Then why did you say the word ? — RussellA

Because it hurt. I could have said some other things or let out an inarticulate exclamation.

"I" doesn't mean "you". "I" doesn't mean "The secretary of State for Georgia". "I" doesn't mean "Brad Raffensperger". — NOS4A2

Yes, that is correct. It is Trump who "had" to and "wanted" to and "needed" to find these votes. Election officials must remain neutral.

Trump switches between "I", "we", "you", and "they".

And why can’t we have professionals do it instead of rank amateurs who will never find anything and don’t want to find anything? They don’t want to find, you know, they don’t want to find anything. Someday you’ll tell me the reason why, because I don’t understand your reasoning, but someday you’ll tell me the reason why. But why don’t you want to find?

And:

So tell me, Brad, what are we going to do?

Who is this we? It is clear:

And I think you have to say that you’re going to re-examine it, and you can re-examine it, but re-examine it with people that want to find answers, not people that don’t want to find answers.

RAFFENSPERGER: Mr. President, you have people that submit information, and we have our people that submit information. And then it comes before the court, and the court then has to make a determination. We have to stand by our numbers. We believe our numbers are right.

He sensibly and impartially suggests that if they can't agree the court can make a determination. But Trump rejects that and brow beats him:

I’ve been watching you, you know, you don’t care about anything.

Once again: multiple investigations had already been carried out and did not find what Trump and Trumpsters wanted. His allegations of fraud have not been substantiated.

But Trump and Trumpsters simply cannot accept that. It is as simple as that. Piling unsubstantiated allegations on top of unsubstantiated allegations does not change the fact that he lost. The hope that he could create enough doubt to postpone or curtail the transfer of power did not pan out either. But Trump would rather burn it all to the ground than concede the election. That goes far beyond looking for nonexistent fraud.

Trump and his lawyers were pressuring them to look at the fraud and to share their reports and data. — NOS4A2

The problem is, multiple investigations had already been carried out and did not find what Trump and Trumpsters wanted. The only finding they would accept is that the election was stolen. And so, Trump pressured them to "find" votes that he could not accept were not there.

Saying "ouch!" is not an involuntary act such as wincing, but rather a cognitive act as part of a language game requiring conscious thought intended to communicate a private sensation to others. — RussellA

If I stub my toe I may say "ouch" even if no one else is around to hear me. Certainly this is not intended to communicate a private sensation to others or to myself.

But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock. — frank

This is something we need to try and make sense of. In order to do so, I think we need to go back to the problem of the greatest good and the greatest harm.

As it is, they [the multitude] are not able to do either [the greatest harm or greatest good], for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish ...

(44d)

It would seem that the laws they make cannot either. For if they could Socrates would have been able to find one or more in Athens who are wise. As we know from the Apology, he did not.

Socrates' concern with the greatest good led to the rejection of the laws as the greatest good. He puts the pursuit of wisdom above the law. The laws can vary from place to place, but the truth does not. For Socrates living well, that is, living the examined life, was a greater good than simply living; and the threat to philosophy a greater harm than the threat to his life. The end of his life would not be the end of philosophy.

The law cannot make one wise, but perhaps the pursuit of wisdom can lead to making wiser laws. In the Apology Socrates says:

... anyone who is actually fighting on the side of justice and who intends to be safe, even for a short time, must act privately rather than publicly.

(32a)

If the men who make laws are to be persuaded it would not be through political speech and action, but by the very thing they are trying to prevent Socrates from doing. By silencing Socrates they harm themselves for they lose the opportunity to be made wiser.

The law claims:

... you have agreed, by your actions if not by your words, to live as a citizen in accordance with us

(52d)

As Socrates pointed out in the Apology, it was not until now that his philosophical pursuits are being judged to be illegal. The argument could be turned around. For much of his life, doing what he does and saying what he says was not prevented by the law. By its actions or lack of action the law agreed to allow him to engage in philosophy.

Crito's attempt to persuade him to flee comes too late. We can only speculate as why Socrates did not choose exile. In the Apology (37d) he says it is because the same thing would happen, the young people will listen to him and this will lead to banishment by their fathers and relations. (37e) He does not say the fatherland, that is, the laws, but the men of whatever city he is in. Philosophy is at odds with the ancestral ways, the ways of one's father, the ways of the family.

Given his advanced age perhaps the most important thing he had left to give philosophy is not more words but a final demonstration of something he has often said: philosophy is preparation for death. If in death he arrives in Hades he will meet his final judgment. He is confident that those who rule there will not judge the life of philosophy as harmful or unjust. The laws agree, putting the blame not on themselves but on the men of Athens.

... as matters stand, if you depart this world you depart unjustly treated by your fellow men, and not by us, the laws.

(54b-c)

When Socrates says in the Apology that he will not cease engaging in philosophy he is addressing the men of Athens. (29d) In line with the distinction the laws have made, his disobedience would not be to the law but to the men of Athens. The distinction is problematic, but leads to another consideration.

Perhaps Socrates was wrong in disregarding the opinions of the multitude, for they have decided his fate. Although he may not care about what they will do to him, he should care about the tension between philosophy and the city. The many will never become philosophers, but the philosophers can and should learn how to speak to the people in order to persuade them that philosophy, with its concern for what is just, and noble, and good, benefits the city.

Trumpsters have a lot of practice inventing "alternative facts". Trump feeds off their resentment and has convinced them that when he complains that he is not being treated fairly that they too are the victims.

Far more often then not when he accuses others of something it is something that he himself is guilty of. In his wake the roads are paved with both friends and enemies that he has thrown under the bus.

The speech of the laws should be compared to what Socrates says in the Apology:

Men of Athens, I embrace you and I love you, but I shall heed the god rather than you, and as long as I am alive, and able to do so, I shall not cease engaging in philosophy

(29c)

For I know full well that wherever I go, the young people will listen to what I say, just as they do here ...

(37d)

Whatever allegiance he might have to the city, when it comes to philosophy he will not be obedient to it. According to the laws, to do so would be to subvert the judgment of the law, and thus would be to act unjustly. But Socrates says he would never knowingly do harm or act unjustly.

Note that at 29c he is addressing the men of Athens. At best only a few

whose opinions are more worthy of consideration

(44c)

It is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm.

At the time of these events the DOJ was being run by Trump's own people. — EricH

Anyone who does not show complete and blind "loyalty" is no longer his own people. Their "disloyalty" is evidence that they cannot be trusted.

Anyone who facilitates the worst conspiracy theory in the history of the United States in an attempt to subvert the duly elected president should not be trusted. — NOS4A2

I am in complete agreement. This is exactly what Trump and his henchmen did.

Why would someone trust the DOJ and Georgia officials? — NOS4A2

Right. Anyone or anything that does not support Trump and his claims cannot be trusted.

he was requesting they look for illegal votes — NOS4A2

That had already been done. He knew that but did not like that none of the multiple investigations supported his allegations.

This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. — frank

Good point. The law says:

... didn’t we bring you to birth (West: beget), since through us your father married your mother and begot you (West: bring you forth through us).

(50d)

The question of paternity and paternalism becomes even more evident in the West translation when later in the same speech when the laws refer several times to the "fatherland". Horan translates it as homeland.

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. — frank

Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive?

He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life — frank

It might be worth looking at what he (Plato's Socrates) said and compare it to what the law says here.

It makes no difference whether he meant find votes that can be discarded as illegal. There was not and is not evidence they exist. He was repeatedly told by the Justice Department and Georgia officials that they did not exist.

It is one thing to question results, but quite another to reject the evidence.

There was not and is not evidence that they exist. Where were they supposed to "find" them?

The laws ask:

Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law?

Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime?

Contrary to the way Socrates frames it, the city in question is not just "any city". It is one whose laws are said to be enacted justly. The problem, however, is not simply justice but the force needed to prevent the law from being overthrown. Although Socrates talks as if it is a matter of persuasion, of convincing the city, that too would be a:

subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing.

Added: West's translation has "judgments" and the following note:

The words "judgments" and "trials" in this speech render the Greekdikai, the plural of dike, "justice".

In effect the claim is that the judgment of the law is just because it is the judgment of the law. But, of course, even the personification of the laws should not obscure the fact that the judgment was that of the many.

… if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this

(51b)

Earlier Socrates said that:

Presumably because doing harm to people is no different from acting unjustly.

(49c)

How much weight should we put on “presumably”? (West translates this as "surely") Is the presumption wrong?

He goes on to ask:

In leaving this place without having convinced the city, are we doing harm, even to those we should harm least of all?

(49e)

Socrates’ concern is twofold. Doing harm to people and doing harm to the city. By doing harm to the city he would be doing harm to the people of the city. By obeying the city, however, he would be doing harm to the enemy, which, according to what has been said, would be unjust.

In the Euthyphro a similar tension occurs. Euthyphro prosecutes his father on behalf of the gods. Although both dialogues are about justice, here there is no mention of either the laws or the city. In the Crito there is no mention of piety. In the Crito the laws are our master, here the gods are our master. In both there is the question of who is harmed by what is being proposed to be done.

It is interesting that you mention Thomas Paine. On the one hand Socrates might have regarded him as someone whose opinions in general should be considered, but his efforts, as an Englishman to become independent, would not have persuaded the law. We are servants of the city and its law, as Socrates speaking for it, demands.

As you point out, not all cities and all laws are the same. But Socrates said he found no fault with the Athenian laws of marriage or the education he received. (50-e) And yet, Socrates own teachings were deemed contrary to those of the city.

I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. — Paine

Our democratic republic is by design a mixed regime. In practice there is always the danger of it becoming something else. This raises the question of whether when the city and its laws devolve what allegiance do we still owe to it?

This is your argument? It has so many holes in it I'll just allow it to collapse under its own weight.

... no matter how hard you spin it. — NOS4A2

Your clumsy rhetorical tactics may appeal to your fellow Trumpsters, but have no persuasive power.

Accuse the other guy of doing what you are doing. Even with the spin you put on it, it is a clear, straight forward brag about him sexual molesting women.

no evidence for any sexual assault, — NOS4A2

And yet based on the evidence presented the court concluded there was sexual assault.

Many people did not find this at all surprising since he bragged about sexually assaulting women.

And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything ... Grab ’em by the pussy. You can do anything.

Are you claiming that sexual assault is not wrongdoing?

Whatever else you think counts as wrongdoing does not erase the wrongdoing he did.

Typical childish Trump defense. Trying to put the blame elsewhere, trying to steer the issue away from what Trump did, and pretending that any accusations against him are for political reasons.

He was not found guilty of the crime of sexual assault. — NOS4A2

In a prior post you claimed:

One can spend days looking through indictments, criticisms, and books for any wrongdoing ... — NOS4A2

He was found liable for sexual assault. That is wrongdoing.

Being found guilty of a crime is not the same thing.

Sexual assault is a crime. No one has been found guilty of it. End of story. — NOS4A2

The jury found in her favor. He sexually assaulted her. He was not found guilty because it was not a criminal case, not because no crime had been committed.

Only because Trump didn’t show for the trial, not that he actually assaulted anyone. Liability isn’t guilt. — NOS4A2

You really should attempt to know the facts before making such claims. It was a civil trial not a criminal trial. Whether or not he showed up for the trial is immaterial to the determination that he assaulted her.

A party is liable when they are held legally responsible for something. Unlike in criminal cases, where a defendant could be found guilty, a defendant in a civil case risks only liability.

Civil law

And if this is the case, do you think that justice between you and us is on an equal basis, and that you are justified in retaliating against anything we set about doing to you?

(50e)

This is straight out of Aristophanes' Clouds, where Pheidippides beats his father Strepsiades. (1330) Here persuasion and coercion are comically joined.

Is the distinction always clear? If I can persuade you by making the weaker argument stronger, isn't that a form of coercion? Note how the song of the law, as I think you pointed out, demands submission.

Descartes was just confused on this point. — Sam26

Someone does seem to be confused. Taking things out of context can often lead to confusion.

But this thread is not the place to discuss Descartes. To do so reasonable and responsibly would require reading him carefully, but since you are not a fan, that is not likely to happen.

And of course "...I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim," so I'm not sure of your point. — Sam26

The point is, it does not reach into the issue of consciousness itself. What is at issue here is not what is at issue for Descartes.

My point is that in terms of what I can know ... — Sam26

The point is, it is not a matter of what I can and cannot know.

There is no internal language-game ... — Sam26

Right, quite the opposite, Descartes' is a daring political language-game addressed to those who are capable of thinking for themselves. It is rhetorical. How can he call into question the authority of the Church and "the philosopher" without suffering the same fate as Galileo? He does this by pretending to call everything into question. His meditations are not internal or private. After all, he is writing to be read. It is from beginning to end public.

Trump brags that he grabs them by the pussy. Surely he would not lie.

The distinction between regimes raises problems for Socrates' song. The city and laws ask:

... do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

The key phrase here is "just enactment". Here he ignores the distinction between just and unjust cities and laws. He states that he refuses to play the part of the rhetorician who:

... might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

(50b)

but does take the part of the rhetorician in his defense of the city and its laws. Like the rhetorician his concern does not seem to be with the truth but with being persuasive. He even asks Crito:

Are the laws speaking the truth, or not?

(51c)

The best argument here is not the one that is true but the one that will persuade him to be obedient to the law. A noble lie may be preferable to the truth.

That leaves open the question of whether this should be the case in all regimes, even the most unjust. Should judgments always stand supreme? Is the fact that the city can be overthrown if the laws are not obeyed sufficient reason to obey?

This is important to understand. It reaches into the issue of consciousness itself, and it's why Descartes is wrong about "I think, therefore I am." There is no such conclusion to be drawn. I simply think. — Sam26

Although it makes no sense to say that I am in pain but I do not know it or I am not conscious that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim. I think you are reaching into the wrong issue.

Something that does not think cannot be deceived, and only something that can think can doubt. I cannot be deceived about or doubt that I exist unless I am a thing that thinks.

@frank started a thread a few months ago https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14302/descartes-reading-group/p1 . What Descartes means by thinking and the significance of his claim were discussed. From the Second Meditation:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

The Greek term νόμος, from which we get the term 'norm', means custom, law, and also song (νόμος).

Socrates sings the song of the law. A nomos nomos, a song of songs, in which the law lays claim to us.

Where did I hear that argument? — frank

For those interested in where, Socrates presents this image in the Republic 488a in support of his argument that the philosophers should rule.

For the sake of the argument I am going to put aside the historical question and treat Plato's Socrates as the same man who defends Athenian democracy in the Crito and criticizes democracy elsewhere.

With this in mind, we can conclude that Socrates is not persuaded by this argument. In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. It is the laws of the city that he must answer to (50a). Although not mentioned by name, the Athenian lawgiver the "wise Solon", stand above the multitude as one capable of doing great things, and thus as one to be heeded.

Solon was no longer alive and could not address Socrates, but the wise laws he established can. The question arises as to the status of those laws and their administration. In more general terms the question is whether the claims Socrates makes on behalf of the laws hold up to critical examination.

I think Socrates gives us reason to think they don't. I will address some of them, but first, if this is right, if the city and the laws are not as just as he makes them out to be, why does he think it is still his duty to obey them?

And if we have no better arguments to offer at the moment, then rest assured, I shall not go along with your plan …

46c

Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we?

In fact, one should either not beget children at all, or else face the difficulties of rearing and educating them.

(45d)

This should be compared to what, in Socrates words, the city claims regarding education and rearing. It may seem like a minor point but it has direct bearing on the question of what his responsibility to the city is based on the claim of what it is responsible for.

We could go round and round again and again, but I won't.

Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour. — RussellA

One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain.

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour. — RussellA

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that:

...if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

(293)

When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain.

As noted in my full quote (now underlined): — Amity

It bears repeating and underlying. It will come up again. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of philosophy then and now relies on knowing how to navigate through the dangers.

Who are those 'best people'? The wise? — Amity

I think Socrates might say, those who wish to be wise and live toward that end through thoughtfulness and moderation.

Are they more likely than the popular majority to carry out the greatest good? How much influence do they have? (philosophers?) — Amity

Neither the philosopher nor the people are able to carry out the greatest good, but only the philosopher takes seriously the question of what the greatest good is.

As what we are doing makes evident, Plato continues to have a great deal of influence. Some might say that this is to the detriment of philosophy, but others see it as a way for philosophy to once again find its way.

Don't the majority also have a sense of morality and justice? — Amity

They have opinions and assume they are right and true.

Ah, but wait...is this teaching is only for those already deemed 'the best'...? — Amity

It is a self-selective process. Most have no interest or patience to work through the arguments, and so, if they do have this interest and are of moderate temperament will match with my suggestion above about who the best people might be.

Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others. — Amity

But given what has happened to Socrates, he should be. Crito makes this point:

But, Socrates, surely you can see that it is indeed necessary to care about popular opinion? The very situation we are now in demonstrates that, if someone is discredited in their eyes, the multitude can do harm, not only on the smallest of scales, but well-nigh the greatest harm of all.

(44d)

Socrates' concerns lie elsewhere:

I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them.

@frank Perhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration

(44c)

might discern through careful reading and interpretation.

In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.

Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity.

Interesting, then, we can ask about whether he lives up to his name. — Amity

He accepts Socrates' speech on behalf of the city without question. But it does raise questions.

... at my age ...

Note Crito's response. He does have some capacity for discernment:

But, Socrates, other men of your age have been overtaken by similar misfortunes, yet their age does not free them from being troubled over their predicament.

(43c)

Commentators have speculated as to why Socrates did not defend himself at trial. One common explanation has to do with his advanced age.

We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view — frank

Speaking on behalf of the city Socrates raises the problem of the relationship between the city and the family as well. I will hold off saying more until we look at that speech more closely.

... it seems perfectly reasonable to Crito and his friends that Socrates should reject the judgement and run. — frank

This is complicated by the fact that he was given the opportunity to do go under the law but rejected that option.