Sorry, I’m not up on the science, and I’m not going to pretend otherwise by reading wiki for 2 or 3 minutes.

But, yeah, I see what appears to be colored things, but I don’t know if they are colored or I color them. And I really don’t care, insofar as it wouldn’t make the slightest difference to me if I should be informed with apodeictic certainty one or the other is the case.

Still, I will maintain that humans are very limited creatures, and leave it at that.

I made a mistake. The line should have said…. Things-in-themselves can be inferred AS the possibility of sensations in general a priori.

Kant had the idea that we can treat the objects of perception and knowledge as conforming to us, rather than us conforming our minds to them….. — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. The so-called “Copernican Revolution”, which of course, he didn’t call it.

…..but it also means that those objects must cooperate, must be capable of cooperating, of appearing to us, of revealing themselves to us or being revealed to us. — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps, but parsimony suggests objects are either there or they are not there. You’re hinting at a limitation regarding the object (it doesn’t cooperate hence doesn’t appear) but I would rather think the limitation is in us, in that our physiology limits what can appear to us, re: only a specific range of wavelengths of light for visual appearances, etc., and also limits the effect that which can appear, has.

Look at what is posited. It is not the empty place-holder it was supposed to be, but is rich with its own structure of revealing and concealing — Srap Tasmaner

If this is the case, the notion that objects conform to our intellect falls apart. Things are rich with the structure we understand it to have that doesn’t contradict the sensation the object provides, for otherwise we couldn’t know it as that thing and not another. We must grant a thing has a composition, but without its being subjected to an intellectual system, the composition cannot relate to a structure in which the composition is arranged. A most dramatic instance being….a sound may indeed affect the nose, but thereby no phenomenon is at all possible.

So the thing that appears isn’t so much an empty placeholder ontologically, but moreso an undetermined constituent of reality. But either way….

without which the formal description of knowledge hangs in the air. — Srap Tasmaner

…..is nonetheless the case.

how is it inferred therefrom that there are multiple things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

how can you infer that it is impossible that appearances aren’t of nothing? Is that simply absurd to you? — Bob Ross

Because appearances are necessarily of something? I’m kinda struggling with the triple negative. At any rate, appearances aren’t inferred, they’re given. Perception is, after all, a function of physics, not logic implied by inference.

I infer that the appearances are representations by comparison of other appearances (e.g., they inject me with a hallucinogen drug and my representations becomes significantly different than when I am sober, etc.). — Bob Ross

First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses. Not yet mentioned, is the speculative condition that appearance denotes only the matter of the thing as a whole, which leaves out the form in which the matter is arranged, the purview of productive imagination, from which arises the first representation as such of the thing, called phenomenon, residing in intuition.

We are not conscious of the instantiation of representations as phenomena, so the alteration of the cognitive process has no effect on that of which we had no awareness in the first place. The changes in representations that occur due to disregard of the rules by unnatural external influence, is in understanding, the representations of which are not intuitions from appearances, but conceptions. The appearance is the same, insofar as it is the same thing being sensed; what the cognitive process subsequently does with such appearance differs, which we commonly refers to as a misunderstanding, but is properly reflected in judgement.

But if representations tell us nothing about things-in-themselves then it is odd to me that it can even be inferred that there is a dynamic of representations vs. things-in-themselves in the first place. — Bob Ross

Odd to me as well; there is no dynamic of representations vs. thing-in-themselves, they have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the intuition of them. Logically, and empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the conceptions of them. There is another dynamic, residing in pure reason a priori, in which resides the relation between conceptions to each other, where experience of the conceived thing is impossible, re: eternal/universal Mind and the like.

I am a substance monist….. — Bob Ross

You’d pretty much have to be, holding with a Universal Mind, right?

……so I am unsure by what you mean by “substance is never singular”: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross

It’s the reduction from there is no such thing as an object comprised of a single property, which reduces to nothing can be cognized by a single conception. Human thought, being a logical system, always requires a relation.

But in all fairness, -ism’s are a dime a dozen, which makes this idea easily refutable.

So would it be fair to say that you think we are barred from metaphysics (other than transcendental inquiries)? — Bob Ross

Nahhhh……metaphysics is an unavoidable pursuit, when reason seeks resolution to questions experience cannot provide. Transcendental philosophy merely points out the conditions under which such resolutions are even possible on the one hand, and the circumstances by which the resolutions may actually conflict with experience on the other. The mind is, as my ol’ buddy Golum likes to say, tricksie.
—————

The universal mind is not an idea, it is mind that has ideas and those ideas are the Platonic, eternal forms which are expressed within space and time, which are conditions of our minds. — Bob Ross

Ok, not an idea. If not an idea, and not a thing, for a human then, what is it? What does it mean to say it is mind, rather than it is a mind? This is what is meant by the impossibility of cognizing from a single conception. One can say it is mind, but that effectively says nothing. To say it is mind that has ideas makes it no different than my own mind. To call it eternal mind adds a conception, but by which is invoked that which is itself inconceivable, re: mind that has all ideas, or, is infinitely timeless.

Still, as long as universal mind theory doesn’t contradict itself, it stands. If it contradicts other theories, then it’s a matter of the relative degree of explanatory power philosophically, or merely personal preference conventionally. There is the notion that reason always seeks the unconditioned, that abut which nothing more needs be said, which certainly fits here. It used to be a theocratic symbol having no relation to us, but it’s since graduated to an extension of us. Not sure one is any better than the other.

I see what you mean, but I would ask, and referencing Russell, doesn’t the plethora of white things simultaneous with our naming practices and awareness of each of them as such over time, antecede the “whiteness” of which all white things partake? What if there was only a single instance of a thing with whatever quality, what universal can be attributed as the being of which a single thing partakes?

If that works, then it is possible for the particular and the universal to be identical, and if the particular is subject to human cognition as an object, then so is the universal, a metaphysical/logical contradiction.

I agree universals proper are not within the purview of human cognition as propositional predicate in a judgement (all white x’s possess whiteness), rather merely designating a relation, but I might hesitate to put them before the particular, re: your, existing in their entirety prior to (…).

Or not…..

Sure, why not? Denominator indicates a underlying standardization, common denominator indicates an underlying standardization for all to which it conditions, and all to which it conditions indicates its universality, which would then be a mere idea. I guess it depends on how far, and on what, one wishes to extend the denomination.

Common denominator for footwear is that which separates the foot from the ground, but that separator in itself is hardly a universal idea. But that a foot should be separated from the ground is a universal idea insofar as far as the construction of all footwear whatsoever is conditioned by it.

Nothing you contribute here is easy, is it?

Either that, or you post stuff just to see how much of a mess folks will make of it. (Grin)

Well done.

Could it be that Universal Mind "adhering to strict laws" is merely the wrong choice of words? — Tom Storm

Maybe, but more likely my misunderstanding of what the words I read are supposed to represent.

You know…..guy spends most of his philosophical life in one mindset, pretty hard to shake him loose.

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.
-Mww

If it never becomes a sensation, then it sounds like you are saying we never come in contact, even indirectly, with the things-in-themselves, is that correct? If so, then how do you know they even exist? — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd….”

Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things.

If the representational system isn’t getting, as input, sensations of the things-in-themselves, it sounds like, to me, the former is completely accounted for without positing the latter. — Bob Ross

This is correct, within the confines of this particular knowledge theory. The intuitive representational process itself, the only one determined by sensation, doesn’t care about anything except what is given to it by perception.

The only reason for positing the thing-in-itself, is to grant that even if things are not perceived, they are not thereby non-existent. It is meant to qualify the semi-established dogmatic Berkeley-ian purely subjective idealist principle esse est percipi, by stipulating that it isn’t necessary that that which isn’t perceived doesn’t exist, but only for that which is not perceived, empirical knowledge of it is impossible. It just says existence is not conditioned by perception, but knowledge most certainly is.

There’s also the confused impression/fact dichotomy inspired by Hume that needs examination, but that’s beyond the realm here, I think.

I didn’t follow this part: what is a “thing of the thing-in-itself”? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: once this thing, whatever it is, appears to perception, that thing-in-itself, whatever it was, disappears, that thing no longer “in-itself”, as far as the system is concerned.

Is that the substance of (or in) which the thing-in-itself is of? — Bob Ross

Can’t be substance, insofar as substance is never singular, which implies a succession, which implies time, which is a condition for knowledge, and by which the imposition makes the impossibility of knowledge contradictory.

Permanence is that by which the thing-in-itself, is of. Which makes the notion that if I’m not looking at the thing it isn’t there, rather foolish.

If we aren’t exposed to it as sensations (….), then how are we exposed to it? — Bob Ross

“It” taken to indicate the thing-in-itself…..we aren’t exposed to it; such is, qualified by definition, “in-itself”.

how you could know that if you can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves—i.e., the real world. I still don’t understand, as of yet, how you resolve that. — Bob Ross

That’s the epistemological issue, innit? We don’t know the real world as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us. Another kind of intellect will probably understand whatever world is common to both differently than we understand it, but it doesn’t matter one bit. We can only work with what we have to work with, and the uselessness of that tautology should tell us something. Like….stay in your own lane!!!!

The real world for us, is just how we understand what we are given. The world is only as real as our intellect provides. Whatever the world really is, we are not equipped to know, and if it really is as we understand it, so much the better, but without something to compare our understands to, we won’t know that either.
———-

If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time…
-Mww

If what exists is what is conditioned by space and time, then space and time do not exist. — Bob Ross

Correct, they do not exist in the same manner as that of which they are the conditions. They are objectively valid as presuppositions logically, but not objectively real as existences physically. They are the conditions for things, re: intuitions, but not the conditions of things, re: properties.

Are you saying that the logical part of our representational system (for each and every one of us) only is conditioned by time? So it exists within the temporal world but non-spatially? — Bob Ross

Pretty much, yep. First one must grant that in humans, all thoughts are singular and successive, from which arises the very notion of time in and of itself. It follows that it is more the case that logic, which is merely the assemblage of thoughts according to rules, makes the world temporal, than that logic exists in a temporal world.

With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.
-Mww

But it has to exist in a thing: what thing are you saying it exists in? — Bob Ross

If it’s not a thing, why does it have to exist in a thing? That which exists in a thing is a property thereof, and logic is not a property. All I’m going to say about it, is that logic resides in human intelligence, and attempts to pin it down in concreto ultimately ends as illusory cognitions at least, or irrational judgements at worst.
————

….reality (which is fundamentally a Universal Mind) — Bob Ross

The reductionism required to get from reality to Mind must be truly intense!!! Even if I accept the human mind as a mere abstract placeholder to terminate infinite regress in intellectual cause/effect, I can still say that mind belongs to me. Which begs the most obvious of questions……

But that’s ok, you’ve circumvented the problem by relieving Mind from meta-cognitive deliberations, so it doesn’t need to belong. But in so doing, you’ve attributed to it a different form of intellectual cause/effect, re: will, which I must say, as I conceive it, also belongs to me.

As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws. — Bob Ross

There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is.

In human cognition, strict law is subsumed under the principles of universality and absolute necessity. The idea of a Universal Mind covers the former, but the latter must be merely granted without justification, in that the Universal Mind does not imbue the necessity of existence itself. In other words, the Universal Mind, if it doesn’t exist, cannot be legislated by law, which means if it is legislated by law it must exist. Which means it cannot be merely an idea.

But all universals are ideas……AAAARRRRGGGGG!!!!!!

Thanks. ‘Preciate it.

This sounds like maybe you don’t hold that we cannot know the things-in-themselves that appear to us, is that correct? — Bob Ross

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know. If the thing-in-itself appeared to me it wouldn’t be as-it-is-in-itself, it would be as-it-is-in-me, as phenomenon. Remember: the thing and the thing of the thing-in-itself are identical. The only difference is the exposure to human systemic knowledge/experience criteria, which reduces to time. I call it the occasion, but, same-o, same-o.

We can’t know the thing-in-itself because it doesn’t appear in us. If that specific box….the only one that appeared to your senses…..had stayed at the post office, you’d never know anything of it, even while inferring the real possibility of boxes in general, iff you already know post offices contain boxes.
————-

…..what ontological status does the logical part of the representational system have it is not a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. I get it is a logical system, but ontologically what is it? — Bob Ross

I guess I can’t say why a logical part needs an ontological status. If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time, it follows that if logic is not conditioned by space and time but only time, thereby out of compliance with the criteria for existence, then the study of its ontological predicates from which its ontological status can be determined, is a waste of effort.

“…. Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to wit, that the understanding is competent to effect nothing à priori, except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general, and that, as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding….”

Keyword: things. With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing. If a label is required for some reason, I’d just call it a condition, or maybe a axiom or fundamental principle of a theory. Heck, maybe just a merely necessary presupposition, in order to ground all that follows from it. All of which lend themselves quite readily to analysis. This is metaphysics after all, immune to proof from experience, so there are some permissible procedural liberties, so maybe logic is just that which prohibits such liberties from running amuck.

Besides, it is possible that the human intellect is itself naturally predisposed to what we eventually derive as logical conditions, so maybe we put so much trust in the power of pure logic for no other reason than we just are logical intelligences. Maybe we just can’t be not logically inclined.
———-

I want to get back to something you said the other day, something like….the universal mind change the world to fit out knowledge, to which I thought it better that our knowledge changed to fit the constant world. If I got that right, I might have a thought up a decent counter-argument or two I’d like you to shoot down, in accordance with your thesis.

Way back when, and in the interest of the most general of terminology, that which contacted the bottom of human feet has never changed, even though through the ages more and more knowledge has been obtained about it.

Long ago, some humans knew the moon as some lighted disk in the sky. They also knew of periodically changing ocean levels, but had no comprehension of tidal effects caused by the moon and even less comprehension of effects a mere disk can have. Nowadays the relation between the tides and the moon are the same as they ever were, but there is resident knowledge of that relation derived from principles.

What say you?

quote="Bob Ross;813236"]if the logical part of the system is not a part of the thing-in-itself and is not phenomena, then what is it? To me, it either exists as a part of the things-in-themselves (i.e., reality) or it is an appearance from our representational faculty—there’s no third option.[/quote]

That which assembles the parts of the representation of a perception in order, is intuition. That which assembles intuitions in order for successive perceptions of the same thing, is logic. In this way, it is not necessary to learn what thing is at each perception, but only understanding that either it’s already been learned, and subsequent perceptions conform to it, or they do not. Already been learned taken as a euphemism for experience.

In the tripartite human logical sub-system in syllogistic form of synthetic conjunction, understanding is the faculty of rules, by which phenomena provided a posteriori are taken as the major premise, conceptions provided a priori by understanding according to rules, serves as the minor premise or series of minors, the logical relation of one to the other is represented in a judgement, which serves as the conclusion.

Thing is, we don’t notice or care about any of that, until, e.g., you perceive a thing that doesn’t match anything else you’ve ever seen. Or, you’ve satisfied yourself with some judgement regarding a thing, then someone comes along and shows you, at least, how different your judgement could have been had you synthesized the same conceptions in a different order (you can’t call that thing a dog because no dog is that big) or, worst case, how wrong you were insofar as the conceptions you did use in that synthesis were not properly related to what you perceived (you can’t call that thing a dog because no dog has horns).

Usually humans learn by being taught by other humans. But show a relative youngster a picture of a dog, instill in him the relation between the picture and perception of the real thing, and he still might see a cow, relate it to the picture, judge it as being close enough, hence blurt out DOG!!!! Dutiful adults of good humor correct the tyke, everybody’s happy. An adult has the exact same operating system, hence is liable to the same mistakes in judgement. The difference is the number of conceptions incorporated in the minor premises, which relates to the accumulation of experiences, such that the major is more precisely described, and the conclusion, the judgement, is thereby more consistent with reality.

Oh man. And we haven’t even started on the aspect of human cognition that is completely logical, which just means there’s no dogs or kids or sensations of any kind, and nobody to tell you how wrong you are. You know this is the case, because you’ve conceived the notion of a universal mind as a completely valid and no one can tell you you’re wrong, that the conception is invalid, but only that the synthesis of the manifold of conceptions conjoined to the major, used by each, don’t relate in the same way, or do not relate at all, which only invalidates the one judgement relative to the other.

That third option…..for what it’s worth.

if the phenomena don’t provide knowledge about things-in-themselves, then how can you claim that we have a representational system which is the translation of the stuff that travels along the nerves to the main processing center? — Bob Ross

There’s a box on the shelf at the post office….
(a.k.a., a thing-in-itself)
Guy brings you the box….
(a.k.a, your perception of a thing)
….hands it to you….
(a.k.a., square, solid, heavy, your intuition of a thing)
You open the box….
(a.k.a., the content of your intuition, packaging material, something in a plastic bag, is a phenomenon)
Phenomenon gets passed on to the cognitive part for object determination.

You still don’t know what the content of the box is, only that the box has something in it, and you never would have had the opportunity to find out if it had stayed on the shelf at the post office. You could have lived your entire life without knowledge of the content of that box even while knowing full well post offices contain a manifold of all sorts of boxes; you can only know the contents of boxes handed to you. And, at this point, the last thing to cross your mind is how the box got to the post office in the first place, a.k.a., its ontological necessity.

Analogies really suck, when it comes right down to it, there’s never a perfect one. But we still try by means of them to explain what simply needs to be intuitively understood, like a jigsaw puzzle.
—————

….to me, Kant’s flaw is that he then claims that, given that representational system, we shouldn’t expect phenomena to tell us anything about things-in-themselves: but that’s what he used (i.e., phenomena) to come to understand that he is fundamentally a representational system — Bob Ross

Phenomena are only one of three general classes of representation, the other two are conceptions and judgement, which is technically the representation of a representation.

It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong.
-Mww

True, but this doesn’t matter for Kant, because, to him, sorting out the non-illusory from the illusory is just more phenomena: which says nothing about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

If you spend 12 years developing a theory on knowledge, wouldn’t the accounting for how human get things wrong matter to you? Rhetorical question; of course you would. Your peers wouldn’t give your theory a second review if you claimed a system is flawed, then don’t show the means to rectify it, or, if such flaw can’t be rectified at all, insofar as it is intrinsic to the nature of the system itself, then to show the means to guard against it.

Sorting out the illusory has nothing to do with phenomena. Reason, the faculty that subjects judgement to principles to determine the logical relation of cognitions to each other, separates the illusory from the rational. Humans can confuse/delude themselves in their thinking, without the possibility of experience correcting them, hence phenomena are irrelevant.
—————

I think that if one endeavors to give an account (of reality), idealism is the best choice. — Bob Ross

Absolutely. No science is ever done that isn’t first thought.

That time of year, me ‘n’ the Better Half pack up, temporarily donate the furry grandkids to a sitter, and hit the road. Maybe there’s a message herein: last time we came here a “never-happens-here” hurricane had just blown the place into the sea, this time “never-happens-here” wildfires burnt the place to the ground. (Sigh)

My point is that under Kantianism, we don’t get knowledge of the world: we just get phenomenon; and, so, how can you claim that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge does? Are you inferring from phenomena something about the things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

Under Kantianism…yes, correct, with respect to the world, just phenomena. If folks of a certain time generally agree on much, and always agree on some, then the phenomena developed in each must be generally congruent or specifically congruent respectively, which shows the same world relative to them. If people in some other time repeat the process, with the same result, the same conclusion is given. If it happens that the folks of the later time agree with the record of the folks of a earlier time, then it is non-contradictory to posit that the world to which the agreement applies, remained constant.

No, nothing to do with the things-in-themselves. Again, that thing to which the system-in-itself is applied, cannot be the thing-in-itself to which it is not.

But, under Kantianism, I don’t see how you can claim that those observed regularties are anything but phenomena: they don’t tell you anything about the world beyond that. Would you agree with that? — Bob Ross

Observed regularities implies knowledge, which is not in phenomena themselves. Phenomena don’t tell you about the world, which implies description, but they are to inform that there is a world, which presupposes the reality of it, and thereby, the possibility of describing it.
————-

Can you elaborate on what you mean by things-in-themselves vs. phenomena? — Bob Ross

Try this on for size. Thing-in-itself is out there, just waiting around, doing what things-in-themselves do, minding their own business. Human gets himself exposed to it, perceives it, it affects him somehow, it gets translated it into this stuff that travels along its nerves to its main processing center. That stuff on the nerves represents what the perception was, but the owner of the nerves isn’t the slightest bit aware of any of that nerve stuff. That stuff is phenomenon stuff.

With respect to this particular form of dualism, the thing and the representation of the thing, the why is more interesting than the what. It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong, insofar as that by which they are affected (the thing) doesn’t match what the system they use tells them about it (the representation of the thing). In order to reduce the source of error, some part of the whole system must be eliminated as being a possible source of any error at all, which leaves the other part as the sole guilty party. Pretty easy to see why speculative metaphysics, in its descriptive cognitive methodology, needs to make necessary only one possible source of error, otherwise it would be monumentally difficult to place blame hence alleviate it.

Keyword: cognitive metaphysical methodology. If that by which things are represented as phenomena are not themselves part of the system that cognizes, they cannot be blamed for cognitive errors. And, again, humans are not conscious of the generation of their phenomena, so to relegate them to the non-cognitive part of the system as a whole, is not self-contradictory.
————

Would you say that the logical part of the system is a thing-in-itself or a phenomenon (or neither)? — Bob Ross

Oh, neither, absolutely. Those conceptions are already methodologically assigned; to use them again in a way not connected to the original, is mere obfuscation. The logical part is just that, a part, operating in its own way, doing its own job, not infringing where it doesn’t belong. Why have a theory on, say, energy, then qualify it by attributing, say, cauliflower, to it as a condition?
————-

”Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.”
-Mww

To give the most parsimonious metaphysical account of reality. Under your view, it seems like you may be committed to ontological agnosticism: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I don’t need an account of reality. All I need is an account of how I might best understand the parts of it that might affect me, be it what it may. Ontological agnosticism sounds close enough to “I don’t really care”, so yeah, I guess.

As to the relation of this agnosticism to a universal mind, yeah, there might be such a thing, but even if there is, nothing changes for me. If I think the moon is just this kinda thing because the universal mind’s idea is what gives it to me, it is still just a moon-thing to me. It’s just like our own brain, operating under the laws developed to describe it, but we don’t use our brain under those lawful conditions. Because of those conditions, sure, by not by those conditions. We don’t think in terms of electron spin or quantum number. We never even consider ion potential….it is never given to us to consider…..when answering a question the traffic cop asks about why we were speeding.

Universal mind is just as empty a conception with respect to human cognition, as is lawful brain mechanics. As a foray into the sublime it’s wonderful; as a logical possibility its ok; as a methodological necessity, not so much. I mean, if it’s OUR intelligence, OUR knowledge, OUR reason, why examine any of it from some perspective that isn’t OURS? You and I talking here aren’t invoking any universal mind in just the doing of it, and even if such a thing is operating in the background we’re not conscious of it as such, so…..

how can you know that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does? — Bob Ross

Are you implying the difference in knowledge from the human olden days to the human current days, is a reflection of a changing world? If so, sure, why not. That lightning came from angry gods reflected the ontological status of the old world, lightning as electrostatic discharge reflects the ontological status of the current world. It is impossible to prove or disprove the world changed on the whim of a universal mind.

How do we know? We don’t, but we raise more questions by supposing our changing knowledge reflects a changing world, then we do if we suppose the world stays constant and it is our knowledge that changes.

We got the whole passel of folks, all through the ages, experiencing a certain thing, in exactly the same way, when they push the very same kind of round something down a hill. Basic mathematics hasn’t changed since the invention of numbers.
————

I don’t see how you can know that there are other people with minds that have the same kind of a priori understanding (in Kant’s terms) that produces representations…..

Again, we don’t, in the strictest sense of knowledge. It is just abysmally counterproductive and quite irrational, to posit that they don’t. Logical inference a priori grants all human have minds; experience grants a posteriori only that they act like they do.

…..that requires a metaphysical jump into the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Only if the thing-in-itself is conceptually maligned, usually by invoking a theory that defines it differently or finds no need of such a thing, than the theory in which it was originally contained. I swear, I am sorely puzzled by how much trouble people have grasping this rather simple dichotomy.
————-

”Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.
-Mww

Your first sentence here suggests you agree that phenomena give us access to things-in-themselves to some degree — Bob Ross

Nope. You said conscious experience is the representation of something. It isn’t representation, its knowledge. Conscious experience is knowledge of something, whether a determined something or just a plain ol’ something, depends on whether or not the tripartite logical part of the system, the proper cognitive part, comprised of understanding, judgement, and reason (but not intuition or consciousness, or the mere subjective condition) can all get their respective functional eggs in the same basket, re: the synthesis of representations conforms to the effect the object causes on perception.

Phenomena just give the functionaries something empirical to work on, having nothing to do with the thing-in-itself. The methodology by which we can say we know what an object is, mandates the necessity of representing them, by whichever means one thinks fit to employ.

….how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?
-Mww

We are within the ‘objective’ world of the mind-at-large and, as such, we come to know that the reality in which we reside is superordinate; and this is distinguished by our intuitive distinctions between what is a part of our will vs. a port of another’s will vs. a part of a will greater than ours. — Bob Ross

I’m fine with distinguishing my will from yours, given the similarities or differences in our behaviors. But how I’m going to distinguish my will from a mind that wills the universe, is inconceivable.

I understand what you mean, but there’s no way I personally can conclude to its rational feasibility. Of course, by the same token, I can’t rationally deny the possibility either.

Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.

Would say that Kant thought we could gather knowledge of the world (…) or he thought that we could never acquire such knowledge (…)? — Bob Ross

Technically, it is only knowledge of representations, hence not of the world per se. The amendments to our representations over time corresponds to the relative correctness of our knowledge, which we call experience. The world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge of it does in our own, so it is obvious there is a major distinction between the two.

To me, Kant goes dangerously close to (if not actually argues for cryptically for) epistemic solipsism. — Bob Ross

If it is to say epistemic solipsism is the notion that the only absolutely certain knowledge is that which belongs to the subject capable of it, then the proposition is an analytical truth, a mere tautology, carrying the implication there’s no need to argue for it, insofar as it is a given. Put another way, its negation is impossible. Kant is arguing, not for the certainty of our knowledge but the warrant for it, the illusory nature of its origins a priori, and thereby its limits. A critique of the given, not a proof for it.
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How does Kant even know, if he cannot know anything about things-in-themselves, that his mind is representing objects — Bob Ross

Sensations. The thing of sensation is the same thing as the thing of the ding an sich. The thing of sensation is as yet undetermined, and only possibly determinable. Plato’s “knowledge that”, Russell’s “knowledge of acquaintance”. Sensation is just of an undetermined something, called an object mostly I suppose, because it is opposed to, distinct from, yet an affect upon, a subject.

Why not “the unknown which may not be an object at all”? — Bob Ross

It is an object for the sake of communication, for talking about it. As far as the system is concerned, in and of itself as a system, it isn’t an object, it is an effect by that which is external to it, sometimes called an appearance. Sometimes called that which awakens internal awareness.
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….we only come to realize that our minds are the best explanation for the production of the conscious experiences we have which, in turn, show us that we are representing something…. — Bob Ross

Technically, conscious experience shows us we know something. Theoretically, knowledge of things presupposes the representation of them necessarily, given the kind of system by which humans know things.

…..but this doesn’t work if one is positing that all of it is mere phenomenon that cannot furnish them with knowledge of things-in-themselves — Bob Ross

All of it, re: conscious experience, is not phenomenon, and experience, as a methodological terminus, is not itself a mere representation. In Kant, the last rendition of a representation is in judgement, an aspect of understanding, which, in the form of a logical syllogism, is way back at the point of the manifold of minor premises, whereas experience stands as the conclusion.
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one can’t even argue that their mind is representing anything but rather that there’s just given conscious experiences. — Bob Ross

Which is fine, but reason will always ask….experience of what, exactly? Convention allows that all we need, under the most general of conditions, to grant is conscious experience; it is, after all, what is most readily apparent to us; the philosopher wants to make the clear exposition of just what is involved with such convention, in order to sustain, or falsify, it, once and for all. Or, bluntly, to…..

“…. raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel.…”
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The only thing I will say now is that the universal mind, under Analytic Idealism, doesn’t will them completely into our representations: there are “objective” ideas that our faculty tries represent (and depending on how well that faculty is, it may not be represented all that accurately) — Bob Ross

With respect to accuracy….agreed. Judgement requires exercise, exercise amends experience.

With respect to representations, on the other hand, how does the subject determine which idea/representation belong to the universal mind and which are his own?

the world one is fundamentally representing is will (i.e., ideas in a universal mind) as opposed to something unknown — Bob Ross

So…..mid-Enightenment, in the schools, Aristotle and God were still in charge. K comes along, paradigm-shifts cognitive metaphysics away from God, maintains Aristotle. If you’re S, a professional philosopher, whacha gonna do when the guy just before you upset the established applecart so completely, all that’s left is to find a loophole in what he said, because it’s just too powerful to cancel. So you concentrate of the one thing you find questionable, and that is the prescription on the limits of knowledge, which you go about finding a way to exceed.

So the deal is, in K-speak, in a human representational system, that which is represented by the system, is not what is is entailed in human knowledge, which is the same as saying that for which the representation stands, is unknown by the system, which just is the human himself. That which is represented in humans is the world, so first and foremost the world itself is that which is unknown by humans.

The fix for that, is to say, in S-speak, even if the world is not known by humans, it is surely known by something not human, whatever it may be. If it happens to be a universal mind, and if Aristotle is still in force, then that universal mind will necessarily know everything about everything, which makes explicit it will know all about the very things humans do not, which the most important would be the world itself.

Long story short, the universal mind has ideas, wills them into worldly object manifestations, complete in themselves, subsequently representable in humans just as completely as the willed idea prescribes in its manifestations. This, of course, logically, makes human knowledge of the ding an sich not only possible, but given. If the universal mind has the idea of it, wills it, then the human system can represent it in himself, and K’s human knowledge limit is exceeded. Which was, given the time and place, the whole raison d’etre for S’s world as will and representation (idea) in the first place.

Close enough? Not even wrong, as my ol’ buddy Wolfgang might say? Whatever objections I might raise are irrelevant, if I got the synopsis wrong, or, not right enough. If close enough, however, it remains to be posited what is gained by such a program, and why it should not be dismissed as a bridge too far.

I bet there is a lot you will want to respond to in my post (; If not, then there’s plenty Kantian questions I have for you. — Bob Ross

There may be a lot to respond to, depending on how well I’ve understood it so far. I suspect, perhaps somewhat egocentrically for which I somewhat apologize, faults in the universal mind theory must be addressed from a Kantian perspective, insofar as the one is almost directly connected to the other, thus if I can refute it, if the universal mind theory cannot withstand refutation, your questions would be answered thereby.

Your turn.

Firstly, under every metaphysical theory, there must be something posited (…) as metaphysical necessary — Bob Ross

Agreed; I’ll go with the three logical laws of thought.

Secondly, the idea is that what is expressed in space (and time) is the representation of immaterial ideas (from a previous time): the physical is just an expression of the mental. — Bob Ross

Is it just the same to say representation of immaterial ideas are what’s expressed in space and time? And is it representation of immaterial ideas that is expressed by the mental? So the physical is just mental representation of immaterial ideas.

If my relocation of nomenclature doesn’t change any of your propositional truth value, I wouldn’t push an argument. The way I’d say it is quite different, but it’s possible we’d end up in the same place, iff it is my mind, my ideas, my representations.

Thirdly, it is not necessary that reality must be a universal mind but, rather, that the universal mind is being posited as metaphysically necessary as a part of what would be claimed as the most parsimonious account of reality. — Bob Ross

What are the other parts of the account of reality. I consider reality to be that which corresponds to a sensation in general, that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being. It follows that there isn’t need for a further account of reality, but there would certainly need to be an account for sensation. Sensation is how we are awakened to reality, which, of course, thereby presupposes it, be it what it may. No need to account for it. Sorta like your metaphysical necessity?
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”The representation is never the physical stuff, and the mental is sometimes what is represented.”
-Mww

The representation within the physical world is the representation of an immaterial idea. From the side of the physical, it appears as a seemingly potential infinite chain of physical causes; from the side of the mental, it was the expression of will (i.e., of immaterial ideas). — Bob Ross

Hmmm. This looks like it puts representation in the external world, when I want it to be in my head. I’d be ok with something like…representations of the physical world are (mentally generated) immaterial ideas. Then we’d have to discuss whether conceptions are immaterial ideas, insofar as I wouldn’t have any problem calling conceptions mental. Immaterial, sure, but I’m not too sure I’d leave conceptions as mere ideas. Both conceptions and ideas are representations, an idea is a conception, but a conception is not necessarily an idea.

But the real problem is expressions of will, which for me belong in moral philosophy alone, which makes this metaphysical nonsense…..

“….. indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who appears as an individual, and the answer is will. This and this alone gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movements. Every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a movement of his body. The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same….”
(WWR, 2. 1. 18, 1844, in Haldane, Kemp, 1909)

….for he who would attribute to will no more than autonomous volition predicated on subjective principles.

Which brings out one of S’s gripes with K….causality, cause and effect. S rejected K’s invocation of freedom as a causality, so without it, for him, will does not stand the relation to cause and effect.

What’s next?

Analytic Idealism posits that one can come to know the world from two sides: the representations (which is the physical stuff) and the mental events which are being represented. — Bob Ross

I’m having trouble here. The representation is never the physical stuff, and the mental is sometimes what is represented. How is yours not backwards? Actually, it is backwards, so the real question becomes….how do you justify the backwardness, without merely saying it isn’t?

Why is it not that coming to know the world from two sides isn’t two kinds of knowledge? I agree there are two kinds of knowledge, re: a priori as representations of mental events, and a posteriori as representation of physical stuff, but only the latter is coming to know the world.

I’d be happier if it was the case coming to know the world from two conditions, which would be physical stuff and mental events, but not so much that each is a kind of knowledge all by itself without influence from the other. Two sides just seems to invoke excessive separation.

For Kastrup, the thing-in-itself, like Schopenhauer, is the universal mind. — Bob Ross

For S it is the will, I thought, but either way…same-o, same-o. Only way this theory works at all, to assign to a concept that which didn’t formally belong to it, is to redefine it. Which effectively makes it a different philosophy.

We, as ‘minds’, are disassociated alters of that universal mind, such that we are ‘cut off’ from experiencing everything at once. — Bob Ross

Right. I mentioned not too long ago that, in us, thoughts are singular and successive, presupposing the condition of time, so it is reasonable we do not experience everything at once.

The ‘physical’, in the colloquial sense of the term (viz., tangible, solid objects within conscious experience), is an extrinsic representation of the mental — Bob Ross

So physical with respect to the conscious experience…..of humans.
Physical for humans is representation of the mental…..of the universal mind?
So for humans a representation of a representation?
The representation of the physical as conscious experience belongs to us as humans, but does the representation the universal mind gives to us as the physical, imply a conscious experience for that to which the universal mind belongs?
In conjunction with the above, wherein reality….our reality….is the brute fact of the universal mind, implies our reality just is the manifold of representations of universal mind without regard for the conscious experience of that to which such universal mind belongs.

Fine, I guess. We prescribe representations to ourselves without knowing how they come about, so no difference in kind prescribing them to something else we couldn’t know anything about. I suppose, from a Kantian perspective, which is what you’re asking for, we have no warrant whatsoever, to speculate metaphysically on that which is not completely within ourselves.

reality is a mind-at-large (i.e., a universal mind) and that is the brute fact (metaphysically necessary) of reality — Bob Ross

You’re on record as admitting a Schopenhauer-ian bent. He was the champion of the PSR, yet brute facts negate the PSR. It must be that being “metaphysically necessary” is sufficient reason, or the PSR doesn’t apply here. But why should it be necessary that reality be a universal mind, or manifest from such a thing?

I would much appreciate it if we kept discussing it, as I am interested in your take from a Kantian perspective. — Bob Ross

Cool. Socratic dialectics? Robert’s Rules? Jousting?

Cards on the table kinda thing, I must say, if we’re discussing analytic idealism from a Kantian perspective, I’m not sufficiently versed in the one to juxtaposition to the other. So maybe you should start with a brief synopsis of what analytic idealism is. Or, just start anywhere you like.
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Kantian idealism has almost no following on this forum….. — Wayfarer

What’s that ol’ adage? If it was easy everybody’d be doing it?

Before getting into all that, you’re promoting analytic idealism, which is interesting in itself. The problem is that attempting to understanding Kantian idealism may very well negate your promotion. We get into this deep enough, you may find your idealism was Kantian all along, or, if it most certainly was not, then why query a form of idealism which is, for present intents and purposes, irrelevant. And even if questions regarding Kantian idealism are merely a matter of your own personal interest, satisfying that interest isn’t necessarily to support your thesis. In short, it’s possible you’re wasting your own time.

Your thread, your call.

I thought perspective came from inside us. — Tom Storm

Where in the data….is perspective. Inside us, outside the data.

”So no, the mind does not produce space and time, it conceives apodeitic conditions as explanatory devices. Mww

But under Kantianism the mind is producing space and time (being synthetic a priori), is it not? Perhaps you have a neo-kantian view, but I am talking about Kant’s original argument. — Bob Ross

I’m saying it doesn’t, taken from Kant’s original text. Apparently we’re at odds over interpretations, which is certainly nothing new. Be that as it may, the second edition introduction states a priori cognitions are contained in the intellect, of even the philosophically unsophisticated. Now for the mind to produce them in order to be contained in the intellect, is for you to say but not Kant himself.

But nevertheless, benefit of the doubt: where does the notion that space and time are synthetic a priori come from? Synthetic a priori does not stand alone, insofar as they indicate the kind and source of cognitions or judgements, which space and time are not. Synthetic/analytic has to do with logic, hence subsumed under reason, but space and time have to do with empirical objects hence subsumed under intuition. While all experience is synthetic, space and time are not experiences. And while space and time are representations a priori, they are not synthetic. I guess I don’t see how you’ve come up with the notion, is all.

He says that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge à priori, namely, space and time. Now this stipulates that there are synthetic a priori principles of knowledge, but that is not to say space and time are themselves synthetic a priori. Which, pardon me for saying, doesn’t make sense for its incompleteness. Synthetic a priori…..what?
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Correct me if I am wrong, but it sounds like Kant is arguing that there is an external world that is impressed onto our senses but that is not the thing-in-itself. But, then, I ask: doesn’t that concede that the mind’s synthetic a priori pure forms of intuition isn’t the only origin of space and time — Bob Ross

Not wrong; he is arguing that. Whatever other origins there are for space and time are irrelevant to any system that conceives its own. Human intelligence originates them this way, its the only intelligence we know about so that kind of origin is all we need. Could our intelligence originate space and time in a different way? Maybe, dunno. Has anyone tried? At any rate, we’d best not get bogged down by mere names. Whatever best answers our questions, right?
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If we are admitting that the world is external to our mind and that it operates likewise in space and time, then space and time are not purely synthetic. What you say to that? — Bob Ross

I say I don’t agree the mind operates likewise to the external world. The mind operates conditioned by time, but not space.

I say I understand the pure ideality of space and time, but don’t understand what you mean by qualifying them with synthetic.
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To me, when I read CPR, it sounded like he was claiming anything beyond the two pure forms of intuition is the noumena (i.e., the things-in-themselves — Bob Ross

Noumena are not things-in-themselves. The latter are real spatial-temporal existences, the existence of the former is only possible for an intelligence unlike our own.

If by beyond the two pure forms of intuition you mean not conditioned by them, then it is the case noumena are beyond them. Still, anything not conditioned by space and time is utterly unintelligible to us, therefore we are not authorized to say that which is beyond them, are noumena.

if the phenomenal world around me is just a representation under space and time that are synthetic of my mind, then I cannot know anything about an external world beyond my mind because it lies outside of space and time — Bob Ross

Again with your vocabulary, the mind is not outside time, is conditioned by it. We can validate this iff it is the case all thoughts are singular and successive, which presupposes a temporal conditioning.

As for knowing anything about the world beyond the mind…..how can anything at all be known beyond the mind, if the mind is absolutely necessary and sufficient for all knowledge. Phenomena are of course necessary, but not sufficient, in that mere perception and representation in phenomena does not give any knowledge at all.
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I don’t think my view requires two actualized infinite spaces and time — Bob Ross

You said the mind produces, and in common vernacular to produce is to actualize, I should think.

I think within Kant’s view space and time are not a representation of anything — Bob Ross

It’s stated as representing an infinite given quantity. Space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each other; in other words, space does not represent to us any determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves. Time, on the other hand, represents coexistences or successions.

Great talk; I’m liking it, so….thanks.

…..has great significance for understanding the situation we find ourselves in. — Janus

Exactly right. In other words, whatever the situation, guard against the illusions inevitably contained in the understanding of it. But I hold a rather low opinion of the human species in general, so, there is that.

I find there to be a conceptual error here of Kant’s (and maybe perhaps Schopenhauer to) of the mind’s ontological status. — Bob Ross

Ok. What do you see as his concept of the mind’s ontological status, and what was the error you found in it?

If the forms of representation are space and time, then that thereby (by my lights) admits the mind as having ontological status. — Bob Ross

Oh. That. Ok. What ontological status does the mind have then? You just mean it is a real thing? But it isn’t real in the sense it can be measured, so you must have a different sense for an ontological status the mind could hold. Which is fine, perhaps even called for in analytic idealism.

If we have no access to the things-in-themselves because our experience is just the expression of them in space and time which is produced by our minds, then our minds must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

Aren’t you just doing with the mind what Schopenhauer did with the will? If not, then awful close to it, seems like. Again, good enough, I suppose, but I can’t really comment on it.
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The only way to reconcile this (by my lights) is for Kant to claim that our minds have no ontological status either—but, then, the mind cannot be producing space and time. What would your response to that be? — Bob Ross

Using your vocabulary for dialectical consistency, the mind doesn’t warrant an ontological status if it doesn’t produce space and time. I think it more the case the mind recognizes that all things are separate from each other and no thing can be more than one thing at once. Two things can be at once but two things cannot be in the same place at once. It recognizes things can change place but no thing can change place instantly. You say the mind produces space and time; I say there is that which are necessary conditions for the explanation of object’s relation to us and to each other, and these reside in that faculty which forms those relations.

Your way, re: the production of space and time, requires the production of two infinites, with all the irregularities found therein. My way needs no infinites, but only those spaces and times which condition the perception, or possible perception, of an object, followed by the experience or possible experience thereof. Lots cleaner and simpler. Or as the mathematicians are wont to say…..much more elegant.

So no, the mind does not produce space and time, it conceives apodeitic conditions as explanatory devices. Therefore, it is possible the mind has no warrant for ontological status.
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I find that Kant’s view is incompatible with reasonable, parsimonious metaphysical explanations of scientific knowledge. — Bob Ross

FYI, he wrote the precursor essays that would eventually become tectonic plate theory, nebular theory, tidal retardation of axial velocity theory, a refutation of Newtonian absolute space and time, all grounded by the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, 1786, which includes a chapter on the first dedicated modern exposition of what would eventually become phenomenology. I rather think his view just IS a metaphysical explanation of scientific knowledge, so you might mean his view is incompatible with someone else’s.
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if our mind doesn’t ontologically exist, then it can’t be producing space and time to represent things to itself. — Bob Ross

Again, FYI……in CPR, mind is the subject of a proposition 176 times, reason is the subject over 1300 times, in ~800 pages total. Mind can be merely a convenient placeholder, signifying nothing more than the terminus of infinite regress hence omitted generally without detriment to a metaphysical theories of the human condition, but reason cannot, insofar as reason actually belongs to every human and without which he is just an animal. If we’re going to reify an abstract, let’s reify that which a human can be proved to possess, rather than that which he could conceivably do without.
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with Kant’s view, we are forced to claim that we cannot infer that there is an natural environment, that we are impacted by other bodies, etc. because we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Kant proves that the impossibility of denying the existence of my own body is sufficient to prove the existence of the external world. The reverse establishes the truth, in that without an external world conditioned on space and time, there is no apodeictic certainty for my own body, the denial of which is blatantly contradictory. As such, the inference of an external world is not necessary, for its reality is certain. It follows that that by which we are impacted and that from which representations are given and empirical knowledge is possible, is not the thing-in-itself, which is the ground of his empirical realism doctrine from the beginning.

Maybe Mww can shed more light. — Janus

Thanks for the invite, but I wouldn’t know where to start. I don’t agree with 90% of what’s said herein regarding any of the three Critiques, not so much because of the general lack of intelligence but because of the failure to hold with the intended perspective on the one hand, and putting on much stock in secondary literature on the other.

Anyway, for starters I guess, regarding CPR, it behooves one to get it, that there are 26 pages concerning the world that is perceived, and 285 pages dedicated to a thesis on what the human intellect does with it, and by association, what it does with everything. It follows that referencing Kant is an automatic limitation to reason (the noun) and reason alone, the world in general and your neighbor in particular can get the hell outta the way; they are irrelevant. And bothersome.

It very well may be separate metaphysics attribute to things-in-themselves and noumena a knowledgeable reality of their own, but in Kant, having given only 26 pages to objective reality, the implication is that nothing about them has any significance. Yeah, there’s a world. Of course there is. So what. Still, that we don’t have any legitimate reason to care about them doesn’t reflect on how the conceptions of them came about, which gets us back to the 285 pages.

Ever onward. Buried as a footnote in the preface to the second edition, which is obviously the very beginning, is the statement that I can think whatever I want provided only that I don’t contradict myself. Many MANY pages later, at the beginning of the 285 page second part, is the statement, understanding is the faculty of thought.

Now we have understanding can think whatever it wants provided only that it doesn’t contradict itself, which implies understanding can think objects of its own all by itself, which it does, and they are represented as conceptions. Then the theory goes on to say understanding has no use for conceptions except to judge by means of them. OK, so we got a conception….but what is there to judge? Merely thinking a conception is all well and good but an exercise in futility if no judgement is facilitated by it. So at this point noumena is a conception understanding thinks but can’t do anything with.

The problem manifests in the fact the impossible cannot be conceived, which just means the conception represented as noumena cannot be impossible, but that does not mean there is a thing that can be related to it, something on which to formulate a judgement. The theory has already stipulated, with respect to things, the only relation permissible to conceptions are intuitions, represented as phenomena. All intuitions are sensible, therefore if there is a noumenal thing to relate to the object understanding thinks, it must be sensible, therefore a phenomenon.

Therein lay the logical contradiction, insofar as if noumena are only objects understanding thinks they cannot be sensible objects perception receives because if they were, they’d be phenomena which means they could not be objects only thought by the understanding. But noumena are valid conceptions, understanding is nonetheless entitled to think them, in that they do not contradict other conceptions, so it must be the case that it just isn’t possible to know whether there are noumenal objects or not, but if there are they are not sensible by us.

But none if that is really important. So what…understanding can do this thing, but get nothing out of it, from which arises a methodological contradiction. Abominable waste of transcendental effort. But like that French guy says in The Matrix (imitates bourgeois Merovingian accent)….there’s always a reason. For want of not bludgeoning the uninterested, the reason is found in the categories, in short, because for that which the understanding thinks, whether in the attempt to solve the world’s problems or just from twiddling its imaginary thumbs cuz it’s bored itself into a stupor, the categories have no effect. What Kant has done, by assigning particular jobs to particular faculties in a systemic methodology, is sustain internal logical consistency. Sure, understanding can do all this fancy shit, but, given a certain set of conditions, here’s what can be known, here’s why it can be known, anything else is junk so don’t go there.

The book on logic is formidable, and might be clearer if not for the prolonged discourse attempting to clarify it. For me anyway, half a century into it, I like to think I’m getting close.

”I think Kant's claim that we don't know what things are in themselves stands”

I disagree: I think schopenhauer finished Kant’s project by correcting this error of Kant’s. — Bob Ross

No, he didn’t correct the error; there wasn’t one to correct. It is impossible to know what things are in themselves, iff the human cognitive system is representational, which they both accepted as the case, and that necessarily. All S did was take that which is impossible to not know….the will….and call it the thing-in-itself, a philosophical blunder for which there is no legitimate excuse.

Let’s do some science. For any transformation of energy there is loss. It follows that for whatever mode of energy incorporated in the mode of reception by the sensory organs, that transforms into another form of energy in the peripheral nervous system, there is a loss in the original form. Therefore, whatever information is represented in the secondary form cannot be identical to whatever information was contained in the original. If that information in the secondary energy represents that which ends as knowledge, and that secondary information is not identical to the original information due to energy loss, it is impossible such knowledge can be of the original energy source.

So it seems metaphysics already proposed in its domain what physics subsequently obtained in its own.
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if Kant were correct in saying that we never come to understand the noumena—but we can. — Bob Ross

Context aside, insofar as there is no pertinent connection, it remains Kant could not have said noumena could not be understood, after having himself conceived a version of them. In Kant, understanding is the origin of conceptions, noumena are conceptions, or rather, noumena is a conception of a general class of conceptions, therefore noumena in general must be understandable, for otherwise the conception itself would be impossible. He made the apodeitic systemically conditioned argument that noumena could never be represented in the intuitive faculty of human cognitive system, therefore no noumenal objects could be an experience for us. Which is not entitlement to say there are no noumenal objects, but only that those systems predicated on a intuitive/discursive systemic methodology are not equipped to know what one would entail.
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”There isn’t a proof, per se, only an internal affirmative logical consistency”.

I just mean what is the case for it? What do you mean by it being an internal affirmative logical consistency? — Bob Ross

Be it granted it is impossible to know what an object is, if for it there is only a single intuition or a single conception. Many things are round, but to cognize any one thing, it must be more than just round. For however many representations there are by which an object becomes an experience, all those representations must be united into a single cognition. The categories are those primitive conceptions, not by which they are but by which representations of objects can be united such that a cognition is possible. This and this and this make up the cognition of that, but there still must be that which facilitates that this and this and this can be connected without conflicting with each other.

The categories can be thought of as regulatory principles, in that the cognition of objects depends on a logical system adhering to something that both makes the cognition possible and at the same time, alleviates contradictions in them. For instance, it is not enough to know it is possible to experience that which exists, but something must make it apodeitically certain it is impossible to experience that which does not exist, even if non-existence itself holds no contradiction insofar as it is merely a complementary conception.

The real attraction justifying the categories, is the human ability to construct its own real existences from abstract conceptions, re: numbers, letters, and so on, which would be utterly impossible if, like Hume, the denial of pure a priori conceptions, as logically invalid or altogether rationally impossible, were the case. It is tacitly inconceivable how we could invent mathematical objects if we didn’t already have the pure a priori conception of quantity contained in our understanding. There would be no moral philosophy predicated exclusively on abstract conceptions, justified post hoc by empirical behaviors.

Anyway….basic rendition of the what they are, but not so much the how they work, which would take a hellava lot more than a couple paragraphs and more than a couple presuppositions.

Fast times at Ridgemont High, or, you gotta be a complete stoner to comprehend this stuff??? Not to be taken as a confession, I swear.

Here I am presented with thinking deep enough to be appreciated, but at the same time, fraught with inconsistencies, prejudicial as they may be. Rather than have our dialectical histories repeat themselves, I’m just going to say thanks, and let it go.

Could you elaborate on the proof? — Bob Ross

There isn’t a proof, per se, only an internal affirmative logical consistency.

Yes, I could elaborate on the rationality justifying the categories, but to do so is a foray into the seriously transcendental, which may be a different idealism then is represented in the theme of your thread. And even if it isn’t that different, the categories are a few magnitudes of depth below what’s been presented in your thesis so far.
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As having "extension in space" is simply how we represent objects, conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. Having extension in space is that by which objects are sensed and represented intuitively as phenomena. Objects represented conceptually is that by which they are thought. Technically, albeit theory-specific, re: intrinsic human cognitive duality, having successions in time is how we represent objects conceptually, space not being a condition for conceptual representation.

we cannot truthfully sat that "space belongs to the object" — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Extension belongs to an object, space does not. Shape, then, just is the kind or degree of extension it possesses.

I read Kant and I didn’t think he really did a good job of arguing for the categories. — Bob Ross

He argued only enough to suit the overall purpose. All he needed to do in justifying a systemic conclusion (the possibility for human empirical knowledge), is demonstrate the necessity of a certain set of antecedent conditions. It’s just a simple “if this then that” logical construct.

Speculative metaphysics writ large.

The form this takes is not something intrinsic to the objects, but is inferred by the mind. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but with respect to the case at hand, the form of the perceived, but as yet undetermined, object, is not the same as the shape of it, which is its extension in space and belongs to the object alone.
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On Pinter: “objects in an unobserved universe have no shape”.

For we as humans, an object, whether observed or not, to have no shape makes explicit there is no extension in a space for it, which presupposes the unobserved universe is not itself a space, an inference for which there is no logical justification.

That experience is sufficient to grant us the authority to say what an observed object is, we are not thereby authorized to conceptualize what the unobserved is not.
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Omnibus-ing can be fun.

On the unity of subjective experience:

Let’s do some real science. Let’s hook up a nifty machine, expressly constructed to measure neural correlates relating perception of your favorite breakfast meal and the pleasure you get from it, to a material manifestation. What you should see is a graph or an o’scope pattern, so big or modulated or whatever for this degree of taste, lesser or something else for that degree.

Oh but wait a New York (CityUniversity) minute….neural correlates are on the nano-scale, but the probes attached to the machine are mini-scale. Dammit, that’s just not gonna work, you’ll wreck the very neurons you’re trying to get a measurement from. Ahhh…so just quantum-ize the probes, insert them into this pathway, then that pathway, or better yet, insert a whole boatload of ‘em in all sorts of pathways just to find out which one actually reads out as “bittersweet, but slightly overcooked”.

But first, solve or disregard the observer problem whereby merely inserting the probes disrupts the influence of the natural components on each other….

Well, crap on a cracker, Mr. Bill. There’s no ‘scope ever possible to build that will read out as bittersweet but slightly overcooked, but only as representing 140 phosphorous ions across a 56pm cleft under 12nv activation potential.

And there ya go. Your love of scrambled eggs is nothing but 140 ions, etc, on this probe, too much pepper on that probe, put only this much jelly on the toast on still another, and so on, and on and on.

If you find that uncomfortable, and who wouldn’t with all those probes, let’s use dyes of different colors then all you have to do is suffer the needles. Now you’re see red dye where bittersweet is and blue dye where overcooked is, and you’ve got your breakfast experience in multicolored science. Yea. Wonderful.

Screw it. Magnetic imaging? Ultrasonic vibration? Some new and unproven futuristic space-age gizmo? Won’t make one whit of difference. For any scientific methodology, you’ll get nothing but what that method gives you, but it will never ever give you what you give yourself.

To quote my ol’ AM radio (remember AM radio? Anybody?) buddy Paul Harvey, and now you know the REESSSSSTTTT of the story.

(Sigh)

So….anything I said find a place in your analytic idealism?

All good.

Could you elaborate on why one should believe that these categories are what our minds use as functions to produce phenomenal experience? — Bob Ross

Unless the human cognitive system is granted as being representational and inherently logical, re: relational, nothing anybody says in support of the categories will be deemed theoretically plausible, much less acceptable.

Unless the human cognitive system is granted as dualistic, whereby the phenomenal part of the system by which objects are given through perception has no cognitive power, the categories are meaningless, for they apply to nothing else whatsoever, but are contained in the other part that has cognitive power, the power of logical thought. So it is that the categories aren’t what produces phenomenal experience, which is a conceptual redundancy anyway, insofar as there is no experience, re: empirical knowledge of objects, that isn’t phenomenal in origin. The system as a whole produces, not just any single aspect of it.

The categories represent the necessary fundamental conditions by which the object perceived represented as a phenomenon, relates to the object thought represented as a conception. They determine, not how the object is to be understood, but that it can be understood at all. Without that underlaying criteria, that which is perceived cannot be conceptually represented hence will never make it past the mere sensing of it. It’s not that we won’t know what the object is, but that there is no way to understand that it is anything at all.

To have no understanding at all, irrespective of its certainty, is contradictory, insofar as any object given to the senses absolutely must be something to which a conception may or may not relate. This is in fact the case, in that sensations given from perceptions are themselves impossible to deny. And if the sensation is undeniable, it leaves it for something to be done with it, can’t just stop being something. Like sensory information traveling down a nerve and never making it to the brain. Just doesn’t happen, all else being equal. The appeasement of the contradiction, allowing the cognitive operation to continue, is sufficient warrant for justification of the function of the categories.

So….one should believe all that iff it makes sense to him. If it doesn’t, he won’t.

So…..metaphysical reductionism to a certain point is an explanatory necessity, but beyond that point is inevitably illusory?

“….6.373 The world is independent of my will….”

what would those categories be exactly? — Bob Ross

Not to step on ’s toes, but to give a quicker answer……

Mathematical:
Of Quantity: unity, plurality, totality;
Of Quality: reality, negation, limitation;
Dynamical:
Of Relations: subsistence/inference, causality/dependence, community/reciprocity;
Of Modality: possibility, necessity, existence.

Fair warning: merely knowing what they are by name doesn’t tell you of the required presuppositions for their function.

…..reductionism is the best means of explanation….. — Bob Ross

But that’s a very good start, insofar as certainly the Kantian, and in some respects, Aristotelian, categories are the reduction of all conditions for function of the human intellect regarding real physical objects, pursuant to a particular speculative metaphysical theory.

Keyword: theory.

…..the power of creating itself. — Wayfarer

…..which is, without doubt, the foremost logical catastrophe, like…..ever.

(Disclaimer: not exactly sure you mean, so I’m begging anticipatory forgiveness)

Everything humans do is a product of culture and society, and always has been. — Jamal

Good.

everything humans do is a product of our nature, culture and society — Christoffer

Better.

As you wish.