Surely you don’t think Jim Jordan was bodyslamming people on the house floor, or that when he says Guillianni is a fighter, Rudy is handing out uppercuts to other lawyers. — NOS4A2

That is the point. What it means for Jim Jordan and Rudy Giuliani to fight is not the same as what it means for an angry mob to fight to prevent the certification of an election on the day and place when that process was taking place.

I think you know this and that is why you have avoided addressing my questions.

What is at issue is what Trump meant by those words. The situation in which he said those words is part of the linguistic context. See linguistic context:

Context is "a frame that surrounds the event and provides resources for its appropriate interpretation". It is thus a relative concept, only definable with respect to some focal event within a frame, not independently of that frame.

and this:

Contextomy refers to the selective excerpting of words from their original linguistic context in a way that distorts the source's intended meaning, a practice commonly referred to as "quoting out of context".

Trump uses the word “fight” numerous times in that speech. You can pick any one of them and we can try to discern whether he was being literal or figurative. Take your pick. — NOS4A2

In order to discern whether he was being literal or figurative he need to do the very thing you are attempting to avoid. When he says:

Jim Jordan and some of these guys, they're out there fighting. The House guys are fighting.

That means something different than telling an angry mob who had falsely been led to believe that the election was being stolen and they had to do something at that moment. And so, once again:

In what other way could the Trumpsters heading to the Capital have fought like hell? How else would they have attempted to "stop the steal"? Were they going there to "primary"? At that point in time how would "peacefully and patriotically mak[ing] your voices heard" be fighting like hell? What are the "very different rules" he told his followers they are allowed to play by as they fought that day? — Fooloso4

For instance, one of Jack Smith’s indictments abuses contextomy to an almost comical degree:

Finally, after exhorting that “we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore,” the Defendant directed the people in front of him to head to the Capitol , suggested he was going with them, and told them to give Members of Congress the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country — NOS4A2

This is a good example of you doing what you accuse others of. Context matters. In what other way could the Trumpsters heading to the Capital have fought like hell? How else would they have attempted to "stop the steal"? Were they going there to "primary"? At that point in time how would "peacefully and patriotically mak[ing] your voices heard" be fighting like hell? What are the "very different rules" he told his followers they are allowed to play by as they fought that day?

There is a significant difference between the rallies you cite and what Trump stood up on stage and encouraged his followers to do. You have not provided any evidence that those who protested against Trump were:

Clinton operatives paid to incite violence. — NOS4A2

Once again Trump and the Trumpsters are the innocent victims who did nothing wrong.

...rally-goers were getting beaten and berated by protesters, rioters, and Clinton operatives paid to incite violence. — NOS4A2

What evidence do you have of this?

... all divined from a mugshot and nowhere else. — NOS4A2

Nowhere else?

It is not clear whether your blindness and ignorance is feigned, willful, or as with so many Trumpists, an inability to see below the facade.

The mugshot attests to the power of images. How much time did Trump spend before his gold-plated mirror working on this latest image? And his followers have bought into it, in some cases literally. I don't know what he imagined this image would convey, but that is part of the power of images.

What I see is the image of a petulant old man/child wearing the latest shade from his changing make-up pallet and dyed comb over hairstyle, trying to put the orange man image in the past.

Although this in not the image he wants to convey, it is still successful in so far as the focus is on the image and not what lies behind the mask.

As the author Megan Garber puts it in the article quoted:

one more opportunity for brand building.

It will be interesting to see to what extent he will attempt to make the trial another brand building opportunity.

quote="NOS4A2;833962"]The persecution of one’s political opponents[/quote]

In that case why is it that other political opponents are not being "persecuted"? Why is he the only "innocent victim"? The thing is, this is not a good look for him. It makes him appear to be weak. The martyr is a role he is only willing to take so far. It is, however, a role his followers embrace because Trump has told them that they are the victims, and they believe they need a powerful leader like him to right the wrongs they suffer. They see every threat against Trump as a threat against them.

Their concern, like Trump's, is not for the fate of democracy, but their own personal advantage.

Does that makes sense? — NOS4A2

NO.

The prosecution does have the burden of proof. We do not. There is, for example, no burden for us to trust someone we suspect of being a con man until we are able to prove his guilt.

If we are on the jury the presumption of innocence means that we should decide whether someone is guilty on the basis of the evidence presented, not on whatever it is we may presume.

One standard that applies to those who prosecute in courts, but to no one else. Only they should presume innocence. Only they require the burden of proof. — NOS4A2

Are you claiming that those who are prosecuting should presume he is innocent? How does that work? Should they not look for or present evidence of his crimes because he cannot be guilty because he is presumed innocent?

Are you claiming that since we are not prosecutors we should not presume he is innocent?

One standard that applies to everyone including Trump.

Yup. That is why I said that NOS is conflating "much talk" with the judicial process.

The presumption of innocence means he has the right to defend himself against the charges in a court of law. That is exactly what is happening.

You seem to be conflating "much talk" with the judicial process. The presumption of innocence does not mean that he does not have to defend himself against the charges brought against him. It will be up to the court and not "much talk" to reach a determination as to whether he is innocent.

First, it must give an account of what fact it is
(about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not
quus. — frank

Here I think he is simply wrong. My mental state and whatever my meaning might be has no bearing on how to properly add numbers.

If our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), but can be explained in terms of training and conformity to standard practice, then what remains of the skeptical problem? — Fooloso4

It is reassuring to know that we have saved addition from Kripke's skeptic ... at least for the time being.

That there is no fact about which rule you were following. — frank

If what is being done is in accord with addition then it does not matter which rule one thinks they are following.

The fact that Kripke is able to make a distinction between addition and quaddition means that there is in fact a discernible difference. No arbitrary rule imposed under conditions that do not occur should lead to skeptical confusion.

It just so happened to favor one candidate, one party, some people, some states, at the expense of the rest. — NOS4A2

Yes, it just so happens that allowing more citizens to vote and have their ballots counted may favor one candidate. Trump's fear was that in this case it would favor Democrats, but that is how this representative democracy works.

So if up until we get to this number, which as far as we know no one has ever encountered, there is no discernible difference between plus and quus and puus. The practice is the same. What then is the skeptical objection?

He's asking for a fact that shows you've actually adhered to this practice as opposed to the practice of quaddition. — frank

As long as we are dealing with quantities less than this imaginary number that has not been dealt with before, then there are a multitude of rules we might invent that we could say are being adhered to. It is only when we encounter this number that we can say say that what follows is or is not arithmetic, for the rules of arithmetic do not allow that two positive integers added together will be less than either one.

There is more than one sense in which we say someone is following a rule. If I if I ask a child what the rule of counting is more than likely she cannot state a rule but will simply demonstrate how it is done by counting.

The challenge is to point to some fact — frank

...our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), — Fooloso4

...there was no rule following. If you disagree, he's asking you to prove it. — frank

Kripke's skepticism is based on his assumption that there must be some fact independent of and other than the fact of the practice of addition.

Wittgenstein's solution to the paradox at PI 201 is that addition is a public practice. Rather than Kripke's appeal to what addition means to an individual or what her intention is or how he interprets it, there is simply the rules of arithmetic that are applicable to all numbers.

201 ... For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the
rule” and “going against it”.

That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.

Kripke poses the challenge:

Who is to say that this [quus] is not the function previously meant by '+'? (9)

The answer is simple: the rules of arithmetic. We either follow them correctly or we do not. When Kripke substitutes 'quus' for some cases of '+' he in not substituting one expression of a rule for another. Quus has no place in the rules of arithmetic. Kripke or his skeptic is not interpreting or misinterpreting the rules of arithmetic, he is disregarding them.

If our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), but can be explained in terms of training and conformity to standard practice, then what remains of the skeptical problem?

The argument presented holds for divine absence and non-existence as well.

How best to work with and cultivate a rebellious, anarchic, and anti-methodical temperament? — Moliere

I have developed a method for that ...

Seriously, I'l start with a point of clarification: by cultivate I mean manage, that is, not allow it to grow or increase uncontrolled.

Touching on the question raised by @Tobias, the dialogic nature of philosophy means that one should not simply accept or reject the work of the philosophers, but rather to remain open to what they might teach us, and to the possibility that there may be questions without answers and problems without solutions.

My thinking reflects my character or temperament and includes the idea that rather than attempting to exclude such idiosyncrasies they should be recognized and admitted as being at the heart of what philosophy is for me. This is not to say that they should be accepted as whatever they are, but rather as material to work with, to alter and develop. The goal is not some abstract ideal of universal objectivity but self-knowledge.

Here I would emphasize the productive aspect of knowledge - to make or produce. We must work with what we have. The question arises as to how best to work with and cultivate my rebellious and anarchic, anti-methodical temperament.

What is 'free and open enquiry'? — Tobias

It is a kind of play that is not determined in advance by how one should play. Some might object that wandering about is not productive, but where one might go and where it might lead and what one might find along the way has its own beauty.

In my opinion the attempt to start with a method is antithetical to philosophy. It raises a whole host of questions, including - Why a method? Why this method and not some other? If a method guides and shapes the inquiry then how confident should we be that this method does not occlude free and open inquiry?

To start at philosophy one should.... — Moliere

Philosophy is a social activity, but who do you keep company with? Even keeping company with books can be a social activity. More often than not, an author writes in order to be read, even if they are selective with regard to who the intended audience is. The dialogic nature of philosophical writing is not always apparent. Even if the author is not able to respond, a text can be interrogated, and the best philosophers often anticipate our questions and objections. The circle extends to other readers as well, and takes different forms including teacher/student relations, secondary literature, and more recently online forums.

As to the question of whether books are necessary, I know of no prominent philosopher at any time who did not read or hear the work of other philosophers. They do not simply read in order to know what others think but in order to think along with and against what they read.

I'm contemplating a thread about Davidson's project. It would be a long one. — Banno

I encourage you and anyone else familiar with Davidson to do this.

Academic incestuousness diminished. — jgill

Yes, I agree. Cross-fertilization and interdisciplinary approaches are promising against ossification and border protection fortifications.

From Wittgenstein's Zettel:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts. We do not have the concepts we have because the facts are as they are, but if the facts were not as they are our concepts would not be as they are.

The closing remark refers to Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Elsewhere he says:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

If we look at species as kinds then we construct our picture of the world, or some aspect of it, in accordance to it, and attend to those facts that conform to this way of looking at things. But if we regard the differences between species as a matter of degree or variation then we begin to take into account facts that were previously overlooked or disregarded. We begin to see not only species but a great many other things differently. There is no fixed, unchanging order to life.

What are we to make of the following?:

Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).

Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging.

Malcolm tells the following story

In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.

so you would find philosophy's distinctiveness in the idea that it has a poetic admixture, whereas science does not? — Leontiskos

I am questioning the notion that philosophy has a distinctiveness that holds throughout its changes. What may be true of one philosopher may not be true of another.

There is a great deal more agreement in science, but I think some scientists are poets in the same sense that some philosophers are; they are makers of images and concepts. Of ways of seeing.

What distinguishes philosophy from science is, I think, changing again. I cannot say what that will look like though.

The dialectic is not presented as the best path from Alpha to Omega. It is presented as better than the alternatives,. — Paine

In the Republic and elsewhere there is diminution from what is simply best to the best we can do and obtain. From the truth itself to what in the absence of knowledge are likely stories. And to emphasize this difference unlikely stories as well.

The dialectical movement in the Republic can be seen in the rejection of the first city that Socrates establishes in speech. Glaucon objects. It is too austere. In response Socrates allows for certain "luxuries". The best city is one man is unwilling to live in.

The best city is unnatural. Certain accommodations must be made to man as he is. This raises the question of whether there is a nature or natures of men, and how this is to be determined. Tellingly, Socrates presents a lie about man's nature.

Dialectic itself is presented in the Republic as if the method of hypothesis could free itself from hypothesis. This stands in contrast to the story of the direct apprehension of the Forms themselves by imagined philosophers who possess the wisdom actual philosophers desire but do not possess.

Socratic philosophy straddles the line between poetry in the ancient sense and science in the modern sense. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are modern practitioners of this way of doing philosophy. To the extent that this is true it is clear that science cannot take the place once held by philosophy.

This may be important for a few reasons:

Two prominent conservative law professors have concluded that Donald J. Trump is ineligible to be president under a provision of the Constitution that bars people who have engaged in an insurrection from holding government office. The professors are active members of the Federalist Society, the conservative legal group, and proponents of originalism, the method of interpretation that seeks to determine the Constitution’s original meaning.

It is important not only for Trump's campaign, but for Federalist Society, conservatism, and the constitution,

Theory of anamnesis / myth of anamnesis. Potato potato? I don't think so. How we interpret a theory is not how we should interpret a myth. But whether this is a myth or theory requires a deep dive that I won't undertake here. In my opinion, and I am certainly not alone here, the dramatic situation in which a dialogue takes place should not be ignored. In the Theaetetus, a dialogue about knowledge there is no mention of anamnesis. It does play a role in the Meno where someone who seems to be completely lacking in virtue asks if it can be taught. And in the Phaedo where Socrates attempts to charm his friend's childish fears of death and deal with the problem of misologic in the face of philosophy's inability to give an satisfactory account of death, which leads Socrates to appeal to myths.

Do you have citations pertaining specifically to the fact that this knowledge had to have at some time been gained directly? — Pantagruel

It is not spelled out. That is characteristic of Socratic philosophy. There cannot be an infinite regress in which what is recollected was not a some time first learned.

I don't want to get too sidetracked so will keep this brief.

The myth of anamnesis requires having at some time previous to this life learned what is in a later life to be recollected. In this earlier life knowledge could not be recollection. However this knowledge was gained it was not by recollection.

Without reincarnation there can be no anamnesis or recollection. If, as Socrates claims in the Phaedo, the human soul is immutable then how can we make sense of the idea that it can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)?

Accepting that Socrates' soul is immortal is not the same as accepting that Socrates is immortal. Plato addresses this problem in terms of number. If the soul is one thing then the body is another. Is Socrates then some third thing?

In the Charmides Socrates suggests that wisdom is knowledge of what you know and don't know.

Our lack of knowledge of knowledge is at the heart of the problem of knowledge.

But I haven't quite figured out what it has to do with this thread. — Leontiskos

The question of the thread is about whether philosophy is still relevant or, as you suggest, whether it ever was. Bacon is instructive with regard to the question of the pull of philosophy, for here we can see a change in the direction in which philosophy pulled the world.

This movement includes a change in what philosophy itself is. Philosophy became not simply for the improvement of the philosopher but for the improvement of mankind. Philosophy's own self-transformation continues with Kant's Copernican Revolution and Hegel's shift from timeless truths to thinking in time.

As to the question of whether philosophy is still relevant we can look to where it has been in order think about where it might go. In other words, the current state of philosophy is not the whole of the story of what philosophy is and will be. Right now the movement of philosophy includes a looking back. But this is not simply a matter of seeing what was that no longer is. The way forward includes a movement back. For there are prescientific ways of thinking and seeing and being that science occludes. Questions and problems of life that science does not address.

I think the scientific revolution was fueled by advances in mathematics.

Aristotle sums up the ancient position on knowledge when he says that all men naturally desire knowledge. Bacon marks the position of modern philosophy when he declares that knowledge is power.

Certainly there had been scientific and technological advances, but nothing on the scope of the scientific revolution.