Funny animal it may seem, yet still be nonetheless relevant to the topic at hand. Or, I guess, now, the sub-topic.

Ehhhhh….dialectical precedent has it that responses to a quote are subjectively more honest without the influence of the author’s name, which is often detrimental to the message on the one hand, or tautologically affirms it on the other.

That, and my clandestine supposition that 1787 would be a sufficient clue.

Do you have more? Didn’t mean to shut you off.

But those details are what give you the evidence of the degree of belief, or confidence. — Ludwig V

A bet was intended to represent the subjective validity of a belief, for which the quality of the evidence just is the degree, both of which are presupposed in the construction of it.

That which evidences my degree of belief, and that by which I am confident of its truth….and indeed whether or not I’m inclined to bet on it at all…..is determined by the possibility of my experience of its object.

Those conditions incorporated in a bet I make, what kind and how much, or even the one I wouldn’t, give YOU the evidence of the degree of my belief, and the confidence in it. This becomes quite apparent, when I admit you are more justified in betting greater on the sun rising tomorrow, than I am betting there is life on other planets we can see.

But enough of this, yes? I was only pointing out the peripheral notion of bets in historical metaphysical investigations.

“…. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition—if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience—that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds….” (ibid)

The nature of and how much the bet, and by whom the validity of the ground of the bet is judged, is irrelevant, with respect to its occurrence. Hence the implied correspondence to induction, which serves a subject as sufficient rational justification a priori for the construction of his empirical beliefs, while not being sufficient for their proofs.

The point being, of course, all of this has been done before, in which case should be found, if not the congruent thesis, then at least a conceptually similar initial condition, merely clothed in new words.

“…. The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. (…) If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.…” (1787)

….although the conceptual relations don't cause natural events, they describe them? — BillMcEnaney

For dialectical consistency, we must say that metaphysically, conceptual relations as such, represent human understanding of natural events. Words describe; understanding uses no words hence doesn’t describe.

In whichever form conceptual relations are eventually understood, the words used to express such relation represents a description post hoc ergo propter hoc, of the understanding alone, which is twice removed from the event itself.

And still as yet has no sufficient justification for reference as law, but merely the initial condition established for its possibility, for as yet there is no account of the principles to which the relations must accord.

Metaphysics: that fun shit in which every single rational human ever necessarily indulges but, all-too-humanly, seldom bothers to acknowledge, while nonetheless thrilled to hear himself talk and then think there’s something important about that.

….metaphysical, not linguistic. I want to know what a law of nature consists of. — BillMcEnaney

All law consists of the relation of conceptions in accordance with principles. That subsumed under law is determined by the source of the principles to which it accords, and that legislated by law is determined by the source of the causality of its objects.

The possibility of law in general on the one hand, and the apodeitic certainty of law on the other, is given from the principles of universality and necessity.

In the case of natural law, then, in which all causality of objects is Nature itself, the source of conceptions is empirical understanding, which is itself always predicated on observation of those objects, the relation being an effect to its cause.

An expression of a law is linguistic in one form or another; the construction of it, is always metaphysical, the purview of speculative pure reason for natural law, and practical reason for moral law in the case made by deontological philosophy.

A metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.

For whatever that’s worth.

My basic (and speculative) thesis is this:…. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I like it too. Or something pretty close to it.

…..this process doesn't necessarily map onto any external reality independent of us; rather, it helps us cope with whatever it is we inhabit. — Tom Storm

Agreed, insofar as all natural external reality is independent from us with respect to its existence, but whatever of external reality to which the process….whatever it may be….does map, is necessarily not independent from us with respect to its perception by us, hence is the mere occassion for the possibility of any experience for us.

I agree we see and use patterns. — Tom Storm

I’ve had better luck with relations, which seems to be what patterns reduce to. Another story, though, for another time. Or not.

It would just take spacetime closer and closer to alpha without ever reaching the point of completion. — jgill

I haven’t the slightest clue regarding Banach space, but I recognize the common version of Zeno’s Paradox when I see it.

Happy doodling.

the entire structure of spacetime contracts to that singular alpha.(…) Which means no "end" to spacetime, but eventually all is taken to the vicinity of alpha. — jgill

Now that got me off on a Planck-scale research trip, I must say. Fascinating idea to be sure, but, if spacetime structure contracts to a single point, for which descriptions of events is complete insofar as there wouldn’t be any more events to describe, wouldn’t that suffice as the end of spacetime?

Granted, only for this particular model, which gets us back to the notion of ending spacetime just is the ending of models representing it. I mean….there was a beginning of spacetime, 1908 or thereabouts, so its ending shouldn’t be all that inconceivable, right?

(Can you hear it? In the background? The whispers? That here, is a perfect example of philosophy getting in the way of science? (Sigh))

Be cool as hell, wouldn’t it, to find the palette idea in the marginations of the very first outline of his magnum opus? When he was, like, 18yo? His rather extensive corpus doesn’t give that clue, as far as I am aware, but to find something like it would be quite interesting.

On the other hand, the applicability of analogies are somewhat the opinions of their creators, and opinions are assertorically denied as syllogistic devices in CPR, so, there is that….

At any rate, it was fun.

I am referring to the end of space-time, and its associated laws. — Jack Cummins

The thread title and the OP refer to different concepts. The end of time and the end of spacetime can only be determinable by very different sets of conditions.

Time ends with the end of the last relational intelligence; spacetime ends after the last formulation of a mathematical model of a relativistic continuum.

Nahhh….all that fits well enough.

Did you keep the palette at three colors only to represent a relatively simple idea? How are the “moving parts of other areas and concepts and systems” affected?

Bigger palette?

The analogy to sensation is one thing, and the colors represent the things of sensation. The analogy to Kant is taken as another thing entirely. — Fire Ologist

I understand; my point was only that the three colors in Kant don’t do what you’re suggesting.

That, and, sorry, I misspoke in saying Kant would agree we live in a green world of phenomena. Our intelligence functions on representations, from which follows our knowledge is not of things as such, but we exist as objects, thus live, in a world of real things.

Why wouldn’t Kant agree we live in green world, behind the phenomenal veil that our mind construct, keeping us separate from things in themselves? — Fire Ologist

He would agree with that, I’ve no doubt. But he would not agree with “So blue represents the thing-in-itself that we can never know in its blue self; yellow represents the categories of mind that construct or allow for our experience; and our experience is all green phenomena.”

First….we have no way of knowing the blue self of a thing. It is only ever blue because we say it is;

Then…the yellow as category belongs to understanding, hence is not the OP’s yellow analogous to the senses, which is mere sensation belonging to sensibility;

Then…our experience is not of phenomena, but is the synthesis of phenomena with conceptions. Phenomena represent only that which is conditioned by both space and time, thereby are only the determinant conditions for the possibility of experience.

Finally…the green of sensation in the Sense Perception bracket of the OP is not the green of the phenomena found in the Kant bracket. Phenomena, in Kant are the “…undetermined object of empirical intuition…”, but sensation is merely “….that of reality by which the senses are affected…”

So….behind the phenomenal veil the mind constructs, keeping us separate from the things-in-themselves….yep, spot on. No metaphors needed. On the other hand, neither of your iterations of green in the aforementioned brackets, is a sufficient metaphor representing the world we live in.

Again, I have no warrant to critique your analogy in general, only that of it which reflects improper attributions to Kantian speculative metaphysics, as I understand it.

Either the analogy works to depict Kant’s idea, or it doesn’t. I think it does. — Fire Ologist

Depict as to give an idea of perception in general, yeah, maybe. Under Kantian textual scrutiny, I think it does not. That being said, I have no wish to upset the resident applecart.

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them. — Leontiskos

I would agree, in principle. A norm, insofar as it is a euphemism for some explicit rational condition, understanding is that by which that condition is given its object. That I understand perfectly well the explicit condition, e.g., respect as a certain, albeit merely cultural, norm, it does not follow I must always without exception, hold the door for a lady.

Does that make more sense? — Fire Ologist

More I’m happy to accept, given the general intent of your analogy. Shades of that “ways to philosophize” thread….I’m quite in love with dissecting minutia, in high hopes of philosophizing with clarity and precision, donchaknow.

Probably more than required to grasp the point.

Of the above, I think it works best to help explain sense perception, then secondly, Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction. — Fire Ologist

Before that help is affirmative, it should be stipulated in what sense “yellow is analogous to the senses – eyeballs, ears, nervous systems, etc.”, insofar as in Kant, the sensory devices are not part of what is commonly understood as the nervous system. They are only the physiological bridge, nowadays called the peripherals, between your empirical blue of the external world, and rational green of internal sensibility, justified by the fact that each object, or product/output, of five different and physically distinct modes of data reception are all treated the same way….governed by the same fundamental criteria….by subsequent procedural mechanisms, which makes explicit the senses, while only distinct from each other, are necessarily distinct from that to which their respective sensations are given.

In addition, also only with respect to Kant, “The noumenal blue objects we sense and come to know…”, is a contradiction.

The Kantian references falsify your thesis; it may have been more helpful overall, without it. But you did say helps secondly, so….

Is there any philosopher since Descartes who has actually defended, as opposed to trying to resolve, scepticism? — Ludwig V

If it be allowed that scepticism as such, is, “….the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein….”, Kant treats scepticism as a natural prerogative or intrinsic condition of reason itself, its ubiquitous nature thereby mandating it best be done properly, which just means to be sceptical in accordance with a method by which one is“….endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of misunderstanding…”.

So it can be said scepticism, at least in this form, is both defended insofar as it is inescapable, and, resolved insofar as it is subjected to a proper method.

The deeper question that I think we should be talking about is what lies behind the ancient philosophical tradition of denying common sense reality. — Ludwig V

Two cents:

Given that common sense reality just means we know things as they are, my understanding of the tradition of denying common sense reality, stems from the major premise contained in at least some versions of that tradition, that the human cognitive system is representational, in that everything to which it is directed is mere affected senses, re: sensation, from which alone no cognition is at all possible.

However deep the question, whether it should be talked about or not is governed by who’s talking. To those who insist a chair is a chair, tend to neglect how it came to be one….probably less than profitable.

Not that there are no obscure prog rock albums from 1973, which makes the analogy works well enough, but it is rather coincidental that one of the 4 or 5 least obscure albums of all time, is both prog rock and came out in 1973.

But, to be sure, this tidbit of philosophizing could be conceived as trivially boring.

Good; well-thought.

I personally hesitate to use creativity regarding philosophical innovation, instead, favoring some sufficiently explanatory methodological construction. The reason being, given the fundamental preconditions of human intelligence in general, those the negation of which is either impossible or self-contradictory, necessarily limit all that follows from them, which is just to limit how creative a new philosophical doctrine can be.

And what of rules? If it is the case human intelligence in general is predicated on some set of rules….of whatever form and origin they may be…..and the proper business of philosophy is the study of human intelligence in general, rules would seem to be anathema to, or at least in conflict with, creativity as a proper philosophical ground.

On the other hand, I gotta admit, it’s a fine line between creating a system, and constructing one. Perhaps merely another stupid language game, getting in the way of good ol’ fashioned logical thought.

I don't think anyone here favors Enlightenment rationality…. — Leontiskos

I do, iff considered as pre-Brentano, re: late 19th century, hardly the apex of the Enlightenment paradigm.

But you probably meant by “anyone here”, conversational participants, rather than just some guy raising his hand from the back of the room.

I'm the one defending the nit-pickers. I had you in mind in crafting the thought…. — Moliere

Oh, I’m a rational-life-long, card-carryin’ dissector, to be sure. I do loves me some minutia, donchaknow, in the interest of philosophical clarity of course.

I'm not sure there's such a thing as apprehension prior to judgment at all. Hence theory-ladenness, though I wouldn't put it at the level of structuring our perceptions very frequently. — Moliere

Theory-ladenness notwithstanding, A99/B160 should make clear that apprehension, in the Kantian sense, has to do with the possibility of perception, and as such, is very much methodologically antecedent to discursive** judgement with respect to empirical cognition.

Aesthetic judgement, on the other hand….that which regards the inspiration of some feeling relative to the representation of a perception….presupposes that the perception has already been structured.

Personally, given the emphasis on apperception and its rather more convincing necessity in the overall theoretical construct, I can do without apprehension in this Kantian sense.

Anyway….just my opinion.

(** philosophically archaic definition, so as not to be confused with the way the term is commonly used on this thread, yet consistent with the immediate subject matter.)

Each thing, then, would be caused by a prior actuality which would provide it with compresence of properties, identity through time, and potency by the mere causality of forms upon forms…. — Bob Ross

All well and good, perhaps, unless or until we want to know what each thing is, how it is to be known as that thing and no other. In such case, the tracing back of its identity through time holds no interest for us.

On the other hand, for that family of things of perfectly natural causality, the knowledge of which is contingent at best, as opposed to man-made assemblages of things in general for which knowledge is necessarily given, to trace the “mere causality of forms upon forms” inevitably leads to at least contradictions, and at most, to impossibilities.
————-

…..it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality). Each thing, then, would be caused by a prior actuality…. — Bob Ross

If matter is missing….what thing can there be? Getting rid of matter in Aristotle’s sense: is there any sense in which matter is not the particular constituency of a thing, regardless of its arrangement or assemblage according to form?
————-

But you asked for a better Aristotle-ian hylomorphic understanding than your own, which I admittedly don’t have, voluntarily confined to the Enlightenment version of the matter/form juxtapositional attitude.

I do think Hume is a bit more rationalist than given credit even on a straight reading. — Moliere

Perhaps the missing shade of blue is a bit of rationalistic thinking? I mean, he admits, re: E.C.H.U., 2, 16, an exception to the general rule of constant conjunction, insofar as he grants a subject may indeed apprehend that of which he has no experience.

….not being able to say (?):

…seems like a tautology to see (say) our minds create…. — prothero

How can a metaphysical project, the theme of which is the set of necessary conditions for a theoretical method of empirical human knowledge, have contained in it as central to that theme, that which is systemically impossible to know anything about?

Given such thematic major premise, it follows as a matter of course that….

…..phenomena/noumena is a false dichotomy;
…..by definition, the mind cannot create reality;
…..a supposed reality in itself is a methodological, systemic, contradiction.

But then, times have changed, pick the predicates of one or of another, but to co-mingle them destroys both.

It pains me greatly to admit I no longer have the acuity, and perhaps not even the time, to absorb first order critical philosophy. It’s like….all I absorbed before is all I’m gonna get. And considering how long THAT took….(sigh).

That being said, it was indeed a pleasure talking to you. Have fun with M. Henry.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy, p106

“….If, then, we learn nothing more by this critical examination than what we should have practised in the merely empirical use of the understanding, without any such subtle inquiry, the presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed upon it….”
(A237/B296)

We perceive real things directly. What more needs to be said?
— Mww

But the way we perceive them is probably not the way they are. — boundless

Doesn’t matter what they are; our intelligence tells us how they will be for us.

Naive realism asserts that we perceive things as they are. — boundless

I don’t favor that position.

Direct realist asserts that our perceptions give us direct access to the external world in itself and we can know how the world is independent on the mental representations. — boundless

I agree that our perception gives us direct access to the external world but not in itself, and I reject the rest.
(On second thought….our perception is how the external world has direct access to us. The first makes it seem like we go out to it, when in fact it comes in to us.)

So probably Kant would agree that we somehow perceive 'real things directly' but we can't know whether they really are as they appear to us. — boundless

Agreed, but without the “probably”. From the beginning, that’s his general introduction to the part on sensibility. Also, “appear” in his use is mere presence, as in “given”, and not “looks like”. So to say they may not really be as they appear, doesn’t make any sense. And if you already were aware of that distinction, there remains the further condition that perception has no cognitive power, so to say that which appears may not be as it appears, indicating it may not really be this or that thing, or some thing with this or that set of properties, makes no sense.

In effect, and to make a long story short….we tell things what they are. All they gotta do, is show up.

Kant believed in an external reality but he did believe that we don't have an unmediated knowledge of it. — boundless

Agreed. So what mediates between the external reality in perception, to empirical knowledge in experience, if not the intelligence directly affected by that reality. Again, that intrinsic dualism pervades the method.

In fact, to us what is 'given' it's an already pre-ordained world, the empirical world, which is already modeled in sensible and intellectual categories (like space, time, pluarality and so on). — boundless

Ok, as long as pre-ordained just means the world is what it is, regardless of how it got to be what it is. But the world isn’t already modeled, insofar as the mode of our cognitive system is representational, which just is to construct a model, mentally, in conjunction with the effect an object has on the senses, physiologically.

But if the empirical world is a 'representation' then it can't be a 'direct realism', except in the sense that we have direct knowledge of the representation. Direct realism asserts that we have direct knowledge of the 'world in itself'. — boundless

I’m not a fan of these -isms. Guy doesn’t like things the way they are, he just creates another -ism to cover what he thought was missing in the one before it. I take the two words, direct and real, and the only situation where those two go together without contradicting each other, is the relation between things in the world, and our perception of them. We perceive real things directly. What more needs to be said?

….what's the point of transcendental idealism? — boundless

There are three: establish the validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn establishes a non-self-contradictory method for acquiring empirical knowledge, contra Hume, which in turn defines the limits of pure reason contra Berkeley’s brand of dogmatic, re: purely subjective, idealism.

….probably I am using the words in an imprecise way…. — boundless

….and I am probably being overly precise.

I believe that 'our' empirical worlds are similar. — boundless

As do I. I have no reason yet, to think they are not, allowing for differences in experience.

They might have the same structure owing to the fact that, as humans, we share the same sensible and cognitive faculties. — boundless

Or, they may seem to have the same structure, because they do.

But there is a fundamental 'privateness' of my experience that suggests to me that my empirical world is indeed 'mine'. This doesn't imply, of course, that we can have an intersubjective agreement. — boundless

Unless it is the case your experiences are of representations of the empirical world, and not the world itself. The representations, then, are indeed your own, born of your own intellect, from which the notion that your experiences are indeed your own receives its justifications.

Fundamental privateness of your experiences, yep; fundamental privateness of the empirical world….nahhhh. Share-sies, dude. This land is your land this land is my land and all that kinda hippie prophetizing, donchaknow.
————-

But if the 'world' is given and is knowable I am not sure how transcendental/epistemic idealism isn't a form of direct realism. — boundless

Transcendental philosophy presupposes direct realism. There is an inescapable duality intrinsic to that method.

I would say that epistemic idealists do not hold any views about what is 'given'. — boundless

I’m ok with that, although I might quibble regarding the view they would all say that it is given. No views on what is given, but holding with the view that something is given.

we can analyse and study our empirical world so for empirical knowledge the empirical world is given. — boundless

I disagree. For empirical knowledge, the empirical world is given. To know is to know about something. The analysis and study from which knowledge follows, is of representation of the empirical world, which are constructs of the human cognitive system. A.K.A., experience.

…..in transcendental idealism the empirical world is a representation/construct of sensible and congnitive faculties of the mind. — boundless

The empirical world is a representation, the conception of the totality of real things of possible experience. But the empirical world is not a thing we know; we know only of representations of things in it. And because it is a mere conception, there is no sensibility involved, no intuition hence no phenomenon, which explains why knowledge of it is impossible.

In Kant and the Enlightenmrnt era natural philosophy, the world is a general conception, having all possible existent things subsumed under it. The ancients called such conceptions Universals.
————-

But if one accepts that there is an intelligible external reality which can in principle be known (and we know/understand in part as it is possible to us), then, there are no different 'worlds' here but different understandings of the world, one perhaps more correct than the other. — boundless

Pretty much what I’ve been saying all along. If this is your position as well, perhaps we’ve just been tangled up in words. And maybe a scattered misplaced principle here and there.

The object IS sensory intuition conjoined with a concept in the apriori intuitions of space and time. — Astrophel

If the object IS the intuition, what use would pure a priori intuitions themselves, have?

The object is not the sensory intuition, but only the occassion by which it is possible.

Conjoined concepts in the a priori intuitions of space and time, is form. The synthesis of this form, with the matter given a posteriori as sensation, gives phenomena, that which represents objects perceived by the senses.

The phenomenon IS sensory intuition.

There is no object in the normal way science and everydayness says there is. — Astrophel

Agreed, but still, there IS an object….

So when you say "and not in the object to which the principle merely applies" I am sure this is not what Kant's "idealism" is about. — Astrophel

….and insofar as the normal way of science and everydayness demands it should be so, I think that’s the epitome of Kantian idealism, re: the supremacy of the subject, in that he gives to…bestows upon….objects that which is commonly thought as belonging to them.

That object is the sensory intuitions and concept unity. You can't speak of the object that is outside of this unity. — Astrophel

Agreed, the object cannot be spoken of outside the construct of its representation, but the object is not that construct. One minor exception might be that the object can be spoken of as existing, for that is the singular necessary condition for all that follows. Re: Plato’s “knowledge that”, or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”.
————-

….only referring to that which must be “….something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related…”….
— Mww

No, no. First, this "must be" is only because he wants separate phenomena from that which it represents, not from any analytic necessity. — Astrophel

How can it not be analytically necessary, when that object which is outside of me most certainly is not in the same space as the object which is my body? The “must” of the quote, and the “must be” of my comment relates only me and objects that affect my senses, as yet having nothing to do with phenomena.

Furthermore, it isn’t so much that he wants to separate phenomena from that which it represents, but rather, it is a mandate of his transcendental doctrine that human knowledge is of representations of things and not of things as they are in themselves.

But you seem to think Kant is allowing something like "nature" which you referred to earlier, some objective substratum, but this is not how it is. — Astrophel

Yeah, I do think Kant’s metaphysical program, in all its various iterations, requires something like Nature, in order to have that which stands on one end of his intrinsic dualism: everything from objective moral behavior, to irreducible proofs for logical syllogisms, to rebutting Newton.
————-

I agree with a lot of your interpretations here, but not so much with your conclusions. That being said…

….the concept of a noumenon. It is not
indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything, but signifies only the thought of something in general…. — Astrophel

Signifies thought of something. In general. Where there is thought alone, the inputs from the faculties of sensibility are vacant, representations being borrowed from consciousness for those antecedent experiences, from understanding itself for those merely possible experiences. All this time we’ve been talking of objects in general, for which the immediate input from sensibility is absolutely required.

Why the switch? What’s this have to do with Nature?

In other words, he is not talking about a thing in any way determined by some even vaguely physical standards. — Astrophel

Agreed.

It is entirely determined transcendentally. — Astrophel

Noumena is entirely determined transcendentally? Noumena are not determined at all; ever notice there is never any noumenal thing? There is never any synthesis of representation into a cognition, which can then be represented by a definitive conception, which, empirically with respect to possible things, is entirely the purview of understanding.

Noumena, the concept, arises spontaneously from understanding, as do all concepts, in this case, simply because understanding is that by which “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”. Noumena, then, is exactly that contradictory thought, the concept without the requisite synthesis of representations, hence, without the possibility of cognizing an object subsumed under the concept.

“…. But there is one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner—this, namely, that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere.…”

The only transcendental going on here, is reason’s examination of the understanding’s stepping out of bounds in its attempts to cognize the impossible.
—————-

….it is very obvious that his thinking is highly suspect…. — Astrophel

It is HIS thinking that shows common understanding’s thinking, is suspect. Suspect insofar as it isn’t paying attention to its own rules. Those rules being…for cognition, synthesis of phenomena and the pure conceptions.

The noumenal is only a concept. — Astrophel

Agreed. So I guess I don’t understand the point you’re making. If you already knew that noumena are only concepts, and given understanding’s propensity to run away with itself, and reason’s obligation to correct the rampage….what more is there?

The question is, why is the concept of noumena allowed to survive at all? Why is it not dismissed in a paralogism? — Astrophel

Because he said understanding doesn’t recognize its own limitations. Thought is spontaneous, concepts arise unbidden, which we know for a fact is the case. We can think whatever we want. Usually, we just move on to the next thought, but if we stop and examine what we just did, we find there is nothing the thought contains that does anything positive for us. Which, is course, is why noumena are treated negatively, to show what we can’t do in relation to empirical knowledge as such.

I don't buy the idea that that is an arbitrary process entirely governed by the mind…. — Janus

…then it becomes rather difficult to explain knowing things.

…..it seems far more reasonable to think that the things constrain our ways of making sense of them…. — Janus

Yes, the only proofs, the checks and balances, for the sense we make of things, resides in the things.

….and that we are blind to both of these constraining influences. — Janus

We can’t be blind to the one insofar as we are the ones directly engaged with it, but I’d agree we’re at least partially blind to the checks and balances ordained by Nature, at least before the fact. She’ll certainly let us know all about it post hoc, though.
————-

Where do you get the idea that there is only one single method available for making sese of the one world of things? — Janus

Toss-up between parsimony and pure logic? All else being given, all humans have a common cognitive mechanism, whatever that may be, and all humans direct that mechanism in the same general direction concerning the same multiplicity of objects. Everybody starts out ignorant, subsequently thinks for himself and learns through experience.

As to there being but one single method available for making sense of things, I don't think that is supportable. I mean, what is this purported method? — Janus

HA!!! You’re lookin’ for me to say something irrevocably Kantian, huh? Only a dope wouldn’t grant transcendental idealism as the singular most powerful explanatory doctrine regarding the human cognitive modus operandi, dammit!!! Get with the program already, jeeeeezz.

Yeah, well…that ain’t right, is it. The single method available to humans in general, is whatever method the human brain uses. All metaphysical theory is speculative gap-filler for the absence of empirical knowledge, the intention of which is to express to oneself a priori, in the least self-contradictory way, that for which he hasn’t, and is unlikely to obtain, the slightest empirical clue.

I mean, there’s gotta be a reason virtually every human ever, agrees with each other with respect to the most obvious natural conditions. Again, all things considered, no human on Earth ever fell up; no human with sufficient experience ever took a stop sign to mean don’t bother stopping, and never mind those trite absurdities like 1 + 1 might not equal 2.
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Do you believe there is an internal, subjective, empirical content of consciousness? I don't know what that even means. How could you know about such a thing? — Janus

Could just call it memory. Only difference is memory is all and only empirical representational content, re: totality of experience, whereas consciousness is the totality of all our representations, experiential and purely abstract, re: a priori.
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I don't think it's that complicated―it just seems undeniable that we find ourselves in a world which makes sense to us…. — Janus

Nahhhh, it isn’t that complicated. But we humans….some of us….are inclined to make it so, sometimes, for whatever reason. And yeah, it does seem undeniable we understand our environment, at least enough to survive in it and at most enough to learn from it.

….the empirical world that I am now cognizing…. — boundless

Do you see the difference in that, and this: the world of my cognition. The empirical world you are now cognizing must be the same world I am now cognizing, else there must be as many empirical worlds are there are cognizers, which is absurd. The world of your, or my or anyone’s, cognition, on the other hand, is singular and private. If you were to say the world of your cognition did not exist before you were born you’d be correct without equivocation, but the empirical world of my cognition remains existent and unaffected.
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If there was a point in time that my mind didn't exist, then, given that the empirical world is not 'independent' from it, it would seem that the empirical world arose. — boundless

We haven’t yet agreed the world, or reality, whichever, is mind-independent? I should hope we have, in which case, if in any time your mind didn’t exist the existence of a world is irrelevant, and for the time in which your mind does exist…..it doesn’t but suffice it to say you have one…..the world was already there awaiting your perception. Or, which is the same thing, the world is given, in order for you to even have perceptions for your mind to work on.

You might say the magnitude of the world’s composition, or maybe the relations between various constituents of it, arises in direct proposition to your experiences.
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…..(mighten it be that) within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?
— Mww

A consistent transcendental idealist IMO would simply say: "I cannot answer this question". — boundless

If a set of conditions is described in a philosophical methodology, he who holds with the rational power of such method damn well better be able to answer any question predicated on it. In fact, T.I does describe a cognitive method in which a construction of this sort does relate to our understanding.

What the T.I. advocate cannot answer, is whether or not the method actually represents the way the human cognitive system works, and indeed, with respect to cognitive science proper, it is far from it.

The gist of the first Critique is, basically, one shouldn’t worry so much about the answers he can’t get, but more the questions he wouldn’t even have asked if only he’d thought about it a bit more.
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If we say that the world is intelligible we are saying something non-trivial. That is, it has a structure/order that can be grasped by our faculties of understanding. — boundless

Yeah, but that exact same world is unintelligible to other beings, or has a structure/order grasped differently by other intelligent beings. So where does the structure/order actually come from, when different intelligences grasp the exact same thing in different ways?

The common rejoinder is that it isn’t the exact same thing. A bug’s world is different from a fish’s world. But that’s not really the case, is it. The world from a bug’s perspective is different than the world from a fish’s perspective, but the world itself, is what it is regardless of either. Same with all other beings, I should think, or there comes mass contradictions.

Havin’ fun yet?

Yeah, yeah, I know. Those gawdamn language games, right? All a guy’s gotta do is open his mouth and he’s stuck in one. Or, what’s worse, a guy opens his mouth and somebody else accuses him of being stuck in one.

Be that as it may, our intelligence makes sense of things; the manifold of sensible things is conceived as reducible to an intelligible world. All well and good, except the world possibly contains things that make no sense, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is irrational, or, the intelligible world of sensible things for some members of it, is not the experience of others, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is merely contingent.

And when you consider the fact that, for us anyway, there is but one world of things….period, and there is only one single method available for making sense of it….period, it seems pretty bold to say the one is intelligible when it’s exactly the same method in play by which things make sense on the one hand, and, conceives the reduction of the manifold of sensible things to a descriptive world, on the other.

And to nickel-and-dime this even further, what of consciousness, which in the Good Ol’ Days used to represent the manifold of all sensible things, of all those things of experience. For some reason or other it was seen as fit to extract the internal, subjective, empirical content of experience represented by consciousness, and move it to the external objective empirical content of a logically constructed compendium represented by “world”.

But, hey, just between you ‘n’ me ‘n’ the fence post, the internal subjective, empirical content of consciousness can’t be extracted, which makes the conceived reduction to an intelligible world….you know….tautologically superfluous. And furthermore, while both the intelligible world and consciousness contain that of which sense has been or can be made, consciousness cannot contain any of that of which no sense can be made, while it remains impossible to know whether the intelligible world contains such things or not.
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Oh man. Don’t even get me started on the visibility of the unperceived. (Grin)

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having….
— Mww

I meant that from a Kantian perspective it's just difficult to explain (….) how the empirical world 'arises'. — boundless

Ahhhh, gotcha.

….one might think to leave this unexplained, as perhaps the most consistent forms of transcendental idealism do. — boundless

Kant’s T.I. does just that, to my understanding anyway. As in his statement that the proud name of ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding, which is to say it is useless to inquire of the being of things, or indeed their possible nature, when there is but one a posteriori aspect of any of those things for our intellect to work with, and consequently supplies the rest from itself.

The empirical world doesn’t ‘arise’’; it is given, to the extent its objects are our possible sensations.
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the point is that within transcendental idealism you have an ordered, intelligible empirical world that is related to a mind. — boundless

Would it be the same to say, within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?

I can’t get behind the notion of an intelligible world, is all. Just seems tautologically superfluous to call the world intelligible, or to call all that out there an intelligible world, when without our intelligence it would be no more than a mere something. Just because we understand our world doesn’t mean the world is intelligible; it, more judiciously, just means our understanding works.

Anyway, thanks for getting back to me. I’m kinda done with it, if you are.