is it logically correct in saying "The world exists."? — Corvus

Might be interesting how that even came to be a question.

Thoughts? — Bob Ross

First thought:
“…. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour….”
(T. H. N., 3. 1. 1. “Morals Not Derived From Reason)

Subsequent paradigm shifts in moral philosophy demonstrate that no matter what necessarily regulates our conduct, it is not sufficient in itself to explain those factual occasions where manifest conduct does not conform to it. That being the case, Hume’s argument with respect to mere sentiment in general, and its regulatory power over our conduct, is falsified, insofar as under those conditions, rather than no ought follows from an is, it is the case an ought is all that can follow from an is.
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Second thought:
The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever. Thus, it isn’t so much that there are no moral facts, but that the notion of moral facts doesn’t make any sense. As it happens, explanatory gaps in moral philosophy are conceptually relieved by exchanging fact for disposition, or…..yikes, dare I say?…..imperative.

End thoughts.

l don't think there is any explanation as to how material objects, such as trees, can instantiate a mathematical number. — Sirius

On the one hand, as soon as some sufficiently capable intelligence wants to know of various attributions of “how many”, the material thing is that which instantiates both the object of such intellectual want in general and the means of satisfying it in particular.

On the other hand, material objects are not so much the instantiation of mathematical objects, but only serve as the occasion for an intelligence to instantiate by its own means, a method sufficient for that which it wants to know about those objects, from which arises the construction of mathematical objects.

What would be a reason for mathematical objects at all, if not for an intelligence that seeks judgement on certain kinds of relations, given between real, physical things? Perhaps, then it is neither the material object itself, not the intelligence itself, that instantiates mathematical objects, but it is merely the occurrence of natural relations between the two, that demands them.

It never was the question of explanation, but only the affirmative power of whatever it may be.
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It appears to me that our minds project mathematical concepts onto the world and shape our phenomenal experience for us. — Sirius

Yep, just like that. But the instantiation of them remains unexplained by the mere projection.

1. True statements can only exist as cognitive content.
2. Cognitive content depends on the existence of a mind which can comprehend it. — Sirius

This reduces to…the true statements that exist depend on the existence of a mind that can comprehend them.

What’s to say the mind on which the cognitive content depends, is the same kind of mind which comprehends cognitive content? From which follows, what may be true cognitive content existing in one kind of mind, is incomprehensible given the cognitive content of another kind. Or, which is the same thing, there are as many true statements as there are minds that exist on which the comprehension of true statements depends.

There is nothing contained in the conclusion that there are necessarily a multiplicity of kinds of minds, given the relative incomprehensibility of cognitive content, that there is therefore a singular all-encompassing mind to which all true statements belong.
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That true statements can only exist as cognitive content, is true; that cognitive content depends on the existence of a mind, is true, that true statements depend on a truth-criterion, is true. Parsimony suggests, then, any mind that exists comprehends only its own cognitive content, insofar as the mere existence of a mind is insufficient for a truth-criterion which grants to true statements their validity, and, more importantly, denies to the totality of all cognitive content the validity of truth.

An all-encompassing mind does not necessarily exist. It might, but not necessarily.

All I wanted to see was the philosophical arguments…. — Corvus

Cool. I know you saw mine, scattered in the two threads where this has come up.

The visual memory content is also appearance? No? — Corvus

No. Memory content is representation of cognized things. Appearance is neither representation nor cognition.

There are unjustified or groundless beliefs too as well as justified ones? — Corvus

Over time, yes, but belief in general, each in and of itself in its time, is nothing but judgement, justified by and grounded in, the relations between the conceptions contained in it. Any discursive judgement may be falsified, but only but another with different relations, in succession, and not by itself.

But isn't there also the possibility that all your past perception of the existence of the world could be an illusion? — Corvus

Not if perception is strictly a non-cognitive operation. If it is the case perception is nothing but a physiological effect of real things on specifically adapted receptive organs, there is no administration of it by the intellectual system, hence no judgement can be made on it, which would preclude whether or not it is illusory.

Why should you rely on the past memory of the world in order to perceive the present world's existence? — Corvus

I don’t. I rely on my senses for perception of things in the world, but I possess nothing that can perceive existence. I understand what you mean, but going only by what you wrote…..makes no sense.

I maintain there is reason to believe the world exists when I’m not perceiving it, which is all I ever meant to comment on.

But can the world be the object of a priori knowledge? — Corvus

No, but irrelevant, because the question was, can it be believed the world exists without perception of it.

When you say precedent perception, could it be memory? — Corvus

Ehhhh….that’s for the psychologist. For the metaphysical philosopher, perception is mere appearance, an as-yet undetermined affect on physiology by something, and from which there is no memory as a determined thing.

Doesn't memory tend to be unreliable for qualifying as a ground of infallible knowledge or justified belief? — Corvus

Every belief is justified, and no empirical knowledge is infallible, so it would seem memory drops out of consideration for either. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is infallible, but does not obtain its certainty from memories of things, but from the necessity of principles.

But we’re talking about believing in the existence of the world, which already presupposes it. We should be discussing belief in the continuation of such existence, rather than existence itself.
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I think it is interesting and significant because perception is perhaps the most important thing in leading a meaningful and trouble free life. — Corvus

In which case, we shall always disagree, in that you are doing empirical anthropology and I’m doing cognitive metaphysics. This irreconcilable dichotomy reduces to the impossibility for qualitative judgements such as meaningful and trouble-free life, being derivable from ontological predicates, such as existence.

Now, there is the domain or paradigm where the subjective condition is pleased or disturbed….certainly a qualitative judgement if there ever was one….given the mere sensation of something, but with respect to the original query, re: can the existence of the world be believed without perceiving it, these judgements, being purely aesthetic in nature, have no say regarding objective necessity.

if you drive a car when you are not perceiving the road ahead of you….. — Corvus

….then you are not driving the car. You’re merely the payload in a projectile.

I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world. — Corvus

You are correct in that you have no immediate reason a posteriori to believe in the existence of the world in the absence of perception. It is still the case you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff you’ve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions. And it is impossible that you do not insofar as you’re alive and functioning, so…..

The logical and epistemic arguments for a priori justifications has been done, and is in the public record. They serve as explanation for not having to re-learn your alphabet after waking up each morning, given that you already know it.
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Is our belief in the existence of the world….. — Corvus

Everydayman doesn’t bother himself with believing in so obvious an existence, any more than he bothers himself with doubting the non-existence of it.

For the philosopher or the scientist, it is quite absurd to suppose either of those merely believe in that existence the ignorance of which, for them, is impossible.

Which begs the question….who else would even wonder about it?

No matter how one defines the term (“free will”) I will not accept it. — Judaka

Nor I. I think of the term as simple speech at the expense of critical thought.

Pretty sad, I must say, to create a philosophy predicated on the convenience of a phrase.

Apparently your interest is in with examining what the will does, whereas my interest concerns what the will is, or, what it is about human agency that makes it possible.

So it isn’t so much first cause, as it is metaphysical reduction. And from that, it becomes clear the will is not determined by my experiences or desires and whatnot, but the determinations the will makes, which manifest as my choice of behaviors, are conditioned by them. If we already understand that’s what happens, it remains to find out how it happens. As you say…we seek a reason, a transcendent cause I remember you calling it. Or, at least make a reasonable philosophical stab at it.

I figured I just gave you one. Kinda. Transcendental rather than transcendent, but a form of cause nonetheless.

Nor do I see how substituting a "universal will"….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool. I never said or implied any sort of universal will.

For my actions to be mine, whatever their cause must be in me. Who ever contested that? Did you really get from what I said, that I was implying anything else?

Oh well. Ever onward.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

While that may indeed be true, it does not follow from it, that there is nothing not caused by something. If it is necessary that everything be caused by something, it becomes a matter of what can cause and whatever relation is possible from it.

Simply put, the principle of cause and effect legislates either in a progressive or regressive series of given empirical conditions, but for which the terminus of the series is not given.

For purely rational conditions, on the other hand, as in a perfectly suitable self-determining system, it is possible that the will be that which is a cause for the progressive series of effects, terminating in an action manifest in the world. But this, even if the case, still leaves the will as either necessitating a cause of itself, or, be itself uncaused. If uncaused, the principle of cause and effect is contradictory, and if the principle of cause and effect is contradictory under some conditions, its total validity immediately becomes questionable, and from which the empirical power of science is doubtable.

If it is unreliable to question the principle of cause and effect, it must be allowed to condition the will, in which case, the regressive series continues. But if the regressive series continues, there is no reason for the notion of a will free to determine anything on its own accord, which destroys the very idea of will as such and inevitably makes morality as a innate human condition, impossible.

It all reduces to the fact the principle of cause and effect cannot be denied, and at the same time but under different conditions, it cannot be used. Which leaves the idea of a substitution for it that does not contradict or intervene on those conditions for which it is necessary.

Given that the principle of cause and effect, as either a progressive or regressive series, is conditioned by time, a non-contradictory substitution for that which is legislated by it, in this case the will and that in a regressive series alone, insofar as its progressive series ends in a behavior congruent with the determination for what it ought to be, must justify the exclusion of regressive successions of time as its own condition.

So it is that that which is not determined by anything may be random, but that which is determined by the will is determined by something, hence not random. But to say an effect is not random does not say anything of its cause other than there is one, and in the case of such cause that has will for its effect, that in its turn being a cause, must have the time condition legislating any other cause/effect series, excluded from it.

There is but one conception, while not precisely sufficient for causality is nonetheless non-contradictory with respect to it, and, most importantly, is irrespective of time, and that is spontaneity. But this conception of spontaneity does not carry the implication that the will is a spontaneous faculty, but only that it is conditioned by it, and from which the conception of autonomy is a logically valid deduction, and from that, arises the conception of freedom.

Easy-peasy.

Or not.

If supernatural is all you got then i get it... you're intellectually bankrupt in that specific area at least (not meant to be offensive, just an observation). — punos

I’d agree to intellectual bankruptcy…..not my own of course; no one willingly admits impoverished rationality…..if supernatural predication was all there was. But it isn’t, and because I’m approaching the issue of will and non-natural causality from the domain of pure practical reason, I’m exempted from any such indirect accusation.

There really is only one will, the singular will of a deterministic universe…… — punos

Ahhh, a Schopenhaur-ian then. Of some sort? Very far from my interest, so….carry on.

Neither you nor anyone else has ever provided me with a 4th option to my list, do you have one? — punos

Nope, and no one ever will. Your list seeks natural causality for the way the universe behaves in relation to the possibility for free will, but in considerations for how human agency itself behaves, which presupposes free will, natural causality won’t work. Hence, the introduction of a non-natural causality, or force in your terms, sufficient for metaphysically establishing a logical ground for human behavior, re: freedom.

I’m using free will because you did…..dialectical consistency and all that. They do not belong together, insofar as free does not describe the will under every possible condition of its use in human agency.

But, as you say, I don’t do debates either. You asked, I offered; do with it as you wish.

If you wanna feel like you're taking it a step further than Nietzsche go ahead, especially if it is the basis for some line of reasoning for you — Vaskane

Well said. I say that, because it’s pretty much the same sentiment I offered in response to his “Making a Case for Transcendental Idealism”.

i acknowledge the challenge of providing a logically consistent and satisfying account of free will, as it would necessitate introducing a force beyond demonstrable science and outside the laws of our universe. — punos

Because you say there would need to be one, would I be correct in assuming you already know there was such a force? If not, there was, introduced in 1785, meeting your general criteria, although the degree of satisfaction obtainable from the account of that force is rather subjective, to be sure.

Is there another option not listed that I should be aware of? — punos

Maybe that given the mere appearance that sufficiently intelligent beings behave in at least one way not available to non-intelligent beings, the case should be granted that they actually do. It follows that if such behavior is granted, it is only logical that there be a force serving as both justification and necessary causality for it, that is not available to non-intelligent beings.

I don't think he would have thought of it as the brain doing it. — frank

Oh, he was quite aware the brain does everything, but we as human don’t consciously operate in accordance with the scientific mode of brain mechanics. And, of course, we don’t give a damn how we operate un- or sub-consciously, insofar we are not sufficiently equipped to know of it, so not much point in constructing a speculative methodological system grounded in something we know precious little about.
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Yeah, well, I’m still on your side, though we’re both technically outside the boundaries of the discussion.

The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. — Corvus

I agree you have the logical ground for the existence of a thing, as you say, while not perceiving it, iff you’ve already had the experience of that thing, under sufficiently congruent conditions. Your #1 asserts you have no logical ground for believing while not perceiving, which is precisely the time in which that ground is all you have.

There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception. — Corvus

Actually, there is no other ground for knowing the tree exists, with apodeitic certainty, apart from the perception of it. You can still think whatever you please.

So the whole point of argument was about the logical ground for belief in the world, rather than the existence of the world itself. — Corvus

Agreed, which makes explicit the vast dissimilarities between mere belief conditioned by logic and empirical knowledge conditioned by perception.

While in general support of your arguments, I think your #1 is suspect.

It’s nonetheless quite obvious, if you’re doing continental metaphysics and everyone else is doing meta-linguistics, the chances for agreeing on much of anything is vanishingly small.

So paint-guy leaves the diagonal unpainted, merely playing the odds that shovel-guy would take the most direct route. Shovel-guy’s just following directions: go from here to there, don’t step outside your own track. Not much of a challenge, is it?

I don’t vote, and I don’t see will as having much to do with this gedankenexperiment.

How would you define it? — Matias

Kant works for me, but it comes with the burden of attributing to judgement more power than most common folk, and too few current philosophers, are prepared to grant.

A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.” , A299/B355.
B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.
C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.

it appears as though Kant has no grounds to be an indirect realist. — Bob Ross

I wonder. Say I get famous. In a hundred years, will they take what made me famous, look at it way differently than I meant for it, then call me something I wouldn’t call myself, because of the way they looked at what I said?

“…. the real—that which corresponds to sensation—….”. All sensations are given directly from perception which is given directly from the appearance of real things, so…..

Why would ever suggest Kant was an indirect realist? If anything, he would be an indirect epistemologist, in that all our empirical knowledge is only possible indirectly from representations of real objects.

Elsewhere, has invited the “mediate/immediate” distinction, as opposed to the direct/indirect. From a purely subjective perspective….what a guy thinks for himself and not what a philosopher thinks for everybody….the invite is a much better approach, and is used by Kant himself.
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Kant gives a proof for everything he claims — Bob Ross

Actually, he admits to not knowing how some things he posits work, re: imagination, even reason itself. He posits logical arguments, which are treated as internal proofs, but are never susceptible to objectively repeatable experiment, hence never empirically proven. He can’t prove there are representations, conceptions, cognitions and whatnot, but he can prove it’s logically valid that this or that happens when there are. It’s called theory, donchaknow. Or, speculative metaphysics.
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the cup which is experienced vs. the cup as it is in-itself — Bob Ross

I asked how a “cup-in-itself” got its name, and the correct answer is…..it doesn’t because there is no such thing as a cup as it is in-itself. No named thing is in-itself; no in-itself is ever named, and no case can be made for transcendental idealism, within its original view, that says otherwise.

I can't see where we disagree, then. — Astrophel

Oh, we disagree over a wide range, which is fine.



But, with respect to that comment, I’ve been there myself. Pure reason’s intrinsic circularity has been obvious for millennia, and advances in neurological science has made it even worse.

The brain goes so far as to manifest itself as an immaterial something-or-other, imbues the seemingness of knowledge into it, but prevents the seemingness of knowledge for informing the immaterial something-or-other of what it is or where it came from. Like, brain says…..YOU are allowed to know whatever YOU think YOU know, in a progressive series, but YOU are not allowed to even think YOU know anything at all in a regressive series, which, of course, includes YOU.

The brain in its mighty magnificence gives its self-manifested subjectivity QM science, a progressive series. One of the tenets of QM science is the fact that observation disrupts the quantum domain by intruding into it, also progressive. A sidebar given by the brain in its mighty magnificence is the incredible density of the constituent parts of itself, informing its self-manifested subjectivity of its ~3b/mm3 synaptic clefts, which is the very domain of QM science….progressive. So eventually the self-manifested subjectivity goes so far as to invent a device for exploring the quantum domain of itself, progressive, searching for a YOU that has been allowed to know…..oh crap!!!!…..regressive.

Now the self-manifested subjectivity takes the chance of disrupting itself, in which case….was it ever there? The brain has tacitly allowed the extermination of its own avatar.

YIKES!!!!

Things in themselves are neither apriori nor aposteriori. — Astrophel

Agreed. Those are conditions related to experience or the absence of it. Things-in-themselves, as such, in and of themselves, have nothing to do with the conditions of our experience.

They are not empirical, not in time and space….. — Astrophel

Space and time are the conditions for the objects of our experience. Things-in-themselves are not objects of experience, therefore space and time are irrelevant with respect to them.

…..just postulates. — Astrophel

For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility.

Pure reason is only shown in our visible affairs. — Astrophel

Pure reason is never shown, if that be taken to mean demonstrated; it is pure transcendental thought and judgement, having no real objects belonging to them. It is, “….the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely à priori….”.

They themselves cannot be witnessed. — Astrophel

Agreed, having space and time already eliminated from them as conditions for being appearances. But it remains that they were conceived for some purpose, and it turns out there were two.

Things-in-themselves, for Kant, did not lie in the perceptual world at all. — Astrophel

Of course they do. In what other world would they lie?

They do not lie in the perceived world.

A thing-in-itself is still just a thing.

Ok. Thanks.

That it exists. — RussellA

But what if its non-existence is impossible?

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience.

Here’s a language game for ya: when “carrying on” a conversation, the worst one can do is repeat himself.

the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named. — RussellA

Nope. We named a possible cause, which could be a possible experience. A thing-in-itself will never be one, by definition.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me?

but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Yep. The catch being, it never will be determined, because……once again, repeating myself…..it is undeterminable, by definition.

This is like telling Henry Ford he didn’t invent the Model T. Or, the Model T he did invent, wasn’t really a Model T. You can’t just take something meant in one way, and make it something else. If Model T’s aren’t your thing, go drive something more adaptable to your way of getting around.

it seems to me that "representation" is really more about how we describe relations within the parts from which the cognitive system emerges…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’d have agreed, if it had said, representation is really more about how we describe relations within the parts of the cognitive system as a whole. I don’t think we should say the system emerges from the description of relations, but the relations described emerge from a kind of system capable of it.

…..not the relations that obtain between the whole cognitive system and the objects of experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That would be fine, as long as the cognitive system as a whole wasn’t comprised of relations. There are established metaphysical theories predicated on just that being the case.

I feel confident in saying we "see trees”….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh certainly. It is the convention to speak in those terms. I suspect only the philosopher or the philosophy student would use the more precise terminology. I understand no one knows how it is we think, but the average joe barely even knows he thinks. He says, I think this, I think that, but hasn’t a farging clue what that means.

….“in-itselfness" seems to be a fraught abstraction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, agreed. There’s only one use for the term, nothing else need ever be said about it.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The homunculus, and the informal fallacy of the argument, disappears from a cognitive system as such. For the subject that is the thinker by means of that system, anything that represents that subject, also as a thinker, to the very self that thinks, is superfluous.

It is quite absurd to consider that there is a theater in the brain, so why would a theory describing a method for what goes on in the brain, make room for one?

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox. — RussellA

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world . — RussellA

Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox.
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But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.
— Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist. — RussellA

It can’t apply to the direct realist, for he knows the name of the object from the perception of it, which makes explicit there is knowledge in the mere perception. Because of this condition, the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. In effect, it is a red postbox for no other reason than it is seen, re: I see a red postbox.

the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red. — RussellA

Not quite. The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right?

Depends on what you mean by the word "see". — RussellA

It shouldn’t. To see is that mode of perception in which a sensation is given from that sensory apparatus susceptible to being affected by light. No human can see with his eyes closed.
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We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A. — RussellA

Ok. You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B. It follows that anybody that doesn’t know the cause, can call it anything they like. Pretty slipshod method for acquiring knowledge, I must say.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is. — RussellA

Sure. We name stuff all the time without knowing what it is. But in the case at hand, the cause is something, and as soon as it is possibly a certain something, it is determinable. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself.
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The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism. — RussellA

I can handle that. It might stand as an initial condition, or a major premise in a syllogistic argument, sure.

….both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding. — RussellA

Perhaps. It then becomes simply a question of which is the more parsimonious, and the less in conflict with what Nature demands.

I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, — RussellA

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. And to perceive alone, is not to represent.

If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? And if you don’t know the true cause, how can you say that which you see is in fact a red postbox?

I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.

If what you say here is the case, how do you explain those times where you don’t know what causes your perception? You feel a tickle on the back of your neck, what tells you it is a hair or a bug? The sound from around the corner…..backfire? Firecracker? Dump truck tailgate? Something dropped from a roof? According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. If you always know a red postbox is what you’re seeing, shouldn’t you always know the name of what you’re hearing? It is obvious this doesn’t always work, which casts doubts on a system operating in accordance with those conditions.

Kant was aware that the thing perceived is always at that time undetermined, but not that it was undeterminable, otherwise every single thing ever perceived would immediately be identified as a certain thing, which contradicts natural occurrence. The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision. And this is what makes you an indirect realist.

Realism: the attribution of properties such that an object is determinable;
Realist: one who attributes properties as that by which objects are determinable;
Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object.

I submit you don’t see a red postbox. You see a thing, to the representation of which you attribute the properties in the form of a series of conceptions, by which the thing becomes the experience of, becomes known to you as, a red postbox.
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As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds. — RussellA

Right. “Cup” names. I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name, which is what happens when there is a “cup-in-itself”, in that the thing now has the name “cup”. How can a named thing exist independently of that which named it? And if it can’t, where did “cup” come from when attached to “-in-itself”?
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The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself — RussellA

I don’t think so. The (immediately) unknown but (mediately) determinable cause of our perception, is the thing; the unknown and always undeterminable cause of the thing of our perception, is the thing-in-itself. And don’t make it an issue that a cause is unknown. A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable.

this just demonstrates that there is no such transcendentally (valid) argument for there actually being real objects beyond our intuitions. — Bob Ross

Transcendental arguments are not intended for empirical conditions, so, no, there wouldn’t be one. No need to argue for that which gives you a bloody nose, or a headache, or hurts your eyes if you look at it too long.

“…. The science of all the principles of sensibility à priori, I call transcendental aesthetic. There must, then, be such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcendental logic….”

What is the argument for intuitions necessarily being sensuous (in the sense of real objects exciting a sensibility)? I don't see how one could transcendentally prove that. — Bob Ross

There isn’t a proof. Remember….we’re not even conscious of this part of the system as a whole. The transcendental argument sets the technical groundwork, nonetheless, as the first part of the work.
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Like how is it called a "ding an sich"? — Bob Ross

No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself.

But the “real objects” which excite your sensibility could be fabrication by a higher power, could they not? — Bob Ross

Sure. But why would we care? We work with what we’re given. In the case for natural real objects, say, what do we gain by asking if something we know absolutely nothing about created that of which we know very little? And for real objects humans make for themselves, it doesn’t even make sense to ask if a supersensible whatever created rakes and dump trucks.

just because there is a set of intuitions which contains a separation (in space and time)….does not mean that the “object” which impacted you exists as something which excited your sensibility — Bob Ross

That’s precisely what it means, insofar as intuitions are proven only and always sensuous. If denied, such that intuitions do not depend on the existence of real things that affect the senses, then you have falsified T.I., at least the original view of it, without sufficient reason.
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I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?

who Austin believed he was arguing against. — J

Not who. What.

“…. What we have above all to do is, negatively, to rid ourselves of such illusions as 'the argument from illusion….”, and assorted other linguistic vagaries.

And a caution, if I may: mention Kant at your own dialectical peril.

“…. The general doctrine….goes like this: (…) we never directly perceive or sense, material objects…. but only sense-data…”

I am on whomever’s side that denies this. We always directly perceive material objects. I do so not from a “…. deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies….”, but because it should never be an issue that I don’t, insofar as every perception is direct, re: unmediated. I perceive a shadow as equally direct as B flat minor.

Nahhhh…..the tidy-looking dichotomies lay elsewhere, direct perception/sense data need add no more to them.

Efficient law-like agent of change. Has a nice ring to it, for sure.

I swear, Feynman had a cool phrase like that, talking about how fields should be treated as real things. It was in the Caltech lectures, but I could never find it again. Wish-I’d-thought-of-that moment, lost to time and weakened memory.

I think of empirical science theories as grounded in models of causation, and causation as not being observed, but inferred. — Janus

Sure, the causes may be inferred, but wouldn’t models of causation be predicated on observable effects following from them? Working backwards kinda thing, donchaknow.

I was just commenting on the main point for writing CPR.

But now that you mention it, why do you suppose he devoted everything after A293/B350 to PURE reason, practically two thirds of the whole work, in Kemp Smith pg, 293 to pg.669, if reason and pure reason where so interchangeable.

I think the key is in pure, rather than reason.