone of my OP. I've offended people and made it harder to have a friendly discussion about this. — T Clark

For the record, I wasn’t offended, and I didn’t consider the tone flippant. It is my contention that the quote you used, “...be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking...” is precisely what happens when all one is doing, is engaging in pure thought. Which is itself, just daydreaming. Even if not often done, it is done nonetheless, and serves as a reference and fundamental ground for philosophy itself.

Regret if you wish, but I remind you......there’s no crying in metaphysics.

In keeping with the times, circa1793, fifteen thousand words to say, the good man already has what religion prescribes, the bad man already rejects what religion prescribes. The text of the essay shows man reasons to religion, not from or because of it, and contains cleverly sufficient platitudes to alleviate the possibility that the church would accuse him of heresy, and the state accuse him of sedition. With bloodbath and demise of the ruling class in the French Revolution still fresh in the continental mind, it’s not healthy to piss off even an enlightened monarch such as Frederick II claimed himself to be, plus having recently established Prussia as a bonafide European power, and, of course, it’s never good to piss off the Pope.

In short, Kant displayed some serious brass balls here.....

“...Hence it is no wonder that the complaint is made publicly, that religion still contributes so little to men’s improvement, and that the inner light of these favored ones does not shine forth outwardly in good works also, yea, preeminently, above other men of native honesty who, in brief, take religion unto themselves not as a substitute for, but as a furtherance of, the virtuous disposition which shows itself through actions, in a good course of life. Yet the Teacher of the Gospel has himself put into our hands these external evidences of outer experience as a touchstone, by telling us that we can know men by their fruits and that every man can know himself. But thus far we do not see that those who, in their own opinion, are extraordinarily favored (the chosen ones) surpass in the very least the naturally honest man...”

.....all the more so because he was as yet no where near as well-known and influential as he was eventually to become.

All that being said, “Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason” is beyond the scope of Everydayman, as is the majority of Kant’s catalog, who probably wouldn't accept it even if he were capable of understanding it, even while being aimed directly at him.

Interesting, so....thanks for that.

“...We enact a self in the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware....”
(Précis of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, https://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/thompson.pdf)

“...I argue that although the self is a construction—or rather a process that is under constant construction—it isn’t an illusion. A self is an ongoing process that enacts an “I” and in which the “I” is no different from the process itself, rather like the way dancing is a process that enacts a dance and in which the dance is no different from the dancing....”
(ibid)
————-

Enaction: "....to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela, et al, 1992)

How far do you think “a growing conviction” is, from a metaphysical theory? How provable is a conviction?

If on the basis of a history, wouldn’t it be a reenactment? There is a precedent for reenactment, under different conditions and terminology, but still extant and philosophically relevant.

Anyway....interesting read. Took me into three hours of some of this, some of that, some I knew, some I didn't. Still....good to hear confirmation that the self is a construction, and at the same time, isn’t an illusion.

‘I experience through my body therefore I am.” — Tom Storm

So.....I am not if I do not experience?

Or, I am iff I experience?

IknowIknowIknow.....it’s just me, but I find it quite absurd, that just because “I” is not always active and participatory, re: absent experience, and it cannot be explained where it goes when it isn’t, re: deep sleep, then there must not have been one in the first place, re: final and irrevocable dissolution of the Cartesian mind/body dualism.

Yet no one has ever functioned as a standard issue, run-of-the-mill human being, without it.

Go figure.

to say he was concerned with words as opposed to the world is a mistake. — Manuel

Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kant’s pre-critical period had much to do with the world, whereas his critical period had only to do with our human relation to the world, which pretty much left the world out of the picture. In that respect, one could say he was more concerned with words, insofar as no one before him had put so much focus on the cognitive system as a systemic whole.

It was said, or at least hinted, by his immediate peers that he was more concerned with words than the world, from the fact he was notorious for changing the meaning of established conceptions on the one hand, re: noumena, freedom, consciousness, etc., and severely restricting the domain of others, re: forms, ideals/ideal, the a priori, on the other.

Also, the times. Science was relatively new, just coming into that which is now taken for granted, which made empiricism the rule of the day. Kant comes along, invents a new philosophy which, while not rejecting empiricism, removes it from primary importance. So everybody, newly amazed at, e.g., the profound immenseness of the Universe, was then being told.....ehhhhh, it’s only immense because that’s how it appears to us. It wasn’t so much that he was more concerned with words, but rather, that he wasn’t concerned with the world. The world is. So what. What are we doing with it, is a much bigger deal.

Fun fact: it took more than two years for a peer review of the first edition of the first critique. Even his BFF Mendelssohn declined to comment, admitting that initially he didn’t understand a word of it, and subsequently, after becoming familiar, was reluctant to endorse so sketchy.....so blatantly radical....a metaphysical overhaul. The philosophical community in general, thought themselves not so much dazzled by brilliance as baffled by bullshit. Towards the end of his life, when asked who he would list as his “best defenders”, he picked not a single, well-published, known-name, chaired, philosopher, but instead, a credentialed mathematician.

So, putting it all together, it’s not all that hard to see how the folks from that era at least, claimed he was more concerned with words than with the world. These days, though, after all the study and microscopic dissection, it is quite unfair that Kant was, as you say, stuck with confusing words with reality.

I think attention, awareness, is at the heart of philosophy. — T Clark

I don’t think these are the same, and although either of them is necessary for their respective doing of philosophy, neither is sufficient for standing at the heart of it. Both are empty, without something to which they relate, and that relation, is the heart of philosophy.

Not directed at you, just using your words as the firing line.

Just pay attention. To the world and to yourself. — T Clark

The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other — T Clark

All empirical philosophy in general and cognitive metaphysics in particular, is contained right there. If the world can do no other than present itself, the fundamental paid attention needs be only to oneself, by oneself, in the receipt of such presentation. The benighted psyches diminish, making intellectual sand kingdoms predicated on them less likely, by the quality of attention paid, and the world necessarily becomes unmasked in direct correspondence to it.

Still, attention paid is the ends, which says nothing of the means. That attention is paid as ends is given, insofar as ignorance of the world’s presentation of itself is impossible, but the form attention takes and the method for its being paid, as means, are not. If the ends are deemed sufficient in themselves, insofar as we are taught about the world, the means under which the possibility of being taught, reduce to merely an interest, and, of course, interest doesn’t teach. The story could end there, under certain restrictive conditions, but in general, it doesn’t.

Interest in the means, can be called speculative metaphysics. Satisfaction in speculative metaphysics, theoretical philosophy. Satisfaction presupposes investigation relative to it, as is always the case, which reduces philosophy to investigation. At the very least, even if only in humans, the agency that pays attention to itself can be supposed to contain the capacity to investigate itself, though not necessarily, and at the very most it can be supposed that such agency actually exhibits that capacity. It follows as a matter of course, that the human agency can at least call himself a metaphysician, because he has an interest, and upon satisfaction with his investigations of that interest, entitles himself as a philosopher.

So here is exactly half the story, which supports the thread title. The other half, assuming the investigative pursuit of it, serves to support its negation. Are not other philosophers themselves presentations of the world, to be unmasked? Fundamentalist extremism aside, does the fact that getting run over by a philosopher carries different implications than a bus, make him any less something to investigate? Could be he’s just running over in a different way. And it could be that knowing something about buses and knowing something about philosophers, occurs by exactly the same method.

Cease fire!!!!

Stop building little intellectual kingdoms out of the sand of your benighted psyches. — T Clark

I imagine my ol’ buddy Father Guido Sarducci would say....that’s just farging beautiful, man.

Good talk. Thanks.

My parents went into a serious hole paying for the house I grew up in, and the land included with it. My first reenlistment check would have paid for it three times over. Now, that amount would only partially pay for a decent used car.

My dad gave me a quarter once, for not lying about wearing this ungodly stupid rain hat when I got off the bus. I gave my son $10 for raking leaves, and people used to give me $100 just to walk through their door.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

HA!!! What’s the average human worth? 23 cents, or some such? Inflation....19?

Not a statement known or judged to be true or false, so, not a statement (is there any other); the idea of a declaration is more appropriate, announcing to everyone that it is me staking myself to this truth. — Antony Nickles

In the same way that a statement could have no meaning to the subject receiving it as it may to the subject constructing it, to stake a claim to a moral truth by a subject, could have no meaning to the subject receiving that declaration. I don’t care what truth you stake yourself to, but at the same time, recognize the necessity of a truth you stake yourself to. But I sure as hell might care how you express it.

a moral claim-ing can be general, which means anyone can do it, which is certainly a true moral statement.

I meant general, as not specific (see discussion above re Wittgenstein), but also that I claim it to be a truth for all of us, which is a claim to community as much as it is to truth. — Antony Nickles

Ok, I see. Your statement, “Diamond proposes that a moral claim can be general, as universally claimed (...), most importantly, is that I am claiming it”, merely indicates the declaration that a universally claimed moral truth is also claimed by you. You are declaring your pledge of responsibility to a moral truth generally claimed by everyone, or, claimed universally.

Yeah, but if there was a universally claimed moral truth, you saying you’d also claim it, is superfluous. It’s universal......you’ve already claimed it. You’re advocating a tautological condition, from which withdrawal is impossible. That’s herd mentality writ large, at the expense of the very intrinsic human condition of moral autonomy, is it not?
—————

Your responsibility is your own, but I hold this truth to be available to both of us, acceptable to both of us, but that you must come to it yourself or reject it, and, though, your reasons may be yours alone, that you are categorically answerable to them. — Antony Nickles

What truth? The truth Diamond proposed, or the truth that my responsibility is my own. For dialectical consistency, I shall suppose the former, the latter of course being uncontested.

This is to have cake and eat it too, which are mutually exclusive. For any universally claimed moral truth, such as Diamond proposed, the reasons for the claiming of it are irrelevant, insofar as the judgement arising from those reasons, will always and only end in responsibility for claiming of that truth, no matter what it is. Otherwise, it is not universally claimed, hence, self-contradictory.

Furthermore, there inhabits a categorical error: in the first there is said to be a universally claimed general moral truth, the rejection of which would be impossible, in the second there is the assertion of the availability of a possible general moral truth, but universality is not found in it, which permits its rejection. That I am categorically responsible for my reasons and by association my judgements given from them, does not immediately demand I am categorically responsible for accepting a general moral truth.

If I must come to a truth of my own accord, under the auspices of my own reason, and that necessarily a priori, how is it possible for you to claim it must be acceptable to me? The only way you can know whether or not I accept, is the action I exhibit in response to it. But I can act as if in acceptance, but rationally reject the truth asserted as available to me.

So, inevitably, we arrive at the Kantian rabbit hole, as all proper philosophy seems to do:

“The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: "What is truth?"...”

————-

no principle can be itself a judgement... it's easy to lay claim to a principle without ever considering the source of it, and consequently, the truth of its necessity.
— Mww

There is no necessity for it except that which you see in it, or are willing to be answerable for in its rejection, — Antony Nickles

Absolutely. The necessity contained in principles is as we see it, as we understand them, insofar as they are born from us. From that, it follows that granting the exception is negation of universality (of a general moral truth). Willingness to be responsible for rejection is negation of validity (of truth).

Universal claiming of a general moral truth is not impossible. There can be a moral truth available and acceptable to everyone, although I argue its possibility is vanishingly small. The onus is on those advocating that it isn’t, to present, not a mere claiming of, but a justification for, why it isn’t.

Before getting started here, let me reiterate my appreciation for your philosophical acumen. I consider you as one of the few actually doing philosophy, even while disagreeing with, or perhaps not fully understanding, the philosophy you do. That being said, going back to the beginning....

the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true) — Antony Nickles

.....does that mean not a known true statement, or, not a statement at all? I took it to mean not a statement at all, insofar as I hold the structure of moral claims to be grounded in the moral feeling alone. The expression of my poverty or well-being is also derived from feelings, but the pledge respecting that expression is a statement, and because it expresses a subjective condition a priori, it must be known by me to be true.

Then you continue with.....

the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true), but that it is a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness — Antony Nickles

...which appears to say, the structure of a moral claim is not a statement but it is a claim that expresses. But a claim that expresses can very well be a statement known to be true. Continuing....

a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness(...). My claim is not a theory but my pledge to be responsible for its state — Antony Nickles

.....it must be assumed my poverty or wellness regards a moral condition, for it is certain the moral condition is the only condition for which full responsibility can be pledged.

But still, the structure of a moral claim......not a statement, an expression by pledge, a pledge of acceptance, acceptance of responsibility, responsibility of my poverty or wellness, my moral poverty or wellness.
————-

Diamond proposes that a moral claim can be general, as universally claimed (...), most importantly, is that I am claiming it — Antony Nickles

This is what happens when language philosophy is treated as something useful. That a moral claim can be general, is very far from the claiming of it, and is the root of the haphazardness of the entire discussion. Diamond.....or you.....should have said, a moral claim-ing can be general, which means anyone can do it, which is certainly a true moral statement. Everyone DOES claim his morals, comes implicit in being a moral agent.

When you say, “I am claiming it”, you intend to be understood as staking a claim on, taking possession of, subscribing to....some personal moral dictation. Which is what every moral agent already does; it is how he IS a moral agent in the first place. The claiming you’re doing, the claim you stake, the subscription to which you hold, is merely the principle of your responsibility for your moral poverty or wellness. All well and good, couldn’t be otherwise. But to say you are claiming responsibility for mine, or that I pledge anything about yours, is outside the realm of moral consideration. Hence, the question concerning the relation between morals to ethics.
—————-

It’s easy to lay claim; it’s impossible to lay claim without thinking about it. Given enough thought, a theory falls out naturally, and from that, it is clear....

The claim of a moral principal and an aesthetic judgment are expressed in a similar structure — Antony Nickles

.....is only superficially true, insofar as aesthetic judgements are grounded in a subjective condition with respect to empirical predicates, re: the beautiful, but the claim of a moral principle, claim here taken from your implication of staking a claim in a moral principle, claim-ing a moral principle, taking possession of it implicitly re: the sublime, in your case apparently, responsibility, are grounded in a subjective condition predicated on pure practical reason. Similar structure in subjective condition, but nonetheless very different in their respective expressions, the former being a judgement expresses as a cognition, the latter being necessary ground for the judgement, expressed as a feeling.

Even language philosophers, with all the needless verbiage of context and usefulness and whatnot, must acknowledge that no principle can be itself a judgement. Still, without a theory to show how, which Everydayman doesn’t care about but still feels, while the philosopher must because he feels, it’s easy to lay claim to a principle without ever considering the source of it, and consequently, the truth of its necessity.

The structure of a moral claim to truth....is its principle.

That is one of the reasons underlying this thread. — Michael Zwingli

Understood.

I’m just happy the subject here doesn’t have “free” attached to it.

...what right do I have to pledge to be responsible on behalf of everyone?
— Mww

It is, as Kant would say, expressed in a universal voice (the 3rd critique) — Antony Nickles

At first glance, that’s a confusion of aesthetic judgements with strictly moral judgements. Are you saying the willingness to be responsible is an aesthetic quality?
—————

the moral realm, and its claim on us, is when we are lost as to what to do — Antony Nickles

Are you saying it would be better if moral claims did contain truths, and from that, given the general inclination to follow the law contained in truths, we’d be less lost as to what to do?
—————

Compliments on the infusion of the third critique. Can you say what percentage of your philosophy with respect to this thread is influenced by it? I mean, you did bring it up.......

terms, or sets of terms, that have a habit of stagnating discussions in philosophy — I like sushi

Take the guy making the greatest impression of his time, find the premier terms he uses....done deal.

Regarding Western philosophy, Classical: matter/form; Medieval: mind/body; Enlightenment: synthetic/analytic; Modern: meaning/use.

Loosely speaking.

I agree with Diamond in that the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true), but that it is a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness — Antony Nickles

Yep. Me too. Except.....

My claim is not a theory but my pledge to be responsible for its state (its life or death), ready to act in its defense, to explicate what is summarized. — Antony Nickles

......if it is my claim, and expresses that pledge, why isn’t it only my poverty or wellness my claim expresses? Furthermore.....

And the claim is not my individual thought, but in the terms of, and in it's place in, our history, our culture, our means of judgment, (all) our interests embodied in life, etc. It is not made just (only) for myself, but on behalf of everyone — Antony Nickles

.....if it is my (moral) claim, how can it not be from my (moral) thought? And if that is the case, what right do I have to pledge to be responsible on behalf of everyone, for that which only expresses only my (moral) poverty or wellness?

The problem he worried on was the fear of relativism. — Antony Nickles

“He” being the author critiquing Diamond, sounds a lot like the opening comment. It looks like spreading MY moral claims, or the personal claims of individuals represented as each “my”, over everybody, is fear of moral relativism. I must say I admit to making no moral claims for anyone else, and reject the notion of anyone making any moral claims I must regard without self-counsel, which makes explicit moral relativism.

Do you think there is an intrinsic gap between moral claims and ethical claims?

rather than trying to reconcile physicalism with idealism (...) can what we consider to be physical and what we consider to be mental (consciousness) actually be identical? — Paul Michael

On the one hand, that just seems like the ultimate reconciliation, doesn’t it? I doubt they’d be considered identical to each other, on the other, so the implication is they each would be identical to something else. But that’s merely extending the rabbit’s hole, from that which we don’t yet know, to that which we have much less chance of ever knowing.

Why not leave them separate? Maybe there’s a clue in the fact no one has been able to sufficiently meld them, logically or empirically.

Dunno....maybe someday.

what would seem to be the best, most unique (lacking semantic overlap) definition of the term? — Michael Zwingli

Best, most unique definition presupposes there is one. Yet.....

the term has been used to mean different things by different people at various times. — Michael Zwingli

....suggests there isn’t.

Each be satisfied with what each thinks? It’s what we do anyway, so......

What is meant by will depends on how it is understood, either as a determining faculty (pace Kant), or as a determined identity (pace Schopenhauer), or something other than these. The first informs as to what I should do, the second informs as to what I am, the third is neither of those.

What should we mean by it, follows from all that.