“….If we think at all, we must think of ourselves (…) as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it….”
(Nagel, 1997)

“….finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation.(…) it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science (…) to favour a criticism (…) by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel….”
(Kant, 1787)



What, in your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it?

Sadly, I don’t think you addressed the paradox from the OP: what were your thoughts on it? — Bob Ross

Bottom line, my thoughts are….either there, 1.) isn’t one, or, 2.) is one albeit of illegitimate origin.
————-

Shouldn’t it be “intuited”, since the, according to you, “phenomena” are the result of a priori intuition and not cognition? — Bob Ross

No. The context for that comment was knowledge. “First cognized” refers to an activity of understanding. Phenomena are the result the synthesis of the matter of sensation with the arrangement of that matter according to an a priori space and time-conditioned form.
————-

By “phenomena”, I was referring to the end result of intuition and cognition: we were just talking about two different things. What term would you use for such an end result which includes the two elements you described (namely phenomena and a priori knowledge)? Viz., what’s the object which we experience called then? — Bob Ross

Hence the potential illegitimacy: we cannot be talking of phenomena in two different ways, or phenomena as two different things, and still say the originator of them is correct in his conclusion, insofar as that very conclusion is predicated on the nature he himself prescribes to them.

The two elements of our cognitions I mentioned were phenomena and conceptions. I have yet to mention a priori knowledge for the simple reason at the juncture of phenomena and conceptions, in and of themselves alone, there isn’t any to mention, in that the faculty of reason which is the source of it, isn’t yet in the explanatory picture.

The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought, itself a third of what the faculty of understanding does. There is no definable end result as such, which includes phenomena and a priori knowledge.

The object we experience is called, is expressively represented by, whatever name understanding thinks for it. In general, on the other hand, objects of experience itself, that of which experience is composed, as the end of a system of knowledge, are the determined empirical representations of what was initially sensed as the “undetermined object of intuition”.
—————

To be fair, you may have a legitimate paradox in mind, but the expression of it herein, the conditions by which you promote its validity, cannot follow from the text in which you say it is to be found.

To be even more fair…..cannot follow from the text as I understand it, and the quotes from which establish the mistakenness of those attributions used as validity. In particular, the notion of stripping away a priori predications, which, if deemed even possible, destroys the entire transcendental philosophy which grounds our system of empirical knowledge in the first place, making any paradox related to it, moot.

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations….. — Bob Ross

The source of phenomena does not cognize…..

“… it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)…”

…..which demonstrates that receptivity and cognition are separate faculties, hence the functions of them must be commensurably separate, even while necessarily working together for a given end.

Phenomena result from “…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. (…) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation….”.

But the matter and form of which a phenomenon is constituted still does not result in one….

“…. we find existing in the mind à priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations….”

…..and it is then the case the synthesis of matter and form is required in order to result in a phenomenon: “…. synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge….”.

The “phenomenal world” is only intuition itself, and, the “certain relations” are between the “undetermined object” and space and time. “Arranged and viewed” is merely a euphemism for cognized, which is clearly post hoc relative to the synthesis of the matter of sensation to the pure form in the mind a priori.

“Elements of our cognitions” are that which constitutes them, but are not them. Phenomena then, are one of two elements of our cognition, the other being conception, there being possibly a manifold of each for any given cognition.

—————

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible…. — Bob Ross

Any given phenomena presupposes the a priori means of intuition, otherwise none would be given. Stripping such a priori means makes phenomena impossible, insofar as all that could remain is its matter given from mere sensation, making the intelligibility of them irrelevant.

In simplistic common sense, as well as a dualistic epistemological metaphysic, such as CPR promotes, the knowledge of what an object is, is impossible by its sensation alone**. THAT there is an appearance of something is determinable from its sensation, but that an object appears, from which we know only the mode of its reception, re: which sensual device is affected, does nothing to facilitate the object’s relation is to our understanding, or, which is the same thing, how it is to be, first, cognized, and consequently, known, by us.
(**An argument prevails still, that experience grants knowledge of things from their sensation alone, but this negates the systemic functionality of human intelligence, which is necessary to relate to which experience a repetitive sensation refers. Enter…..consciousness, the highest transcendental object belonging to humans alone, as a derivable product of pure reason. For whatever THAT’S worth.)

Thanks for the nod, Bob. Hopefully whatever I contribute helps in some way.

…..proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

If he correctly concludes, how can a paradox arise? Isn’t a paradox only possible if he wasn’t correct with his conclusion, given the initial conditions? Is it that a paradox is being manufactured from a misunderstanding?

Thing-in-themselves are never considered by those faculties providing empirical knowledge: “…. the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made….”.

Things-in-themselves are only ever considered by the faculty of reason: “….. objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility…..”.

Really shouldn’t be that taxing to grasp the notion knowledge….regardless of the adjective describing it…..of thing-in-themselves is impossible, insofar as representation is necessary for all knowledge of anything, and things-in-themselves are only considered by reason, which is not part of the constitution of our sensibility which provides representations.

All the world is not accessible to you….
— Mww

Well, there's me in my place. — Vera Mont

Ever been to the center of the Earth? Have any experience of it, whether direct, indirect, 1st, 2nd, 3rd…..hand? Ever going to? Think you got enough time to experience all those parts of the world that are accessible you?

I don’t care about whatever place you’re in, only what you say while you’re there.

You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess. — creativesoul

HA!! What…no sense of adventure? No foray into the sublime? Not a fan of time-wasting? But yeah, I get that a lot; explains the great disparity between my comments and mentions.

Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking? — creativesoul

Opening a gate is possible by observation, but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise.

Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.
———————

All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too. — Vera Mont

All the world is not accessible to you, even while the observed and recorded behavior of (some) animals, is. What is not included in the observed and recorded behavior of animals, is that which is the cause of it, which we as humans consider rational thought.

Do you know of a man named Vladimir Putin? Is he accessible to you? — Vera Mont

Of course I know of a particular man, and therefore of course he’s accessible to me; I got a tv.

To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if you’d asked if I knew Putin, I’d have given a different answer?
——————

Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience? — Vera Mont

Correct. If another’s capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldn’t be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.

Is there any experience that isn’t subjective?

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
— Mww

By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. — Vera Mont

If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. Which is not to say we cannot infer, from an experience, its cause. But I’m not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.

All notions of ‘physical’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. — Ludwig V

I disagree. All notions of physical, all of that which is conditioned by natural relations, do rest on the same ground, but such ground is Nature. Nature cannot contradict itself, but human intelligence certain has that capacity.

Is it really worth the trouble, to admit other possible worlds and such, in which, e.g, our logical principles, and by extension our mathematical principles, are false, or, even the totality of this Nature inaccessible to us in which there may be natural contradiction, and we are forced to start over? How would we even do that, if all we thought we knew is destroyed, but the internal mechanisms by which we know anything at all, remains the same?

The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. — Ludwig V

Agreed. But this presupposes world, and world as not that which contains the lens through which it is understood. There is us, and there is not-us, which justifies the distinction in grounds upon which they rest.
—————-

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior,
— Mww

What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time. — Ludwig V

This conflates the effect with the cause of it. Rational/irrational behavior is a complementary pair in exhibition of rationality. Humans know what rationality is, without the necessity of an example of it, and irrationality being merely its negation.

It is absurd to say humans don’t apprehend rationality, in that rationality is the general human rule and irrationality is the exception to the rule.
—————

thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
— Mww

That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. — Ludwig V

It can’t mean that, without self-contradiction. But that’s irrelevant, in juxtaposition to your response intermingling internal with external, yet my comment maintains their separation. In correcting the inconsistency, it is true my judgement of your thought/belief, being the aforementioned external arbiter, is unjustified, in that I have no warrant whatsoever for it. It is only your behavior consequential to your thought/belief that is sufficient warrant, such behavior being external to yourself hence for me a mere perception, understood, as you say, through a lens that is me.

And don’t neglect context here. The dialectical dichotomy refers to humans as opposed to lesser animals, which does not abide in human as opposed to human, which is what you’ve done. Now it is the case that for me to refuse affirmation of your thought/belief, its inaccessibility to me notwithstanding, perfectly exemplifies my invalid judgement.
(sidebar on a technicality: all judgements are justified, else they wouldn’t be judgements. Conclusions to which judgements arrive may be unjustified, iff subsequent judgements with different premises falsify them.)
—————-

Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided. — Ludwig V

I am not withholding language-less thought belief; to do so is to contradict myself, insofar as I affirm my own. I am withholding affirmation of thought/belief, specifically rational thought/belief, in language-less intelligences. Provision of sufficient reason for withholding such affirmation reduces to the fact they cannot inform me of it on the one hand, and I have no possibility of affirming that which is inaccessible to me on the other.
————-

Two conclusions follow. — Ludwig V

This is tantamount to claiming that cloud which looks like a flying horse, is a flying horse. Extreme example, but holding in principle. That which instills a notion in us cannot be used as proof for the validity of the notion, re: sunrise/sunset. The notion that deities exist cannot itself prove they do.

Anyway….feel free to rebut as you will.

“…Dan, you pompous ass!!!….

A gentle reminder, n’est ce pas?, not to take what we do here all that seriously?

Back in The Day, 60 Minutes ended each show with “Point/Counterpoint”, parodied on SNL most hilariously between Jane and Dan.
(jesuuuuuus, that as funny. Sad commentary, perhaps: 1975…the last time I remember laughing that hard (sigh))

All that follows is dry, humorless point/counterpoint, a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, if you will, with all due respect:

We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. — creativesoul

All notions of ‘rational’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “rationality” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.

The quality of any behavior, which is to say whether such behavior is rational, which reduces to whether the quality of the thought/belief from which the behavior follows is rational, can only be judged by that intelligence that deems itself in possession of it. Just as we cannot know the beauty of a thing without the apprehension of beauty itself to which that thing relates. Just as we cannot deem an observed act as moral without our own sense of what morality is.

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, the notion follows that rationality should be apprehendable in other animals by humans regardless of behavior, which is under any condition whatsoever impossible, hence the notion is incoherent.

This is no reflection on language-less thought/belief as such, which is, again, only apprehendable from a human point of view. It is not a valid judgement that lesser animals are language-less, nor is it a valid judgement that lesser animals engage in thought/belief. Regarding the former, any series of vocalizations by any species so capable of them, in conjunction with another of like kind, can be a language for them, and, thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.

But it is non-contradictory that humans do engage in language-less thought/belief, given the possibility of thought/belief by means of mere imagery. And from that follows that it is also non-contradictory to maintain that, in humans, thought/belief in general and rational thought/belief in particular, is antecedent to and proper ground for, the inception and development of language in them as a species.

Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. And without sufficient reason to grant to these quite lesser animals thought/belief, it is then immediately contradictory to grant them rationality, which is merely a relative quality of thought itself.

Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?

Odd, innit? We find ourselves using our intelligence to judge other intelligences, but in the very judging of them we have no choice but to treat them other than how they may actually be. Which is the same as being completely wrong, which in turn, and indeed to be rational about it, makes explicit we are best served to not engage in those judgements at all.

….be sure to tune in next week….

In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter. — creativesoul

I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.

What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?

Forgive me if I’m supposed to know this, if I’ve been informed already and let it slip away.

What about microscopic organisms…. — kindred

Fits the offered criterion of an existent/thing, no different in principle than an ice cube in a glass.

There are other things things that exist too which have no discernible affect upon our senses such as magnetism — kindred

Feynman says fields are things, but he’s a science guy having little truck with philosophers. With that in mind, an affect on the senses by an effect of a cause does not necessarily make the cause a thing. From a philosophical/epistemological perspective, I’d rather leave such phenomena as magnetism, gravity, charge, and whatnot, as forces or fields, and leave that which is acted upon by them, as existents/things.

But that’s just my opinion, in answering the question contained in the thread title.

On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought. — creativesoul

At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.

Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated back on pg.7, which drew precious little relevant response, I thought. I’d have to go check, but I don’t recall anyone actually answering the question, but instead gave questionable examples of individual notions of it. Or wandered off into disciplines from which no relevant answer would ever be sufficient.

Anyway, as you say…..cheers!!!

That part attributed to me, isn’t mine.
— Mww
Yes, you are right. — Ludwig V

WHEW!!! Thanks. I was wondering how I was gonna get myself out of that personal self-contradiction, if it was something I actually said.

I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation. — Ludwig V

One can do with a word what cannot be done with a concept, and vice versa. Thing is, if one wishes to not do what is conditioned by a word, he can still do what is done with concepts. If one wishes to not do what is conditioned by concepts, he can do absolutely nothing at all, which includes not wishing what he wished to not do.

No structural similarity? Isn’t “concept” a word? Isn’t ”word” a concept? In that respect, they are in the same category, but I agree that does not in itself justify calling the relationship a representation. I think it the prerogative of a specific theoretical metaphysic that establishes that justification.

If it is the case a specific theoretical metaphysic can establish a justification, it is not contradictory pursuant to that same metaphysic, to then declare, and perhaps even prove, it is not a concept from which meaning is determinable. And if THAT is the case, your “a concept is the meaning of a word” cannot be true, insofar as concepts, again pursuant to that same metaphysic, are only that by which particular cognitive functionality is possible. In other words, concepts enable function but are meaningless in and of themselves. Meaning is determinable only from the relation of conceptions to each other, but not necessarily from any conception on its own. Best, or easiest, way to comprehend this idea is, it is absolutely impossible to cognize any object whatsoever, if it is represented by a single conception. You cannot say what an object is, if all you think of it, is “round”. Or, “green”. Or, “upright”.

Which goes a great distance in limiting the notion, hence the very possibility, of rationality in animals, I should hope.

Existent/thing: in humans, that which is, or possibly is, an affect upon the senses.

Hey back.

Yeah, we been around this block a few times, or one like it, over the years. Been fun too, for the most part, despite our dissimilar grounding presuppositions.

…..thereby legitimizes the death of the “meaning is use” nonsense,
— Mww

SO what kind of nonsense are you going to replace it with? — Ludwig V

HA!!! Hopefully that of somewhat less nonsense?

A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions.
— Mww

I can't make sense of this. — Ludwig V

That part attributed to me, isn’t mine. Or isn’t mine in conjunction with what came before it. I’d like to deny I ever said it, but….crap, I forget stuff so easy these days. If you would be so kind, refresh me? Or, retract the attribution?
————-

….method always antecedes product.
— Mww

H'm. What precedes method? — Ludwig V

Intellectual capacity? For what it’s worth, metaphysics treats intellectual capacity in humans as a necessary condition, so with respect to formulation of methods regarding the possibility of empirical knowledge, such condition is reason.
—————

I think there's more to language than making good the deficiencies of images. — Ludwig V

Except there cannot be any. If an image is the precursor to all that follows, what is there to say there was something missing in it? When you perceive a thing, your perception is complete, to the extent that whatever your thoughts on that thing, they relate exactly what that which was given by the image. Which is why it is said the image just is the thought.

Now, there are errors possible in the system as a whole, just not here and now, at this time and procedural place of the method, insofar as we are at “thought”, which is a process we like to call understanding, but not yet at “rational thought”, which is the logical quality of the process, which we like to call judgement. And “we” intended as literary license, donchaknow.

This makes sense, in juxtaposition to the adage “a picture’s worth a thousand words”, in that it is possible an image cannot be sufficiently represented by words, simply because we don’t have a word or words to represent the sum of the conceptions contained in it. So it is that there is more to imagery than making good the deficiencies of language.

….isn't a painting (generally) a non-linguistic representation…. — wonderer1

I’d answer that the fact an object is named, makes explicit, e.g., a “painting”, has already represented a thought, or more likely an aggregate of them, without regard to the subject of it.

I’m guessing the inference should be that the Magritte is relevant to what I said. I’m just not sure which relevance, affirmation or negation, I would be looking for.

Little help??

The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. — Ludwig V

Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional. All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the “meaning is use” nonsense, insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize….think rationally….without ever expressing even a part of it via “verbal behavior”.

Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic? — Ludwig V

Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows.

Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And there’s evolution for ya, writ large.
————-

Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do)….. — Ludwig V

……and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product.

Right; got it. — Vera Mont

Yeaahhhhhno, you don’t. Not this time anyway.

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. — Ludwig V

A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. But it does not follow such skill necessarily involves conceptions, and, if conceptions as such are considered as abstract metaphysical objects, it becomes then a question of whether those lesser animals engage in metaphysical pursuits. And we end up kicking that can down a very VERY long road.

Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use. — Ludwig V

I do not so recognize. That which grounds the act of a dog howling and maybe even nipping your foot upon you stepping on his, has no more meaning than an altogether empirical measure of his relative well-being, which most of us are inclined to grant, rather than inviting non-empirical conceptual cause/effect relations he must form pursuant to his intellectual capacity, which some of us are not.
—————

….how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason?
— Mww

How it's normally done is: choose a dictionary definition of 'reason', rather than a philosophical stance. — Vera Mont

Nahhhh….I’m not doing that. Reason is already defined by whichever philosophical stance incorporates it, either by what it is, and/or by what it does.

There’s no need for experiment: there is only that reason as a human thinks of it, and thereby there is only that reason as belongs to intelligence of his kind. While it is justifiable to grant the possibility that lesser animals have a fundamental ground for their own intelligence, it must remain impossible to ascertain whether, and susceptible to palpable contradiction to merely assume, that ground in the lesser is in any way discernible by the higher. And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects.

Burthogge - “An Essay Upon Reason…. — Manuel

Interesting indeed. Thanks for it, “….and the Nature of Spirits” notwithstanding.

Hmmm……

Given the irreducible condition of human reason, re: the propensity for inquiring after impossible results, how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason? Not so much that lesser animals, e.g., inquire of infinite things, but rather, that they construct a conception antecedent to the inquiry, hence establishing its possibility.

Given that human reason is the only reason possible for a human to examine, insofar as such reason must be self-reflective necessarily, under what possible conditions would lesser animals be determinable as possessing it, or anything like it, insofar as the self-reflective necessity, is impossible?

Pretty silly, methinks: dog says to himself….humans don’t even know how their own rationality works, but they wonder nonetheless whether I have any. Best they are equipped to affirm is, they have an intelligence of their own, and for them to grant we dogs have an intelligence of our own, is at least not susceptible to such idle speculations, should one of them inquire why we don’t climb mountains just because one of them happens to be there, and we can. You know…..in between burying bones, destroying sofa cushions and whatnot.

(Sigh)

I think there's quite a lot of work both with you and Wayfarer to tease out "discovered" vs "constructed". — Ludwig V

Oh absolutely. Along with a whole bunch of mutually agreed presuppositions.

Still, in affirming what you say, it doesn’t make any difference to anything (important). Although, we would certainly be dealing with details.

I’m very much in the ‘discovered’ camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct…. — Wayfarer

I’m putting myself in the ‘discovered’ camp regarding constructions, but for understanding, rather than logic. Hence, insofar as discovery may be by mere accident, with intelligence comes the ability to construct a relation of conceptions to such discoveries, which is cognition.

Whether or not conceptions belong to each other, is the purview of logic, which are constructs in accordance with principles obtained from the faculty of reason, and must be considered an intrinsic manifestation of the human intellect alone, hence, with respect to logic itself, I’m putting myself in the ‘constructed’ camp.

Gets pretty lonely over here sometimes, I must say. But that’s fine; I can turn “Dazed and Confused” up to eleven and nobody throws stuff at me.

On “what is the real nature of truth”:

“…. The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object,” is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition?…”

Too bad folks couldn’t differentiate between that which may be true, and the “real nature of truth”, by whichever there is that may be true, is determinable as being so.
—————

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy (…) raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)? — Cadet John Kervensley

First, it should be asked, what is the topic of the debate, by which the fundamental question whether truth is universal or relative, is raised?

Second, if the most enduring debate in philosophy isn’t about anything other than whether truth itself, as a stand-alone irreducible a priori logical condition, is universal or relative, then what could possibly ground the debate, insofar as the mere occurrence of the debate itself, presupposes the definition of its subject, and thereby the answer to the question, is already given?
————-

Is truth unique and universal, is a contradiction: if it is unique it cannot be universal, and if it is universal it cannot be unique.

If truth is relativistic, in that it depends on perspectives and contexts, such dependence is redundant, insofar as a perspective is a context, and conversely, a context is a perspective.

Under the supposition “truth is the accordance with a cognition with its object”, it is the case that truth….not that which is true, but that stand-alone a priori condition by which things are determinable as being true, is neither unique/universal, nor does it depend on context or perspective.

All of which gets flushed, unceremoniously, in the metaphysical crapper, if the definition of truth, as given, is denied. Cool part is….immediately upon denial, the definition sustains itself, albeit, in the negative.

Two cents; no more, no less.

I take it the issue bores you. — frank

How I tell left from right kinda does, but looking into the philosophical problem of what it means to be left or right, or the origin of the conceptions themselves, is interesting enough.

Dissimilar orientation: left is over here, right is over there. That’s how I tell one from the other.
— Mww

Are you laying something like an x-y axis over your visual field? — frank

From a non-philosophical perspective, I suppose something like that suffices. For any plurality of things, there is a necessary spatial relation inhering in all of them amongst themselves (the x-y axis notion), which is irrelevant with respect to a single thing, even though all quantitative conditions whatsoever, including singulars, necessarily relate to that which observes them (the visual field notion).

But you’re asking how do we tell left from right, in conjunction with an overlooked philosophical problem. That problem has nothing to do with reference frames represented by x-y coordinates in visual fields, which is merely a constructed explanatory device to enable us to tell left from right, but says nothing at all about what Kant 1768 calls “the inner ground”, re: the presupposition that
apprehension of relative spatial distinctions is given as intrinsic to human intelligence and is necessarily antecedent to the conceptual representation used to distinguish congruent or incongruent things.

But it is pretty clear this sort of philosophical problem doesn’t have much bearing on life in general, especially nowadays, when all the aforementioned philosophical proofs/claims/argumnts are laid waste.

If you’re interested, see https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rogerio-Severo/publication/229153077_Three_Remarks_on_the_Interpretation_of_Kant_on_Incongruent_Counterparts/links/0912f5100284fc9f99000000/Three-Remarks-on-the-Interpretation-of-Kant-on-Incongruent-Counterparts.pdf

…..people have difficulty detecting philosophical problems…. — frank

….which presupposes there is one. Well, shucks, Mr. Bill, seeing as we’re all human, of course there is one. But which one is at issue here? It certainly can’t be as simple as telling one’s left from his right hand. Left is over here, right is over there and n’er the twain shall meet. What’s the big deal?

“….his (Kant’s) basic argument in the 1768 essay is that Leibniz’s view does not enable one to distinguish between a left handed glove and a right handed glove….”

That’s the basic philosophical problem, circa1768, and I’ll wager people have difficulty detecting it, because they haven’t a clue as to what the ground of the basic philosophical problem actually was, insofar as it requires knowing what Leibniz’s view was.

Leibniz 1679 and Wolff 1716 maintained similarity and equality as necessary and sufficient conditions for the congruency of things, re: enclosable in the same limits. Pre-Critical Kant maintained similarity and equality may be necessary but are not in themselves sufficient, in that orientation is also required to entail congruent counterparts. It follows that incongruent counterparts are those entailing similarity and equality of constituent structure but of dissimilar orientation.

Dissimilar orientation: left is over here, right is over there. That’s how I tell one from the other. Which is quite an empty consolation, altogether haphazard, which highlights the REAL philosophical problem: how to get from the absolute space implied by the equality/similarity conditions for the congruency of things, to the apprehension of spatial relations in and of themselves, irrespective of things in spaces, yet serves to “prove” the implications of “Leibniz's theorem” wrong?

Anyway….Kant’s 1768 proof was itself falsified by the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle, even though he himself had given up on it by 1770’s PhD dissertation and his Critical-era 1786 Metaphysics of Natural Science, in which was deconstructed the Newtonian notion of absolute space, and with it, by extension, the Leibniz/Wolff conditions.

As my ol’ buddy Paul Harvey used to say, now you know the rrresssssst of the story.

Objects (…) must have a way of being, independent of us, in virtue of which they exist independently of us. — Manuel

I see a green tree. — Manuel

What is wrong here? — Manuel

The entire raison d’etre of the first Critique, is to prove those two statements are contradictory.

I think your interpretation of Kant would be called a "deflationary" one? — Manuel

I’m ok with that, if “deflationary” means getting to the bottom of why those two statements are contradictory.

I thought context might help. Or not.

You may know Kant considers the “I” that thinks to be the ground of consciousness, just meant to provide that “….all my representations belong to me alone….”, such that there’s no chance for “…a varied and many-sided self as there are representations….”.

I bring this up because a distinction is required between the understanding that thinks, which is the same as taking for granted it can consider objects as things in themselves, and the “I” that thinks. Conceptions belong to understanding, they arise through spontaneity with respect to phenomena, and they also arise spontaneously even without the synthesis with phenomena, hence the intelligible object, and this is what it means for the understanding to think, the spontaneity of conceptions.

The “I”, on the other hand, that thinks, indicates only the synthesis of representations in consciousness, which means the conceptions represented are already given, which means understanding has already thought. This makes sense when we say, “I understand”, which makes explicit “I” as the transcendental ego representing the self, is not the same as the faculty of understanding, which is merely a logical functionary.

Here, too, when he says, “I can think whatever I please provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, it happens that when understanding considers the objects it thinks as intelligible existences, understanding is contradicting itself, by trying to apply a category, existence, to that which isn’t even available for it to be applied to, insofar as such availability requires sensibility, not mere thought.

Another way to think about it…..time. When we say, it just popped into my head, we’re talking about a sheer instant, that time when there was no considered object, and the next when there was. At that point of “there was”, there is no other cognitive constituency at work, there just hasn’t been any time for it.

Ok, so now let it be given the human cognitive system doesn’t stop working, there are no blank spots while conscious and otherwise naturally functional. So we got this time of a considered object, and if the system keeps on rolling along as it should, it will do what it supposed to do, which is to form a cognition of the thing it just took for granted as a considered object. So now let it also be given that the means for cognizing anything at all has certain requirements, and one of these requirements is synthesis of representations…..and we find there just aren’t any representations present in the system to be synthesized, at the time understanding merely considers an object in itself.

Kant speaks about "things in themselves" and these are the ground of appearances. We do not know how this grounding relation works….. — Manuel

.

The things-in-themselves are not the ground of appearances; if they were they would not be “in-themselves”. Things are the ground of appearances, hence the grounding relation of appearances is known to us. Cause and effect: for every sensation as effect there is necessarily a thing which appears, sufficient as a cause of it.

…..only that it must be so, otherwise objects would relations all the way down, and that's incoherent for us. — Manuel

Objects are relations all the way down, insofar as they remain intelligible for us. Given from the principle of cause and effect, it is only incoherent for us when we look for one of those without the other connected to it. So…don’t look there.
————

On the other hand, Kant speaks of noumena. — Manuel

Yes, he speaks of it, but only from pure understanding’s perspective….

“….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence (…) for a determinate conception of an existence, which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding….”

….this isn’t to say understanding is in the act of thinking an object, but is comparable to what we would simple call something “just popped into my mind”. This cannot be the ding an sich from which are given the things that appear to sensibility, it is a thing in itself because it comes to understanding as a singular whole thought. Obviously, if something (in or as itself) pops into your mind, it must be capable of being in your mind (in or as itself), which is the same as it must be capable of being a thought (in or as itself). So whatever happens to pop into your mind is at that exact point, being nothing more a perfectly undetermined conception which exists nowhere but in your own intelligence, but it is there, which kinda suckers understanding into thinking it can do something constructive with it. But….as we all know….understanding can’t cognize a damn thing on its own. So it is that understanding takes for granted it can think objects, which it can, and can do something with them, which it cannot. Those things are the intelligible existences, the undetermined conceptions, called ……waaaiiiitt for itttttttt…..noumena.

Positive or negative noumena don’t matter; each is noumena as far as understanding is concerned, and since understanding is the problem-child here, the exposition of its flawed or illegitimate functionality is paramount. Besides, positive or negative noumena have to do with intuition anyway, in which either there is a kind of it we don’t have, re: that kind which can develop its representations given merely intelligible existences, or, there is that kind we do have, re: that kind which develops its representations only because there are real existences.

These are my impressions and I might have misread many things myself.

You will not bait me..... — Manuel

I wouldn’t dare such a thing.

Thanks, and hopefully I got it right enough. I got ’s attention, so…..we’ll see.

I look forward to it, and the opportunity to be shown how something in what I wrote can be understood at least differently, and perhaps better.

I am under the impression that Kant believed thing in itself or noumena was required for phenomena to appear. — Gregory

No need to remind you the tread subject is Hoffman. With that out of the way, and admitting I know very little of Hoffman’s philosophy, I’ll just say this:

….Kant’s thought is the thing-in-itself was required for the things that appear;
….the thing of the thing-in-itself just is the thing that appears;
….phenomena are not that which appears, but are intuitive representations of things that appear.

….noumena are never even in the conversation, they do nothing, are nothing, and cannot ever be anything, to us. They were never meant to be the same, never meant to be understood as similar or identical, as the thing-in-itself, but were only ever to be treated in the same way, re: as some complete, whole yet entirely unknowable something, by the cognitive system from which they both arise.

…..Kant says things-in-themselves are real existent objects (Bxx), but never once says noumena are anything more than “…a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but solely through the pure understanding….” (B310).

Gottlob Schulze was wrong.

What comes to mind for me is that the argument of the Third Meditation could, or may HAVE been, used by Kant in defense of noumena's existence. The thing-in-itself lives in twilight but it has to be there…. — Gregory

Half-agreed, yes. Meditations 3, #14 and #15 forward a good, albeit generic, rendition of the subsequently infamous transcendental ding an sich. But it remains to be said, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the even more infamous transcendental noumena, for which, within Descartes’ notion of ideas and their relations to existent objects, and Kant’s of understanding and its relation to conceptions, there never was nor ever could be, any existence whatsoever.

Kant defended noumena as a valid conception in us, but that is not to defend the existence of any noumenal things for us. And for Kant, such existence cannot be defended, insofar as to do so contradicts the criteria by which existence of things is given.

Now, to be fair, he did say noumenal things cannot be said to be impossible, so maybe that can be considered a quasi-defense for an existence which was, for all intents and purposes, a mere conception. But to grant such existence in concreto destroys transcendental philosophy itself, which just might be why some folks go through the motions of attempting to prove it.