Try critical self-analysis, rather than metacognition.

I don’t understand this noticing a weasel.

My problem with it is the implicit assumption that the apple is red the way it looks red to the perceiver. In my view, the awareness of red is added by the perceiver. — Marchesk

While I subscribe to that condition as well, it may be worth remarking that the schematic doesn’t qualify the real object perceived as having any color at all. There is a real object, we are aware....wordlessly in fact....of that real object. Doesn’t look to me like the implicit assumption of color is given, so I don’t see a conflict with our view.

The problem would arise if the schematic specified red apple instead of real apple, followed by awareness of red apple instead of awareness of real apple, in which case of course, red is certainly not added by the perceiver but is antecedently specified as a property of the apple, a contradiction to our philosophical d’ruthers.

Did I miss something? I hate it when that happens........

some in Kant's time said he had merely rehashed Leibniz. — Gregory

Perhaps in some respects, but the “REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION“ , A261/B316, is a 20-page destruction of Liebnitz’s monadology. Amphiboly being Kantian transcendental-speak for, “don’t mistake a noumena for a phenomena, dammit!!!!!”. And the major condition of doing so is by attributing space and time as properties of objects, not where they properly belong, as the pure a priori forms by which objects are presented to us. In other words, space and time belong to the thinker, not the object thought.

From that, it is clear a materialist understanding of Kant, with respect to space and time at least, doesn’t work. Materialism for Kant is the acknowledgement of the reality of material things, but such acknowledgement does not extend to our empirical knowledge of what those things actually are. We do not and cannot know things; we can only know the representations of things.
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I think Hume really disturbed Kant and the three critiques can be seen as his attempt to heal his faith and psychology — Gregory

Yeah, one could say he was disturbed. Hume said of pure reason, “consign it to the flames”, while Kant based his entire epistemology on the very thing Hume declared worthless. I’d be disturbed, too. Although I’d likely use a rather stronger word for it.

Kant’s faith didn’t need healing, and he rejected psychology as a doctrine, having “...its origin in a mere misunderstanding....”.

....another whole metaphysical can of transcendental worms.

The word "noumena" originally meant "that which is thought" and it seemed to me Kant choose this for a reason. — Gregory

He probably did, perhaps because, in the interest of a complete metaphysical system, and after positing that the understanding is the faculty of thought, he then forced himself into.....

A.).....saying just what it is that the understanding thinks,
B.).....the understanding is the source of concepts which arise spontaneously merely from the thought of them,
C.).....thus he must, to be consistent, acknowledge the understanding can think what it wants, but some of what it thinks has no application in the metaphysics he was creating from scratch with respect to human knowledge,
D.)....he couldn’t call that which the understanding thinks that is itself outside the system of knowledge “illusory” or derivatives of it, because that term had already been used against pure reason as a whole,
E.)....he couldn’t call what the understanding thinks ding an sich because that had already been assigned to real objects external to us,
F.).....he couldn’t regulate spontaneity without contradicting the validity of our conceptions’ origin,
G.)....he settled on granting the understanding the capacity to think “objects in themselves”, and called them noumena.

“...The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself*** must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence...”

***considered as a thing in itself does not mean objects in themselves are the same as things in themselves. It means only that understanding considers phenomena in the same way sensibility considers real external objects. First, real external objects are given to the faculty of representation initially as a sensation, which imagination synthesizes with intuitions to generate phenomena. Second, phenomena are given to the faculty of understanding as undetermined objects, or, as an “object in itself”. Third, understand thinks to determine what the “object in itself” is, by the only means available to it, the categories, but the categories do not have the power to determine what any kind of object is, but only sets the conditions under which real physical objects external to us, are possible.
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”thing-in-itself", "noumena", and "phenomena" are just different ways we perceive objects. — Gregory

The only way to perceive objects is by means of the sensations by which the cognitive system is given something to work with. None of those three listed conceptions/notions/ideas affect our sensory apparatus, only the “thing” of the “thing-in-itself”, does.
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there is no mention of conatus in the Critique of Pure Reason. — Gregory

The Critique is a treatise on knowledge, which presupposes whatever being it is possible to know about. While he grants ontology as one of four major domains of metaphysics in general, he has no use for it in a speculative transcendental theory of human empirical knowledge.

“....Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding...”.

Here he is saying ontology doesn’t do what its proponents attribute to it, that is, his peers and the immediately antecedent philosophy from which his peers ground theirs. It bears remembering that Kant instituted a paradigm shift in the philosophical thinking of his day, which he then used to refute everybody. Still, in the interest of keeping his job, he had to play nice.....somewhat.....because his peers also held their own respect, which required great care in besmirching indiscriminately. It is within this perspective, including the controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn with respect to pantheism, a form of dogmatic determinism itself grounded by Spinozianism that the Kantian transcendental aesthetic found its primary use. It was, in effect, the philosophical politics of the day, that Kant even got involved in the pantheism debate in the first place, and some literature even suggests the use of the first edition of the critique to support one side or the other inspired the second edition, with its changes eliminating, or at least clarifying, pertinence.

“...It is hard to comprehend how the scholars just mentioned [Mendelssohn and Jacobi] could find support for Spinozism in the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique completely clips dogmatism's wings in respect of the cognition of supersensible objects, and Spinozism is so dogmatic in this respect that it even competes with the mathematicians in respect of the strictness of its proofs....”
(Essay, “What Does It Mean.....”, fn#6, 1786)

Dating makes explicit the debate could only have used the 1781 edition, in which was included an entire section of the specifics of realism vs idealism. The 1787 edition completely eliminates that entire section, replacing it with a much shorter and less controversial rendering.
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Lastly,

The Critique of Pure Reason feels mechanistic to me — Gregory

As well it should, with a nod to wayfarer. It took 800 pages to create a theory, in which every possible tenet relevant to it, is named and given its place, and then, how all the tenets operate as a whole in order to arrive at something irrefutable. Knowledge.

Because of this, then necessarily that, is quite mechanistic, yes. Nevertheless, to grasp Kantian metaphysics as a complete system, rather than each as its own system, all three critiques need be understood together. Kant was, for better or worse, the ultimate dualist.

All the above, except the quotes, is my understanding alone, and I make no claim for academic standing.

It seems that phenomena is noumena. — Gregory

If that is the case, why would an entire chapter be dedicated to distinguishing one from the other?

“...That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon...”

“...If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition (...) But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition....”

Whether object impossible for us to sense, or not an object we could possibly sense, either way, noumena mean absolutely nothing whatsoever to us as intelligences with intuitive rationality, for no intuition of one can ever be held by us.
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The exactly what of phenomena is unknown, for it has not yet met the necessary conditions for empirical knowledge. Hence the “undetermined object”.

The theoretical what of phenomena, that is, what part does this particular member of a speculative cognitive system play.....is limited to that which affects the human sensory apparatus:

“....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses...”

Phenomena are the possibly determinable, but as-yet undetermined, representations of “the objects which affect our senses”.

The CI is one of the best philosophical renderings in history, to this day. — creativesoul

No doubt. And that has only to do with his moral philosophy. His speculative epistemology has been professionally superseded....or neglected outright......which leaves we armchair types to keep it alive.

Probably because we don’t know any better. Or just maybe...there isn’t any better.

Ehhhhh.....you know how it is, right? Somebody’s gotta show the post-moderns how they went off the epistemic rails.

Kidding. Reading a lot does not necessarily indicate learning.

“.....Don't our internal discriminative states also have some special "intrinsic" properties, the subjective, private, ineffable, properties that constitute the way things look to us (sound to us, smell to us, etc.)? No. The dispositional properties of those discriminative states already suffice to explain all the effects: the effects on both peripheral behavior (saying "Red!", stepping the brake, etc.) and "internal" behavior (judging "Red!", seeing something as red, reacting with uneasiness or displeasure if, say, red things upset one). Any additional "qualitative" properties or qualia would thus have no positive role to play in any explanations, nor are they somehow vouchsafed to us "directly" in intuition. Qualitative properties that are intrinsically conscious are a myth, an artifact of misguided theorizing, not anything given pretheoretically....”
(Dennett, 1991a, in a precursor to “Consciousness Explained”)

Not given pre-theoretically carries the implication that, if qualitative properties are possible at all, they must be given pursuant to some cognitive theory. An artifact of misguided theorizing carries the implication that, on the one hand, quality is a property, or, the consciousness of quality in and of itself, is in fact directly accessible to us because it is in fact an intuition. Taken together, it becomes clear that whichever cognitive theory predicates quality with a property, and consciousness of such as belonging to phenomena, is metaphysically empty.

Proper theorizing.....understood herein as opinion, of course, with just a hint of argumentum ab auctoritate.....attributes to quality “the order of degree in time”, as opposed to, e.g., quantity, which is “the order of content in time”. Thus it is, following that opinion, that WIL intuitions grounding WIL language, can never occur as time-determinant conditions alone (which validates “pumping” out those of that kind), for they are themselves necessarily conditioned by it, but may only be indirectly accessible iff it is conjoined to the intuition of a phenomenon which is itself conditioned by successions in time, which gives phenomena their degree. It is therefore only from such degree, that WIL language may ensue. Still, even the possibility of WIL language granted by intuition of degrees in phenomena is not sufficient for its intelligibility, for the degree of a thing..........wait for it...............does not give the order of it.

Not only are “special subjective properties” of quality not special, they are not even properties of a subject; they are merely relative understandings of a subject that thinks order in his conceptions.

Please. Hold the tomatoes. I’m only here cuz it’s too early for football.

So those who don’t perceive them are the ones who don’t trust their senses?
— Mww

Yes, in short. — Olivier5

So if I reject the notion of qualia, but insist my senses are generally trustworthy, I’m just deluding myself? Or maybe it’s the other way around...... if my senses are generally trustworthy in themselves, then I am only deluding myself in the rejection of qualia?

As much as I’m willing to admit to deluding myself upon proper grounds, it remains much more parsimonious, methinks, to allow perceiving its dependability, dismiss qualia as something conditioned by perceiving, and fault understanding a posteriori or judgement a priori, for whatever cognitive errors I make. Things just run smoother that way.

so you cannot actually point at them. But you can perceive them. — Olivier5

So those who don’t perceive them are the ones who don’t trust their senses?

I'm working on an ordinary language rendering of the (consciousness)process. — creativesoul

A worthy endeavor. Opening major will be important.

Carry on!!

The proponents of qualia and quale are the ones who attempt to decouple, sever, and/or otherwise separate some aspects of consciousness from the ongoing process, — creativesoul

Yeah......”raw feels”....”seemings”.....are themselves modes of thought, in as much as a subject can neither ask himself nor tell himself about the “seeming” of a sensation, unless he already has something with which to juxtaposition to it. Any “seeming” implicates a presupposition that must be contained somewhere in the ongoing process, hence “seemings”, or the qualia meant to represent them, cannot be detached from the process in which the juxtapositioned elements are contained, in effect, making them superfluous.
(Incidentally, which is the primary reason “the friends of qualia” needs qualia to be empirically obtained, as opposed to the standing of “a theorist’s useful interpretive fiction”, in order to justify their reality, because epistemologically they are not necessarily so.)

On the other hand, if the predicates of such seemings are pure a priori considerations, in which the subject is not consciously involved, wherein the cognitive system is asking itself about the relativity of a “seeming”, which both speculative epistemology and methodological naturalism actually require, seemings are irrelevant with respect to conscious investigations of the general nature of the system in which they are contained.
(Incidentally, if this is the case, it is why Dennett then relies on the notion that qualia are altogether too ill-conceived to be “exactly” defined.)

“....Thus, the criterion for the possibility of a conception (not its object) is the definition of it...”
(CPR, B154)
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On another note, assuming you’re still here.........

The arena where qualia exert their influence, tacitly granting there are such things, is the domain of sensibility. In the ongoing process, sensibility extends only from the appearance of an external object (physiological perceiving apparatus has been affected by something) to the imagination of a particular phenomenon related to it (intuition), all of which operates without the consciousness of our cognitive system, but only the requisites of the physical system, re: particular ways and means of specialized data transmission to the corresponding specific regions of the brain. Hence, there is as yet no empirical knowledge, no conscious experience (as if there was any other kind).......and absolutely no language use. Whether or not any of the speculative stuff is actually the case, the assets of it do necessarily exist in their entirety, and they necessarily consist of integral correlations. Maybe not what you’ve always had in mind, but perhaps congruent to it.

What's left? — creativesoul

Experience is a synthesis, not an aggregate. Experiences cannot be disassembled, they may only be analyzed.

Beware misplaced concreteness.

Also, it seems you didn't quite understand my take on the issue. — TheMadFool

Wasn’t trying to. You asked, I answered. Using my understanding.

I meant to say that (....) the idea of an actual infinity is...well...something doesn't add up. — TheMadFool

Ok, fine. You’re entitled to that. Still, the infinity of space or time makes perfect sense to me. Doesn’t make it a fact, only that I don’t contradict myself by thinking it, as far as my knowledge currently permits.

First a duck, then a rabbit are each seemings in themselves, yes. Easily understood. Shaded bars are not illusory seemings, insofar as I do actually intuit a shaded bar from a given appearance, and as such, some qualia (phenomenal representation) pertains to it, and will so pertain until I am shown the illusion, which suffices as a qualitatively different appearance, with different pertinent qualia (phenomenal representation), facilitating a different experience.

Nutshell?

The seeming part. — Marchesk

Ok, but some illusions are actual seemings, re: the bulging part of the checkerboard, and some illusions do not seem so but must be illustrated as such, re: the shaded square and the shaded bar. What then of qualia?

So.....qualia advocate, then? What part are they playing in these illusion scenarios, do you say?

Interesting. Still, that human sensibility is susceptible to hoodwinking, is hardly contestable. Seen one constructed illusion, seen ‘em all, right?

Just sayin’ I don’t hold the same incredulity, that’s all.

this is pretty incredible. — Olivier5

Ok.

How then the notion of an actual infinity, completed as it must be? — TheMadFool

I suppose....keyword, notion. An actual infinity would have to be thought as a concept in and of itself, merely to represent that of which the totality is either incomprehensible or altogether impossible, under the auspices of a particular cognitive system. Problem is, every conception must have an object at least thought as belonging to it, from which follows, in certain idealist doctrines, those objects may be merely another conception. But even then, metaphysical reductionism, or, which is the same thing.....logic.... mandates that eventually, we absolutely must rely on experience to ground all of those conceptions. Hence, we have the concept of actual infinity, justified by the a priori conception of time, which is justified in turn by the a priori conception of change, which can be given to us by sensibility, from which we finally arrive at experience. So...we haven’t experienced infinity, but only justified, logically validated, the conception of it, completed in itself. In effect, a bottom-up systematic rendition of the actually infinite.

On the other hand, if the complementary nature of human reason is granted, re: yes/no, right/left, right/wrong, up/down....for any conception its negation is given immediately.....then because bounded things are known with certainty, otherwise we could never even talk about that which is perceived as real, unbounded things are given necessarily by it, otherwise our cognitive system is inherently inconsistent. In such cases, what those unbounded things are is irrelevant, only that they must be possible. In effect, a top-down systematic rendition of the potentially infinite.

Amazing — Olivier5

Is it, really? Where, exactly, is the illusion? Do you see A.)....you are being TOLD there is an illusion, and B.)....you are being COERCED, by means of the subtlety of the declared illusion, in conjunction with the manufactured proofs thereof, into contradicting your own experience.

In a way, though, you’re correct. It is amazing what folks will do to convince themselves that what they know can so easily be undone.

I'd just like to run something by you for your views: What's the difference between an actual infinity and a potential infinity? — TheMadFool

I’d say mathematicians might hold with actual completed sets of infinite members, but philosophers tend to hold with the potential of infinitely continuous series.

I favor Enlightenment continental metaphysics, which holds with the actual infinity of space and time, but also with the potential infinity of limitless sequential natural numbers, so I guess it just depends on the context of its use, which kind of infinity is to be considered.

Truth be told, Everydayman doesn’t have much use for either one, and I am that before all else.

But anyway.....my views thank you for asking about them.

Agreed, on consciousness, and understood on Dennett.

Thanks.

how do you know this, our, universe isn't (...) infinite? — TheMadFool

It is impossible to know, which makes it irrational to ask how I know.

Physicalism is adequate. — Marchesk

Yes, adequate, with respect to empirical knowledge. Would you agree with me, that human reason is often not satisfied with the merely adequate?

What say you? — TheMadFool

What say I? Nothing more than.......

........to keep adding implies infinity hasn't been “gotten”, and infinity “gotten” implies there is no adding, “gotten” tacitly understood to indicate “arrived at”;
.......the pure a priori concept of quantity is far the more a beginning, than the schemata subsumed under it;
......the notion of “other-worldly” is impossible to derive from the predicates contained by the concepts given in “our universe” and “thought by us”, which the emphasis in the originals should have illustrated.

Rhetorically speaking, of course.

Are there an infinite number of dimensions higher than the 4d spacetime that defines our universe — an-salad

Given the conditions under which the conception of infinity is thought by us, the question is irrational with respect to our universe.

Have we invented the hard problem of consciousness? — Beautiful Mind

The problem didn’t need inventing; it occurs immediately from the invention of consciousness itself. Not much doubt the problem has been made difficult, merely from disagreement with respect to the conditions under which a purely metaphysical construct can serve as a necessary human quality.

Irreducible Mind, E. Kelly et al. — Wayfarer

I’ve appreciated methodological parallelism since James, 1890b, v1, and this book since I downloaded it 8 years ago.

Good read, interesting information, despite its psychological leaning.

How could proof from empirical brain science say anything about intuition if it cannot use the term? — Isaac

Proof that the grass is shorter now then it was before implies no necessity for the term “lawnmower”.

Your

intuition remains philosophical — Mww

........is out of context.

Addendum. I seem to be running amok with them today.

Ask it 'how are you?' If it can answer, it's not a zombie. — Wayfarer

How about we ask it to enclose a space? If it cannot, it is a zombie.

I can see a contradiction. — Olivier5

Gotta be careful here, though. The theoretical construction of p-zombies makes explicit they must be indistinguishable from humans, but it is just as theoretical that humans appeal to intuitions. If it should become established that humans, metaphysically speaking, via some Kantian-like paradigm shift, don’t necessarily appeal to intuitions, or physically speaking, from proof of empirical brain mechanisms in which intuition is irrelevant, then the contradiction disappears.

Until either of those comes about....I see the same contradiction.
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Addendum:
Speaking of Kantian paradigm shifts....it is the case therefrom, that intuition is not used in pure thought, which is accomplished from conceptions alone. Therefore, if a p-zombie doesn’t exhibit any a posteriori affects, that is, if he only thinks, or when he only thinks, which he is permitted to do because he is indistinguishable from a human which does think without the use of intuition, a human could never recognize its zombie-ness, at least from the appeal to intuition.

Still, it's pretty sloppy for Dennet to use the very psychological term "intuition" — Olivier5

I think it sloppy for anyone to use intuition as a psychological term; intuition remains philosophical, as far as my use of it will ever extend. But you know what is said about opinions.......
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Even if somebody perfectly described to you the taste of his dinner.....does that description give you taste? No, it does not, which immediately suffices to prove experience by means of second-hand sensibility is impossible, and subsequent attempts to shore up empirical impossibilities, with mere a priori abstractions such as imagination and its offspring, is absurd. In other words, a priori qualitative analysis is non-transferable, from which follows necessarily, both, I have no sufficient cause to tell myself “what it is like”**, and, I don’t even possess a rational method to tell you “what it is like”.

**self-correction subsequent to erroneous judgement aside.....

Ridiculous, aye!! Concur, and I would add, it is preposterous to conceive of a thing missing the very attribute (e.g., conscious experience, Kirk, 2005) necessarily belonging to the thing from which it is meant to be indistinguishable.

The adjectives describing those of us holding with the “disease of what passes for philosophy these days” is legion, and precious few of them are complimentary.

My point is: p-zombies have no ability for intuition that I can see. — Olivier5

While I agree with that, under a certain set of conditions for the metaphysical conceivability of zombies in the first place, it is at the same time contradictory to say p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans. If a zombie has no capacity for intuition, which is in essence the faculty of representation a posteriori, then it must be distinguishable from an entity that does, which includes humans. At least includes humans pursuant to one particular speculative epistemology.

The entire zombie thesis hinges on the modality of the human cognitive system. If it is not representational, intuitions have so much less the import, hence may not even be necessary, which means the absence of it in zombies won’t serve as a legitimate means to distinguish one from a human counterpart.

Ask it 'how are you?' If it can answer, it's not a zombie. — Wayfarer

True enough, with the proviso that a human object of the query wasn’t ignoring me, or just didn’t hear me.
————

On 1637!!!.....just goes to show: all the good stuff has already been done.

How do p-zombies define "intuition", by the way? — Olivier5

Damned if I know; theoretically, I wouldn’t be able to distinguish one as such, even if he was standing right in front of me. Still, I imagine I would treat the definition as if it came from a rational agency like me, especially if there was no possibility of ever discovering it didn’t. It doesn’t matter the source of definitions given to me anyway; they must all be met with my judgement as the only permissible criterion for their validity.

First off.....excellent dissertation. Pretty much as I view the human condition as well. That being said, permit me a couple minor caveats, if you will:

This doesn't mean experienced reality is only subjective — Wayfarer

......experience itself, is altogether impossible, in fact has no meaning at all, without a cognitive subject to which it belongs. Thus, while reality in general is not subjective, the particular experienced reality, is;

the objective world has only an apparent reality as part of this cognitive process (as per Kant). — Wayfarer

......the objective world is reality, re: “...the schema of reality is existence in a determined time...”, schema here being the manifold of extant objects in the world. I don’t think the fact we cannot prove with certainty the nature of the objective world, is sufficient to say the reality of the objective world is itself merely apparent to us. So saying, we must admit the existence of objects in a determined time is itself merely apparent, from which follows necessarily knowledge of such objects becomes immediately impossible because we have no means to distinguish whether it is the object or the determined time of that object, that is apparent.

Nevertheless, I would welcome an textual extract supporting your proposition. Or maybe just a clarification, to bring me back from way out in left field where I have this tendency to go sometimes.....
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Or is he, as his philosophy suggests, simply another noisy chimp? — Wayfarer

I read “Consciousness Explained” when it first came out, and I thought.....hmmmm, hasn’t it already been explained? It has to my satisfaction, satisfaction being merely a euphemism for intellectual prejudice, so because of it....yep, noisy chimp. But then, I’m stuck in the Enlightenment, for which I offer not the least apology, perfectly exemplified by your “the subjective element is intrinsic to any judgement, statement, or thought about the world”, so even if he turns out to be a noisy chimp who happens to be correct with his “we should explore the default possibilities first. This is the pragmatic policy of naturalism”, I’m not affected.
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Dennett's philosophy contains an innate contradiction — Wayfarer

I know what you mean, but I would expand the notion: from 1995, “....Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge...”, we are then presented with 2013’s “Intuition Pumps”. C’mon, man......intuition isn’t something that can be PUMPED!!!

Anyway....thanks for the good talk.