the bucket and space in and outside of it are all outside of you — Corvus

Wasn’t what I asked.

What is it with people, who can’t maintain dialectical consistency. If a guy asks about a certain thing, but gets a response that doesn’t contain anything about that thing…..what a farging waste of the guy’s time, I would think.

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.
— Mww

No it doesn't. — AmadeusD

Hmmmm……

He said Kant said: Our exposition therefore establishes (…) the objective validity…
I said: The objective validity (…) is deduced
He said Kant said: …..presented to us outwardly as object….
I said: …..relates the objects as separate from the perceiver.

You’re quite correct; my fault. The pressure waves corresponding to the sounds of these two sets of words would be somewhat different.

Still, isn’t somewhat different synonymous with pretty much the same?

Jeeezz….and I thought I was the last remaining fundamental literalist in the generation infamous for them.

he had two cases of explanation for space….. — Corvus

Yes, he did. One was the transcendental exposition, the other the metaphysical exposition. The former concerns objects thought, re: your example regarding mere geometric figures, the latter objects perceived, re: your example of seeing the tree. Both expositions restrict space to the mind, or, as I prefer, the condition of the subject, and can only be attributed as external to the subject, iff it is a property of things-in-themselves, which, of course, cannot be determined as being the case.

So, Kant was not simply saying that all space is internal and necessary a priori condition for all perception. — Corvus

Sorry, but I cannot find a justification that it isn’t exactly that. In other words, I find that is precisely what he’s saying. And not only that with respect to perception, but indeed, because the space in which the extension of things occurs cannot be thought away as can all its properties, it absolutely must reside in the subject himself.

Guess you didn’t think about the empty bucket, huh? I was kinda looking forward to your account of what kind of sensation you got from its apparent emptiness.

Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object — Corvus

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.

Ok. Nothing untoward about that. It’s a footnote, and says nothing about perception of space or that space can be an appearance. It just says space with nothing in it is a valid conception, re: non-contradictory. In addition, the last sentence of the footnote warns that just granting the non-contradictory nature of the admission does not imply the possibility of the idea the antithetical argument presents. And in fact, the argument in the thesis denies such possibility.

Think….empty bucket. That the bucket itself encloses a space, and that enclosed space presents to sensibility no appearance, but without which that things could be put in the bucket that would be appearances, becomes impossible.

You’ve presented an antinomy justifying the antithesis of an idea. My response is merely a further counter-claim extending from the thesis of that idea.

Reason doing its thing, only this time from two different intellects, one on each side, rather than one intellect merely confusing itself by taking both sides. Or, maybe not being persuaded by one over the other.

Not from my point of view. That something appears inconsistent and vague may be my fault, in which case reading between the lines just shirks the responsibility of doing a better job.

Yes, isn't what exactly Kant was pointing out? — Corvus

What….that reason can do pretty much whatever it wants? Sure, but then what?

Space as object has its physical properties. — Corvus

Not in CPR, is doesn’t.
(Glances up at thread title)

Space is presupposed in the perception of the objects. — Corvus

Yes, but to presuppose is to deduce, it is not to perceive.

My point was that you cannot perceive objects without perceiving space. — Corvus

Then you must grant that space can affect the senses in the same manner as objects, which reduces to the necessity that space must have properties. At which point, upon determining that space cannot have properties, insofar as there is no possibility of space appearing to you as an object, you’ve contradicted yourself.

If space is incomprehensible….. — Corvus

It isn’t.

Isn't perception of space necessarily deducted in the perception of objects? — Corvus

No. The objective validity of that which relates the objects as separate from the perceiver, or as separate from each other, is deduced from perception of objects.

Deduction is a logical function; perception is a physiological activity. They do not relate to each other. A logical object cannot be perceived, a perceptible object has no need of being deduced.

Asked and answered.

I suppose the answer could reduce to…space is comprehensible, perception of space is not. Hence, the difference.

Perception is an activity; space is a pure representation.

In so far as space is merely itself a representation, and perception of representations is impossible, perception of space is incomprehensible.

Yours was valid as a question, but dialectically irrelevant.

So our perception of time is an illusion
— RussellA
So our perception of space is also an illusion.
— RussellA
But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. — Corvus

Here is a perfect transcendental illusion:

One intelligence puts forth a certain proposition, in which there resides in the subject a certain conception.

Another intelligence, upon reception of the proposition as an appearance, attaches to the subject of the received proposition, a conception that was not antecedently contained in it, thus does not consequently belong to it.

PERCEPTION (of space is an illusion) becomes SPACE (is an illusion).

If it be assumed the second intelligence understands the conceptions contained in the originating proposition, and judges them as united without contradiction in it, but nonetheless projects an understanding of his in the form of his own proposition, in which the subject in his does not relate to the subject in the other’s, his reason has deluded itself without his conscious awareness.

Such is not the least a slight on intelligence in general, but on reason itself, to which every intelligence is susceptible. These, while entirely unremedial, can be nonetheless guarded against.

his distinction between the two terms — Wayfarer

Transcendent: one of two domains to which cognitions relate.
Transcendental: that mode of pure reason by which certain modes of cognition are determined.

Humans are a funny bunch. They create for themselves those things to which they actually attribute the impossibility of experiencing in the same way as they experience material things, from which follows they immediately prevent themselves from knowing those things they create, in the same way they know rocks roll downhill. That one domain in which cognitions of knowledge is abolished in favor of mere cognitions of belief, or, which is the same thing, any knowledge of its objects is impossible, is called transcendent.

But humans also create for themselves that which they may or may not then construct as things in the real world. Insofar as knowledge of objects in this domain is at least possible, it is called immanent.

Transcendent is that in the juxtaposition of domains in which experience is the arbiter.
—————-

That humans in general can create as thought, what is not yet, and even may never, be constructed in the world as real, is possible insofar as the human intellect is endowed with a particular capacity, and anything which follows in accordance with that capacity, regardless of the reality of its objects, is transcendental.

Transcendental is, then, the mode of pure reason as an intrinsic human intellectual capacity, by which all its exercises relate to those pure a priori cognitions it creates for itself, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with experience as such.

The discipline in which all such exercises of this one faculty relate to, and legislate the operation of, the other higher cognitive faculties, re: understanding and judgement, is metaphysics.

The system in which this discipline administers the natural world, and by which experience is possible, is transcendental philosophy.

Or not…..

Find A491/B519.
— Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? — Corvus

The explanation of the antinomies, the exposition of what they are, is A407/B434, wherein pure reason is concerned only with itself and the troubles it causes itself. However such examples of these conflicts manifest, isn’t as important as recognizing how they occur.

Kant states for the record he considers himself a transcendental idealist. Being that kind of idealist grants to empirical conditions their just warrant, so his favoring one name for a philosophy, doesn’t negate his regard for the world with the other.

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? — Corvus

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular.

…."the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect"…. — Wayfarer

Instinct?

we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? — Corvus

Inevitably ending in making of him something for which he would be in no position to affirm or deny. So what’s the point? What does it matter with respect to his philosophy, which is all anyone should care about anyway.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. — Corvus

It’s defined, without equivocation, in the very text from which his metaphysical philosophy gets its name. How could it be left to mere supposition, for his successors to guess about, that which is the formal ground of a paradigm shift in human thought? The fact of it, as you’ve hinted yourself, is completely irrelevant, even if its logical consistency and internal integrity are absolutely necessary.

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? — Corvus

No.
(I’m not aware of any indication that it does)

I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience". — Corvus

It doesn’t.
(There is another term representing “prior to experience”)

What are your definitions….. — Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part.

Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? — Corvus

What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself?

Kant definitely says that TI is nothing to do with idealism in the Prolegomena. — Corvus

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? Then, the poor guy, reading the reference material promising that TI has nothing to do with idealism, comes across “…The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism…”, aannnndddd…..he’s farging lost it. He slams the book shut, walks off, goes back to his comic books or video games, or whatever it is that doesn’t stress his intellect enough to discover that which is at least purported as “useful truths”.

Rhetorical. The answer is in the Critique, and “…. could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so….”.

Ahhh…so it was just my machine. It’s a clickable link now. Not that I’m anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel.

Thanks.

Your moderator’s move of some of the comments on here, to a different place on the forum. Usually that shows up as a clickable link, colored letters, underlined, and all. So a guy doesn’t have to cut and paste.

FYI, that didn’t come up as a link. Was it supposed to? Was mine the only machine where it didn’t?

Try me — I like sushi

Ehhhh….I’m not finding much joy in the iterations presented here, so I might not be the one to ask.

It is a matter of debate whether the Kant's Category of Causality applies only to Appearances or also to Things-in-Themselves. — RussellA

He stated without equivocation the principle of causality could not, why it should now be category of causality, and that it might, I have no idea. So…..you can say whatever you like.

What does it matter where it comes from?

It’s fine, though. One inclined to “much prefer the phenomenological approach”, as you admit, isn’t likely to be persuaded by finespun transcendental arguments, regardless of their authors.

So I can equally say "the window was broken by a thing-in-itself". — RussellA

You can say what you like, but depending on the ground of the determinations by which you say anything at all, re: how you understand things in general, and in particular from transcendental philosophy, you cannot say with legitimacy “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.

“….. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we (….) have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense….”

While the broken window is that which ends up being the something that caused your perception, that alone is not sufficient to inform you of the cause of the window being broken.

So in saying what you do here, merely reflects that you have not learned to take things in two senses in accordance with this particular methodology, from which follows the sense of a thing by which it can be causal and the sense of it in which it cannot. Which is fine; it is speculative metaphysics writ large, after all.

…..a unicorn can ‘exist’ but it cannot be ‘real’. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is neither of these. — I like sushi

Actually, the thing-in-itself is both.

“…. The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere…”
————

….none of it said anything to me. — I like sushi

No problem.

Human being, or being human.

Best I could come up with, for the substance equivocation in Descartes, was Aristotle’s physics was still method of the day, re: pre-Newton. Dunno if that’s a sustainable premise or not.

Good point, hence Kant’s attribution of “problematic” idealism to Descartes on the one hand, and his specificity of substance as a pure category on the other.

Ehhhh….that’s ok.

Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.

Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your “I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper”, doesn’t hold true.

Or I just misunderstood. Dunno.

5+7=12 is a proposition. — Corvus

Yep, a mathematical proposition, to distinguish the principles of its origin.

Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. — Corvus

Which is why the distinction in principles. Mathematical propositions cannot be bivalent, because they cannot be false, because they are grounded by the principles of necessity and universality.

We’ve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest?

The proposition of ‘a-thing-in-itself’ needs greater context. — I like sushi

It just is the context; it justifies the representational nature of human intelligence, under which every other context is subsumed.

….you get the answer 12…. — Corvus

Ahh, but my good man, you initially made no mention of 12. All you stipulated was 5 + 7, in which….

“…. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5….”

….the mere thinking of a union of quantities is very far from construction a mathematical proposition, from which follows….

“….. but not that this sum was equal to 12.…”

….which is a mathematical proposition.

“…. Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience….”

The propositions are always a priori constructs; the proofs for them, on the other hand, are always empirical.

Wouldn't he only know….. — Corvus

In this case, that’s what I meant, yes. But it is a possible scenario where he already knows about the things in the basket, and because he knows that, he knows it’s too heavy to lift before the failed experience of trying to lift it. It isn’t when he knows from experience in one time, it’s what he knows without it in another time.

Peruse the section in CPR on pure/impure a priori knowledge, A2/B3.
——————

Whadyamean belongs to him? Maybe it’s his ailing grandmother’s basket. Or the guy whose wife he just stole and he’s feeling sorry about it.

Yeah, but ya know what? It is more than likely any one of those guys, upon experiencing the impossibility of lifting the basket off the ground, will know a priori, that there’s too much in it. And you’re right, in that he won’t care about the math, until he wants to know how much is too much.

Which is sorta why there’s math at all. Because we want to know how things relate to each other, or, maybe more importantly, how they relate to us. The uneducated or inexperienced doesn’t have reason to care.

I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper — Corvus

If that were the case, synthetic a priori cognitions would be impossible, from which follows the entire ground of transcendental philosophy fails. So while it may be the case we usually don’t think 5 + 7 without perceiving the objects that represent that activity, we can still think the relation intrinsic to one quantity adjoined in a progressive series with another. Numbers do nothing more than represent the quantities, but do nothing whatsoever to illustrate the relation between them, which must be thought.

One shouldn’t mistake rote classroom instruction, for innate human intelligence.

Just like that, yep. Although, technically, I suppose, the nature of these illusions is illicit judgement, whereby the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. But that depends on the nature of the judgement. A simple judgement, re: “the world exists”, is illicit on the one hand because existence adds nothing to the conception of world, and on the other, it is false insofar as world is not even a thing that exists.

…..given its ubiquity in human dialogue.
— Mww
So, it is a linguistic illusion. — Corvus

No word is ever spoken that isn’t first thought. To call it a linguistic illusion presupposes the actual nature or source of it. The simplest nature or source, I guess, for this kind of illusory use, is plain ol’ misunderstanding.

So, it was illusions on their part (…) Kant proved its non-existence 300 years ago in his CPR. Is that correct? — Corvus

Yep, provided one accepts the tenets of transcendental philosophy.

That is not to say the world cannot be thought. Obviously it can be thought, given its ubiquity in human dialogue.