Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. — Sam26
Well, do you believe 12x12=144? — Sam26
38. Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the 'inner process' or 'state' and ask "Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?" What
is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions.
39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely
reliable, as certainly correct.
42. ... To think that different [mental] states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.
179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.
245. So if I say "I know that I have two hands", and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can't do that, for my having two
hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: "That I have
two hands is an irreversible belief."
I say, "I have hands," that's a belief. — Sam26
10. ... it is only in use that the proposition has its sense.
"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false? — Fooloso4
I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well. — Fooloso4
The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant. — Fooloso4
You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands". — Fooloso4
It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not? — Sam26
You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. — Sam26
10. Then is "2x2=4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? "2x2=4" is a true proposition of arithmetic ...
I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind. — Sam26
Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics. — Sam26
Many human concepts family resemblance categories rather than classical concepts (Aristotelian). — javi2541997
Aristotle is using categories to discover differences, whereas Wittgenstein is using categories to discover similarities — RussellA
I understand now that language categories are listed for searching similarities instead of differences. — javi2541997
Concepts in the mind pick out categories in the world — javi2541997
In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.
Where do family resemblances exist - in the mind or in the world — RussellA
67:“ Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relation ship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our con cept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread— namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres.”
Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different — Fooloso4
Furthermore, the existence of the particulars is neither strictly in the mind nor in the world. It is in the relational practices that make linguistic meaning dependent on the enacting of material configurations through our engagement with the social and non-human world. — Joshs
If Wittgenstein is in fact either an anti-realist or idealist, where there is no mind-independent world, then as for Wittgenstein the meaning of a word is in its relation between mind and world, and as for Wittgenstein the world exists in the mind, then it follows that for Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word must also exist solely in the mind. — RussellA
One need not post mind as having an ‘inside’ that can be distinguished from an outside. — Joshs
There are other ways of thinking about the relation between mind and world than in terms of the binaries realist vs anti-realist or empiricist vs idealist. — Joshs
There are other ways of thinking about the relation between mind and world than in terms of the binaries realist vs anti-realist or empiricist vs idealist.
— Joshs
What other ways are you thinking of, of how the subjective mind of colours, pains, fears and hopes relates to the objective world of rocks, mountains, supernova and gravity. — RussellA
“Realism is the view that science aims to provide theories that truthfully represent how the world is--independent of human categories, capacities, and interventions. Both realists and antirealists propose to explain the content of scientific knowledge, either by its causal connections to real objects, or by the social interactions that fix its content; the shared presumption here is that there is a fixed "content" to be explained. Both scientific realists and antirealists presume semantic realism--that is, that there is an already determinate fact of the matter about what our theories, conceptual schemes, or forms of life "say" about the world. Interpretation must come to an end somewhere, they insist, if not in a world of independently real objects, then in a language, conceptual scheme, social context, or culture.”
By contrast, a postmodern view of science rejects “the dualism of scheme and content, or context and content, altogether. There is no determinate scheme or context that can fix the content of utterances, and hence no way to get outside of language. How a theory or practice interprets the world is itself inescapably open to further interpretation, with no authority beyond what gets said by whom, when…. we can never get outside our language, experience, or methods to assess how well they correspond to a transcendent reality
“We must now show that its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as empiricism itself. Both take the objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object. Both keep their distance in relation to perception, instead of sticking closely to it.
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