Your versions are fine, although I might insist every experience affects the condition of the subject.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?
— Mww

I think it does. But it is misleading to say that there's no such thing. It's just that one's self is not an object. — Ludwig V

Agreed. Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object. Or even an object that is not a thing. Or maybe just a new definition for old terminology. Either way, abolishing the concept itself isn’t likely in the near future, anyway, so…..the beat goes on.

From my reading of CPR, the thing-in-itself is what impacts the senses. — Bob Ross

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. I would like to see where in your reading of CPR, that it is.

But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge? — Ludwig V

While the case may be made that empirical knowledge is impossible without the experience of what the knowledge is of, but it is also quite often the case there can be experiences for which no knowledge is given. If it is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case, there’s a need for a different case.

Insofar as the negation of which is a contradiction, it is always the case that…..
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.

As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
—————

…..oneself can never be an experience.
— Mww
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)? — Ludwig V

I suppose. That isn’t necessarily contradictory or invalid, given the object immediately appended, re: of oneself. That only matters because without such appended object, the proposition is contradictory, re: never be an experience that is an experience. Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?

If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. — Janus

Close enough.

the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked. However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. — Janus

Out of respect for our history, I won’t be so brash as to throw the ol’, much-dreaded “categorical error” at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isn’t one.
————

Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former….. — creativesoul

To would seem impossible to explain how mindless creatures use tools. But to be mindful does not make explicit thought and belief, or thinking about thought/belief.

The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be, which affirms the possibility of mere instinct for such use. Even “use of tools” itself risks conceptual misappropriation, in that making that connection by a qualified observer does not justify that same connection being made by the observed.
(Man: did you just use a tool to get at those ants?
Chimp: dunno about that; finger/hole/ant, then finger/hole no ant, putting a stick in my hand is just growing a longer finger, finger/hole/ant)

It is irrational to say only humans are rational creatures. For those interested in such investigations, he has no choice but to judge other un-like creatures’ rationality, with the very one impossible for them to possess, which immediately prejudices his investigation.

Nagel’s glorified bat.

…..also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency. — creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations.

The concept of an apple is knowledge of what an apple is—that’s part of the whole idea of having a concept of an apple. — Bob Ross

The whole idea of having, the only reason to have, a concept, is to represent that thing perceived, by a name. The name apple merely indicates how the thing perceived is to be known, which is called experience.

……wouldn’t you agree the brain is the representational knowledge of those faculties? — Bob Ross

I may be misunderstanding, but assuming I do, no, I would not agree. Faculties are function-specific members of a system described in a metaphysical theory. There’s no possible method by which those faculties can be found in a brain, they being merely logical constructs, and by the same token, there’s nothing empirically provable, hence nothing falsifiable, in a metaphysical theory. All that can be said, insofar as empirical verifications for non-empirical theories are out of the question, is the brain has nothing to do with abstract conceptions authorized by such theory.

So…what good is it, is the usual modern ask. It’s all we got to work with being the best answer.
—————-

…..you have to concede that you have to trust your conscious experience to derive that that experience is representational—no?….. — Bob Ross

All I have to trust is that my knowledge obtained at one time, does not contradict Nature in another time.

That my experiences are representational, or, that all my experiences are of only representations, is proved at sensibility, systemically long before the experience itself, therefore I have no need to trust them to prove their constituency.

…….Otherwise, you are just blindly presupposing that objects affect our senses—there’s nothing, without the aid of experience, that can be used transcendentally to determine that. — Bob Ross

Why do I have to presuppose that objects effect my senses, when my sensations apodeitically prove my senses have been affected? If I can see a mosquito bite me, if I can smell the bacon I hear frying, why do I have to presuppose either one of those objects?

And on the other hand, why subject myself to the absurdity of supposing what just bit me, or that stuff I’m about to consume, wasn’t an object at all?

There’s nothing that can be used transcendentally to determine…..what, that it is only objects that effect the senses? Why do we need a transcendental source to determine empirical circumstance? We may like a transcendental source for determining how empirical circumstances are possible, but the fact of sensation already proves it, so why bother?

I’m a little in the dark here, not sure how you arrive at the questions you ask.

The question is which experience is veridical. — Ludwig V

….which is irrelevant if the experience in question is impossible. There no reason to care about semantic truths, indeed there couldn’t even be any such judgements, without having first established the objects contained in the utterances. I understand this must have been done, or at least attempts at it, somehow or another, otherwise Husserl’s philosophy lacks justification.

One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. — Ludwig V

And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing, but is itself a laden on the condition of the subject to whom it belongs. Skills and expectations laden the system, but not that which the system finalizes as its product.

I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other. — Ludwig V

I can see that, but that says more about relation between character or personality, and manifestation. I’m more interested in its development then its activities, which may even contradict that character.
—————

A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea. — Janus

Oh absolutely. Very well spoken. We post hoc name what we do, but the cum hoc doing, in and of itself, is nameless.

One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? — Janus

If the first is true, experience of oneself makes oneself as phenomenon, necessary. Under the auspices of some theoretical metaphysics, phenomena are the product of the synthesis of the matter of a thing given a posteriori by the perception of it, and some form which resides a priori in that faculty doing the synthesizing. While it is not contradictory for oneself to contain a priori form, it is utterly contradictory for oneself to contain matter. Because it cannot, one cannot perceive oneself, the synthesis initiated by perception immediately becomes impossible, hence oneself can never be phenomenon, from which follows necessarily, oneself can never be an experience.

What’s needed to justify oneself as an experience, is to predicate experience itself on something other than what some another theory demands. But different predication, while being necessary in order to change things around enough to grant the possibility of that which was originally denied, the logic grounding such predication must also be stronger than the original under suspicion.

Phenomenology, in the view from this armchair, while sufficing as a sufficiently different source of predication affirming the possibility for the experience of oneself, leaves out too much of the original doctrines to be powerful enough to grant that which was originally denied.

Whew!! Thanks for editing me out, saves me any more time trying to figure out how to respond.

….I just like details…. — Ludwig V

Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, it’s awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
—————

I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience — Janus

Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.

That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:

“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….”

It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.

Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.

No. For a number of reasons. — Ludwig V

D’accord.

Good enough reasons.

Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.

It was very good. Thanks.

Gotta love Ferguson’s Andy Rooney-vibe.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof.

Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. — creativesoul

All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.

The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t. Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.

I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in. — creativesoul

I’m guessing anyone thinking deeply enough about stuff he doesn’t know, gets himself into a pickle of some sort or another, sooner or later.

Assuming for the moment I’m actually in one, any recommendations as to how to get out of it?

So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind. — Ludwig V

There is that argument, but mine, given the context, is concerned with higher intellects in juxtaposition to lesser, and it is to the lesser the lack of knowledge pertains.

The argument leads to self-contradictions when higher is pitted against higher, for even if it is the case knowledge of minds in similar enough creatures is technically impossible, it becomes absurd to suppose humans do not all have the same kind of mind, or that any one of them may not have a mind of any kind at all.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

The matter is the clay; the general arrangement of the matter is the statue;
The matter contains all forms possible from the substance of the matter; the form necessarily contains no other substance than that of the matter from which it is arranged;
When both are given, without regard to either the constituency of the matter, nor the causality of the arrangement, the relation between them reduces to a modality, the primary schemata of which are change, re: a statue from clay, origination, re: this statue from clay, and necessity, re: this statue from clay.

Under the stated conditions, in which Bob paid for a certain arrangement, given as necessarily contained in the matter, but received back only the matter exhibiting no formed arrangement at all, relegates the relation, not to between the clay that exists and the statue that doesn’t, but to between Bob and the clay, which is still modality and still primarily the schema of change, in this case, the absence of it. The schema of necessity, on the other hand, becomes mere possibility, re: the clay still contains the possibility of arrangement into a statue.

So it is proper that the relation between the clay and the statue, and the relation between Bob and the clay, reduces to time, the only negotiable connection between that which changes and that which does not.

Bet you never saw that one comin’, dija???
(Charlie Chaplin-esque exit, stage right, or…guy gets his Mr. Smartypants ass yanked by giant hook, thrown out the backstage side door)

Opening a gate is possible by observation...
— Mww

No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be? — creativesoul

Exactly, insofar as it is implicitly self-contradictory, hence altogether impossible, for a minded creature to comprehend a mindless condition. Comprehension by a higher intellect of a lesser animal’s behavior, which to an investigator of it is mere experience, was never the problem. To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.

To which the common rejoinder is….well, crap on a cracker, dude….how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didn’t do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creature’s behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.

But, where such investigator is human, he doesn’t. He can’t; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.

While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away “…beneath the dignity of proper philosophy….”
—————

Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of. — creativesoul

I agree dogs do not take account of themselves, nor do they think about their knowledge, for to do so is to implicate a form of personal subjectivity separable from mere instinct, for which there is no observable warrant. I’d admit that it seems as though dogs take account** of the effects their behavior causes, but less so that they think themselves as causal.

How is to think about what they’re doing, not taking account of themselves? If it is the case dogs do not take account of themselves, it follows necessarily they do not think about what they’re doing, and if not of what they’re doing, then assuredly not temporal successions of it.

**Although, with that, is the lead-in to the suggestion they think, not about what they’re doing, but what they've done. But it is just as feasible to suppose an internal reaction predicated on external observed pain/pleasure, fight/flee, as rational thought in itself. I used to think my JRT did its thing just because it elicits a reaction from me which she found pleasurable, when it is just as likely she did her thing because to do otherwise elicits a reaction she finds less than pleasurable. Or, most likely of all, she did her thing regardless of me entirely.
—————

The striking singular difference….. — creativesoul

I like all that…..

Our own thought and belief(along with meaning, truth, and falsehood) are only discovered via language use. — creativesoul

…..except that. Which is a different can of different worms.

…..a priori/a posteriori was Kant’s summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction….
— Wayfarer

What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work. — Ludwig V

If I may:

As to the summation….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise (…) and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? (…) But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)…..”

As to the why…..

“…..Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. (…) The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.…”

Me, I think Kant imbedded this distinction in his work, because no one else, even if acknowledging the possibility of the distinction in one form or another, had constructed a method sufficient to prove both its feasibility and its limitations.

Construct, I think, rather than 'create', out of materials ready to hand, so to speak. — Wayfarer

Yes, much better. Thanks.
(Self dope-slaps. Shoulda got there by myself)
———-



You, too. Nice rendition of the essay. Thanks.
But I reserve self dope-slappin’ here, cuz I might not have got there by myself at all.

Might it be an even bigger problem, to label oneself with a philosophical label at all? To me it kind of suggests a closedness to different ways of looking at things. — wonderer1

Hmmmm…..

I think we’re allowed a certain closedness, which may reflect a related philosophical label, provided we’ve been intellectually honest in the procurement of it. We’re not entitled, on the other hand, intellectual honesty notwithstanding, when such closedness is falsified upon stronger ground.

I have no qualms about admitting to the rejection of some different ways of looking at things.

Isn’t the ‘order of reasons’ simply what it says? Something which any valid syllogism will exemplify? — Wayfarer

I thought that as well, but isn’t a syllogism a logical construct in propositional form, which we create?

Oh. Nice catch on scholastic philosophy/rigid adherence to dogma. It didn’t necessarily pertain to my comment; I just didn’t want the quote to feel naked cuz I was to lazy to included as its author would have expected.

An a prior conception is a prior knowledge: that is knowledge which one has independently of any possible experience. — Bob Ross

Given the procedure shown below, there is a systemic distinction between a conception and knowledge. We think an a priori conception iff there is no condition from experience contained in it, conceptions themselves being the purview of spontaneous discursive understanding or transcendental pure reason, a priori knowledge simply indicates that knowledge possible from a priori conditions. In other words, the conception alone is not knowledge.
————

The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought.
-Mww

So when you see a ball, you would call that the “thought” of a ball and not the “phenomena” of a ball? — Bob Ross

If I see a ball, I don’t call it either of those you mentioned. I call it a ball iff I already know it as such, or, if you inform me that’s what that thing I see, is.

When I see a ball, is not the same as what happens when my cognitive system operates correctly according to theoretical transcendental idealism.

In operating correctly, the system is affected by an object….
(I sense via vision, re: I see….)

(Remove long typically over-blown dissertation on correct metaphysical operations. You’re welcome. (Grin))
—————-

This is cheating. I am asking what you call, generically, the thing which is the result of the intuition and cognition—of which we experience—and you just replied with “it’s whatever our brain thinks it is—e.g., a ball”. — Bob Ross

Ok, generically, you’re correct enough. Generically. In everyday situations. Mere convention. But convention cannot satisfy the relation between my “the unity of phenomenon and conception”, something we subconsciously do, and your “what do you see when you see a ball?”, an experience, something we consciously have. So I wasn’t cheating; I was being overly-analytic. Unnecessarily precise.

And I didn’t say whatever our brain says it is; I said whatever our understanding says it is, insofar as the faculty of understanding, in its full procedural operation, thinks, judges and cognizes….all those systemic artifices which are grounded in logic as opposed to being grounded in external reality and externally affected physiology, and internal reproductive imagination, re: intuition, the sum of which is called sensibility.
————-

Do you not believe that transcendental idealism presupposes that one has cogent knowledge that the individual exists in reality as it is in-itself and is of such a nature as to have representative faculties which represents objects which exist in reality in-itself according to how it is pre-structured to sense and represent? These are all claims about the world as it is in-itself, and not merely as it appears to us. — Bob Ross

I do not believe, more accurately stated as I do not hold with the opinion, transcendental idealism presupposes humans possess knowledge of some kind or degree, but does presuppose nonetheless, that the human individual is of such a nature as to have representational faculties imbued in a system by which any knowledge at all is possible. It follows that whatever cogent knowledge a human has, simply makes explicit the system presupposed as contained in the nature of individuals, is sufficient for the provision of it, and thereby denies to that system Locke’s notion of innate knowledge as such, while at the same time refuting Hume’s rejection of pure knowledge a priori.

I do not see all these claims as being about the world as it is in itself.
————-

Could it be that the biggest problem for indirect realists, is being called indirect realists?

“….If we think at all, we must think of ourselves (…) as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it….”
(Nagel, 1997)

“….finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation.(…) it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science (…) to favour a criticism (…) by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel….”
(Kant, 1787)



What, in your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it?

Sadly, I don’t think you addressed the paradox from the OP: what were your thoughts on it? — Bob Ross

Bottom line, my thoughts are….either there, 1.) isn’t one, or, 2.) is one albeit of illegitimate origin.
————-

Shouldn’t it be “intuited”, since the, according to you, “phenomena” are the result of a priori intuition and not cognition? — Bob Ross

No. The context for that comment was knowledge. “First cognized” refers to an activity of understanding. Phenomena are the result the synthesis of the matter of sensation with the arrangement of that matter according to an a priori space and time-conditioned form.
————-

By “phenomena”, I was referring to the end result of intuition and cognition: we were just talking about two different things. What term would you use for such an end result which includes the two elements you described (namely phenomena and a priori knowledge)? Viz., what’s the object which we experience called then? — Bob Ross

Hence the potential illegitimacy: we cannot be talking of phenomena in two different ways, or phenomena as two different things, and still say the originator of them is correct in his conclusion, insofar as that very conclusion is predicated on the nature he himself prescribes to them.

The two elements of our cognitions I mentioned were phenomena and conceptions. I have yet to mention a priori knowledge for the simple reason at the juncture of phenomena and conceptions, in and of themselves alone, there isn’t any to mention, in that the faculty of reason which is the source of it, isn’t yet in the explanatory picture.

The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought, itself a third of what the faculty of understanding does. There is no definable end result as such, which includes phenomena and a priori knowledge.

The object we experience is called, is expressively represented by, whatever name understanding thinks for it. In general, on the other hand, objects of experience itself, that of which experience is composed, as the end of a system of knowledge, are the determined empirical representations of what was initially sensed as the “undetermined object of intuition”.
—————

To be fair, you may have a legitimate paradox in mind, but the expression of it herein, the conditions by which you promote its validity, cannot follow from the text in which you say it is to be found.

To be even more fair…..cannot follow from the text as I understand it, and the quotes from which establish the mistakenness of those attributions used as validity. In particular, the notion of stripping away a priori predications, which, if deemed even possible, destroys the entire transcendental philosophy which grounds our system of empirical knowledge in the first place, making any paradox related to it, moot.

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations….. — Bob Ross

The source of phenomena does not cognize…..

“… it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)…”

…..which demonstrates that receptivity and cognition are separate faculties, hence the functions of them must be commensurably separate, even while necessarily working together for a given end.

Phenomena result from “…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. (…) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation….”.

But the matter and form of which a phenomenon is constituted still does not result in one….

“…. we find existing in the mind à priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations….”

…..and it is then the case the synthesis of matter and form is required in order to result in a phenomenon: “…. synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge….”.

The “phenomenal world” is only intuition itself, and, the “certain relations” are between the “undetermined object” and space and time. “Arranged and viewed” is merely a euphemism for cognized, which is clearly post hoc relative to the synthesis of the matter of sensation to the pure form in the mind a priori.

“Elements of our cognitions” are that which constitutes them, but are not them. Phenomena then, are one of two elements of our cognition, the other being conception, there being possibly a manifold of each for any given cognition.

—————

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible…. — Bob Ross

Any given phenomena presupposes the a priori means of intuition, otherwise none would be given. Stripping such a priori means makes phenomena impossible, insofar as all that could remain is its matter given from mere sensation, making the intelligibility of them irrelevant.

In simplistic common sense, as well as a dualistic epistemological metaphysic, such as CPR promotes, the knowledge of what an object is, is impossible by its sensation alone**. THAT there is an appearance of something is determinable from its sensation, but that an object appears, from which we know only the mode of its reception, re: which sensual device is affected, does nothing to facilitate the object’s relation is to our understanding, or, which is the same thing, how it is to be, first, cognized, and consequently, known, by us.
(**An argument prevails still, that experience grants knowledge of things from their sensation alone, but this negates the systemic functionality of human intelligence, which is necessary to relate to which experience a repetitive sensation refers. Enter…..consciousness, the highest transcendental object belonging to humans alone, as a derivable product of pure reason. For whatever THAT’S worth.)

Thanks for the nod, Bob. Hopefully whatever I contribute helps in some way.

…..proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

If he correctly concludes, how can a paradox arise? Isn’t a paradox only possible if he wasn’t correct with his conclusion, given the initial conditions? Is it that a paradox is being manufactured from a misunderstanding?

Thing-in-themselves are never considered by those faculties providing empirical knowledge: “…. the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made….”.

Things-in-themselves are only ever considered by the faculty of reason: “….. objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility…..”.

Really shouldn’t be that taxing to grasp the notion knowledge….regardless of the adjective describing it…..of thing-in-themselves is impossible, insofar as representation is necessary for all knowledge of anything, and things-in-themselves are only considered by reason, which is not part of the constitution of our sensibility which provides representations.

All the world is not accessible to you….
— Mww

Well, there's me in my place. — Vera Mont

Ever been to the center of the Earth? Have any experience of it, whether direct, indirect, 1st, 2nd, 3rd…..hand? Ever going to? Think you got enough time to experience all those parts of the world that are accessible you?

I don’t care about whatever place you’re in, only what you say while you’re there.

You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess. — creativesoul

HA!! What…no sense of adventure? No foray into the sublime? Not a fan of time-wasting? But yeah, I get that a lot; explains the great disparity between my comments and mentions.

Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking? — creativesoul

Opening a gate is possible by observation, but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise.

Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.
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All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too. — Vera Mont

All the world is not accessible to you, even while the observed and recorded behavior of (some) animals, is. What is not included in the observed and recorded behavior of animals, is that which is the cause of it, which we as humans consider rational thought.

Do you know of a man named Vladimir Putin? Is he accessible to you? — Vera Mont

Of course I know of a particular man, and therefore of course he’s accessible to me; I got a tv.

To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if you’d asked if I knew Putin, I’d have given a different answer?
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Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience? — Vera Mont

Correct. If another’s capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldn’t be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.

Is there any experience that isn’t subjective?

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
— Mww

By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. — Vera Mont

If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. Which is not to say we cannot infer, from an experience, its cause. But I’m not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.

All notions of ‘physical’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. — Ludwig V

I disagree. All notions of physical, all of that which is conditioned by natural relations, do rest on the same ground, but such ground is Nature. Nature cannot contradict itself, but human intelligence certain has that capacity.

Is it really worth the trouble, to admit other possible worlds and such, in which, e.g, our logical principles, and by extension our mathematical principles, are false, or, even the totality of this Nature inaccessible to us in which there may be natural contradiction, and we are forced to start over? How would we even do that, if all we thought we knew is destroyed, but the internal mechanisms by which we know anything at all, remains the same?

The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. — Ludwig V

Agreed. But this presupposes world, and world as not that which contains the lens through which it is understood. There is us, and there is not-us, which justifies the distinction in grounds upon which they rest.
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Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior,
— Mww

What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time. — Ludwig V

This conflates the effect with the cause of it. Rational/irrational behavior is a complementary pair in exhibition of rationality. Humans know what rationality is, without the necessity of an example of it, and irrationality being merely its negation.

It is absurd to say humans don’t apprehend rationality, in that rationality is the general human rule and irrationality is the exception to the rule.
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thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
— Mww

That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. — Ludwig V

It can’t mean that, without self-contradiction. But that’s irrelevant, in juxtaposition to your response intermingling internal with external, yet my comment maintains their separation. In correcting the inconsistency, it is true my judgement of your thought/belief, being the aforementioned external arbiter, is unjustified, in that I have no warrant whatsoever for it. It is only your behavior consequential to your thought/belief that is sufficient warrant, such behavior being external to yourself hence for me a mere perception, understood, as you say, through a lens that is me.

And don’t neglect context here. The dialectical dichotomy refers to humans as opposed to lesser animals, which does not abide in human as opposed to human, which is what you’ve done. Now it is the case that for me to refuse affirmation of your thought/belief, its inaccessibility to me notwithstanding, perfectly exemplifies my invalid judgement.
(sidebar on a technicality: all judgements are justified, else they wouldn’t be judgements. Conclusions to which judgements arrive may be unjustified, iff subsequent judgements with different premises falsify them.)
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Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided. — Ludwig V

I am not withholding language-less thought belief; to do so is to contradict myself, insofar as I affirm my own. I am withholding affirmation of thought/belief, specifically rational thought/belief, in language-less intelligences. Provision of sufficient reason for withholding such affirmation reduces to the fact they cannot inform me of it on the one hand, and I have no possibility of affirming that which is inaccessible to me on the other.
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Two conclusions follow. — Ludwig V

This is tantamount to claiming that cloud which looks like a flying horse, is a flying horse. Extreme example, but holding in principle. That which instills a notion in us cannot be used as proof for the validity of the notion, re: sunrise/sunset. The notion that deities exist cannot itself prove they do.

Anyway….feel free to rebut as you will.

“…Dan, you pompous ass!!!….

A gentle reminder, n’est ce pas?, not to take what we do here all that seriously?

Back in The Day, 60 Minutes ended each show with “Point/Counterpoint”, parodied on SNL most hilariously between Jane and Dan.
(jesuuuuuus, that as funny. Sad commentary, perhaps: 1975…the last time I remember laughing that hard (sigh))

All that follows is dry, humorless point/counterpoint, a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, if you will, with all due respect:

We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. — creativesoul

All notions of ‘rational’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “rationality” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.

The quality of any behavior, which is to say whether such behavior is rational, which reduces to whether the quality of the thought/belief from which the behavior follows is rational, can only be judged by that intelligence that deems itself in possession of it. Just as we cannot know the beauty of a thing without the apprehension of beauty itself to which that thing relates. Just as we cannot deem an observed act as moral without our own sense of what morality is.

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, the notion follows that rationality should be apprehendable in other animals by humans regardless of behavior, which is under any condition whatsoever impossible, hence the notion is incoherent.

This is no reflection on language-less thought/belief as such, which is, again, only apprehendable from a human point of view. It is not a valid judgement that lesser animals are language-less, nor is it a valid judgement that lesser animals engage in thought/belief. Regarding the former, any series of vocalizations by any species so capable of them, in conjunction with another of like kind, can be a language for them, and, thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.

But it is non-contradictory that humans do engage in language-less thought/belief, given the possibility of thought/belief by means of mere imagery. And from that follows that it is also non-contradictory to maintain that, in humans, thought/belief in general and rational thought/belief in particular, is antecedent to and proper ground for, the inception and development of language in them as a species.

Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. And without sufficient reason to grant to these quite lesser animals thought/belief, it is then immediately contradictory to grant them rationality, which is merely a relative quality of thought itself.

Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?

Odd, innit? We find ourselves using our intelligence to judge other intelligences, but in the very judging of them we have no choice but to treat them other than how they may actually be. Which is the same as being completely wrong, which in turn, and indeed to be rational about it, makes explicit we are best served to not engage in those judgements at all.

….be sure to tune in next week….

In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter. — creativesoul

I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.

What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?

Forgive me if I’m supposed to know this, if I’ve been informed already and let it slip away.

What about microscopic organisms…. — kindred

Fits the offered criterion of an existent/thing, no different in principle than an ice cube in a glass.

There are other things things that exist too which have no discernible affect upon our senses such as magnetism — kindred

Feynman says fields are things, but he’s a science guy having little truck with philosophers. With that in mind, an affect on the senses by an effect of a cause does not necessarily make the cause a thing. From a philosophical/epistemological perspective, I’d rather leave such phenomena as magnetism, gravity, charge, and whatnot, as forces or fields, and leave that which is acted upon by them, as existents/things.

But that’s just my opinion, in answering the question contained in the thread title.

On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought. — creativesoul

At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.

Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated back on pg.7, which drew precious little relevant response, I thought. I’d have to go check, but I don’t recall anyone actually answering the question, but instead gave questionable examples of individual notions of it. Or wandered off into disciplines from which no relevant answer would ever be sufficient.

Anyway, as you say…..cheers!!!

That part attributed to me, isn’t mine.
— Mww
Yes, you are right. — Ludwig V

WHEW!!! Thanks. I was wondering how I was gonna get myself out of that personal self-contradiction, if it was something I actually said.

I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation. — Ludwig V

One can do with a word what cannot be done with a concept, and vice versa. Thing is, if one wishes to not do what is conditioned by a word, he can still do what is done with concepts. If one wishes to not do what is conditioned by concepts, he can do absolutely nothing at all, which includes not wishing what he wished to not do.

No structural similarity? Isn’t “concept” a word? Isn’t ”word” a concept? In that respect, they are in the same category, but I agree that does not in itself justify calling the relationship a representation. I think it the prerogative of a specific theoretical metaphysic that establishes that justification.

If it is the case a specific theoretical metaphysic can establish a justification, it is not contradictory pursuant to that same metaphysic, to then declare, and perhaps even prove, it is not a concept from which meaning is determinable. And if THAT is the case, your “a concept is the meaning of a word” cannot be true, insofar as concepts, again pursuant to that same metaphysic, are only that by which particular cognitive functionality is possible. In other words, concepts enable function but are meaningless in and of themselves. Meaning is determinable only from the relation of conceptions to each other, but not necessarily from any conception on its own. Best, or easiest, way to comprehend this idea is, it is absolutely impossible to cognize any object whatsoever, if it is represented by a single conception. You cannot say what an object is, if all you think of it, is “round”. Or, “green”. Or, “upright”.

Which goes a great distance in limiting the notion, hence the very possibility, of rationality in animals, I should hope.