Are you a platonist? — NOS4A2

No, I'm a vegetarian. (Not really).

This is just an attempt to repackage your same old argument. In your attempt to defend your desire to benefit from society without taking any responsibility you introduce a "metaphysics" which is nothing more than an abuse of terminology that is already problematic enough.

There are two parts to my understanding of language: i) words have a use in the language game and ii) the language game has a use in the world. Wittgenstein deals with the first part, but ignores the second. — RussellA

He does not ignore the fact that a language game has a use in the world. The language game develops out of and is understood within the context of a form of life, which includes particular activities, such as building.

He proposes that the meaning of a word does not come from the thing that it is naming, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not come from a slab in the world. — RussellA

Of course it comes from a slab in the world! The builder does not order him to bring a slab that does not exist. The assistant must know what kind of object he is to bring.

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”,
“beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

(2)

What makes it a complete language is that it does not consist simply in objects named but what is done with those objects. In other words, its use in the world.

Perhaps you can enlighten me. — NOS4A2

I have tried, repeatedly over many threads. More often than not I don't bother though.

Are you just playing at being obtuse or do you really not understand what is at issue?

What jungle? There is only a bunch of different individuals in the same place.

The difference is that a forest is not just a bunch of individual trees, it is a self-sustaining ecosystem.

What he didn't realize is that he was in a forest. There is a difference, but for the same reasons he would deny he was in a thicket.

If trees could talk there would be one in the forest claiming that there is no forest: "When I look around all I see are trees. No where does this fictitious entity a "forest" exist."

Well, as they used to say on American Bandstand, "Its got a good beat and you can dance to it". So I think this Plato guy just might have a hit or two in him.

If he succeeds it would be a Pyrrhic victory.

What I like about your view is that it makes me think. — frank

Sometimes when someone tells me that I apologize. (A serious joke.)

... the divine ... — Paine

We tend to impose our own beliefs and ideas on what this term means. I think it helpful to consider something Homer, who in the Phaedo Socrates calls the “Divine Poet” (95a) says. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

The first mention of law does not occur until 50a. It is also here that we find the first mention of the city.

The first mention of justice occurs earlier:

That’s right. And without going through them all, Crito, doesn’t the same issue arise in other cases too, and especially when it comes to justice and injustice, disgrace and nobility, good and bad, with which our deliberations are now concerned? Should we follow the opinion of the majority and fear it, or the opinion of one person, someone who is knowledgeable, and feel more shame and fear before him than before all the others put together? And if we do not follow him, shan’t we corrupt and maim that which we agreed is made better by justice, and ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing?

(47c-d)

Your take is a little unorthodox — frank

I don't know what might stand as an orthodox reading today but, to quote Marx:

Whatever it is I'm against it

(Groucho)

I take responsibility for my interpretation but I don't think there is anything there that is original.

We could definitely argue against the speech the Law has given, but it's clear within the context of this dialog that Socrates does accept what the law has said — frank

I think that it is clear that Socrates wants Crito to accept it. It is also clear that Socrates abides by the decision of the court. Before imagining what the law will say he was already convinced that to flee would be unjust and to return an injustice with an injustice is unjust. This is not the same as accepting the words he puts in the mouth of the law.

At the risk of stating the obvious, it is Plato who imagines what Socrates imagines the law would say. Socrates fashioning this argument to convince Crito is not the same as Socrates being convinced by the argument. From the perspective of the reader the question is whether Plato is trying to convince
us. If we can argue against the speech I think it likely that Plato's Socrates could have as well. What is at issue is not simply why Socrates did what he did, which admittedly is puzzling, but what philosophers who come after him have to think about and do. In this case it means, at least in part, to learn what Socrates did not, but Plato and Aristotle did, that is, how to speak to the city and the law.

A couple of reasons to think that Socrates did not put the law above justice. In the Apology he says he would not stop engaging in philosophy even if the law prohibits it. He also refused to comply with the Thirty and arrest Leon of Salamis.

These are the words I seem to be hearing, just as the frenzied dancers seem to be hearing the pipes, and the very sound of these words is reverberating within me, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. — Horan translation

I don't think Socrates, who devoted his life to the truth based on giving a reasoned account, would be persuaded by words that resembled frenzied dancers and pipes.

... he has acquired an overwhelming obligation to obey the Laws because they have made his entire way of life, and even the fact of his very existence, possible. — IEP

His entire way of life is exactly what the law now demands he no longer practice.

The law claims:

... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us
(52d) — Fooloso4

For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy. — Fooloso4

The law has violated the terms of the agreement. But even so Socrates is unwilling to break the law.

It is true that Socrates was free to leave, but Athens was for him not simply where he lived. Although by leaving when that option was open he would not have broken the law, it would have broken his bond to the city which was not simply a legal one.

If we are to understand Wittgenstein we would do well to look at what he points to, what people do and say, and not posit theories. If I cut myself or hit my hand with a hammer I might say ouch even if no one hears it. If you ask why, "because it hurt" is as good an explanation as any other and better than many. Given than no one else is around it is obviously not to convey anything or communicate anything to anyone. It is only an observable behavior if someone observes it, but it is what we do whether it is observed or not.

But the speech Law has been giving (through Socrates) puts Law as the source of both Athens and Socrates himself. — frank

I think the law has it backwards. There would be no human nomos, that is, not simply laws and statutes, but custom or convention or norms, without men. Prior to cities there were families and tribes. If whatever the head or chief ruled was law then the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men collapses.

Plato recognized the conflicting demands of the family and the city. This is why in the Republic the just city abolishes the family by hiding who one's biological parents and children are.

The distinction between just and unjust laws raises the problem of the source or standard of justice. The speech of the law, however, does not make such a distinction.

The ancient Greeks distinguished between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). If, along with the Stoics, we accept the claim that man is the rational animal, then to live according to nature is to live according to reason not according to conventions or norms.

It's hard not to see this as proto-social-contract theory. — frank

If there was a contract then what was the obligation on the side of the law? For his whole adult life Socrates practiced what he is now forbidden to do. Did the city break the contract? When the Thirty briefly came to power was there a contract agreed to or did the new law simply impose its power?

Society is the foundation of your existence, so you owe it obedience. — frank

Does this mean that we owe obedience even when there is a radical change to the laws of a society? Suppose a regime comes to power that abolishes private property and declares that we are all the property of the state without any human rights. Suppose further that it restricts emigration. What do we owe it?

It should be in your nature to support that which gives you life. — frank

Unless we are by nature slaves to the state and not free, then there must be limits to the demands of the state. If there is to be a social contract then one side cannot hold all the power.

... do not reckon children or life or anything else to be more important than justice — Horan translation

Justice (dike) is more important than law (nomos). Law is in the service of justice, but they can be in conflict. Consider, for example, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. There can be unjust laws and unjust administration of the law. The speech of the law glosses over this problem.

those who rule there. — Horan translation

Gods, not men, rule in Hades. As the law says in this passage, Socrates was treated unjustly by Athens. It does not claim that he was treated unlawfully. But justly or not, for Socrates to disobey the judgment of the city would be unjust. More important than any specific judgment by the city is the preservation of the law. Unjust laws cannot be changed and made just if law is discarded.

According to the law, man in the service of justice rather than justice being in the service of man. But does the law overstate its case?

I don't think he refers to this divine force as a 'daemon'.
It is his daemonion, a 'voice' he hears. — Amity

You are right, he always refers to it as his daemonion. I have not paid much attention to this and do not feel qualified to say much about it. There is no consensus, however, as to who or what it is the voice of. Here is a brief discussion of his divine sign.

However, this latest made me wonder as to the importance of the use of the word 'slave'. — Amity

What is at issue can be seen if we put it in the form of a question: are the laws for the benefit of man or is man for the benefit of the laws?

(mastery of self?). — Amity

From the Phaedo:

For all wars arise on account of the possession of wealth, and we are compelled to acquire wealth because of the body, as we are slaves in its service.

(66c-d)

The presence of Socrates' daimonion? — Amity

Or rather, its conspicuous absence. It plays a significant role in the charges brought against Socrates in the Apology, where he is accused of believing in:

... other novel divine forces.

(24b-c)

Here Socrates claims:

I am, now and always, the sort of person who heeds nothing else but the reasoning that on reflection appears best to me.

(46b)

His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something.

I am sure that "ouch!" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour. — RussellA

It is neither.

I don't know why you don't just ignore him. — T Clark

Maybe because the truth matters.

Changing his mind doesn't.

I say that the right people in the right positions to lead — ToothyMaw

This is the problem. There is no general agreement as to who the right people are.

But you have a moral obligation by virtue of all the good you could do ... — ToothyMaw

What some might consider good others might not.

But what do you think of the case Socrates' Law has made in Crito? Are you convinced or not? — frank

I am convinced of the importance of just law, but not that he is the slave (West translation) of the law. The Greek term is "doulos". I don't know why Horan translates it as servant, but possibly because a servant is able to leave (51d). This would be a kind of social contract, but there is no contract or agreement between master and slave. As the argument progresses this claim is dropped, in favor of the idea of an agreement.

Leaving this aside, we can consider the rest of the claim in this passage, that he is the offspring or son of the law. While a son may have an obligation to obey a father who is just and good, what is his obligation to a father who is not? The speech of the law does not make this critical distinction.

The distinction and blurring of the distinction between the law and the people who make, decide, and administer the law is also problematic.

As quoted above, the law, so to speak, washes its hands of the matter by admitting that Socrates was treated unjustly, only not by the law but by men.

Then why did you say the word ? — RussellA

Because it hurt. I could have said some other things or let out an inarticulate exclamation.

"I" doesn't mean "you". "I" doesn't mean "The secretary of State for Georgia". "I" doesn't mean "Brad Raffensperger". — NOS4A2

Yes, that is correct. It is Trump who "had" to and "wanted" to and "needed" to find these votes. Election officials must remain neutral.

Trump switches between "I", "we", "you", and "they".

And why can’t we have professionals do it instead of rank amateurs who will never find anything and don’t want to find anything? They don’t want to find, you know, they don’t want to find anything. Someday you’ll tell me the reason why, because I don’t understand your reasoning, but someday you’ll tell me the reason why. But why don’t you want to find?

And:

So tell me, Brad, what are we going to do?

Who is this we? It is clear:

And I think you have to say that you’re going to re-examine it, and you can re-examine it, but re-examine it with people that want to find answers, not people that don’t want to find answers.

RAFFENSPERGER: Mr. President, you have people that submit information, and we have our people that submit information. And then it comes before the court, and the court then has to make a determination. We have to stand by our numbers. We believe our numbers are right.

He sensibly and impartially suggests that if they can't agree the court can make a determination. But Trump rejects that and brow beats him:

I’ve been watching you, you know, you don’t care about anything.

Once again: multiple investigations had already been carried out and did not find what Trump and Trumpsters wanted. His allegations of fraud have not been substantiated.

But Trump and Trumpsters simply cannot accept that. It is as simple as that. Piling unsubstantiated allegations on top of unsubstantiated allegations does not change the fact that he lost. The hope that he could create enough doubt to postpone or curtail the transfer of power did not pan out either. But Trump would rather burn it all to the ground than concede the election. That goes far beyond looking for nonexistent fraud.

Trump and his lawyers were pressuring them to look at the fraud and to share their reports and data. — NOS4A2

The problem is, multiple investigations had already been carried out and did not find what Trump and Trumpsters wanted. The only finding they would accept is that the election was stolen. And so, Trump pressured them to "find" votes that he could not accept were not there.

Saying "ouch!" is not an involuntary act such as wincing, but rather a cognitive act as part of a language game requiring conscious thought intended to communicate a private sensation to others. — RussellA

If I stub my toe I may say "ouch" even if no one else is around to hear me. Certainly this is not intended to communicate a private sensation to others or to myself.

But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock. — frank

This is something we need to try and make sense of. In order to do so, I think we need to go back to the problem of the greatest good and the greatest harm.

As it is, they [the multitude] are not able to do either [the greatest harm or greatest good], for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish ...

(44d)

It would seem that the laws they make cannot either. For if they could Socrates would have been able to find one or more in Athens who are wise. As we know from the Apology, he did not.

Socrates' concern with the greatest good led to the rejection of the laws as the greatest good. He puts the pursuit of wisdom above the law. The laws can vary from place to place, but the truth does not. For Socrates living well, that is, living the examined life, was a greater good than simply living; and the threat to philosophy a greater harm than the threat to his life. The end of his life would not be the end of philosophy.

The law cannot make one wise, but perhaps the pursuit of wisdom can lead to making wiser laws. In the Apology Socrates says:

... anyone who is actually fighting on the side of justice and who intends to be safe, even for a short time, must act privately rather than publicly.

(32a)

If the men who make laws are to be persuaded it would not be through political speech and action, but by the very thing they are trying to prevent Socrates from doing. By silencing Socrates they harm themselves for they lose the opportunity to be made wiser.

The law claims:

... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us

(52d)

As Socrates pointed out in the Apology, it was not until now that his philosophical pursuits are being judged to be illegal. The argument could be turned around. For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.

Crito's attempt to persuade him to flee comes too late. We can only speculate as why Socrates did not choose exile. In the Apology (37d) he says it is because the same thing would happen, the young people will listen to him and this will lead to banishment by their fathers and relations. (37e) He does not say the fatherland, that is, the laws, but the men of whatever city he is in. Philosophy is at odds with the ancestral ways, the ways of one's father, the ways of the family.

Given his advanced age perhaps the most important thing he had left to give philosophy is not more words but a final demonstration of something he has often said: philosophy is preparation for death. If in death he arrives in Hades he will meet his final judgment. He is confident that those who rule there will not judge the life of philosophy as harmful or unjust. The laws agree, putting the blame not on themselves but on the men of Athens.

... as matters stand, if you depart this world you depart unjustly treated by your fellow men, and not by us, the laws.

(54b-c)

When Socrates says in the Apology that he will not cease engaging in philosophy he is addressing the men of Athens. (29d) In line with the distinction the laws have made, his disobedience would not be to the law but to the men of Athens. The distinction is problematic, but leads to another consideration.

Perhaps Socrates was wrong in disregarding the opinions of the multitude, for they have decided his fate. Although he may not care about what they will do to him, he should care about the tension between philosophy and the city. The many will never become philosophers, but the philosophers can and should learn how to speak to the people in order to persuade them that philosophy, with its concern for what is just, and noble, and good, benefits the city.

Trumpsters have a lot of practice inventing "alternative facts". Trump feeds off their resentment and has convinced them that when he complains that he is not being treated fairly that they too are the victims.

Far more often then not when he accuses others of something it is something that he himself is guilty of. In his wake the roads are paved with both friends and enemies that he has thrown under the bus.

The speech of the laws should be compared to what Socrates says in the Apology:

Men of Athens, I embrace you and I love you, but I shall heed the god rather than you, and as long as I am alive, and able to do so, I shall not cease engaging in philosophy

(29c)

For I know full well that wherever I go, the young people will listen to what I say, just as they do here ...

(37d)

Whatever allegiance he might have to the city, when it comes to philosophy he will not be obedient to it. According to the laws, to do so would be to subvert the judgment of the law, and thus would be to act unjustly. But Socrates says he would never knowingly do harm or act unjustly.

Note that at 29c he is addressing the men of Athens. At best only a few

whose opinions are more worthy of consideration

(44c)

It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.

At the time of these events the DOJ was being run by Trump's own people. — EricH

Anyone who does not show complete and blind "loyalty" is no longer his own people. Their "disloyalty" is evidence that they cannot be trusted.

Anyone who facilitates the worst conspiracy theory in the history of the United States in an attempt to subvert the duly elected president should not be trusted. — NOS4A2

I am in complete agreement. This is exactly what Trump and his henchmen did.

Why would someone trust the DOJ and Georgia officials? — NOS4A2

Right. Anyone or anything that does not support Trump and his claims cannot be trusted.

he was requesting they look for illegal votes — NOS4A2

That had already been done. He knew that but did not like that none of the multiple investigations supported his allegations.

This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. — frank

Good point. The law says:

... didn’t we bring you to birth (West: beget), since through us your father married your mother and begot you (West: bring you forth through us).

(50d)

The question of paternity and paternalism becomes even more evident in the West translation when later in the same speech when the laws refer several times to the "fatherland". Horan translates it as homeland.

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. — frank

Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive?

He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life — frank

It might be worth looking at what he (Plato's Socrates) said and compare it to what the law says here.

It makes no difference whether he meant find votes that can be discarded as illegal. There was not and is not evidence they exist. He was repeatedly told by the Justice Department and Georgia officials that they did not exist.

It is one thing to question results, but quite another to reject the evidence.

There was not and is not evidence that they exist. Where were they supposed to "find" them?

The laws ask:

Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?

Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?

Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:

subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.

Added: West's translation has "judgments" and the following note:

The words "judgments" and "trials" in this speech render the Greekdikai, the plural of dike, "justice".

In effect the claim is that the judgment of the law is just because it is the judgment of the law. But, of course, even the personification of the laws should not obscure the fact that the judgment was that of the many.

… if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this

(51b)

Earlier Socrates said that:

Presumably because doing harm to people is no different from acting unjustly.

(49c)

How much weight should we put on “presumably”? (West translates this as "surely") Is the presumption wrong?

He goes on to ask:

In leaving this place without having convinced the city, are we doing harm, even to those we should harm least of all?

(49e)

Socrates’ concern is twofold. Doing harm to people and doing harm to the city. By doing harm to the city he would be doing harm to the people of the city. By obeying the city, however, he would be doing harm to the enemy, which, according to what has been said, would be unjust.

In the Euthyphro a similar tension occurs. Euthyphro prosecutes his father on behalf of the gods. Although both dialogues are about justice, here there is no mention of either the laws or the city. In the Crito there is no mention of piety. In the Crito the laws are our master, here the gods are our master. In both there is the question of who is harmed by what is being proposed to be done.