Does that make more sense? — Fire Ologist

More I’m happy to accept, given the general intent of your analogy. Shades of that “ways to philosophize” thread….I’m quite in love with dissecting minutia, in high hopes of philosophizing with clarity and precision, donchaknow.

Probably more than required to grasp the point.

Of the above, I think it works best to help explain sense perception, then secondly, Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction. — Fire Ologist

Before that help is affirmative, it should be stipulated in what sense “yellow is analogous to the senses – eyeballs, ears, nervous systems, etc.”, insofar as in Kant, the sensory devices are not part of what is commonly understood as the nervous system. They are only the physiological bridge, nowadays called the peripherals, between your empirical blue of the external world, and rational green of internal sensibility, justified by the fact that each object, or product/output, of five different and physically distinct modes of data reception are all treated the same way….governed by the same fundamental criteria….by subsequent procedural mechanisms, which makes explicit the senses, while only distinct from each other, are necessarily distinct from that to which their respective sensations are given.

In addition, also only with respect to Kant, “The noumenal blue objects we sense and come to know…”, is a contradiction.

The Kantian references falsify your thesis; it may have been more helpful overall, without it. But you did say helps secondly, so….

Is there any philosopher since Descartes who has actually defended, as opposed to trying to resolve, scepticism? — Ludwig V

If it be allowed that scepticism as such, is, “….the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein….”, Kant treats scepticism as a natural prerogative or intrinsic condition of reason itself, its ubiquitous nature thereby mandating it best be done properly, which just means to be sceptical in accordance with a method by which one is“….endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of misunderstanding…”.

So it can be said scepticism, at least in this form, is both defended insofar as it is inescapable, and, resolved insofar as it is subjected to a proper method.

The deeper question that I think we should be talking about is what lies behind the ancient philosophical tradition of denying common sense reality. — Ludwig V

Two cents:

Given that common sense reality just means we know things as they are, my understanding of the tradition of denying common sense reality, stems from the major premise contained in at least some versions of that tradition, that the human cognitive system is representational, in that everything to which it is directed is mere affected senses, re: sensation, from which alone no cognition is at all possible.

However deep the question, whether it should be talked about or not is governed by who’s talking. To those who insist a chair is a chair, tend to neglect how it came to be one….probably less than profitable.

Not that there are no obscure prog rock albums from 1973, which makes the analogy works well enough, but it is rather coincidental that one of the 4 or 5 least obscure albums of all time, is both prog rock and came out in 1973.

But, to be sure, this tidbit of philosophizing could be conceived as trivially boring.

Good; well-thought.

I personally hesitate to use creativity regarding philosophical innovation, instead, favoring some sufficiently explanatory methodological construction. The reason being, given the fundamental preconditions of human intelligence in general, those the negation of which is either impossible or self-contradictory, necessarily limit all that follows from them, which is just to limit how creative a new philosophical doctrine can be.

And what of rules? If it is the case human intelligence in general is predicated on some set of rules….of whatever form and origin they may be…..and the proper business of philosophy is the study of human intelligence in general, rules would seem to be anathema to, or at least in conflict with, creativity as a proper philosophical ground.

On the other hand, I gotta admit, it’s a fine line between creating a system, and constructing one. Perhaps merely another stupid language game, getting in the way of good ol’ fashioned logical thought.

I don't think anyone here favors Enlightenment rationality…. — Leontiskos

I do, iff considered as pre-Brentano, re: late 19th century, hardly the apex of the Enlightenment paradigm.

But you probably meant by “anyone here”, conversational participants, rather than just some guy raising his hand from the back of the room.

I'm the one defending the nit-pickers. I had you in mind in crafting the thought…. — Moliere

Oh, I’m a rational-life-long, card-carryin’ dissector, to be sure. I do loves me some minutia, donchaknow, in the interest of philosophical clarity of course.

I'm not sure there's such a thing as apprehension prior to judgment at all. Hence theory-ladenness, though I wouldn't put it at the level of structuring our perceptions very frequently. — Moliere

Theory-ladenness notwithstanding, A99/B160 should make clear that apprehension, in the Kantian sense, has to do with the possibility of perception, and as such, is very much methodologically antecedent to discursive** judgement with respect to empirical cognition.

Aesthetic judgement, on the other hand….that which regards the inspiration of some feeling relative to the representation of a perception….presupposes that the perception has already been structured.

Personally, given the emphasis on apperception and its rather more convincing necessity in the overall theoretical construct, I can do without apprehension in this Kantian sense.

Anyway….just my opinion.

(** philosophically archaic definition, so as not to be confused with the way the term is commonly used on this thread, yet consistent with the immediate subject matter.)

Each thing, then, would be caused by a prior actuality which would provide it with compresence of properties, identity through time, and potency by the mere causality of forms upon forms…. — Bob Ross

All well and good, perhaps, unless or until we want to know what each thing is, how it is to be known as that thing and no other. In such case, the tracing back of its identity through time holds no interest for us.

On the other hand, for that family of things of perfectly natural causality, the knowledge of which is contingent at best, as opposed to man-made assemblages of things in general for which knowledge is necessarily given, to trace the “mere causality of forms upon forms” inevitably leads to at least contradictions, and at most, to impossibilities.
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…..it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality). Each thing, then, would be caused by a prior actuality…. — Bob Ross

If matter is missing….what thing can there be? Getting rid of matter in Aristotle’s sense: is there any sense in which matter is not the particular constituency of a thing, regardless of its arrangement or assemblage according to form?
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But you asked for a better Aristotle-ian hylomorphic understanding than your own, which I admittedly don’t have, voluntarily confined to the Enlightenment version of the matter/form juxtapositional attitude.

I do think Hume is a bit more rationalist than given credit even on a straight reading. — Moliere

Perhaps the missing shade of blue is a bit of rationalistic thinking? I mean, he admits, re: E.C.H.U., 2, 16, an exception to the general rule of constant conjunction, insofar as he grants a subject may indeed apprehend that of which he has no experience.

….not being able to say (?):

…seems like a tautology to see (say) our minds create…. — prothero

How can a metaphysical project, the theme of which is the set of necessary conditions for a theoretical method of empirical human knowledge, have contained in it as central to that theme, that which is systemically impossible to know anything about?

Given such thematic major premise, it follows as a matter of course that….

…..phenomena/noumena is a false dichotomy;
…..by definition, the mind cannot create reality;
…..a supposed reality in itself is a methodological, systemic, contradiction.

But then, times have changed, pick the predicates of one or of another, but to co-mingle them destroys both.

It pains me greatly to admit I no longer have the acuity, and perhaps not even the time, to absorb first order critical philosophy. It’s like….all I absorbed before is all I’m gonna get. And considering how long THAT took….(sigh).

That being said, it was indeed a pleasure talking to you. Have fun with M. Henry.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy, p106

“….If, then, we learn nothing more by this critical examination than what we should have practised in the merely empirical use of the understanding, without any such subtle inquiry, the presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed upon it….”
(A237/B296)

We perceive real things directly. What more needs to be said?
— Mww

But the way we perceive them is probably not the way they are. — boundless

Doesn’t matter what they are; our intelligence tells us how they will be for us.

Naive realism asserts that we perceive things as they are. — boundless

I don’t favor that position.

Direct realist asserts that our perceptions give us direct access to the external world in itself and we can know how the world is independent on the mental representations. — boundless

I agree that our perception gives us direct access to the external world but not in itself, and I reject the rest.
(On second thought….our perception is how the external world has direct access to us. The first makes it seem like we go out to it, when in fact it comes in to us.)

So probably Kant would agree that we somehow perceive 'real things directly' but we can't know whether they really are as they appear to us. — boundless

Agreed, but without the “probably”. From the beginning, that’s his general introduction to the part on sensibility. Also, “appear” in his use is mere presence, as in “given”, and not “looks like”. So to say they may not really be as they appear, doesn’t make any sense. And if you already were aware of that distinction, there remains the further condition that perception has no cognitive power, so to say that which appears may not be as it appears, indicating it may not really be this or that thing, or some thing with this or that set of properties, makes no sense.

In effect, and to make a long story short….we tell things what they are. All they gotta do, is show up.

Kant believed in an external reality but he did believe that we don't have an unmediated knowledge of it. — boundless

Agreed. So what mediates between the external reality in perception, to empirical knowledge in experience, if not the intelligence directly affected by that reality. Again, that intrinsic dualism pervades the method.

In fact, to us what is 'given' it's an already pre-ordained world, the empirical world, which is already modeled in sensible and intellectual categories (like space, time, pluarality and so on). — boundless

Ok, as long as pre-ordained just means the world is what it is, regardless of how it got to be what it is. But the world isn’t already modeled, insofar as the mode of our cognitive system is representational, which just is to construct a model, mentally, in conjunction with the effect an object has on the senses, physiologically.

But if the empirical world is a 'representation' then it can't be a 'direct realism', except in the sense that we have direct knowledge of the representation. Direct realism asserts that we have direct knowledge of the 'world in itself'. — boundless

I’m not a fan of these -isms. Guy doesn’t like things the way they are, he just creates another -ism to cover what he thought was missing in the one before it. I take the two words, direct and real, and the only situation where those two go together without contradicting each other, is the relation between things in the world, and our perception of them. We perceive real things directly. What more needs to be said?

….what's the point of transcendental idealism? — boundless

There are three: establish the validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn establishes a non-self-contradictory method for acquiring empirical knowledge, contra Hume, which in turn defines the limits of pure reason contra Berkeley’s brand of dogmatic, re: purely subjective, idealism.

….probably I am using the words in an imprecise way…. — boundless

….and I am probably being overly precise.

I believe that 'our' empirical worlds are similar. — boundless

As do I. I have no reason yet, to think they are not, allowing for differences in experience.

They might have the same structure owing to the fact that, as humans, we share the same sensible and cognitive faculties. — boundless

Or, they may seem to have the same structure, because they do.

But there is a fundamental 'privateness' of my experience that suggests to me that my empirical world is indeed 'mine'. This doesn't imply, of course, that we can have an intersubjective agreement. — boundless

Unless it is the case your experiences are of representations of the empirical world, and not the world itself. The representations, then, are indeed your own, born of your own intellect, from which the notion that your experiences are indeed your own receives its justifications.

Fundamental privateness of your experiences, yep; fundamental privateness of the empirical world….nahhhh. Share-sies, dude. This land is your land this land is my land and all that kinda hippie prophetizing, donchaknow.
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But if the 'world' is given and is knowable I am not sure how transcendental/epistemic idealism isn't a form of direct realism. — boundless

Transcendental philosophy presupposes direct realism. There is an inescapable duality intrinsic to that method.

I would say that epistemic idealists do not hold any views about what is 'given'. — boundless

I’m ok with that, although I might quibble regarding the view they would all say that it is given. No views on what is given, but holding with the view that something is given.

we can analyse and study our empirical world so for empirical knowledge the empirical world is given. — boundless

I disagree. For empirical knowledge, the empirical world is given. To know is to know about something. The analysis and study from which knowledge follows, is of representation of the empirical world, which are constructs of the human cognitive system. A.K.A., experience.

…..in transcendental idealism the empirical world is a representation/construct of sensible and congnitive faculties of the mind. — boundless

The empirical world is a representation, the conception of the totality of real things of possible experience. But the empirical world is not a thing we know; we know only of representations of things in it. And because it is a mere conception, there is no sensibility involved, no intuition hence no phenomenon, which explains why knowledge of it is impossible.

In Kant and the Enlightenmrnt era natural philosophy, the world is a general conception, having all possible existent things subsumed under it. The ancients called such conceptions Universals.
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But if one accepts that there is an intelligible external reality which can in principle be known (and we know/understand in part as it is possible to us), then, there are no different 'worlds' here but different understandings of the world, one perhaps more correct than the other. — boundless

Pretty much what I’ve been saying all along. If this is your position as well, perhaps we’ve just been tangled up in words. And maybe a scattered misplaced principle here and there.

The object IS sensory intuition conjoined with a concept in the apriori intuitions of space and time. — Astrophel

If the object IS the intuition, what use would pure a priori intuitions themselves, have?

The object is not the sensory intuition, but only the occassion by which it is possible.

Conjoined concepts in the a priori intuitions of space and time, is form. The synthesis of this form, with the matter given a posteriori as sensation, gives phenomena, that which represents objects perceived by the senses.

The phenomenon IS sensory intuition.

There is no object in the normal way science and everydayness says there is. — Astrophel

Agreed, but still, there IS an object….

So when you say "and not in the object to which the principle merely applies" I am sure this is not what Kant's "idealism" is about. — Astrophel

….and insofar as the normal way of science and everydayness demands it should be so, I think that’s the epitome of Kantian idealism, re: the supremacy of the subject, in that he gives to…bestows upon….objects that which is commonly thought as belonging to them.

That object is the sensory intuitions and concept unity. You can't speak of the object that is outside of this unity. — Astrophel

Agreed, the object cannot be spoken of outside the construct of its representation, but the object is not that construct. One minor exception might be that the object can be spoken of as existing, for that is the singular necessary condition for all that follows. Re: Plato’s “knowledge that”, or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”.
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….only referring to that which must be “….something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related…”….
— Mww

No, no. First, this "must be" is only because he wants separate phenomena from that which it represents, not from any analytic necessity. — Astrophel

How can it not be analytically necessary, when that object which is outside of me most certainly is not in the same space as the object which is my body? The “must” of the quote, and the “must be” of my comment relates only me and objects that affect my senses, as yet having nothing to do with phenomena.

Furthermore, it isn’t so much that he wants to separate phenomena from that which it represents, but rather, it is a mandate of his transcendental doctrine that human knowledge is of representations of things and not of things as they are in themselves.

But you seem to think Kant is allowing something like "nature" which you referred to earlier, some objective substratum, but this is not how it is. — Astrophel

Yeah, I do think Kant’s metaphysical program, in all its various iterations, requires something like Nature, in order to have that which stands on one end of his intrinsic dualism: everything from objective moral behavior, to irreducible proofs for logical syllogisms, to rebutting Newton.
————-

I agree with a lot of your interpretations here, but not so much with your conclusions. That being said…

….the concept of a noumenon. It is not
indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything, but signifies only the thought of something in general…. — Astrophel

Signifies thought of something. In general. Where there is thought alone, the inputs from the faculties of sensibility are vacant, representations being borrowed from consciousness for those antecedent experiences, from understanding itself for those merely possible experiences. All this time we’ve been talking of objects in general, for which the immediate input from sensibility is absolutely required.

Why the switch? What’s this have to do with Nature?

In other words, he is not talking about a thing in any way determined by some even vaguely physical standards. — Astrophel

Agreed.

It is entirely determined transcendentally. — Astrophel

Noumena is entirely determined transcendentally? Noumena are not determined at all; ever notice there is never any noumenal thing? There is never any synthesis of representation into a cognition, which can then be represented by a definitive conception, which, empirically with respect to possible things, is entirely the purview of understanding.

Noumena, the concept, arises spontaneously from understanding, as do all concepts, in this case, simply because understanding is that by which “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”. Noumena, then, is exactly that contradictory thought, the concept without the requisite synthesis of representations, hence, without the possibility of cognizing an object subsumed under the concept.

“…. But there is one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner—this, namely, that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere.…”

The only transcendental going on here, is reason’s examination of the understanding’s stepping out of bounds in its attempts to cognize the impossible.
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….it is very obvious that his thinking is highly suspect…. — Astrophel

It is HIS thinking that shows common understanding’s thinking, is suspect. Suspect insofar as it isn’t paying attention to its own rules. Those rules being…for cognition, synthesis of phenomena and the pure conceptions.

The noumenal is only a concept. — Astrophel

Agreed. So I guess I don’t understand the point you’re making. If you already knew that noumena are only concepts, and given understanding’s propensity to run away with itself, and reason’s obligation to correct the rampage….what more is there?

The question is, why is the concept of noumena allowed to survive at all? Why is it not dismissed in a paralogism? — Astrophel

Because he said understanding doesn’t recognize its own limitations. Thought is spontaneous, concepts arise unbidden, which we know for a fact is the case. We can think whatever we want. Usually, we just move on to the next thought, but if we stop and examine what we just did, we find there is nothing the thought contains that does anything positive for us. Which, is course, is why noumena are treated negatively, to show what we can’t do in relation to empirical knowledge as such.

I don't buy the idea that that is an arbitrary process entirely governed by the mind…. — Janus

…then it becomes rather difficult to explain knowing things.

…..it seems far more reasonable to think that the things constrain our ways of making sense of them…. — Janus

Yes, the only proofs, the checks and balances, for the sense we make of things, resides in the things.

….and that we are blind to both of these constraining influences. — Janus

We can’t be blind to the one insofar as we are the ones directly engaged with it, but I’d agree we’re at least partially blind to the checks and balances ordained by Nature, at least before the fact. She’ll certainly let us know all about it post hoc, though.
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Where do you get the idea that there is only one single method available for making sese of the one world of things? — Janus

Toss-up between parsimony and pure logic? All else being given, all humans have a common cognitive mechanism, whatever that may be, and all humans direct that mechanism in the same general direction concerning the same multiplicity of objects. Everybody starts out ignorant, subsequently thinks for himself and learns through experience.

As to there being but one single method available for making sense of things, I don't think that is supportable. I mean, what is this purported method? — Janus

HA!!! You’re lookin’ for me to say something irrevocably Kantian, huh? Only a dope wouldn’t grant transcendental idealism as the singular most powerful explanatory doctrine regarding the human cognitive modus operandi, dammit!!! Get with the program already, jeeeeezz.

Yeah, well…that ain’t right, is it. The single method available to humans in general, is whatever method the human brain uses. All metaphysical theory is speculative gap-filler for the absence of empirical knowledge, the intention of which is to express to oneself a priori, in the least self-contradictory way, that for which he hasn’t, and is unlikely to obtain, the slightest empirical clue.

I mean, there’s gotta be a reason virtually every human ever, agrees with each other with respect to the most obvious natural conditions. Again, all things considered, no human on Earth ever fell up; no human with sufficient experience ever took a stop sign to mean don’t bother stopping, and never mind those trite absurdities like 1 + 1 might not equal 2.
—————-

Do you believe there is an internal, subjective, empirical content of consciousness? I don't know what that even means. How could you know about such a thing? — Janus

Could just call it memory. Only difference is memory is all and only empirical representational content, re: totality of experience, whereas consciousness is the totality of all our representations, experiential and purely abstract, re: a priori.
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I don't think it's that complicated―it just seems undeniable that we find ourselves in a world which makes sense to us…. — Janus

Nahhhh, it isn’t that complicated. But we humans….some of us….are inclined to make it so, sometimes, for whatever reason. And yeah, it does seem undeniable we understand our environment, at least enough to survive in it and at most enough to learn from it.

….the empirical world that I am now cognizing…. — boundless

Do you see the difference in that, and this: the world of my cognition. The empirical world you are now cognizing must be the same world I am now cognizing, else there must be as many empirical worlds are there are cognizers, which is absurd. The world of your, or my or anyone’s, cognition, on the other hand, is singular and private. If you were to say the world of your cognition did not exist before you were born you’d be correct without equivocation, but the empirical world of my cognition remains existent and unaffected.
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If there was a point in time that my mind didn't exist, then, given that the empirical world is not 'independent' from it, it would seem that the empirical world arose. — boundless

We haven’t yet agreed the world, or reality, whichever, is mind-independent? I should hope we have, in which case, if in any time your mind didn’t exist the existence of a world is irrelevant, and for the time in which your mind does exist…..it doesn’t but suffice it to say you have one…..the world was already there awaiting your perception. Or, which is the same thing, the world is given, in order for you to even have perceptions for your mind to work on.

You might say the magnitude of the world’s composition, or maybe the relations between various constituents of it, arises in direct proposition to your experiences.
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…..(mighten it be that) within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?
— Mww

A consistent transcendental idealist IMO would simply say: "I cannot answer this question". — boundless

If a set of conditions is described in a philosophical methodology, he who holds with the rational power of such method damn well better be able to answer any question predicated on it. In fact, T.I does describe a cognitive method in which a construction of this sort does relate to our understanding.

What the T.I. advocate cannot answer, is whether or not the method actually represents the way the human cognitive system works, and indeed, with respect to cognitive science proper, it is far from it.

The gist of the first Critique is, basically, one shouldn’t worry so much about the answers he can’t get, but more the questions he wouldn’t even have asked if only he’d thought about it a bit more.
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If we say that the world is intelligible we are saying something non-trivial. That is, it has a structure/order that can be grasped by our faculties of understanding. — boundless

Yeah, but that exact same world is unintelligible to other beings, or has a structure/order grasped differently by other intelligent beings. So where does the structure/order actually come from, when different intelligences grasp the exact same thing in different ways?

The common rejoinder is that it isn’t the exact same thing. A bug’s world is different from a fish’s world. But that’s not really the case, is it. The world from a bug’s perspective is different than the world from a fish’s perspective, but the world itself, is what it is regardless of either. Same with all other beings, I should think, or there comes mass contradictions.

Havin’ fun yet?

Yeah, yeah, I know. Those gawdamn language games, right? All a guy’s gotta do is open his mouth and he’s stuck in one. Or, what’s worse, a guy opens his mouth and somebody else accuses him of being stuck in one.

Be that as it may, our intelligence makes sense of things; the manifold of sensible things is conceived as reducible to an intelligible world. All well and good, except the world possibly contains things that make no sense, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is irrational, or, the intelligible world of sensible things for some members of it, is not the experience of others, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is merely contingent.

And when you consider the fact that, for us anyway, there is but one world of things….period, and there is only one single method available for making sense of it….period, it seems pretty bold to say the one is intelligible when it’s exactly the same method in play by which things make sense on the one hand, and, conceives the reduction of the manifold of sensible things to a descriptive world, on the other.

And to nickel-and-dime this even further, what of consciousness, which in the Good Ol’ Days used to represent the manifold of all sensible things, of all those things of experience. For some reason or other it was seen as fit to extract the internal, subjective, empirical content of experience represented by consciousness, and move it to the external objective empirical content of a logically constructed compendium represented by “world”.

But, hey, just between you ‘n’ me ‘n’ the fence post, the internal subjective, empirical content of consciousness can’t be extracted, which makes the conceived reduction to an intelligible world….you know….tautologically superfluous. And furthermore, while both the intelligible world and consciousness contain that of which sense has been or can be made, consciousness cannot contain any of that of which no sense can be made, while it remains impossible to know whether the intelligible world contains such things or not.
—————-

Oh man. Don’t even get me started on the visibility of the unperceived. (Grin)

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having….
— Mww

I meant that from a Kantian perspective it's just difficult to explain (….) how the empirical world 'arises'. — boundless

Ahhhh, gotcha.

….one might think to leave this unexplained, as perhaps the most consistent forms of transcendental idealism do. — boundless

Kant’s T.I. does just that, to my understanding anyway. As in his statement that the proud name of ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding, which is to say it is useless to inquire of the being of things, or indeed their possible nature, when there is but one a posteriori aspect of any of those things for our intellect to work with, and consequently supplies the rest from itself.

The empirical world doesn’t ‘arise’’; it is given, to the extent its objects are our possible sensations.
—————-

the point is that within transcendental idealism you have an ordered, intelligible empirical world that is related to a mind. — boundless

Would it be the same to say, within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?

I can’t get behind the notion of an intelligible world, is all. Just seems tautologically superfluous to call the world intelligible, or to call all that out there an intelligible world, when without our intelligence it would be no more than a mere something. Just because we understand our world doesn’t mean the world is intelligible; it, more judiciously, just means our understanding works.

Anyway, thanks for getting back to me. I’m kinda done with it, if you are.

I was rather thinking the mere discussion of presupposed existential reality was Hume-ian, which may be considered half-Kantian.

Only the subject, by and for his conscious thinking self alone, does the full, strong, transcendental Kant.

…..blurring that dichotomy might be the way to go. — Jamal

Personally, I’d be inclined to do that, in that for Kant, sensuous physiology is foundational to reality, while, as you say, human intelligence, by whatever name one wishes to identify it, necessarily shapes that given reality, by the empirical faculties prescribed as belonging to it.

As an aside, I’d contribute that for mere discussion of presupposed existential reality and experiential shapes thereof, there is no conscious need of transcendental faculties, the discursive empirical cognitive faculties sufficient in themselves for it. Pure a priori, that is to say, transcendental, cognitions being already manifest in a subject’s antecedent construction of conceptual relations contained in his part of the discussion.

Everybody dances to the empirical tune of the senses; whether they care whether they look silly or not to the crowd they’re doing it with…..that’s determined by their transcendental self-awareness.

I think there's something more basic in us that is pre-verbal. — Relativist

Oh absolutely. Couldn’t be otherwise. In my opinion, that is.

That sounds absurd to me. Does he provide some epistemological assumption for this claim? — Relativist

If I may, with apologies to , the gist of the argument resides in the fact nothing comes to the human intellect already named, and from that comes the notion that things become named in accordance with some initial idea in that mind determining what it will be. Classic cases-in-point….quarks, and Slinkies. Donut holes.

The fact kids are informed of names of things from rote instruction, or the familiarity with things otherwise through indirect experience of them as is the case with Everydayman in general, is beside the point.

While it seems superfluous to assert we must first learn what we know, centering on the known disguises the necessarily antecedent priority of how knowledge is possible. Kant set the stage for speculative epistemological metaphysics, which theorizes on how knowledge is possible, Schopenhauer the soonest worthy expansion….or criticism…. of it.

Both these philosophical pioneers agreed on this major premise: that which is first given to the senses is undetermined. From there, it’s off to the races…..

…..a problem with Kant's and similar views. (…) it seems that the 'ordered world' of experience arises from the 'interaction' between the mind and 'the mind-independent reality', which is never truly presented 'as it is itself' to the mind. — boundless

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having, but at first glance:
So if the ordered world of experience arises from the interaction between the mind and representations of the external domain….the problem disappears?

It seems in fact to assume that there is, indeed, a mind-independent reality which is then 'represented' by the cognitive faculties of the mind. — boundless

That which is mind-independent cannot be represented. With respect to Kant’s view alone, reality is not mind-independent, by definition hence by methodological necessity, the content of which remains represented not by the cognitive faculties, but sensibility. From which follows the ordered world of experience arises from that which is always truly presented to the mind, and from that, appearances to the senses are not merely assumed, but given.

The 'represented' world of exprience is thus like an interface (…) and for the knowing subject it is impossible to know what the world is like independent from the mental categories. — boundless

From whence, then, does the interface arise? If the represented world of experience is all with which the human intellect in general has to do, there isn’t anything with which to interface externally, interface here taken to indicate an empirical relation. And if the only possible means for human knowledge is the system by which a human knows anything, the interface takes on the implication of merely that relation of that which is known and that which isn’t, which is already given from the logical principle of complementarity. Does the interface between that out there, and that in here, inform of anything, when everything is, for all intents and purposes, in here?

….to the strict epistemic idealist, I would ask: how do you explain the 'arising' of the 'empirical/experienced world' without positing an intelligible mind-independent reality…. — boundless

If by epistemic idealist is meant that purely subjective position holding with a representational system of human intelligence, however speculative such system may be, in which all empirical knowledge of things is predicated on, and thereby resides within, that system alone, he must at the same time posit that to which those representations, hence his knowledge, relates, which cannot be contained within, therefore must be external to, the system itself.

Empirical/experienced world, and the variated iterations thereof, is a conceptual misnomer, though, I must say, a rather conventional way of speaking, not fully integrating the development of the concepts involved. That, and the notion of “intelligibility of the world”. Which sorta serves to justify why the good philosophy books are so damn long and arduously wordy.

Anyway….just me. Rambling.

…..loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. — Wayfarer

“…. substance is the permanence of the real in time….”

Sight regained?

Is there any reason among all reasons which cannot influence a decision? -- I don't think so. — Quk

But I’m asking about the possibility of there being one reason which always influences any decision.

There's always a cause or a reason for a decision. It's impossible to inhibit all causes and reasons of the universe. — Quk

If it is impossible to inhibit all reasons, is there a single reason, or a manifold of reasons under a particular rubric, necessary in itself, to cause any decision? Is there one reason impossible to inhibit for decision-making?

To arrive at the possibility of a singular condition is the very epitome of specialized, insofar as the will’s freedom, and the will’s limitations thereby infused into it, are given.

Does this agree with Dawnstorm's idea regarding "trigger"? — Quk

Ehhhh….dunno. Maybe. Smacks of psychology to me, while I’m more inclined toward speculative metaphysics for its explanatory power.

I can only desire something that is feasible? — Quk

No, I think the definition implies one can desire in accordance with whatever idea crosses his mind, but that desire doesn’t mean he has the capacity to cause, or to will, those ideas to manifest objectively.

On the other hand, one can attain only that which is feasible, or possible, which could be said to be the limitation of practical desire.

I can't desire what I want. — Quk

Desire: in general, a subject's capacity to become, by means of his ideas, the cause of the actual existence of the objects of those ideas.

A related effect does not necessarily follow from having a causal capacity, but for that subject attaining the effect related to an idea, a causal desire for it is necessarily presupposed.

A guy passes up a parking spot, without knowing the availability of any other, has immediately the idea of a shorter, post-parking, walk, the desire for which can only be satisfied by causing himself to look for a closer spot.

A guy takes the first parking spot he comes to, the idea of cruising the lot in vain hope of finding a better one insufficient causality for a very contingent effect, expresses a more relaxed desire, but a desire nonetheless.

I can't switch my desire for women over to men. — Quk

Yet, there are instances of record of those that desire the switch, and of those there are some that will themselves to cause the attainment of the idea contained in that desire. From which follows that the concepts of desire and will having the same meaning is not necessarily the case, and if not necessarily the case, then possibly not true at all.

Is this a good analysis? — bert1

I think not, insofar as that situation whereby a choice MUST be made contradicts the fundamental idea of choice itself.

MUST choose. The impossibility of NOT choosing. Therefore, MUST choose is the same as not NOT choosing. Which answers the thread title: apparently we are not entirely free to choose, because we are not free to make no choice.

But of course…we are.

Desire and will have the same meaning. — Quk

If I may desire whatever I want, but it is altogether impossible to will whatever I want, then the two concepts cannot have the same meaning for me.

….it is the case that this stone cannot move itself. It must be moved by something else, and this holds true by necessity, so how can I know this apodicticity that is IN the stone when the stone stands outside of the logic produced in my mental affairs? — Astrophel

The certainty isn’t in the stone…. — Mww

Of course it is. What is the stone? It IS sensate intuitions and concepts. And so the stone IS whatever the concept is, and the concept IS its apriori structure. — Astrophel

In the first, I am to suppose there is a movable object. In the second I am to suppose the said movable object is sensate intuition and concepts. Which leaves me to wonder….how are sensate intuitions and concepts movable?

Having exposed the, dare I say, grotesque!!!, categorical error, it follows from the fact that all knowledge, and antecedently all a priori principles by which empirical knowledge is possible, resides in me, the certainty an object of whatever name cannot move itself but must be moved by something else, which is a representation of one such a priori principle, must also reside in me, and not in that object to which the principle merely applies.

The stone is an intuitive/conceptual construct, and if you remove all perceptual presence, the stone is no longer there. — Astrophel

Precisely the categorical error. Without perceptual presence of things, and forthcoming experience, it can only be a priori that I still know with certainty nothing in space moves itself.

The stone is not; that which is represented by the word stone, very much is simply out there, independent of my mental affairs. Stone is from those very affairs.
— Mww

Well, you may think this, but Kant doesn't. Being "simply out there" is, where, in space? But read the transcendental aesthetic: Space is an apriori for of intuition. — Astrophel

Oh, I’m pretty sure he thinks, and is trying desperately to impress upon the rest of us, “simply out there” indicates “simply not in here”. I didn’t mention space, only referring to that which must be “….something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related…”, and that by means of the logic intrinsic to my mental affairs.

The thing out there IS your mental affairs. — Astrophel

Oh dear. The thing out there is nothing but the appearance to, the effect on, the occassion for, my mental affairs, but is not them, “….for, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…”
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It is ungracious to critique the Critique?? — Astrophel

…..ungracious to suggest later that he forgot something. — Mww

Since when is ungracious to suggest the same as ungracious to critique? As long as we’ve been here we’ve both been critiquing the Critique, but only one of us suggests a flaw in the memory of its author. Without knowing the totality of what he knew, what could possibly be said about what he forgot?
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….when you see an object, you generally are not "thinking the concept"…. — Astrophel

Correct. “…Intuition cannot think, understanding cannot intuit…”

….but rather, the recognition is spontaneous. — Astrophel

When I see, or perceive by any sense, the affect on my senses is immediate. So I would only say the recognition my senses have of been affected, re: sensation, is simultaneous with such appearance. The spontaneity of concepts takes place in understanding, and so has nothing to do with when I see an object.

If it is me that is thinking the concept, does it make any difference to then say it is me recognizing the spontaneity by which the concept is thought?
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Have a good trip.

But his Deduction is analogized to a quid juris legal affair, which has "no clear legal title, sufficient to justify their* employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason." — Astrophel

The lament, “no clear legal title sufficient to justify their employment, being obtainable from experience or reason”, was a slam on Hume, who posited mere “constant conjunction” of sense to experience on the one hand, and his rejection of pure a priori conceptions of reason entirely, on the other.

It is that the categories are analogized to a quid juris deduction, or, which is the same thing, it is that a sufficient warrant, a clear right, that the categories are the necessary conditions, not for experience, but for the invocation for synthesis in understanding of the sense of a thing to the cognition of it, and THAT being the logical necessity for experience.

It seems to me by your words, you’re saying the categories have no clear right to do what Kant intended for them, re:, his deduction of them is suspect, or downright illegitimate, therefore they have no sufficient warrant for their employment.

…..it is the case that this stone cannot move itself. It must be moved by something else, and this holds true by necessity, so how can I know this apodicticity that is IN the stone when the stone stands outside of the logic produced in my mental affairs?…. — Astrophel

The certainty isn’t in the stone, it’s in the truth of the necessity, which is not outside the logic of my mental affairs.

…..It MUST be that the stone is not simply out there in a world that is independent of my mental affairs. — Astrophel

The stone is not; that which is represented by the word stone, very much is simply out there, independent of my mental affairs. Stone is from those very affairs.

Rather, there must be a relation that binds the two. — Astrophel

There is a relation, but not between the thing out there and my mental affairs with respect to it. The relation binds, through synthesis, the phenomena of intuition in sensibility to the logic of cognition in understanding. The ground for that function of synthesis, is imagination, the rules by which all synthesis abides regarding empirical content, are the categories.

….he misses the need for a transcendental deduction of the totality of experience. — Astrophel

If he thought there was a need for it, wouldn’t he have included it in what he’d already said was a completed metaphysical system? Besides, the pertinent fundamental transcendental deduction concerns the possibility of experience, the totality of each being no more than just itself, and of course, the totality of experience in general, is unintelligible.

Totality of experience is not a thing to which transcendental deductions can apply, but rather, represents an aggregate of individual things, to each of which such deductions would apply. In the thought of them. Experience is merely an end, given from a certain methodological means, hence, being an end, or, object of, is not itself subjected to, the means.

Why is there a need, and what form would restitution for that need take?

I mean, it took him ten years and 700-odd pages to construct what he thought he needed, so it seems pretty ungracious to suggest later that he forgot something. I know I’m barely smart enough to understand what he did, but I’m certainly not smart enough to question what he should have done.
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But his Deduction is analogized to a quid juris legal affair, which has "no clear legal title, sufficient to justify their* employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason." — Astrophel

So all you’re saying is that he didn’t really deduce anything, when he states for the record that transcendental deductions are “…. an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects…”, which appears to presuppose the conceptions being applied.

If appearance tells me a thing exists, logic tells me its existence is necessary. I have no need to deduce any of those pure conceptions justifying my logic, beyond the authority they impose on my thinking. This is what his successors meant by telling us all about what we couldn’t talk about. It isn’t and never was what we can’t; it’s because there no need.

The term 'exist' itself is concept; what isn't? and thus it gives us a principle of subsumption for particulars. — Astrophel

The term “exist” is a conception, yes, which can be predicated of things. Existence gives the principle of subsumption for particular things as a condition for them, yet can never be itself a predicate. It follows that the criteria for a pure conception, is that it is always the subject of a proposition and from which is given a principle in relation to time, and cannot be a predicate in the cognition of things. Existence is, therefore, not just a conception, but a pure conception.

In much the same way is “space” a conception. But insofar as space is the condition of the sensing of things rather than the thinking of them, it is not a pure conception, but instead, a pure intuition, holding to the same transcendental manner of applying a priori to objects but not contained in them.
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when you are not thinking of a pot and you see and know what it is you are not actualizing the empirical concept 'pot' but ignoring it, at least until, someone says, hand me that pot! and you explicitly hear the word. — Astrophel

Ok, so if I see a thing and know what it is, that’s called experience and makes explicit the thing I see has run the full gamut of cognition. It follows that if I’m seeing a pot, I must be thinking the concept in order to know what I’m seeing this time conforms to the thing I saw at some antecedent time and by which I first knew that thing as a pot. If I see and know a thing I must have actualized the concept.

On the other hand, what do I care about not actualizing a concept when I’m not thinking about some thing? I can almost guarantee I’m NOT thinking about a hellava lot more things than I am.

When I’m looking at and knowing a pot, and the guy says frying pan….why is it that I don’t hand him the pot? I didn’t hand him the pot only because what I heard him say doesn’t sound like the name of what I see? Wouldn’t I have to actualize both concepts, think the thing belonging to this sound and think the thing belonging to that sound, in order to judge whether or not the sound I heard properly represents the thing I see?

If I have to actualize concepts for the relations of different sounds, why wouldn’t I have to actualize concepts in the relations of what I know?

Is it that once there was no word for anything? — Astrophel

That’s my opinion.
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Kant looks at experience and "observes" Aristotle's logical structures. So he identifies logical structures and ask about their genesis---but why is the palpable world not given the same due? Logic is just "there" and we call it apriori because of the necessity of it. — Astrophel

The world is not given the same logical structure because we don’t know enough about it. Still, what we do know about it can be said to demonstrate logical structure in its relations to us, the simplest being near or far.

The genesis of logical structure is in us, and it is impossible that we do not know that very structure which we construct for ourselves, the simplest of that being A = A.

The world is just there, and we determine for ourselves how it is to be understood. Just because we say roses are red doesn’t indicate the impossibility that they be anything else, but only that they are that for us. By the same token, if the rose is red regardless of what we say, it is red necessarily. Our intelligence is not equipped to say which is the case.

“….That metaphysics leads to divinity is not an accident of history but is intrinsic to the very enterprise of metaphysics…”
(Link, intro., lower pg 3)

It has been intrinsic historically, but would you agree it isn’t so much anymore? Seems to me the logical ens realissimum doesn’t necessarily indicate a divine being, but merely an irreducible one, re: an ideal.

Might just be me, but when I see “divine” I feel like I gotta say some kinda prayer to it or something. Offer up burning incense.

Be that as it may….good reference material, as usual.

Note that when you think you are speaking to yourself. — Astrophel

I was hoping, by my mention of shoe-tying and book-reading, you might note that my position has always been that humans generally think in images.

If one speaks to himself, how does he know what to say?
If to think is to speak to oneself, why not just say one thinks to himself?

What seems like the proverbial voice in your head is merely extant experience doing its thing, taking up the time when the cognitive part of the system recognizes it’s only repeating itself.
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But "beneath" this is impossible to talk about. — Astrophel

“This”, here, is thinking, and your idea that what’s beneath thinking is impossible to talk about. I would extend that to your question, “what is logic”. Other than bare definition, what’s beneath logic, is impossible to talk about.
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The world IS givenness, and thus, transcendental thinking is not to be treated abstractly, but existentially, and this changes everything. — Astrophel

I’m not sure what you mean by transcendental thinking. All transcendental is a priori and belongs to reason but thinking both a posteriori and a priori belongs to understanding. In the former is the complete determination of all things in general; in the latter is the determination of one thing at a time. It is by the transcendental substratum for the determination of all things, are given the rules for the possibility of determining particular things. The completely determined in general is an idea; the completely determined in particular is the ding an sich, neither of which is a possible experience.

If we were in the weeds before, we’re damn near being choked out by them now.
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Ethics' essence is found in affectivity, the kind of thing Kant strictly and explicitly dismisses. — Astrophel

I don’t know what affectivity is. What does it mean for ethics to have an essence?

What is the case is the synthetic apriority in language relations with the world. — Astrophel

Perhaps, depending on context, but I’m claiming the irreducible case, hence regardless of context, is Nature. Language relations with the world presupposes the world, and world being the representation of Nature in general, gives the irreducible.

Which gets us to….by quid juris is it, that synthetic apriority in language relations with the world, is the case? Which in turn requires the answer to, the case….for what?

Then what kind of deduction is this? — Astrophel

The kind of deduction is transcendental, insofar as it is free of any empirical conditions. It’s right to be a deduction of this kind, is to serve as explanation for possession of the conceptions required in a complete system by which the possibility of human experience is determinable.

”….But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence….” (B117)

That is a big confession. — Astrophel

Ehhhhh….methinks ‘tis not so much a confession as a sad commentary on the sorry state of speculative metaphysics. Funny, too, in that the historical record exhibits that Kant allowed himself precious few indulgences of any kind, so there wouldn’t be anything of the sort to which a confession of his would refer.

I’d also like to revisit your quote in which he says, “…(…) if such exist….”. At the time, as you well know, synthetic a priori cognitions hadn’t been entered into the philosophical vocabulary. He had to prove the validity of the concept, and he said “if they exist” because no one had yet thought about them as existing. And they don’t “exist” in the strict categorical sense, but I already spoke to that.
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So reason asking about the nature of reason really is nonsense. — Astrophel

The circularity of human reason has been long established and thoroughly understood. It is, in fact, the ultimate transcendental illusion not to acquiesce to its inevitability. It is the case, then, the nonsense resides in the continued engagement with the illusion, re:, that pure reason affords absolute certainties, in spite of being given the means to avoid doing so.

And such is the reason metaphysics cannot be a proper science on the one hand, and the transcendental philosophy is above all a purely speculative system on the other.
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Ask what any of this is, and you will find more language. Language never really "touches" anything beyond language, and yet, as Dewey et al held, it "works"! — Astrophel

Yeah, it works because the human has this incessant need to express his opinions on every damn thing.

See https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0111332
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BUT, does this mean the world as it "really is" is just a nonsense term? — Astrophel

Yep, pure nonsense. But to ask or tell of the world as it really is, is something we do all the time. Sorry, had to; couldn’t help myself. Scare quotes….conspicuously absent in those philosophical texts I’d invite on a second date.
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put your finger over a lighted match. Can one doubt this? Now THAT is apodicticity! There is no historicity and its contingency of language here that gives rise to doubt, nor is this an abstraction. It is the opposite of an abstraction, the clearest most vivid thing one can imagine. — Astrophel

Doubt what? I doubt I’d do it. I don’t doubt it’d hurt, but the apodeicticity (speaking of quid juris, by what right is there some concept to which this word belongs????) here presupposes experience.

There is no historicity (oooo….there’s another) of language here, because there’s nothing to be said about the pain….and foolishness…of putting one’s finger over a lighted match.
(Why not contingenicity???)

So if the clearest most vivid thing one can image is that which he cannot doubt….wasn’t Descartes right after all?

True apodicticity is found existentially in the only absolute there is, which is outside language. — Astrophel

Sorta where I’ve been coming from since the beginning. True absolute certainty is found outside language because there never could be anything absolutely certain about it.

What the source is presupposes there is such a thing as absolute certainty, which, according to Kant’s definition is the unconditioned, and that is proved existentially unattainable, and THAT is the purpose of the critique of pure reason.
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Please forgive my frivolity. If one can’t have fun with this stuff he shouldn’t be doing it.