I don't think the notion of internality is helpful here. — Janus
The world is neither necessary nor sufficient for pure a priori cognitions, under the assumption there are such things. — Mww
Are you saying that it is knowledge of a tree only because of us? — Janus
Yep. Think about it. What was it before it was a tree? And that thing, why is it a “tree” and not some other named thing? That thing always was a thing, it just wasn’t a tree until some human said it was.
Besides, if it always was a tree, why do we have to learn it as such? Why didn’t we already know it as tree bore having to be instructed about it? — Mww
Yes, for their proofs, their empirical validity. Not for their construction, which are merely logically non-contradictory. Logic alone cannot teach us facts of Nature. — Mww
But talking about the "neural binding problem" does not shift to an inapproprate empirical frame of reference (i.e. what your guru Chalmers calls "an easy problem of cognition") when discussing the allegedly philosophical "hard problem of consciousness"? :shade: Your hypocrisy, Wayf, is only exceeded by your conspicuous lack of grasping what's at issue here. :brow:It transposes the discussion into an inappropriate frame of reference. — Wayfarer
Your continual invocation of 'woo of the gaps' only illustrates that you're not grasping problem at hand. It's a hard problem for physicalism and naturalism because of the axioms they start from, not because there is no solution whatever. Seen from other perspectives, there is no hard problem, it simply dissolves. It's all a matter of perspective. But seen from the perspective of modern scientific naturalism, there is an insuperable problem, because its framework doesn't accomodate the reality of first-person experience, a.k.a. 'being', which is why 'eliminative materialism' must insist that it has no fundamental reality. You're the one obfuscating the problem, because it clashes with naturalism - there's an issue you're refusing to see which is as plain as the nose on your face. — Wayfarer
So it wasn't called a tree until some human named it such, but neither was it called a thing until some human named it as such. — Janus
what could it be in itself? — Janus
But talking about "neural binding problem" does not shift to an inapproprate empirical frame of reference (i.e. what your guru Chalmers calls "an easy problem of cognition") when discussing the allegedly philosophical "hard problem of consciousness" — 180 Proof
The issue is that the mind, under phenomenology, is not allowed to have presuppositions -- presuppositions of the cause of the sense impressions — Caldwell
We see.....sense..... something directly. It isn’t a tree until the intellect gets done with it, somewhere downstream in the mental process. — Mww
Did I talk about phenomenology? I'm sorry, but I can't understand the rest of what you said. — Wayfarer
An urge to explain consciousness in supernatural terms seems as fraught as the need to use the more speculative aspects of quantum physics as the engine for driving a fresh cult of transcendental obscurantism. — Tom Storm
Another way of putting it is in terms of Lockean primary versus secondary qualities; Traditionally, the discipline of Physics charts only the primary qualities of objects, events and processes i.e. their mathematical interrelations, where the relationship of their primary qualities to their secondary qualities (i.e. qualia) is ignored and undetermined. The reason why the secondary qualities are classically ignored by physics is as a consequence of traditional physics treating it's subject matter to be independent of any particular observer, which is itself due partly to convenience and simplification, and due partly as a consequence of the objective of physics to model the causal relationships that hold between action and consequence irrespective of the contextual nuances and discrepancies of any given observer.
Strictly speaking, the propositions of physics are senseless, like an unexecuted computer program, until as and when the propositions are used by an agent and thereby become grounded in the agent's perceptual apparatus in a bespoke fashion, at which point Locke's secondary qualities become temporarily welded to the physical concepts.
Classical physical concepts are therefore by design irreducible to mental concepts; something has been a central feature of physics rather than a bug, at least up until the discovery of special relativity and quantum mechanics, both of which show that even the Lockean primary qualities of objects are relative to perspective. — sime
The unity of conscious experience is an undeniable fact of experience, a priori. — Wayfarer
It might have been a configuration of microphysical particles or energy fields, but then even that is part of our experience. — Janus
But it doesn't follow that it is nothing sans our experience. — Janus
So its manifestation as a tree depends on both its percipients and on its own structure, whatever that might be. — Janus
But how could we have logic without empirical experience? — Janus
True the idea in a particular form is in Plato, the noumenal world of the Ideas as opposed to the phenomenal shadows of the Cave. — Janus
"carved at the joints" more or less isomorphically with the ways we perceive it. — Janus
It's hard to imagine how a rich world of diversity, invariance and change could manifest out of an amorphous mass of whatever. — Janus
We could, without experience, iff the human cognitive system is itself logical. We think logically for no other reason than that’s the mandate of the system with which we are equipped. Which explains why we can never use logic to explain logic, insofar as a necessary condition of a thing cannot at the same time be an explanatory device for that thing. Maybe why we don’t know how the brain presents subjectivity. — Mww
we could reasonably infer that the cosmos is, always already, prior to human experience, logically structured, or "conceptually shaped" — Janus
it then becomes the proverbial “transcendental illusion” to suppose systems not anything like ours, operate the same way. — Mww
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.