we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? — Corvus

Inevitably ending in making of him something for which he would be in no position to affirm or deny. So what’s the point? What does it matter with respect to his philosophy, which is all anyone should care about anyway.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. — Corvus

It’s defined, without equivocation, in the very text from which his metaphysical philosophy gets its name. How could it be left to mere supposition, for his successors to guess about, that which is the formal ground of a paradigm shift in human thought? The fact of it, as you’ve hinted yourself, is completely irrelevant, even if its logical consistency and internal integrity are absolutely necessary.

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? — Corvus

No.
(I’m not aware of any indication that it does)

I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience". — Corvus

It doesn’t.
(There is another term representing “prior to experience”)

What are your definitions….. — Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part.

Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? — Corvus

What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself?

Kant definitely says that TI is nothing to do with idealism in the Prolegomena. — Corvus

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? Then, the poor guy, reading the reference material promising that TI has nothing to do with idealism, comes across “…The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism…”, aannnndddd…..he’s farging lost it. He slams the book shut, walks off, goes back to his comic books or video games, or whatever it is that doesn’t stress his intellect enough to discover that which is at least purported as “useful truths”.

Rhetorical. The answer is in the Critique, and “…. could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so….”.

Ahhh…so it was just my machine. It’s a clickable link now. Not that I’m anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel.

Thanks.

Your moderator’s move of some of the comments on here, to a different place on the forum. Usually that shows up as a clickable link, colored letters, underlined, and all. So a guy doesn’t have to cut and paste.

FYI, that didn’t come up as a link. Was it supposed to? Was mine the only machine where it didn’t?

Try me — I like sushi

Ehhhh….I’m not finding much joy in the iterations presented here, so I might not be the one to ask.

It is a matter of debate whether the Kant's Category of Causality applies only to Appearances or also to Things-in-Themselves. — RussellA

He stated without equivocation the principle of causality could not, why it should now be category of causality, and that it might, I have no idea. So…..you can say whatever you like.

What does it matter where it comes from?

It’s fine, though. One inclined to “much prefer the phenomenological approach”, as you admit, isn’t likely to be persuaded by finespun transcendental arguments, regardless of their authors.

So I can equally say "the window was broken by a thing-in-itself". — RussellA

You can say what you like, but depending on the ground of the determinations by which you say anything at all, re: how you understand things in general, and in particular from transcendental philosophy, you cannot say with legitimacy “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.

“….. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we (….) have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense….”

While the broken window is that which ends up being the something that caused your perception, that alone is not sufficient to inform you of the cause of the window being broken.

So in saying what you do here, merely reflects that you have not learned to take things in two senses in accordance with this particular methodology, from which follows the sense of a thing by which it can be causal and the sense of it in which it cannot. Which is fine; it is speculative metaphysics writ large, after all.

…..a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these. — I like sushi

Actually, the thing-in-itself is both.

“…. The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere…”
————

….none of it said anything to me. — I like sushi

No problem.

Human being, or being human.

Best I could come up with, for the substance equivocation in Descartes, was Aristotle’s physics was still method of the day, re: pre-Newton. Dunno if that’s a sustainable premise or not.

Good point, hence Kant’s attribution of “problematic” idealism to Descartes on the one hand, and his specificity of substance as a pure category on the other.

Ehhhh….that’s ok.

Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.

Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your “I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper”, doesn’t hold true.

Or I just misunderstood. Dunno.

5+7=12 is a proposition. — Corvus

Yep, a mathematical proposition, to distinguish the principles of its origin.

Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. — Corvus

Which is why the distinction in principles. Mathematical propositions cannot be bivalent, because they cannot be false, because they are grounded by the principles of necessity and universality.

We’ve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest?

The proposition of ‘a-thing-in-itself’ needs greater context. — I like sushi

It just is the context; it justifies the representational nature of human intelligence, under which every other context is subsumed.

….you get the answer 12…. — Corvus

Ahh, but my good man, you initially made no mention of 12. All you stipulated was 5 + 7, in which….

“…. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5….”

….the mere thinking of a union of quantities is very far from construction a mathematical proposition, from which follows….

“….. but not that this sum was equal to 12.…”

….which is a mathematical proposition.

“…. Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience….”

The propositions are always a priori constructs; the proofs for them, on the other hand, are always empirical.

Wouldn't he only know….. — Corvus

In this case, that’s what I meant, yes. But it is a possible scenario where he already knows about the things in the basket, and because he knows that, he knows it’s too heavy to lift before the failed experience of trying to lift it. It isn’t when he knows from experience in one time, it’s what he knows without it in another time.

Peruse the section in CPR on pure/impure a priori knowledge, A2/B3.
——————

Whadyamean belongs to him? Maybe it’s his ailing grandmother’s basket. Or the guy whose wife he just stole and he’s feeling sorry about it.

Yeah, but ya know what? It is more than likely any one of those guys, upon experiencing the impossibility of lifting the basket off the ground, will know a priori, that there’s too much in it. And you’re right, in that he won’t care about the math, until he wants to know how much is too much.

Which is sorta why there’s math at all. Because we want to know how things relate to each other, or, maybe more importantly, how they relate to us. The uneducated or inexperienced doesn’t have reason to care.

I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper — Corvus

If that were the case, synthetic a priori cognitions would be impossible, from which follows the entire ground of transcendental philosophy fails. So while it may be the case we usually don’t think 5 + 7 without perceiving the objects that represent that activity, we can still think the relation intrinsic to one quantity adjoined in a progressive series with another. Numbers do nothing more than represent the quantities, but do nothing whatsoever to illustrate the relation between them, which must be thought.

One shouldn’t mistake rote classroom instruction, for innate human intelligence.

Just like that, yep. Although, technically, I suppose, the nature of these illusions is illicit judgement, whereby the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. But that depends on the nature of the judgement. A simple judgement, re: “the world exists”, is illicit on the one hand because existence adds nothing to the conception of world, and on the other, it is false insofar as world is not even a thing that exists.

…..given its ubiquity in human dialogue.
— Mww
So, it is a linguistic illusion. — Corvus

No word is ever spoken that isn’t first thought. To call it a linguistic illusion presupposes the actual nature or source of it. The simplest nature or source, I guess, for this kind of illusory use, is plain ol’ misunderstanding.

So, it was illusions on their part (…) Kant proved its non-existence 300 years ago in his CPR. Is that correct? — Corvus

Yep, provided one accepts the tenets of transcendental philosophy.

That is not to say the world cannot be thought. Obviously it can be thought, given its ubiquity in human dialogue.

Yeah, sorry. A judgement is the synthesis of conceptions. A cognition is the synthesis of judgements. The use of one judgement authorizing only this cognition cannot be used to justifying any cognition not related to it. What we’re dealing with here, then becomes…a judgement used to authorize a cognition regarding sensible objects, cannot be used to authorize cognitions on non-sensible objects, which are concepts. Or, ideas.

What is the proof Kant's solipsism? — Corvus

Of course there isn’t one. What is irrefutable, is the fact Kant writes most importantly on the critique of reason in its various forms, all of which belong to a subjective entity of some specified kind. If your entire raison d’etre, as demonstrated by your philosophical catalog, concerns the individual rational subject and his abilities, then you are writing with respect to each and every instance of that subject, for and by itself, which in turn, approaches the concept of solipsism. The clues are in the catalog..…the metaphysics of morals, the metaphysics of ethics, the metaphysics of natural science.

Solipsism has a varied history, so…best be careful with the concept generally employed.
————

…..an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea.
— Mww
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? — Corvus

More than that. It is that there is no world, as such, of which to know. It isn’t that you don’t know the world because you’ve never perceived it, but you don’t know the world because it isn’t ever going to be a perception. Pretty simple, innit? If it is impossible to know each and every single thing a world might contain, how is it possible to know the world as it is? Hence, the unconditioned reason seeks but never finds.
————-

How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is? — Corvus

The fundamental example of the dreaded transcendental illusion: saying something about something, when the warrant you’re using to justify the claim, doesn’t. The reconciliation of the illusion, is don’t say a thing exists when it is impossible to know what it is. This is the converse of the logical necessity, that all that can be known a posteriori, is that which exists.

The critique of reason is not a denial of its abilities, as demonstrated by: “…I can think whatever I please….”, but rather, it is an exposition on its methodological limits, re: “….provided only that I do not contradict myself…”.
————-

As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty. — AmadeusD

Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, bearing in mind none of this works under the tenets of a different theory.

Were Kant a solipsists? No. — Corvus

By what measure? By whose standard? I’d never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasn’t on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which don’t concern us here.

he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. — Corvus

You realize that every word represents a concept, right? The fun part is figuring out that “world”, while an empirical concept arising from understanding alone, as do all concepts, doesn’t conform to the rules by which experience is possible given such empirical concept. Reason now intercedes, and because “world” is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. That “world” is a subject of cosmology has to do only with how Kant uses the term, and he means by it only its relation to the regressive series of empirical conditions, re: that which we do experience as objects in the world, to the unconditioned totality of all possible things in the world, which makes the world itself, unconditioned. For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing, or, rather, reason must treat them as the same kind of transcendental idea.
————

The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. — Corvus

Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesn’t exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word “world”.

Beauty doesn’t exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture.

How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist? — Corvus

I don’t. I apply the concept of “world” as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk aren’t doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.

Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category “existence”, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements.

Hey, now!!! I’ll have you know, I’m cheap but I ain’t easy. (Grin)

are you not committing yourself into the dark chamber of solipsism? — Corvus

Of a sort, perhaps. On the other hand, if late-Enlightenment transcendental philosophy stands as a legitimate, albeit speculative methodological system, every human thinking subject/moral agent resides in the same chamber, which implies it is the default modus operandi of the human intellect in general, from which follows…..how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that we’re all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right?

If you say, the world is not an object, but a concept, and the predicate 'exist' is logical rather than real, then wouldn't Kant say to you, that you are an idealist with extreme solipsism? — Corvus

Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, I’d say, imitating my ol’ buddy Col Jessup….you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope he’d call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid.

Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied.
————

The record shows Kant had high esteem for Wolff generally, but only for Leibniz or Spinoza in the pre-critical era, for both of whom he established refutations of, or in your words, revolted against, their respective primary theses in his critical era, the former in CPR, the latter in CpR and Lectures on Metaphysics.

Still, in order to relate how all that is the case, one would need an equal exposure to all those guys, which I don’t have. Secondary literature tells me so, is all I got, plus the few-and-far-between direct references in the relevant Kant texts.

Kant was apparently a proper Prussian gentlemen, in that he didn’t blast the guys he disagreed with, re: Schopenhaur regarding Hegelians, but made no bones about praising those with whom he did agree. It was left to the reader, intended to be an academic peer, to fathom who he was refuting by his arguments but without being always named.
————

Regarding “dogmatic slumbers”, care is advised in the subtlety of the expression, in light of this….

“…. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori…”

….which implies it is his slumber that is being critiqued, not what quality of the slumber it has.

Due to this view, Kant believes that the proposition "The world exists." is a form of subreption{1} caused by hypostatisation{2}. — Corvus

“…..I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion{1} arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate{2} (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception….”

One man’s mental masturbations, re: Leibniz, et al, ca1712-14, is another’s epiphanic paradigm shift.

…..if the world is not an object, but just a mere concept, then could it be A priori…. — Corvus

Simply put, all concepts are from the understanding, hence always arise a priori. But it isn’t enough to class all conceptions as a priori when their application is more informative, that application depending exclusively on the theory developed to prescribe it.
————-

So the garbage man taking the BBQ rack away was sufficient reason for you not to believe in its existence? There’s your transcendental illusion for ya…..because the rack isn’t in this space at this time, it isn’t in any space at any time.

YIKES!!!!

Hmmmm……most obviously, I suppose, objects are separated from concepts by definition, when the former is conditioned by space and time, but the latter is conditioned only by time, each being defined accordingly. Metaphysical theory-specific distinctions might be something like…objects are determinable from sensibility, concepts are determined from understanding, defined accordingly. Another way…phenomena represent objects perceived, concepts represent objects merely thought, again, defined accordingly.

In such case where an object is itself a concept, re: the predicate in an a priori cognition, that object separates from concepts generally as a matter of relation, or, more precisely, judgement. Here, though it isn’t so much a separation by definition as of belonging.

The problem with definitions is that there aren’t any that perfectly relate representations to each other, except those for mathematical objects.
—————

I didn’t notice you added to your comment.

The reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the “world” represents, even without immediate perception, is….experience. Given experience, the negation of reason to belief, is a contradiction.

The world is still undefined concept. — Corvus

Ehhh….it’s defined well enough as a concept, but I’d agree it’s not well-defined as an object. Problem is, and hence the notion of transcendental illusion, and….as you made mention, one of the antinomies of pure reason…..it is generally treated as an object, thereby the existence of which there would be sufficient reason to believe even if not perceived.

But the world is not an object; it is merely a euphemism for the totality of possible appearances, from which follows there’s no reason to believe in the existence of it, DUH!!!! because it doesn’t, but there is reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the conception “world” represents.
———-

But can the world be the object of a priori knowledge? — Corvus

I missed that clue, for which there is no excuse.

Yes because within the hypothesis that the world is a projection….. — PL Olcott

That hypothesis is not one of the conditions by which I would affirm the thesis.

Which did you know first, the video or Kant’s cosmological idea?

I’ve adjusted my response: you are correct in that there is no reason to believe in the existence of the world when not perceived, under two conditions. First, iff perception is taken as Hume intended, and second, iff the world is taken as a transcendental idea.

I seriously doubt anyone thinks along those lines these days. Doesn’t make you any less correct, or the dialectic any less interesting, but perhaps does question the relevance.

Hume's writing can be deceptive in Treatise….. — Corvus

I think got this right. For my part, I don’t think his writing deceptive, as much as just disagreeing with the way he uses his conceptions, which follows from how other philosophers use the same ones.

In the case of the dilemma of existence, on the other hand, which he names as such in T.H.N., it isn’t the dilemma itself that’s disagreeable, but rather, it is the principle he claims as ground for it, insofar as if the principle is inappropriate or misconceived, the dilemma disappears and with it the disagreement. Or, maybe, which is usually what happens, the dilemma just changes its clothes.
————

The statement "The world exist." should it not be dissected for the legitimacy and rationality ? — Corvus

Yes, it should, if one wishes. But it remains whether the legitimacy and rationality can even be addressed by transcendental ideas, and as you can read for yourself in A424, it is just the epitome of a sceptical method in which nobody wins. I think the question as to the illogical appending of existence as a predicate to an empirical conception is properly addressed elsewhere in the text.

In addition, the impossibility of a certain method of belief does not follow from the denial of certain predicates, which makes this…..

If it is even irrational or illogical to utter the statement, then belief in the existence will be proven to have no ground either. — Corvus

….false, if the uttered statement is “the world exists”, insofar as the logical legitimacy in accordance with rules, is not the same as a belief, which is nothing but a judgement based on the synthesis of conceptions, regardless of rules.

While we’re here, the rule is…you can’t synthesis an empirical conception, re: the world, with a transcendental conception, re: existence. To do so is the ground of illegitimacy, in the form of “…a mere sophism…” or, “….a miserable tautology….”. But to believe the condition of a thing, that rule is not evidenced in the mere synthesis of conceptions, hence is not illegitimate in that way.

So it is that once World as you use the term is understood as a cosmological idea, it becomes just as illegitimate to believe in its existence, as it is legitimate for Everydayman to believe in the existence of the plain ol’ world of appearances. Kantian dualism run amok, n’est ce pas?

All well and good, but why would you invoke the antinomies of pure reason, especially with respect to cosmological ideas, when the question was only ever to do with believing something?

Even to change the initial ask regarding perception and belief, to one of the illogic of appending existence as a predicate, still only involves understanding and has no need or call for transcendental ideas and whether or not they abide with dogmatic proofs.

You’ve went and done made the World a cosmological idea for which there is no possibility of any experience, but it started out as a mere totality of possible appearances, any one of which may be a experience.

So what….we’re just moving here? We’ve left the original query and it’s offspring aside? Fine by me, but you outta warn whoever’s left.

”The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever.”
-Mww

I agree: so where does that leave moral realism, then? — Bob Ross

Either the moral isn’t real as conditioned by fact, or, the moral is real but conditioned by non-empirical fact, a contradiction. For a non-empirical fact to carry non-contradictory implication yet retain certainty, it is merely a subjective truth, from which follows that the moral is real iff conditioned by subjective truths.

All of which solves nothing, in that it remains contentious that the merely subjective can be real, which reflects on whether the moral, when conditioned by subjective truths, can be real. But if morality is a human condition, in which every human of otherwise rational constitution thinks himself a moral character, and if every human in moral circumstance thinks himself as properly according himself to it, then it must seem to him that he really is a moral agent. Even so, it is still suspect that the moral in and of itself, is real, when it is the subject that merely thinks he is being moral by some self-determined expression of a condition intrinsic to his human nature.

So….where does that leave moral realism? In a great big pile of odiferous philosophical bullshit. There never was a need or a good reason to imbue the moral with the real, especially when the real had already been well-established as representing EXACTLY what the moral is not.

Which gets us, finally, to this: when, pray tell, did you ever, in any arbitrary, albeit immediate, moral circumstance whatsoever, make a statement about it? If you never did…and of course you actually never did….moral statements are nothing but cum hoc ergo propter hoc critiques or judgements of moral activity in general, from which follows it isn’t a case of the truth of the statements at all, but the correspondence of the moral activity to its critique or judgement. Now, the subject, to which both the act and the critique belong, must already be fully conscious of both and the truth is given regarding that correspondence, and for that subject to which the act does not belong but the statement does, for instance when someone not you makes statements about something you did, he cannot possibly be conscious to the same degree nor in the same manner, and therefore the truth in that correspondence cannot ever be given.

So say you do make a moral statement, not in immediate relation to a circumstance but before or after an act representing the circumstance. If before, it cannot be a true statement representing the act because the act hasn’t happened and may not happen, and if after, it is true statement only because the act made it so, which transfers the quality of “true statement” to mere “account”.

Yeahyeahyeah….I know. The word “statement” can be bastardized to represent “act”, in which case a moral statement is slipped sideways, shoehorned if you will, into representing a moral act, and from which it follows that any moral act is a moral statement. But here, we have the absurdity of an act being either one or the other moral or immoral immediately upon its implementation, an expression of morality itself, in juxtaposition to a statement being true or false with respect to an act being moral or immoral whether or not it is ever implemented, an expression relative possibility hence not of morality itself. The former is necessary, the latter contingent; they have no legitimate connection to each other, that irresponsible flights of fancy hasn’t heaped upon the unguarded.

Just another stupid language game, dreamed up by those who couldn’t improve what had already been done. Of which I could be similarly accused, so…..there ya go.

It is illogical to say "the World exists." Because pure reason cannot grasp totality of all appearance in the universe… — Corvus

Ehhhh, maybe. I’ll have to back check that. But there’s a more exact exposition of why not. See A592/B620 for the groundwork, if you’re so inclined.

where does that leave moral realism, then? As opposed to normative realism? — Bob Ross

Dunno, don’t care. I don’t bother with -isms or -ists that confound more than confine. Dunno how to answer where is moral realism left when there’s no non-arbitrary meaning for what moral realism is, insofar as there is no irreducible consensus for what either moral, or real, is.

The ask in the OP was for thoughts; I gave mine, and admittedly, they will have very little in conjunction with the rest of the commentary.