Morality can have a social effect, certainly, but I don’t think that makes morality any less an irreducibly personal condition.

Yes I read the OP. Interpreting the title as I did, I questioned whether the initial argument was sufficient support for it.

I am arguing that morality is always both personal & social, and never just personal. What you've said doesn't indicate whether or not you agree with that. — Judaka

I wanted a better understanding of what you mean by personal morality is just morality.

I disagree morality is both personal and social. Morality is personal as a function of will, ethics is social as a function of behavior. A decidedly minority opinion, to be sure, but I’m ok with it.

Is all doing thinking?…… — Astrophel

I’m going with an unqualified yes, except for sheer reflex or accident.

…..Implicitly, yes; I would say a cow standing in a meadow "thinks" when it sees taller more tempting grass. — Astrophel

If implicitly yes, as do I, but…..a cow??? And a cow “thinking”. Is that different than a cow thinking? Maybe “thinking” is a euphemism for instinct. Dunno, but I seriously doubt a majority of lesser animals, if not all of them, have any conception of relative heights as a function of temptation. He goes to taller grass because he doesn’t have to bend his neck so far, not because its tempting.

I agree with you, in that I know what it is to know. One thing I know, is that I don’t know what goes on in a cow’s head, and therefore wouldn’t ever suggest anything about it.
———-

….reason, left ungrounded in worldly confirmation, moves to inventing metaphysical nonsense. — Astrophel

Absolutely. But that isn’t so much a Kantian fallacy as the prime example of the human disposition to think beyond its logical authority. As true these days as it’s ever been.

….when reason conceives of what it is to be a "rational truth" according to its own model, it creates an abstraction out of reason. — Astrophel

Yeah, the intrinsic circularity of reason herself. Nothing to be done about the way Nature made us.
———-

Truth as a philosophical idea requires actual occasions of truth to be revealed for what they are PRIOR to analysis, not after. — Astrophel

I don’t think occasions of truth are antecedent to the philosophical idea of truth. How would we know a thing is true if we didn’t already know what form any truth must have? Are not universals prior to particulars? How could particulars be analyzed without the universal to which it necessarily relates?

If all truths are contained in propositions, and the simplest possible proposition that cannot possibly be false is the gauge by which all other occasions of truth would be judged, it follows that the idea is before the occasion.

I’ll grant that occasions of truth must be revealed for what they are prior to analysis of possible truths.

You begin with the idea personal morality is just morality.

If I begin with the idea morality is personal, would you say we’re beginning with the same general idea?

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

On second look, perhaps it has.

philosophy conceived as "feast of thought" (….) and while it certainly is this, it begs the question, what is thought? — Astrophel

What if it could be said what thought is by what it does? If only this can be done by thinking, then the doing of this is thinking. If I think of, or cognize, a dog as fur, teeth, a tail, a nose, in a certain arrangement, and if fur, teeth, tails and noses represent conceptions I’ve thought, than I should be authorized to say….thought is cognition by means of synthesis of conceptions to each other. And its negation works just as well, insofar as if I cannot connect a set of conceptions to each other, then I have no authority to say I’ve thought anything at all.
————

but thought is never simply thought; it is inherently aesthetic (see Dewey on this — Astrophel

What does he mean by aesthetic? Something like a feeling? If so, I call that a subjective condition, but deny thought as a subjective condition while maintaining that feeling is. Thought, then, would revert to a condition of the faculty from which it arises, which is understanding.
————

Truth isn't, nor has it ever been, just a propositional affair — Astrophel

Why not? What would prevent it from being just a propositional affair? What is truth such that it cannot be merely propositional? Propositional implies a relation, so what if everything the human intellect does, is relational? It follows necessarily then, that truth must be a propositional affair.

Having suggested that philosophy, as you say, is an affective, makes explicit a relation between it and that which is affected. So….there ya go: truth, insofar as it is a philosophically determinable judgement in accordance with the laws of logical thought, is indeed a propositional affair. With the obvious caveat that we’re not talking about what is true, but only what being true, is.

you don't really mean it's inconceivable that you are not thinking…… — Srap Tasmaner

Right.

….you mean it's impossible for you to think, "I am not thinking" — Srap Tasmaner

Wrong.

Good luck. Just remember it’s only a theory. If this, then that kinda thing. Whether or not there ever is a this….ehhhhh, you’ll have to decide.

Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.

Don’t hate the messenger.

We only know of thinking as something organisms do. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s a logical inference, the negation of which is possible, but nonetheless vanishingly improbable.

I only know of thinking as something of which I do, the negation of which is impossible.

Are you saying that cognitive neuroscience is misguided? — Joshs

No. I’m saying cognitive neuroscience is irrelevant to my self, insofar as even if it proves its point, the fact remains the self does not operate in terms of the physical laws by which science necessarily operates. It may in fact be the case that 47 phosphorous ions traversing a set of 7nm clefts at 12pv activation potential manifests as my perception of a civil injustice, but it remains that the civil injustice in and of itself, is what presents to my self.

Nietzsche’s view is correct, in that thought, and talking about thought, are very different, while thought and thinking about thought, are exactly the same.

I do find it a little puzzling that comments I made were in no way suggestive of "a mutually profitable dialectic." — Astrophel

Yeah, well, they weren’t. When I returned comment, it became so. The mutually beneficial part kinda fell by the wayside because of those damnable concepts inspiring little to no agreement. But forget them, I say.

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

I find myself agreeing with most of your writings, so the point of a dialectic is established already.

What changes would be required in your thinking about what the self is in order for the possibility of self to make sense? — Joshs

That’s just it: that I think presupposes the means for it, which makes explicit its possibility is already established. That self is its representation is merely a conceptual device given from the type of intelligence which contains it a priori.

The changes required, then, reduce to the fact that I do not actually think in the way that seems to me to be the case. Hence…..psychology on the one hand and cognitive neuroscience on the other.

Would any notion of self be possible without the ability to experience self as object? — Joshs

To experience self as object requires a whole different set of preconditions then those that affirm that experiencing the self as object, is absurd. Subjective, or non-empirical, experience has a different name.

The notion of the possibility of self makes no sense, insofar as the even the inception of it presupposes what is asked about.

At best, the human intellect can think the self as object in propositional logic, in which case the subject that thinks the proposition treats itself as a content of them. Nevertheless, that which thinks must antecede the representations which manifest as thoughts, from which follows the thought of self as object, is contemporaneous, re: in relation to, rather than coexistent with, that from which the proposition, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, arises.

Under the assumption the question pertains to my self and the treatment of it by me, recognition of other selves is irrelevant.

Pure metaphysics: both the bane and the blessing of the human condition.

how do you see the 'self' as coexisting as subject and object? — Jack Cummins

I see that such coexistence is not the case, under a certain set of preconditions. Consciousness of self as subject is very far from a cognition of self as object.

the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. So either your conclusion isn’t as radical as you supposed, or, your conclusion is as outdated as the original.

If it were me I’d have said judgement instead of interpretation, but other than that I’m in general agreement.

One has to ask what a foundational existence could even mean — Astrophel

I asked, because you brought them up. I’m guessing you know what a can of worms they are, which makes me wonder….why bring them up, then do nothing with them.

And also keeping in mind that a word like 'absolute' has already corrupted the inquiry. — Astrophel

Yep. Goes without saying, so why did you bring that up along with foundational existence? Point being, you’ve said some interesting stuff, but contaminated the interest with that which doesn’t belong with, and cannot contribute to, a mutually profitable dialectic. I keep looking for a connection that doesn’t seem to be there.
————-

”I am" is not a singularity. there are no such things in language. — Astrophel

Of course there is. It’s right there. From both of us. And people in general. Perhaps the only place it is. And it has to be a singularity, meaning there is only one “I” that is. Or maybe you meant there is a plurality of “I”’s, which is fine but each is still singular in itself, insofar as no “I” can replicate any other such that a common identity is given from it.

to engage a singularity is impossible. — Astrophel

Engage with, true enough. But that does not deny that a singularity engages. How else to partake in the world?

… analysis places the intuition apart from the understanding, the former being affective, the latter cognitive, and the understanding is distinctively cognitive. Non propositional knowledge is not recognized. — Astrophel

Agreed, in principle. What does any of that have to do with existential absolutes or foundational existences? I mean, you brought them up….I guess….in an attempt to lay the groundwork for something apparently about the world, but from what you’ve called our contemplative midst. I can’t seem to find a connection you’ve made between them, as yet anyway.

One is simply directed to purify one's gaze, deliver observation from the presumptive thinking that generally steps in and makes claims and argues…. — Astrophel

To purify one’s gaze makes none but metaphorical sense, but nevertheless observation is already delivered…..separated…..from presumptive thinking, which you’ve already granted, insofar as affective intuition is placed apart from cognitive understanding.

But I argue that even though we face the world in a determinate historical way (educated and enculturated), the event of acknowledging something retains its original status as an intuition. — Astrophel

Again, agreed in principle, overlooking the repetitive semantic disassociation (we in general face the world, but each subject alone, retains some original status). Still, no exposition of a relation between an existential absolutes and foundational intuitions. And yet the problem seems to be the loss of foundational intuitions and the subsequent recovery of them, or at least their status as such. But how can that be the case, in a systemic whole? Can’t lose a part then get it back and still have the system maintain itself.

They say that once an intuition is observed it is already embedded in context, and the "purity" (or innocence) of the observation is entirely undone. — Astrophel

I’m guessing that because intuitions are representations of observations, the rationale is that the innocence of being observed is lost to manifestation as phenomenon. While that does no harm, it also has no benefit. Seems like naught but a minor rendition of “non-overlapping magisteria”, in that observation is this, intuition is that and while one necessarily presupposes the other, neither is contained in the other. In other words, intuitions are never that which is observed, which in turn leaves observation to be just what it is, no part of it in the least undone.
————-

I think you’re trying to elaborate on the distinction between private philosophy (thought) and public philosophizing (thought-in-the-world), re:

It is called 'I am' in the context of language; it is complex in that when you look for the 'I am" you find a multiplicity, not a singularity. One finds thinking, feeling and the rest; but a single "I" does not show up. — Astrophel

So it was called “I am” in the context of “I think”, as it should be. I am that which thinks, is a singularity. Even though “I” never shows up in thought, it is nonetheless the case that all thought is the manifestation of a singular thinker, for which “I” is merely the representation. All of THAT, in the context of language.

Any idea what that would be, what form it would take? Is that the scope of your elucidation?
— Mww

Foundational intuitions? — Astrophel

No. An existential absolute. Or, apparently, just recently, your foundation of existence. Is one the same as the other?

I claim there is an existential absolute (…). This is the bare givenness of the world. — Astrophel

There is a confidence that science is "about" something, even if that something is implicit and elusive. It is here I wish to elucidate. — Astrophel

So the main thesis does not concern foundational intuitions, but rather, an existential absolute with respect to the implicit and elusive something science is “about”?

Any idea what that would be, what form it would take? Is that the scope of your elucidation?

Or am I wrong about this? — Astrophel

There is no wrong in speculative metaphysics; just coherence, and logical consistency to support it.

The notion of foundational intuitions initially became coherent, within its own logically consistent framework, in 1781.

Attempts to dismiss them as such, or maybe realign them as something else, began in 1818, been going on ever since.

He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self….. — Bob Ross

“…. because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results….”

The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.
—————-

“…. This relation**, then, does not exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity. The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious….”
** “this relation” is between me and my representations.

This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different. When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;
That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;
That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.
————-

”My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant….”
-Mww

It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. — Bob Ross

The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.
———-

I must agree with when he says you’re not listening. I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless. Same with requests for proofs. There is no damn proof, fercrissakes. It’s a fargin’ THEORY, grounded in abstractions for which there never can be a proof. And that a mind must be a thing-in-itself, when in accordance with the consistency of the presently concerned dialectic, it cannot.

(Sigh)

I didn’t see a proof in that quote…. — Bob Ross

Because, as you say, it’s a summary, or an abstract, sort of, hence there isn’t a proof per se. There is only, in the text that follows, an affirmative argument for something, at the time, that had never even been considered by any of his peers.

quote="Bob Ross;817972"]……you should be able to articulate the proof that convinced you.[/quote]

My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant. I’m sufficiently persuaded by the affirmative argument to think he’s come up with a perfectly fascinating metaphysical theory. That’s it.

“…. If a judgement is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion.….”

I could articulate the argument, but all I’d doing is reading the book to you. To be as fair as possible, re: not imbue my interpretive subjectivity into a text, you should study it for yourself. Cut out the middleman, so to speak.

Now you may say you’ve already done that, but your interpretation is so different from mine that you’re just looking for clarity. But what if I’ve got it all wrong? Then you’re right where you started, anyway, left with your own understanding. As it should be.
————-

Addendum: Fancy-talk for dammit!! I saw this but forgot to mention it:

On your “Of The Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception” quote, the very next line after what you posted, shoots your argument in the foot. The “I think” is a representation, therefore not a thing-in-itself, which is, of course, never that which can be represented.

“….. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations…..”

Just sayin’…..

I have no problem with that BUT I can do the same exact thing about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I don’t think so. Not exactly. You can do as you wish, re: appeal to intuition, but you must first treat the thing-in-itself differently, such that it is all and only that which appears to be represented in intuition as a phenomenon. The established condition is that it is not, therefore you must show that it is. In order to do that, you must treat it differently. Which is fine, you are certainly authorized by your reason a priori. Just, not in accordance with Kantian transcendental philosophy.

Why can possible knowledge not be from experience? — Bob Ross

Experience is present or past; possible knowledge is future. Possible knowledge requires possible experience. Seems pretty cut and dried to me.

We use parsimony, coherence, intuitions, reliability, consistency, empirical adequacy, etc. and this doesn’t require us to limit ourselves to transcendental investigations. — Bob Ross

Yeah, but I want to know if all those reduce to something that grounds them all, or if there is not. For that investigation, a transcendental method, insofar as a priori cognitions are the only way for my determinations with respect to those wishes to manifest and a transcendental method proves the validity of them, I am well served by it.

If I am understanding you correctly, then you are using the “understanding” vs. “reason” semantics from Kant (which is fine). If so, then I would say that (1) your ability to acquire the knowledge of the ‘understanding’ is just metaphysics (and is no different than what I am doing) and (2) I reject Kant’s formulation of it as merely an exposition of ‘reason’ as opposed to the ‘understanding’ — Bob Ross

(1)….correct. I don’t acquire the knowledge of understanding; it is methodologically given as a faculty contained in and used by a speculative system, and is thereby just metaphysics;
(2)….reject to your own satisfaction. That doesn’t detract from the ground of the formulation which shows what the opposition is.
————-

Maybe expound whatever proof you found convincing for Kant’s twelve categories: that might help me understand better. — Bob Ross

“…. Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our à priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table of these elementary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts. The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the à priori cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole; consequently, only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to it…..”

Convinced of a proof grounded in an idea? Nahhhh….no more than persuaded, and that in conjunction with his claim that he’s thought of everything relevant, and needs nothing from me to complete the thesis. For me to think he could have done better, or that he trips all over himself, implies I’m smarter than he, which I readily admit as hardly being the case.

Funny, though, innit? To help you understand? You realize, don’t you, that is beyond my abilities? No matter what anybody says in attempting to help you, you’re still on your own after they’ve said whatever it is they going to say. And because you’ve rejected some parts, it isn’t likely you’re going to understand the remainder as a systemic whole, which necessarily relates to the parts rejected.

My interest here is waning , sorry to say.

A most valiant effort.

”…..if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it.”
-Mww

I said: (…) if you are saying that possible knowledge is that which one experiences….
If by “if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it”, you just mean that you’ve experienced something…..

The question up for debate here is whether you have justification for claiming there are things-in-themselves that are being represented in that experience—not that having an experience is having an experience. — Bob Ross

Do you see that neither of your follow-up’s relate to what I said?
……Possible knowledge, knowledge not in residence, cannot be from experience that is.
……To experience is not necessarily to know, but to know is necessarily to experience.

Justification for claiming things-in-themselves are being represented in experience, should never be a question up for debate, and if it does arise as such, it can only be from a different conception of it. To represent a thing-in-itself in its original iteration, is self-contradictory, insofar as the thing-in-itself is exactly what is NOT developed in the human intuitive faculty for representing sensible things.
———-

Our understanding of the world is dictated by our representational faculties, but that doesn’t mean we can’t give cogent accounts of beyond that…. — Bob Ross

Then why isn’t such cogent account given by the understanding that’s already dictated our understanding of the world? If it can, then it hasn’t dictated as much as merely proposed, and if it can’t then its dictation is all it is capable of doing, which releases anything beyond it from being an object of it, which in turn means there won’t be a further cogent account.

But I get it. Reason can always influence understanding by enabling thoughts or chain of thinking beyond that which is dictated by the representational faculties. The old, “what if…..” scenario, which only reason can initiate, and in so doing requests that understanding bend its own rules. Which is fine, obviously, in that empirical science advances in no other way, except for sheer accident. Thing is, though, empirical science is checked by either Nature or experience, whereas pure mental exercise has no such check, but relies on self-correction in the form of logical juxtaposition to synthetic a priori principles, like..…. “no, son, you cannot enclose a space with two straight lines. Don’t even go there.”

So it turns out, not only does reason ask understanding to bend its own rules, but justifies the request because it has already bent its own principles. If that happens, there are no checks and balances left at all, and there manifests an intellectual free-for-all where anything goes, an “…embarrassment to the dignity of proper philosophy….”, so those old-time actual professional philosophers would have us know.

It sounds like you are saying there are minds which are of a mental substance — Bob Ross

I only said what my mind is not. I’ve said before I don’t hold that minds are anything beyond an object of reason, which negates that I may be what’s referred to as a substance dualist.

But, traditionally, a mind is a conscious intelligence—a thinking subject which has qualia. — Bob Ross

Oh. A new tradition, then. The old one didn’t need qualia for conscious intelligence. Got along rather well without them, actually. A pair of shoes with a pretty shine, is still just a pair of shoes.

I agree that the body is not a thing-in-itself, but the mind (or something else) must be. — Bob Ross

Ok. Why must it be? For a mind, or something else which serves the same purpose, to be a thing-in-itself makes necessary it is first and foremost, a thing. Says so right there in the name.

Even if the mind is not a ‘thing’ in the sense of being of a physical substance, it is a ‘thing-in-itself’ of a mental substance. — Bob Ross

This looks like a way to force acknowledgement for the existence of a mind. The thing-in-itself is a physical reality, so if the mind is a thing-in-itself in a mental reality, then that’s sufficient reason to justify its existence? Which still requires an exposition for mental substance such that mind can emerge from it. Are you using Descartes for that exposition? It’s in Principia Philosophiae 1, 51-53, 1644, if you want to see how yours and his compare.

It just seems to me like an incredibly unparsimonious account of reality. — Bob Ross

I am not accounting for reality; I’m accounting, by means of a logical methodology, reality’s relation to me.

You’re correct, in that I don’t know any of those things you listed, in the same manner as I know the things of my experience. But I know with apodeictic certainty the conditions under which the relations logic obtains, and from which my experiences follow, do not contradict Nature, which is all I need to know. ‘Course, I might someday trust that logic so far that it kills me, but it hasn’t yet, so I must be doing something right. Or at least not wrong enough to sustain permanent damage.

You want me to go further in my accounting, but I don’t see any need for it.

”I don’t think there’s sufficient warrant to claim there are other minds in any case, but it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose there are.”
-Mww

Why would it be reasonable if you cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves, which would include other minds? — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves concerns things. Minds are not things. Things-in-themselves do not include minds.

But there are things about you as a mind you cannot prove of others without venturing into metaphysical claims about the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I am not a mind; I am a conscious intelligence, a thinking subject, which is certainly a metaphysical claim. Notice the conspicuous lack of mention for the thing-in-itself. My body is never absent from my representational faculties, insofar as they are contained in it, thus is always a thing and never a thing-in-itself.

It just seems like an evasion (inadvertently) of the real issue I am trying to address here to say that ‘mind’ is merely ‘reasoning’. — Bob Ross

I didn’t say mind was merely reasoning. Such idea makes no sense to me. As well, I’m responding in kind to your verbatim comments, so if I’m evading it’s because I am not aware of what you’re trying to address.

Likewise, you can’t prove, even if that is the case that we all reason, that ‘we’ are the ‘ones reasoning’. Do you agree with me on that? — Bob Ross

Sure. It is not impossible what I consider as thinking really isn’t, but is in fact merely the material complexity of my brain manifesting as the seeming of thought. So, what…..you’re trying to say that because it is not impossible for thinking to be other than it seems, the door is thereby left open for my thinking to be a manifestation of something even outside my own brain? Perhaps that’s no more than the exchange of not impossible regarding brains, for vanishingly improbable for external universal entity.
—————

Time and space aren’t properties of objects per se, but you are, under transcendental idealism, producing them under space and time. — Bob Ross

No. I am not producing objects. I am producing representations of them, and those under, or conditioned by, space and time.

Saying that the objects only exist in your perception is just to say that there no corresponding object beyond those forms of space and time — Bob Ross

Sure, but no one has sufficient justification for saying objects only exist in perception, which makes the rest irrelevant.

”In order to know a thing in the strictest sense, it must manifest as an experience.”
-Mww

It can agree with this, as a matter of semantics, if you are saying that possible knowledge is that which one experiences…… — Bob Ross

Semantics, huh? Why don’t we just agree that if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it.

……but then this just pushes the question back: why can’t we say that possible knowledge goes beyond our experiences? — Bob Ross

Why wouldn’t that be true? The truth of that doesn’t affect the premise that if a thing is known it must have been an experience, and doesn’t affect possible experience.

Also, as a side note, wouldn’t it be impossible to know that, for example, your mind uses pure conceptions of the understanding to produce the world if we are defining possible knowledge as only that which we experience? Because we definitely don’t experience that. — Bob Ross

Of course. The categories are nothing but theoretical constructs. It is merely a logically consistent speculation that understanding relates pure conceptions to cognition of things. Pretty hard to experience a theory, right?
————-

Because we can tell that our perception of the world is dictated by our representative faculties. — Bob Ross

Now, for me, this is exactly backwards. I mean…what comes first, the appearance of a thing, or the representation of it? Our understanding of the world is dictated by our representational faculties.

Metaphysics is about understanding that which is beyond all possibility of experience, and that includes transcendental philosophy. — Bob Ross

Ehhhhh…..we just have different ideas of what entails metaphysics. While it may be fine to say it is understood for something to be beyond the possibility of all experience, it remains the case that understanding is not authorized to say what that something is, but only that the criteria for experience has not been met.

Understanding cannot inform what things are not conditioned by the categories, but only informs regarding those that are. Without the categorical criteria, understanding can still conceive on its own, but mere conception is by no means sufficient causality, from which follows that understanding cannot determine the ground of experience on its own accord. Something else must intervene, in order for subsequent understanding to grant the invalidity of its conceptions….the error in its judgement……with respect to possible experience because of them.

“…. By exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given à priori.…”

Yours wants the content of a conception as metaphysical, which is an exposition of it; mine wants that there are conceptions, including their content, not thought spontaneously as in understanding in conjunction with a synthesis of relations, but given complete in themselves from a pure a priori source. Reason is the only human faculty with the power to forward conceptions complete in themselves, which are called objects of reason, or, transcendental objects, and are not at all objects of experience.

So, yes, it is understood there are things beyond experience, but metaphysics in relation to understanding is not how they are given.

Things-in-themselves are beyond the possibility of all experience. — Bob Ross

And of course, the thing-in-itself is no more that a full-fledged, self-contained conception arising from…..that’s right……pure reason. A metaphysical conception understood within an empirical domain, but not given from it.
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Analytic Idealism, I would say, is just pure ontolotical idealism; whereas transcendental idealism is really only epistemic idealism — Bob Ross

That sounds reasonable to me, and also serves as a barrier for the compatibility of our respective philosophies. Which is fine, I don’t mind, but we’ll run out of things to discuss sooner rather than later.

Are you agreeing with me then that:
— Bob Ross

For example, under transcendental idealism I don’t think you can claim: there are other minds; that you have a mind; that you have representative faculties; that objects persist in their existences even when you are not perceiving them, etc[/quote][/quote]

I don’t think there’s sufficient warrant to claim there are other minds in any case, but it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose there are.

I recognize the ubiquity of the conventional use of the word, but I personally don’t hold with minds as something a human being has. I consider it justified to substitute reason for mind anywhere in a dialectic without detriment to it, given the fact it is impossible to deny, all else being equal, that every human is a thinking subject. On the other hand, I am perfectly aware I am a thinking subject, which authorizes me to claim reason for myself, and that beyond all doubt.

I don’t claim representational faculties, but affirm the predicates of a speculative philosophy that presupposes them. They are explanatory devices in a discipline where the empirical support of experience is absent.

That objects do not persist in the absence of perception leads to irreconcilable contradictions, which suggests the claim as to whether or not they do, is an irrational inquiry. The logical consistency inherent in human intelligence demands only that which can be said about the relation a perceived object has with me, as opposed to the relation an unperceived object has with me, in either case the object’s existence is presupposed, from which follows the ontology of the object should never be in question.

The absurdity resides in the notion that if non-perception implies non-existence, then my perception is necessary existential causality itself. But it is absolutely impossible for me to cause the existence of whatever I wish to perceive, as well as to not perceive that of which I have no wish whatsoever, which makes explicit the only existences I could possibly be the causality of, is that which was already caused otherwise, which is all my perceptions could ever tell me anyway.

Then there is time. If I am the cause of an object’s existence merely from my perception of it, then the time of my perception is identical to the time of the object’s existence, which is the same as my having attributed to that object the property of time. But time, as well as space, can never be assigned as a property, therefore the time or space of the object’s existence cannot be an attribution of mine, which makes explicit the time and space of an unperceived object is a duration of a time in general and a position in a space in general, which for me is the same as any time and space in general, which is not necessarily the particular time and space of the object of my perception.
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Yes, I think we can know that there are minds that represent the world around to themselves: what is impossible (in terms of knowledge) about that? — Bob Ross

In order to know a thing in the strictest sense, it must manifest as an experience. What is impossible (in terms of knowledge) about that, is that minds of any form are never going to manifest as an experience. You alternative is to not conceive minds that represent the world, as things, or, to characterize knowledge as something other than that which manifests as experience.

Complicated further but the annexation of “to themselves”. If it is the case minds that represent are not met with the criteria for knowledge, then a mind that represents to itself is unintelligible.

So the question remains…..how would such knowledge be possible? How is it that you think that which the judgement represents, can be known?
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I thought you were claiming that we cannot perform valid metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy—as we cannot know the things-in-themselves. Is that incorrect? — Bob Ross

That we cannot know the thing-in-itself has nothing to do with metaphysics. Metaphysics proper concerns itself with solutions to the problems pure reason brings upon itself, of which the thing-in-itself is not one. In fact, the thing-in-itself shouldn’t be a problem in any case, under the purview of the theory from which it originates, re: transcendental philosophy. There are those that make a problem out of it merely by altering judgement of its original conception and its subsequent derivatives, which just culminates in the installation of a different philosophy.

You mentioned good vs bad metaphysics a few pages ago. I didn’t think that a worthy distinction then, and I don’t think valid/invalid metaphysics to be any better now. Good vs bad logic in conjunction with experience or possible experience, for whatever metaphysics, has better service.
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It is originally called ‘analytic’ idealism because it is formulated under the Analytic school of philosophy — Bob Ross

Ahhhh…that’s it? Transcendental idealism shifted the entire idealistic paradigm, so I figured that which attempts to shift it again, would shift from that. There is a short missive in CPR which sets the ground for its doctrine, which says metaphysics is predicated necessarily on the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, then goes about proving there are such things which validates the ground initially set as a premise. That to which synthetic cognitions are juxtaposed, are analytic, so….I just figured the new style of idealism wanted to be grounded in pure analytic cognitions, which are mere tautologies necessarily true in themselves, which, of course, a universal mind would have to be, re: self-evident. I mean….what would there be to synthesize to a universal, which makes synthetic cognitions with respect to that concept, impossible, which means that condition must itself be, well…..analytic.

But now….never mind. Just flew into my head, in keeping with what some philosophers historically do with themselves: take what one said, change this and that a little bit, present it as something new and different.

”yours concerns what is thought about, mine with thought itself.”
-Mww

I can agree with this to a certain extent; but I also hold that our minds are representative faculties—however, I don’t think it is cogent to claim that we can only go that far. — Bob Ross

One of the subtleties of metaphysics in general, is the recognition that only through reason can reason be examined, from which follows that all that is reasoned about is predicated on what is reason is. This is, of course, the epitome of circularity, and because it is inevitable, it best be kept to a minimum. No one has admitted to having sufficient explanation for how we arrive at representations, even while many philosophize concerning what they do in a speculative theory, justifying their inclusions in it. So saying, to posit an additional representational faculty, doing what it does and we not being able to say how it does what it does, stretches circularity beyond what couldn’t be explained beforehand.
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What do you mean by “it doesn’t work by claims”? — Bob Ross

I mean you are correct, in that there are things, such as those you listed, that I have no warrant to claim, either as fact objectively, or as irreducible truth subjectively, which is exactly the conditions under which transcendental philosophy is to be understood.
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”…..only demonstrates another form of impossible knowledge.”
-Mww

What is the other form of impossible knowledge that my theory conceives? — Bob Ross

You hold that knowledge of the nature of the thing-in-itself is knowable, which is knowledge I hold as impossible, yet you hold with the mind as a representational faculty, which is something impossible to know without the antecedent knowledge there is a mind, and, the nature of it is such that it has representational capabilities.
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…..under my view, it is actually and metaphysically possible for the ball at the top of the hill to fall to the ground because I belief the world has to offer such things that could actualize it. — Bob Ross

That the world offers (or withholds) is just another way of saying there’s a set of relations between the world and its objects, one set of relations and this happens, another set of relations and that happens which is the same as this doesn’t happen, all from the perspective of an intelligence capable of characterizing relations.
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But not all conceivable things are metaphysically possible. — Bob Ross

If conception is itself a metaphysical function, and if possibility is a metaphysical condition, then whatever is conceivable must be metaphysically possible.
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….you can’t turn around and claim, like a Kantian would (which was my whole point originally with Mww), that we can’t do metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy. — Bob Ross

No matter what was turned around from, or by whom, I never said nor hinted there is no metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy, or that all metaphysics is necessarily predicated on transcendental philosophy’s critical method.

“…. (That for) which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems (of pre reason) is named metaphysics….”

One can attempt to solves pure reason’s problems, including the one of singular importance, any way he wishes, depending on the preliminaries he uses.

Perhaps you might be so kind as to reiterate what your whole point originally was, with respect to what you said there.

Do you have an idea as to why your system is called analytic idealism, insofar as it is a metaphysical doctrine?

I thought the origin of the proofs themselves, being in the understanding, would be a priori….. — Bob Ross

The a priori/a posteriori distinction is determined by the what, not by the where. While understanding creates it own objects, re: numbers, a priori, proofs by means of them would be impossible if they were not made into real objects in the world.

You can think all day long it takes three lines to enclose a space, but you’re not going to prove it with apodeitic mathematical certainty, unless you physically draw three real lines in a relation to each other corresponding to the image representing your thinking.

….we cannot know a priori the mathematical relations of objects a priori — Bob Ross

Correct. Relations of objects makes explicit experience, which is always and only determinable a posteriori.

……math is not a priori in the sense of being a part of our construction, via the understanding, of the world around us. — Bob Ross

Agreed, not part of our construction of the world, which begins with phenomena, whereas mathematics ends with them. In the former objects are given to us, in the latter objects are given by us.

It isn’t that the possible worlds exist but, rather, that under one’s metaphysical commitments there is an existence with the potency to actualize the thing, and as such the thing is considered metaphysically possible. — Bob Ross

Sure, but so what? For me, a thing I have yet to experience is already metaphysically possible, simply because it is conceivable as a thing, or a manifold of things, such as a world of things. You’re saying a thing is metaphysically possible insofar as some existence with the potency to actualization some possible thing hasn’t done it yet, which is tantamount to a non-natural causality.

Now, I accept the transcendental conception of a non-natural causality, but not with respect to the actualization of metaphysically possible things.
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(Paraphrased for simplicity)

For example, under transcendental idealism I don’t think you can claim: there are other minds; that you have a mind; that you have representative faculties; that objects persist in their existences even when you are not perceiving them, etc…… — Bob Ross

Transcendental philosophy is a speculative methodology. It doesn’t work by claims, which imply possible truths, but by internal logical consistency in the unity of abstract conceptions, same as yours.

On the benefit of analytic idealism:

I think a more plausible explanation and account of reality. — Bob Ross

Perhaps, but not more knowledge. So we have between us, one philosophy which demonstrates that some knowledge is impossible given this set of conditions, and another philosophy which demonstrates that the former impossible knowledge really isn’t, given a different set of conditions, which in effect, only demonstrates another form of impossible knowledge.

Idealism, in whichever denomination, is always predicated on a subject that cognizes in accordance with a system contained in the form of his intellect. I rather think your idealism has to do with the cognitions, whereas my idealism has to do with the system proper; yours concerns what is thought about, mine with thought itself. Yours is limitless, mine self-limiting.

When considering the pros and cons of each, parsimony should be the rule.

the true origin of our proofs in pure math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason — Bob Ross

The true origin of the possibility of our proofs, is in reason and is a priori.
The origin of the proofs themselves, is in understanding, and is a posteriori.

our proofs (…) of the useful application of math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason’s ability to construct the phenomenal world according to principles. — Bob Ross

Useful application…..is empirical, for which the phenomenal is constructed, but by understanding, according to conceptions. Understanding is incompetent to construct synthetic principles a priori, but only to construct the conceptions and the synthesis of them to each other, representing the content of those principles. Transcendental application, is neither useful nor empirical, the form of which is merely syllogistic and thus having no empirical content.

“…. The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”
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And because logic is a metaphysical practice, and the conception is already a methodological requirement, then it could be said that they are metaphysically necessary.
-Mww

Metaphysical necessity is essentially that it is true in all possible worlds — Bob Ross

Jeeezz, I hate that expression. Like…..what other world is there? That other worlds are not impossible says not a gawddamn thing about the one we’re in. And we’re not in a possible world; we’re in a necessary world.

Metaphysically necessary merely indicates a condition in a thinking subject. End of story.
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A cautionary tale, relevant to the thread topic:

“…. The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in other regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its success is thus great, because it can support all its conceptions by à priori intuitions and, in this way, make itself a master, as it were, over nature; while pure philosophy, with its à priori discursive conceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit or show any à priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.

As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere of transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction are persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into the splendours of the intellectual world—it becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We shall, accordingly, show that the mathematical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage—except, perhaps, that it more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy—that geometry and philosophy are two quite different things, although they go hand in hand in the field of natural science, and, consequently, that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.…”

This just says, while mathematics is that which exhibits absolute certainty, and we are ourselves the author of mathematical procedures, then it is true absolute certainty is possible for us. The cautions lay in thinking that insofar as absolute certainty is possible, we are thus authorized to pursue the experience of some object representing it. But that just won’t work, because the objects being pursued are not those we construct of ourselves, but are thought to exist in their own right. And they might, but there are no mathematically derived principles given from pure reason, and by association there can be no absolute certainty contained therein, that can support the reality of that object.

The certainty of mathematics can not be imitated in philosophy.

Question: Is a universal mind an absolute certainty deduced from mathematical principles? If not, the object, represented as a universal mind in our understanding, is a mere philosophical possibility. If all our representations are derived from ideas contained in that which is not itself a certainty, why should we trust that our representations arise from it?

I dunno, man. If I can grasp that all my representations belong to me, and never doubt or question that they do, why would I shadow that certainty with that which has decidedly less so, by thinking to myself that my representations are merely offshoots of something else?

While you are correct in saying it is possible, what’s missing is why I should even consider the possibility that analytic idealism holds more persuasions than the transcendental idealism I currently endorse?

So…..what do I gain by granting my representations have their irreducible origin somewhere other than in me?

You seem to be claiming that simply because we start out with an empirical proof that the rest that is abstractly reasoned about them is thereby empirical: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Kindasorta, I guess. The whole possibility of mathematical processes is predicated on the principle reason provides a priori, which itself is derived from a category, regardless of the quantities involved. It is so much easier to empirically prove the small number operations, but the large number operations follow the same principle, so, they are just as possible to empirically prove, but rather much more time consuming. As long as there are people willing to do it, or any sufficiently correlating method, all the sands on one beach could be added to all the sands on another beach….no problem. Not much point in it, except to prove it can be done.
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But I am necessarily extrapolating it from phenomena.
-Mww

I could equally claim that it is ‘necessary’ that your mind is a thing-in-itself. In both cases, it isn’t logically nor actually necessary but rather (debatably) metaphysically necessary. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. I’ll go with…it isn’t actually necessary, in that there may not even be any such thing as a phenomenon (mind). Still, if phenomena/mind are valid metaphysical conceptions, and if they arise logically in a methodology which requires them, then they are logically necessary. And because logic is a metaphysical practice, and the conception is already a methodological requirement, then it could be said that they are metaphysically necessary.

All things which phenomena tell me about, are already outside my representational faculties.
-Mww

As of yet, I think this is an assumption you are making if you aren’t extrapolating it from the phenomena. — Bob Ross

But I am necessarily extrapolating it from phenomena. It would be impossible to be informed of whatever phenomena does tell me, if there weren’t any. All I have to do to say what phenomena tell me about, is extrapolate within the method by which phenomena arise, to the source of them. If the phenomena is necessarily given according to methodological procedure, the source cannot be contingently assumed. The cause must be as necessary as the effect it produces, for otherwise the theory is without sufficient ground.

Caveat: there is as yet no knowledge of what the phenomena represents, but only that it represents something. Sensibility is a representational faculty, not a cognitive one.
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On large numbers:

I think it can be proven, just not empirically. Are you disagreeing? We prove it with reason, not empirical tests (e.g., not with counting our fingers). It is a priori. — Bob Ross

I disagree large quantity summations cannot be empirically proven, and I disagree reason a priori is itself the proof. The latter is the source of synthetic principles a priori, which make the form of mathematical operations possible, the content be what it may. All empirical proofs require content, which reason alone does not provide, in accordance with the principles, which it does.

Furthermore, reason can only prove within its own constructs, which we call logic. So it is true it is logically provable that some quantity adjoined to another in serial accumulation produces a quantity greater than either of two adjoined, but such is not a proof for particular numbers added together, insofar as to prove that, and thereby sustain the logic, the content for which the principle is the condition, would have to actually manifest, which just IS the empirical proof. In the case at hand, it follows that the great magnitude of the quantities to be adjoined, and the adjoining of them in a mathematical operation, do nothing to violate the principle.

your description here is an attempt at reverse engineering what is outside of your representative faculty by means of what is presented to you by your representative faculty — Bob Ross

That would be the case if the reversal went further than authorized by the normal Kantian method.

……the post-modern sense: the acquisition of knowledge purely from the phenomena, of which says nothing of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Same as transcendental philosophy, except the latter says that things-in-themselves exist while saying nothing about such existence.

…..that would require that phenomena do tell you about the things which reside outside of your representative faculty…. — Bob Ross

All things which phenomena tell me about, are already outside my representational faculties.
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Things are things in themselves until they are met with human sensibility.
-Mww

But isn’t all evidence of “human sensibility” phenomenal? Isn’t it a metaphysical claim? — Bob Ross

Mine references a time before, yours references a time after. They don’t connect to each other, and each is true on its own.

the idea that we can never know the world beyond what is capable to conform to ourselves entails that reality becomes hyperreality. The map and territory, for practical purposes, blend together. — Bob Ross

For all practical purposes, yes. Reality conforms to us each time a high-rise goes up, or some
numbnuts burns down a forest. Metaphysically, on the other hand, the map/territory divide rests assured.
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You can’t empirically prove that 8888888888888888 + 2 = 8888888888888890. — Bob Ross

An individual may not have enough time to prove it, but it certainly can be proven. The measure is degree of difficulty, not its possibility.

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? — Wayfarer

Often is the case….like, almost always…..that the origin of an idea, and the use of that conception subsumed under it, are treated without regard for the necessary distinctions between them.

Use of the object representing an idea, presupposes it. If more than one understanding represents the idea with the same conception, and they understand each other in the mutual use of it, the idea presupposed in the one must be identical with the presupposed idea in the other.

So, no, your idea of seven, or any singular idea susceptible to representation, and mine, are not different, all else being given. But you already knew that.

If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, and, consequently, they have to develop a post-modern pragmatist approach (such as using difference to gather knowledge)--like the American Pragmatist Pierce.

I am just curious how you get around this issue? Or is it even an issue to you? — Bob Ross

Isn’t relation the manifestation of a difference? The very conception of a synthetic a priori cognition, the backbone of transcendental philosophy, specifies a difference in the relation between the conceptions contained in the subject and the conceptions contained in the predicate of a syllogistic proposition. VOILA!!! Using difference to make the gathering of knowledge possible.

I think Piece was a closet Kantian anyway, wasn’t he? Early on he called himself a “pure Kantist ”, The Monist, 1905. Also in The Monist, he states pretty much the Kantian doctrine regarding the ding as sich, and the importance of the categories. He abdicated the Kantian pedestal only later, becoming a Hegelian absolute idealist…..for some reason or another. But I get your point.

Kant isn’t doing anything differently here other than trying to keep his metaphysical research as close to ‘home’ as possible. — Bob Ross

Agreed, iff “home” is the human thinking subject.

To me, you just pointing out that if our representative faculty lost its two pure forms of intuition that we would not longer perceive the objects--but that doesn’t mean there aren’t any. — Bob Ross

It does not follow from the loss of intuitions that we would lose perception. We would lose the ability to arrange the matter of the object into a form for a phenomenon, but that doesn’t mean there weren’t any appearing objects. Appearance means presence; because we don’t lose perception, we don’t lose appearance so the object isn’t lost to us. Completely and utterly useless appearance, insofar as we couldn’t decipher the sensation the appearance provides, but provide it does.

If you’d said we could no longer cognize the object, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t one, I’d have just said….yep.

It does not presuppose there existence as things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Things are things in themselves until they are met with human sensibility, re: Pierce….since you brought him up:

“….I show just how far Kant was right, even when right twisted up on formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is all the universe is for us….”

Yes, by why do you think there is a horse-in-itself and a fence-in-itself? — Bob Ross

I don’t need to think it; I can represent to myself differences in arrangements of matter. Horse are not comprised of wood and fences don’t have hooves. Different phenomena, different things, different things-in-themselves from which the things appear.

I have no problem with this. — Bob Ross

Makes me wonder why you would ask why I maintain a thing-in-itself for each thing that appears.

To be honest, although he was very smart, he says these kinds of contradictory things so much in the CPR that I think he didn’t have the view fully fleshed out. — Bob Ross

I’ve heard that argument repeatedly, and maybe he didn’t. Takes one more scholarly that I to show it, though.

Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data. — Bob Ross

Man, after reading that, it appears you’re more familiar with this stuff than you let on when talking to me. Which makes much of what I say pretty much superfluous.

We are NOT amused!!!! (Grin)

”….not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.”
-Mww

I agree and think this is true if we were speaking about what you can empirically know…. — Bob Ross

Yes, exactly. Knowledge or possible knowledge a posteriori.

…..but how do you know metaphysically there are things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross

To know metaphysically is knowledge a priori, as opposed to empirical knowledge. Knowledge a priori as it applies to external reality, in Kant, is impure a priori, insofar as it has empirical conditions contained in the syllogism, and is thereby an inductive inference, a logical function, hence, at least for convenience, is metaphysical knowledge. Which is all the thing-in-itself was ever meant to indicate.

So we don’t know all things are appearances given from one thing-in-itself, or as many things-in-themselves as there are things that appear. Nevertheless, humans are capable of more than one sensation at a time, either from a single object or from a multiplicity of them. For single objects there’s no conflict, but for more than one sensation from more than one object, and knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible anyway, we gain nothing by the one-for-all over the each-in-itself, which makes the all-for-one superfluous.

By your own concession, we aren’t supposed to know reality fundamentally is…. — Bob Ross

Not that we’re not supposed to, but that we are not equipped.

By my lights, you cannot be certain that there are things-in-themselves just as much as I can’t be certain that there is a Universal Mind. — Bob Ross

Maybe not, but the alternative is that I am necessary causality for the entire manifold of all that I perceive. Let the contradictions rampant in that scenario simmer awhile.

….if you want to go the truly skeptical route that we are barred from metaphysics (or at least ontology) then to be consistent I think you would have to also rebuke transcendental philosophy — Bob Ross

Absolutely**, but then, I don’t hold with being barred from metaphysical expositions. I just find ontology unnecessary as a discipline in transcendental philosophy, because the existence of things is never in question as is the manifestation of them in experience.

**”…. Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism….”

This is no different than inferring that the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is is a Universal Mind—there’s no certainty in that either. — Bob Ross

Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations.
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First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.
-Mww

Appearances are perceptions, which are representations that your mind generated of the sensations. — Bob Ross

Break it down: Appearance = the input to the sensory device; perception = the activity of the sensory device; sensation = the output of the sensory device. The sensory device generates the sensation, which is the matter of the object that appears. Not yet a representation, for the mere matter of sensation has not been arranged into a determinable form. There are representations generated by the mind from sensation, but these are phenomena, in which the matter is arranged into a form by the reproductive imagination.
(Easier to comprehend if it be granted a perception is the reception of the whole object, all at once, which makes descriptive analysis of it impossible, and if the system can’t describe it, can’t analyze it, it won’t be able to cognize it, making knowledge of it impossible)
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are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression of the thing.

You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself…. — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression, intuition, understanding of the thing.

So Kant can’t say stuff like:

“….We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition….” — Bob Ross

Hey, give him a break. He’s a seriously-genius Enlightenment Prussian. He’s just reminding the readers, maybe half a dozen of whom are his intellectual peers, that the things of intuition are not things-in-themselves. And things-in-themselves, if they contain or are constituted by relations, such must be relations-in-themselves. Continuing with the passage…..

“…..if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear….”

The subjective constitution of our senses in general, which is to say regardless of whatever appears to us, is imagination and the two pure intuitions. Take away imagination the synthesis of matter to form and therefore the phenomenon is impossible; take away the pure intuitions and objects that should have appeared won’t, insofar as there is nothing for object to extend into, therefore they have no shape, and if they have no shape the can contain no matter, and if they contain no matter, they are not objects at all, and if they are not objects at all, there wouldn’t be anything to appear, a blatantly inexcusable contradiction.

If the relations between the phenomena tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves, since they are just the “subjective constitution” of our senses…. — Bob Ross

Phenomena are not what is meant by subjective constitution of our senses in general. Subjective constitution is that within us which makes the transition from sensation, determined by the physiological constitution of the sensory apparatus, to phenomena, possible

The follow-up says it all:

“….. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us…..”

Sensibility is that part of the human cognitive system that has to do with perception, covering the range from appearance to phenomena, technically, “….. The capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility….”. The mode in which we are affected means just which one or more of the five sense organs creates its sensation.

Notice, too, that the nature of objects considered as thing-in-themselves, presupposes their existence. I mean….how could the nature of a thing be considered, even if the thing is considered as having the nature of a thing-in-itself, if it didn’t exist? But I think you’ve acceded that point, if I remember right.
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Because this is an extroplation of the relations of phenomena: you are saying that this phenomena relates to another in a manner that suggests they are representations of different things. Kant is barring this (as seen in the above quote). — Bob Ross

I don’t see where in the above quote anything is being barred. If you perceive a horse jumping over a fence as a whole appearance, the phenomenon of the horse is separate from but nonetheless related to the phenomenon of the fence. And this, by the way, is a good example of the intricacies of the system, insofar as motion, having neither matter not form, and therefore not a phenomenon, is provided a priori as rules by the understanding, re: succession of times in conjunction with a plurality of spaces in a singular intuition.

If you think about it, you can see the validity in it. You may have experience with horses, and with fences, and with things that move, but you’ve never seen a horse jump a fence. But you an still connect a horse to jumping a fence even though you’ve never seen it happen, thus have no experience of it. In short, you can easily conceptually image the motion, a certain indication it must be possible without contradicting the natural order, which is a purely logical deduction, which only understanding can provide, exemplifying the prime dualism in human cognition:

“….. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think…..”
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I think that is what metaphysics is about—giving the best general account of reality. — Bob Ross

Yep, no dispute there at all.

You may choose to phrase it more carefully than I will,…. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s why I said I agreed, in principle. You said we say something about x, and we do, but not at the time of x. We say determinate things about x after the system has already subjected x to process, in which neither the system as a whole nor the processing of x, say anything. And the processing of appearances has no other purpose than to give to the system some x, whatever x is. There is no predication here, no logic, only transition from the external natural state of being of x to an altogether very different internal state which represents it. We couldn’t predicate in this time frame because we’re not conscious of it, which makes explicit there’s no way to philosophize on the one hand metaphysically, or empirically theorize scientifically on the other, about how that transition occurs. But….it does, we know the ends, but not the means. Given all that, it remains that all that can be said about x, at the time of its appearance, is that x exists.
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…..the overall shape of that Kantian position is that something is revealed to us but something at the same time is concealed, namely how the thing is in itself rather than for us. — Srap Tasmaner

True enough, but not at the same time, which just distinguishes the thing from the thing-in-itself. At one point in time it is a thing-in-itself, and some other point in time the thing-in-itself is a thing for us, the changeover being if and when there is an appearance.

Again with the finer points, a euphemism for one man’s reductionism is another man’s quibble….

……nothing is revealed to us, it is given to us.
……if a thing is sufficiently concealed it is not necessarily an existence, but a thing-in-itself is a necessary existence, insofar as without it, the thing which appears is impossible, a contradiction.

….in saying that there are somethings that appear to us (…) we are saying something about those things….. — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed, in principle; we say they exist, and that necessarily.

….that they have this character of revealing or being revealed, and showing themselves to us is a potential or capacity of such things. — Srap Tasmaner

But if we can say they exist necessarily, there’s nothing added by saying they have a character of this kind or that, which could only be attributed to that which exists anyway.
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But what of the object that is revealed to us, at least partially? — Srap Tasmaner

Then we cognize the part we perceive. How would we know the thing is only partially revealed? Reason might guess is there more than meets the eye, but perception does not.