I'm a research psychologist — Isaac

When “folk psychology” is spoken to you, what best describes what you hear, in a narrower sense of the term?

They are instead representations of the ground the thinking in itself arises from. — tim wood

Yep. AKA....principles. Does RGC say anything about those, in relation to AP’s?

What does being awake feel like? Hell....what does being asleep feel like? Even if being asleep is different than being awake, is the difference qualifiable as a feeling?

If I’m awake, the being of awake is merely a particular condition in which my state of consciousness is found. Why do I need to think of a condition as a feeling, when I already understand that condition as a relative state of being?

The conditions of a thing are different; feelings of the condition of the thing is a needless abstraction.

I think his meditations were absolute tosh even at the time, though. — Kenosha Kid

“....But, as in the " Discourse on Method," I had requested all who might find aught meriting censure in my writings, to do me the favor of pointing it out to me, I may state that no objections worthy of remark have been alleged against what I then said on these questions....”
(M.F.P., Preface to the Reader, 1647, in Veitch 1901)

Hobbes, Gassendi, Arnauld, et al aside.....asked and answered in exchanges of letters through Mersenne, even before publication of Meditations
————-

Thought maybe....you know, in your spare time.....you might find something interesting here, essay by Williams specifically:

http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/59207/frontmatter/9781107059207_frontmatter.pdf

I don’t do postmodernism, so beg pardon for being off-topic.

denial of the difference between reason and sensation. I am somewhat flabbergasted that this is something that has to be argued for. — Wayfarer

Yeah.....sad commentary, highlighted from the essay, “...high-powered narrowing of the human mind...”

Although I might concede that this argument is part of a pattern. — Wayfarer

(Chuckles to self)

pattern recognition — Wayfarer

For an object the properties of which are perceived as arranged in a certain way, reason describes, e.g., the conception of a sphere. For the exact same object the properties of which are arranged in the exact same way, but perceived from a different perspective, reason constructs the conception of a circle.

Just as the pattern of the Fibonacci sequence, or of primes, can never be inferred from the conceptions of numbers alone, the conception of a circle can never be inferred from the perception of a sphere alone.

The patterns perceived are termed assertorial conceptions, in that we name the pattern determined by the object given to us, a logical inference. The patterns reason constructs of its own accord, are termed mathematical conceptions, in that we name the pattern as it is determined by us, a logical deduction.

I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise. If, in the metaphysical estimation of human cognition, the notion of synthesis is granted, then either patterns fall out of such operation logically, or, patterns are necessary for the operation to logically manifest in the first place.

My two rhetorical thalers-worth.......

If nothing can be known.....how is the question possible?

I’ve been fortunate enough that my understanding has served me well. I do use commentaries sometimes, to check up on it, though. Sorta like....see if my understanding still works like it used to.

I dismiss Hegel just because I disagree with him, and I guess, in all honesty, I disagree with him because somebody else beat him to being the ground by which everything else of like kind is judged. Guy’s gotta acknowledge his own prejudices, right? Otherwise he’s simply fooling himself.

It's good enough for me. — 180 Proof

Wouldn’t do much good to update me, at this stage of the game. I mean....what would be the point? Wouldn’t matter to water under the bridge, and there won’t be that much water or that many bridges left anyway, so.....

Nahhhhh.......updates are for those inexperienced enough to actually benefit from them.

But neither are by Hegel — Gregory

Are you saying Pinkard’s translation of Phenomenology of Spirit isn’t Hegel because it should have been translated as Phenomenology of Mind?

Which book did you read? — Gregory

Pinkard’s Phenomenology of Spirit. No commentary needed, thanks.

At least read one of his books before you criticize — Gregory

Which presupposes I never have.

I didn’t criticize; Schopenhauer did.

All good.

Misery of Nominalism — Olivier5

......explains the dearth of commemorations of Roscellinus.

Yep. And with a healthy dollop of metaphysical reductionism applied to info processing, one decent enough answer to the thread title distills out quite nicely.

CJ is an even tougher read than CPR. I’m ok with the aesthetic part, probably from its ground in CPR, but don’t find much favor with the teleological.

I beg to disagree. — charles ferraro

As you wish. It’s your thread.

"The mind as concept realizes it too is the universal, is one totality returned into itself, whose distinctions are equally this totality and the object" writes Hegel — Gregory

That, is probably what Schopenhauer was talking about, when he said this:

“....still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid Hegel...”
(WWR, v2, App, pg8, 1818, in Haldane/Kemp, 1884)

I mean....really? A concept that realizes??? If mind as concept, what makes it so?

Schop was pretty harsh, but still......

These are both correct and incorrect! Paradox? — Gregory

Kant says the “sure sign of sagacity and wisdom”, is to refrain from asking questions for which there is no rational answer. In other words, frame inquiries in such a manner as to prevent the inception of paradoxes.

And did Kant read Plato? — Gregory

There is a section in CPR where Plato’s specific terminology is advocated as being taken as Plato intended. And holding the logic chair at Konisberg for years, one would suppose he was well-read in classical Greek generally.

Matter=phenomena and Ideas=noumena? — Gregory

This is Platonic, in that phenomena are matter and form. Matter is from sensation, but form resides a priori in the mind, in contradistinction to Plato, who held that form as well as matter are both external. Kant did this in order to refute Hume, who denied a priori pure reason, and the only way to prove the possibility of it, is to move form from the external to the internal, thereby making it the sole discretion of the mind, more properly, pure reason, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with matter. That which has nothing to do with matter can have nothing to do with experience, and that which has nothing to do with experience, is a priori. But moving it was not enough; he still had to justify the move, which he did by proving that the logical ground of the science mathematics, given certain conditions, is necessarily a priori.

An idea, in Kant-speak, is “a concept formed from notions a priori and transcending the possibility of experience, that is, for which no corresponding objects can be given by sensibility" (A327/B384). From that it could be said that noumena are ideas, because noumena can be concepts formed from notions a priori. But noumena come from the concepts of understanding, whereas ideas come from the concepts of reason. There’s much more to it, but....you know....nutshell.....so to speak.

Kant truly started philosophy imo — Gregory

The Platonists will certainly jump all over you up for that. Any of the pre-Socratics, too, maybe. But even they must grant that he single-handedly caused a paradigm shift in how metaphysical philosophy is done.

can we say that objects in themselves could be perceived by us through our space/time intuitions had it not been for transcendental additions we necessarily make to them — Gregory

Yes, and no. Perceived, but not by us, because our space-time intuitions prevent it. Only a non-representational, non-intuitive system might perceive things-in-themselves as such, but......how would we ever be able to tell? Dolphins might, whales, any given alien system....who knows? We wouldn’t understand them no matter what.

Agreed. The OP, however, specifies Kantian fundamentals. People been elaborating on them ever since, to be sure.

Phenomenal objects, by their very definition, i.e., as phenomenal, must first be experienced in a spatio-temporal context — charles ferraro

Stage 1. Close enough. Closer examination reveals inconsistencies, but.....close enough.

Stage 2. Again, close enough. The synthesis is not done by the categories; it is done by the intellectual imagination which relates the categories to phenomena, as a reproductive judgement.

The principles of strict universality and absolute necessity refer to the general human condition, whereby every human cognitive system operates in exactly the same way. These principles do not represent characteristics of phenomena, but are only the inherent characteristics of the system by which phenomena are possible entirely a priori, given an intuitive/discursive system of knowledge.

One more incidental: universality is not a category, as is necessity, which serves as further support for the rejection of strict universality as a condition of sensed objects and thereby a transcendental characteristic, or criterion, of phenomena. Necessity, yes; universality.....ehhhhhh, not so much.

Or, better yet, I suppose, I don’t see the need for it. I mean, absolute necessity refers to the spatial-temporal context, as you call it, but what would universality refer to, that necessity hasn’t already?

Thanks. Still, just because that’s how I understand it, doesn’t mean that’s how The Good Professor meant it to be understood. I wish, but I don’t know.

distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental characteristics of phenomenal objects — charles ferraro

Phenomena are “the undetermined objects of empirical intuition.” (A20/B34)

The empirical characteristics of any intuition is the matter of the object that affects sensibility, and is called sensation.

Phenomenal objects of intuition have no transcendental characteristics; they are undetermined.

“Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.” (A50/B74)

Absolute necessity and strict universality are transcendental principles contained in a priori cognitions. Undetermined objects of empirical intuition....phenomenal objects....are not a priori cognitions, therefore do not themselves exhibit these principles as characteristics.

The transcendental in phenomena, is “that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations” (A21/B35). The transcendental in phenomenon is not a characteristic of it, but merely represents the conditions under which the content and its arrangement are related.

The fundamental epistemic criterion (properly, criteria) of phenomenal objects rests in how they are treated by the human system of pure reason, therefore the criteria does not reside in the characteristics they have, but in the determining conditions by which they are known.

Kantian transcendentalism is more a methodological justification for, and less a rational characteristic of, speculative metaphysics.

Not that anybody cares..........

F" takes it back behind the curtain. — tim wood

Never mind. I see now Charles has something else in mind.

I was going to guess space and time.

Watch the trap.

Fundamental epistemic criteria.

Ground. What comes first, not last.

Three hours, no bites.

What do you think......nobody knows, or nobody cares?

1.) Yes, but only to demonstrate a limitation.....
2.) ....because of the limitation....

....and the limitation is us.

Not sure yet what to make of it, but interesting.

one of the activities 'the system' is strongly suspected of doing is filtering and even, in some cases, completely changing, the sensations to match the expected model — Isaac

Ain’t that the truth!! Some do it more than a others, the most prevalent, I would guess, being the long-ago story embellishment......“Damn thing was THIS big, I swear, then the line broke and he was gone!!!”....which relates to purely personal aesthetic judgements whereby the ego satisfies itself. More serious are occasions of rejecting empirical evidence in dispute with personal prejudice, which relates to discursive judgements whereby the ego finds its satisfaction from outside itself and maintains it at all costs. As Paul Simon says, “Still, a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest, mmm, mmmm, mmmmmm”.

But you know as well as I, only by understanding the properly working system does its impropriety become recognized, and the simplest, easiest to recognize error in metaphysical cognitive systems, is the LNC.

The purpose of my metaphysics is, hopefully, to have “....discovered the cause of—and consequently the mode of removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself in the sphere of non-empirical thought....”
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Can you hold contradictory judgements? — Isaac

Technically, a judgement isn’t something one holds, and judgements are not themselves contradictory. The relativism of truths are that which are said to be held, and cognitions are those which are contradictory. So, no, one cannot hold contradictory judgements, but under a given set of conditions, he does hold with beliefs, the judgements for which its cognitions are only contingently true hence susceptible to contradicting themselves, or, under a given set of conditions he does hold with knowledge the judgements for which its cognitions are necessarily true, hence cannot contradict themselves.

In the former, a different judgement made on the same premises is sufficient to nullify or otherwise change the cognition of the object, but in the latter, a judgement made on an entirely different set of premises is necessary to nullify or otherwise change the object of cognition. The former is a different version of the same truth; the latter is a different truth entirely.
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Judgements are necessarily recalled post hoc (one doesn't re-judge every second)..... — Isaac

Yes, agreed. Recalled post hoc, but that merely implies pre-existence, indicating they are not themselves post hoc, but occurring immediately upon their temporal standing in the system. So, no, we don’t re-judge; we constantly, continuously, judge. Think of it like....we cannot have a cognition without its dedicated neural pathway, in accordance with the physical system, we cannot have a cognition without its judgement, in accordance with the metaphysical system Even cognizing the same thing but at a different time, still requires its own pathway/judgement. It doesn’t matter that it’s the same pathway/judgement, each is temporally distinct.

....so a judgement being 'in mind' is a phenomena, an interocepted state one discovers one has. — Isaac

Hmmm....dunno, man. When I think, “every good boy deserves favor”, am I referencing a judgement, or a cognition? I rather think I’ve cognized the veracity of the proposition, which follows from the antecedent judgement. So the state I’m in, or the state I currently have, is one of truth. I have trouble seeing the state I have is, “every good boy deserves favor”.

Disclaimer: a metaphysical theory of judgement is very complex, perhaps even to the point of massive confusion and obfuscation. It’s just like science trying to explain consciousness; we know it’s something but damned if we can figure out a bottom line for it. There is a critique of judgement, a treatise in its own right, but is even more dense that the critique of reason, and I make no claim whatsoever for having grasped its instructions.
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Hence - what best translates from my system as your 'reason' is only ever something which gathers inferences about sensations, not makes them. The inferences it makes are those which unify the systems below it, to better predict what they are likely to deliver next. 2+2=4 is just such a model. — Isaac

When I speak of reason without qualifiers, I speak of reason in its empirical use, properly termed a posteriori. So, yes, contrary to your system, mine does make inferences about sensations. If a thing impresses me as this and this and this, I may safely infer it as that.

As regards making inferences which unify that which is likely to be delivered next, I must qualify reason as “pure reason”, insofar as there are conditions already in play, from which what follows isn’t so much inferred, but made possible. With respect to your math example, pure reason has already made the condition “quantity” available, in order for quantifiable objects to relate to each other. With respect to the real, physical domain, pure reason makes available “existence”, “possibility”, “necessity”, “causality”, “community”, and exactly seven other similar conceptions, as fundamental grounds for the possibility for the subsequent inferences a component makes on an input from an antecedent component.

2 + 2 = 4 is an exact inferential model of the relation between a possible pair of these extant things conjoined with a possible pair of those extant things necessarily ends as that final thing. The mathematical expression not only wouldn’t work, but wouldn’t even be conceivable, absent the pure conditions antecedent to it. In effect, unifying the whole system.
——————-

At no point does your conscious, rational, system get access to the sensations from one's environment (nor from one's physiology). — Isaac

My system agrees without equivocation. Remember I mentioned a few days ago we are not conscious of parts of the whole cognitive system. My conscious rational system is the part that thinks about the phenomena given from sensation, but never about the sensation itself. In effect, thinking has no access to sensibility, but is only conditioned by it. Such is the speculative representational system writ large

to have your conscious rational judgement, it can only be done by the meta-modelling consciousness systems, whose inputs are the activity logs of the other systems actually doing the inference modelling of sensations. — Isaac

Pretty damn close. Whose inputs are activity logs is my imagination. It isn’t a consciousness system itself, but it does inference modeling from sensations and conscious rational judgement is impossible without it.

“...By the word synthesis***, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition.(...) Synthesis, generally speaking, is (...) the mere operation of the imagination—a blind but indispensable function without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious...”
(***for all intents and purposes, explanatorily synonymous with your meta-modeling)

Methinks the methods be different, but the results the same.

Thanks for sticking around, valiantly scaling The Great Wall of Text, and especially for showing another point of view.

Not to say the most important one. — dimosthenis9

I would venture to say exactly that. Would mathematical logic, and propositional logic in general, even be possible, if the human way of thinking wasn’t itself logical?

The inherent circularity in that is embarrassingly obvious, but whatcha gonna do, when the question just begs asking.

But my question is if that engine's work is cause of Intelligence or something else? — dimosthenis9

How would that determination be possible, if the very thing asked about requires the use of it?

The bane of epistemological metaphysics since Day One, not that it isn’t a worthwhile query despite having no irreducible...apodeitically certain..... answer.

the judgement is contradictory.
— Mww

...which is a type of thought, no? — Isaac

We’re......I’m......talking about a system, a cognitive system, a determined speculative methodology. It behooves understanding the system from without, to maintain its components in relation to each one’s functionality as a whole, from within. Part.....“think: puzzle pieces”; part......“don’t overthink”, that which has already been completely rendered. As such, understanding/judgment is the faculty of thought, but a judgement is not a thought. A thought is a cognition from conceptions. Conceptions arise spontaneously from understanding in relation to phenomena, judgement is the unity of conceptions in relation to each other. These together are a cognition. Reason determines the relation of conceptions to each other, that is, a cognition, to experience.

Couple things that might help....an object cannot be perceived by a single property. An object cannot be cognized by a single conception. There’s a whole slew of both, but nevertheless usually resolving into a single item of knowledge, a single experience. It gets complicated for the system because the world is complicated, but we, as conscious agents, usually have no conscious notion of the work the system does, in order to keep us out of trouble, so to speak. It seems Mother Nature realized her rationally-inclined creations work better and last longer if mentally streamlined. It’s when things don’t quite fit together, that understanding of some theoretical system makes possible the understanding of why things don’t quite fit together. And the first realization is...it isn’t that things don’t fit together, but rather, it is that we ourselves that have misfit them.

But I made a mistake. I said, Given a series of thoughts, if the judgement arising from them does not conform to them, the judgement is contradictory. I should have said, given a series of conceptions.... From the correction, it clarifies that a judgement wherein the conceptions do not belong to the phenomenon, reason finds such cognition contradicts experience, re: “That ain’t like no dog I ever seen”. It is in judgement alone, with respect to a posteriori cognitions, that errors in our thinking occurs, and it is reason alone that discovers them, and is solely responsible for the possible correction of them.

It is from all that, that this arises: “...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself....”, which translates to, I can judge conceptions as being united with each other til the cows come home, in any manner and any combination I like.......as long as reason, finds nothing wrong with it.
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Logial inference is still something one 'senses' and so empirical, — Isaac

Does that, relate to this, re: interoception?

It's the sense of one's internal states. — Isaac

I’m not so sure about that. It reeks of the Homunculus Argument, in that if one senses an inference it begs the question...from whence did the inference arise, if one merely senses that there has been one? On the other hand, if one senses an inference presupposes he is the source of it, begs the other question....why would he call it something he sensed, if it was he who created it? What one senses, is the conclusion the inference obtains, which may or may not be empirical. He does not ‘sense’ the act of logically inferring from which the conclusion is given.

I think you may mean, from your point of view, that to ‘sense’ indicates that under the proper experimental conditions, evidence is presented that one does a logical thing in response to relevant stimuli, and so is empirically verified that such is the case.

If that is what you mean, do you see the problem? What else could possibly appear under such experimental conditions, if the human cognitive system is itself a logical system? Of course you’ll witness that ones ‘senses’ a logical inference, because he could not possibly do anything else, simply because that is the very nature of the system under which he does anything at all. Your system would be of great benefit, if it were demonstrated that the human system is not in fact logical, but a human still ‘senses’ logical inferences, because in that case, he would not be at the same time the source of it. If you can’t do that, in effect you’ve done nothing metaphysics hasn’t already done, 300 years go.

So...in order to reconcile the paradigmatic conflict, what I think you meant, and what you actually meant, are way more separate than laid out here. Which I grant beforehand.

Which brings up this: I’ve been telling you of my system, but you haven’t reciprocated by telling me of yours. And while all this is a proper demonstration of Socratic dialectic, it is necessarily one-sided. Just letting you know it doesn’t have to be; you could always lay some psychological counterpoints on me.

There is absolutely no empiricism in cognitive metaphysics, it being entirely a rational study under the auspices of logic alone.
— Mww

I disagree. What seems logical to you is an empirical finding from interoception. You find it logical that 2+2=4. That's not different than you finding the rocks are hard or roses smell sweet. — Isaac

We’ve been exposed to simple arithmetic since Day One, practically, so we don’t notice the fundamentals anymore. That 2+2=4 is a given, but it is merely the empirical proof, a euphemism for experience, that the logical inference “these things conjoined with those things makes a greater thing than either”.

Rote memorization is cognition, but isn’t cognitive metaphysics, which presupposes memory, albeit named by a different conception.
—————-

But surely it is either given that it is ("if it seems to me to be bacon then it is bacon") or you accept that things can seem some way yet turn out to be another. — Isaac

If it seems to be bacon presupposes what bacon seems like. What bacon seems like, to me, is my experience of it. So, all else being equal, if that which I now perceive seems like bacon, than I am justified in experiencing it as bacon.

That I am forced to admit that some things seem some way, but turn out to be quite different, is nothing but the manifold of conceptions I think as belonging to that thing, were insufficient for the valid cognition of it. These days, that’s just called “not enough information”. This is why we don’t need science to tell us empirical knowledge is both contingent, and incomplete; logic told us that eons ago.

Guy has the experience of a certain animal. He’s out for a stroll, sees an animal, perceives the same properties in the second he found in the first, says...yep that there’s a “dog”, too. Second animal does an about-face, guy then notices a stripe running the full length of its back. Oops, he says, that ain’t no dog like I ever seen. Gonna call that a “badger”.

Guy calls this thing a table. Some other guy comes along, miniaturizes him, takes him way down deep into the table, guy finds nothing but mostly empty space. Does he think his table isn’t what it seems? No, he does not, for he is no longer cognizing the table, but only that which occupies the space relative to himself, which quite obviously does not include his pre-conceived table.
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“...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself....”
— Mww

So... is the thought that some thought is a contradictory thought subject to the same restrictions? — Isaac

Thoughts are not contradictory. Thoughts are singular and successive, in that no thought is of more than the one thing to which it relates, and no thought is simultaneous with any other. Given a series of thoughts, if the judgement arising from them does not conform to them, the judgement is contradictory. For me to judge blue and square, that which I conceive to be red and round, is me contradicting myself. Simple, extreme, but serves as the general principle.

Me judging a car to be doing 50, when the cop giving me the ticket proves the car was doing 60, is not me contradicting myself, but me misunderstanding the empirical conditions, which is not irrational. If I judge the car as doing 50, look at the speedometer which shows the car doing 60, but insist the car is doing only 50 anyway, then I contradict myself by denial, which is quite irrational.
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Interoception. Interesting concept. I never heard of it. Care to elaborate?

Did you think you added something to the conversation here? — Banno

Don’t know, don’t care. I commented on the subject matter, which is enough.

The thread is here because I have the gut feeling that there must be something wrong with the argument in the OP; it's just too obvious. But I don't see what the eror is. — Banno

Necessity relates to possibility. Something is necessary if its negation is impossible, an a priori axiomatic logical truth, which needs no account of empirical domain.

Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world. — Banno

The proposition should read...it is true a thing is necessary if its negation is impossible. It follows that a god is necessary iff the non-existence of a god is impossible. If true the non-existence of god is possible, then the necessity of god is false. If true or false, where it is true or false, is irrelevant.

Piecea cake.

The only difference then between this metaphysics and cognitive science seems to be that that we make the assumption all this happens in a brain (a good assumption, I think). — Isaac

I think the proper metaphysician grants the assumption. I certainly do, myself. Everything human happens because of the brain. Neither discipline knows the exact means by which the brain does what it does, but to say it doesn’t permits absurdities. Your system has the advantage of dispelling absurdities by experimentation in compliance to natural law, whereas my system can only argue against them in conformity to logical law. Which ventures a subtlety in itself, insofar as humans were logically endowed long before they were scientifically inclined.

In truth, all I got going for me is, “...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict    myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities....”

I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process.
— Mww

Why would it matter? — Isaac

It must be obvious I consider metaphysics a purely first-person architecture. As such, I don’t want data contributing to my metaphysical system for which I hold no responsibility. How would I trust my knowledge, if there were external influences on it not included in the constituency of the system?
—————

We've just established the investigation is post hoc, so externally derived data about it isn't going to disrupt the process we're investigating, that's already happened and we're simply gathering data about it. — Isaac

Deriving data by third-party investigation of a system’s use, seems to be something different....

In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process — Isaac

....than third-party’s contribution of data, which makes explicit data not connected to the system being investigated. The first is not an issue, the second is, asked and answered by the above.

Nevertheless, I understand the ramifications. It is the case that sometimes third-party investigations reveal a physical discrepancy in the mechanics of the system, and sometimes even a rational article the system hadn’t presented to itself, re: “I never thought of it that way”. Even so, when presented with this missing piece, the system must still incorporate it into the compendium of its extant conditions, re: its relevance must still be understood by the system. If it isn’t, it has no power and thus cannot amend the system.

“....Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity; and for such a failing we know no      remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such, persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, and it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want....”

Kinda funny, really. Here we have you, an intelligence in one regard, and me, an intelligence in another, duking it out in a dialectical free-for-all.....with an onlooker claiming we’re both exhibiting a deficiency in judgement, you for mine, me for yours, neither of us improved from the other’s tuition, making us both stupid. Perhaps, in best-case scenario, we’ve each gained from each other, making the onlooker eat his words.
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Something's not being a science doesn't seem to me to have any bearing on whether science can investigate it. — Isaac

Science is an empirical study, or, a study under necessarily empirical conditions. There is absolutely no empiricism in cognitive metaphysics, it being entirely a rational study under the auspices of logic alone.

Sports aren't themselves a science either, but science investigates them. — Isaac

Yes, but herein, science investigates the manifestation of the sporting activity...what makes a sportsman deficient, hence to improve it. What makes a person a sportsman, better yet, a good sportsman....is not a science, but a psychological investigation, which is not an empirical science. At the extreme, me calling that sportsman a farging cheater, winning all the damn time, either immediately manifests as me being merely jealous due to my incompetency, or he actually does cheat, in which case I have found him out. Both metaphysical deductions. Amendable to mediate psychological investigation, sure, but....er....post hoc.
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you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency.....
— Mww

I read this the requisite three times...still nothing I'm afraid. Any chance of a re-phrasing? — Isaac

Substitute any occurrence of mind, with reason.
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I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it.
— Mww

It doesn't follow that you are aware of all that you are affected by. If I knocked you unconscious and then shaved your eyebrows off you would have been affected by the outside world but not aware of it. — Isaac

You have caused an effect, but not an affect. Affect presupposes awareness; how could I say I was affected if I never sensed that which affected me? Even if something happened to me, I still couldn’t say it had an affect, if I never knew about it. So I wake up, notice missing eyebrows.....now I am affected.

If I am unaware, the system that discerns conscious activities, is useless. Being unaware makes explicit no sensation, which eliminates every single downstream constituent of the system which follows from it. This emphasizes the previous stipulation, whereby the input to the system is not part of it, while still being absolutely necessary for it.

“....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses....”

Bad example, really. If there’s no mirror, or it’s my day off and I have no outside contacts, I, at least temporarily, might not know I’m missing my eyebrows. Hence.....for the duration of such temporality, their being missing has no affect. But I see your point.
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I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field.
— Mww

You absolutely do. Absent of a mind all you have is a chaos of staccato signals, which tell you nothing, not even if there's something. — Isaac

Mostly correct, insofar as all I would have is signals which tell me nothing......except that there are signals. So, yes, I am informed of something. But those signals would be there irrespective of my reception of them, iff I grant the reality of the external world, which I, personally, do.

Now, it may be said mind is that which grants such reality, but that’s a different argument, consisting of ontology rather than cognitive metaphysics, which is an epistemological investigation. Again, I don’t care that there is something (chaotic signals); I want to know if that something is this or that (red, or, bacon, or, gunfire).
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What is "Honey-Do time"? — Isaac

Honey, do take out the trash, please?; Honey, do mow the lawn, please?; Honey, do the dog-poop pickup, please? Etc, etc, etc.........