If A justifies B, presumably the truth of A justifies B. I don't know what could count as a justification that could not be put into propositional form and take a truth value. — Banno

If I say "the key is on the desk" what proposition justifies it? I might say that I left it there I might add that no one has been in the room. That keys do not just disappear. In the end the only thing that justifies it is not a proposition but finding the key on the table.

When Wittgenstein says:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

It is not only that propositional justification is not necessary but that a proposition cannot serve as justification.

I can't see how any of the multiple quotes count against the contention that Wittgenstein held the proper use of "know" to involve justified true belief. — Banno

Must the justification for a belief that is true be in the form of a proposition?

When you claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy, that means that all breakings of the Law are blasphemy. — Leontiskos

Complete nonsense! It seems more than a bit desperate. There are a great many laws in Judaism. Only a few of them are punishable by death. This like arguing that since breaking some laws in US jurisprudence are punishable by death that means that all breaking of the law is punishable by death.

You are now on my ignore list. — Leontiskos

Thank you!

This is simply playing with an equivocal usage of "divine." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you have it backwards. It is not playing with an equivocal usage. The term itself is equivocal.

Jacob wrestled with a divine being. (Genesis 32:24-30) The being is called a man, but:

Jacob called the place Peniel, saying, “It is because I saw God face to face, and yet my life was spared.

(30)

This being is often regarded as an angel. Man, God , Angel? Divine or of the divine? Is what is of the divine in some sense also divine?

One thing that should be noted is that unlike in Christianity Judaism is not bound by official doctrines.

With regard to the nature of Jesus, a distinction is made during the conflict addressed at the Council of Nicaea between apotheosis and divine ousia.

I think it quite easy for pagan followers of Jesus to regard Jesus as a god. After all, Caesar and humans are called both divine and gods.

I take your point that some Jews either modified or rejected the Jewish teaching but, according to Mark 12:29 he recited the Shema:

Hear, O Israel; The Lord our God, the Lord is one.

and called it:

The first of our commandments.

Paul, however, who preached to the gentiles said:

yet for us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things came and through whom we live.

(1 Corinthians 8:6)

Two points here: He distinguishes between God from whom all things came, and Christ through whom all things came. Jesus is not God. He is not the creator. The one Lord is not the one God.

Seeing as in the visual sense? Or seeing as something the mind does, as in "I see your point." — frank

Both and more. Some things I posted in prior discussions. This in no way meant to be comprehensive:

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an aspect”.

114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience.
— Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment



111. Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

He goes on to say at 116:

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. - So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

The idea of seeing something according to an interpretation blurs the line between seeing and thinking. "Now I see it" can mean, "Now I understand". Seeing is not limited to passive reception, it involves both perception and conception.

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

The focus on propositions can occlude the importance of seeing for both the early and latter Wittgenstein. Seeing connections involves making connections and seeing things in light of this perspective.

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value)

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

what do you think is being overlooked about Wittgenstein's thoughts? Nothing? — frank

The central importance of seeing.

Good example.

I asked you to defend it and you gave a non sequitur argument. Now you are finally admitting, albeit quietly, that you were wrong: — Leontiskos

You have a noxious habit when you are unable to understand the scope of an is of accusing me of a a non sequitur argument. The Law includes Torah, Mishnah, and Talmud. To break the Law is not limited to infractions. The accusation of blasphemy is not limited a claim of divinity as you eventually go on to admit:

Jesus gets accused of blasphemy for doing things like ... teaching and reinterpreting the Law "with authority," — Leontiskos

To say that Gentiles need not follow the written Law, is a grievous example of breaking the Law.

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy. — Leontiskos

Evidence?

The historicity of the gospel narratives has been questioned by scholars, who suggest that the evangelists' accounts reflect the later antagonism that arose between the Church and the Synagogue.

(Wikipedia, Sanhedrin trial of Jesus)

I pointed to the problem of historical veracity in an earlier post.

So we agree: your earlier claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy is false. — Leontiskos

Absolutely not!

People who steal, that is a desecration of God's name.

(On the Other Hand: Ten Minutes of Torah - What Is Blasphemy, Anyway?)

Now there might be so disagreement between rabbis, but interpretation and disputes over interpretation are part of the Law. So, both the violation of at least some of the Laws as well as rejection of the Law fall under the accusation of blasphemy.

What is your conclusion here supposed to be? That Jesus is claiming that anyone who is human can forgive sins? Do you even believe yourself when you make these sorts of points? — Leontiskos

You ask what my conclusion is then put words in my mouth, as if this is my conclusion. Another example of arguing in bad faith. If you had waited form my answer I would have told you that it not just anyone. Once again, Jesus, according to the Gospels is not just any man.

The appropriation of Daniel works against you.As pointed out above: The Aramaic phrase bar enash means human being. The is no decisive evidence in Daniel that Jesus is this man . Whoever the man is, he was given authority, glory and sovereign power by the Ancient of Days. So again, not just any man, but a man none the less.

No, just in general. Is there something you think is being lost? — frank

In a remark to Drury Wittgenstein says :

Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things that look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: ‘I’ll show you differences.’

Connections often obscure differences. When differences are taken into account the problem of what this guy is saying and what it means is compounded by what that guy is saying and what it means.

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost.
— Fooloso4

Do you think that's happening here? If so, what's getting lost? I'm asking. — frank

Do you mean by referencing Hume? No, not as it stands.

And does he maintain this position despite his later arguments? That's kinda the point. — Banno

Yes. There is a direct through line with propositional analysis on one side and in the Tractatus' showing/seeing on the other, plus form of life in PI, plus doing/acting ("In the beginning was the deed.") in OC.

How is "look closer" propositional justification?
— Fooloso4
It's not. Again, that's the point. — Banno

I don't think that is the point. Looking/seeing stands over/against/ beside propositional justification. A few of many examples:

PI 66. ... look and see whether there is anything common to all ... [emphasis in the original]

To repeat: don’t think, but look!

And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small.

PI 122 A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation [übersichtliche Darstellung] produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous [durchsichtig] view of the foundations of possible buildings. (CV, p. 7)

(I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)

(Zettel 461)

hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

And yet, in 3 and 7 he gives examples of things he knows without giving propositional justification.

By the way, I agree that whether Wittgenstein dislikes Hume is bedsides the point.

The point about texts as a whole is a general point regarding interpretation. For example, if an author says one thing and then another that seems to contract it, we need to pay attention and see it the seeming contradiction can be reconciled.

Trouble is, this text is not a whole. It is an incomplete process, a work in progress. Sam26 and I have pointed this out repeatedly. — Banno

And as I responded: where does this leave the reader? And:

The act of thinking, both for the writer and the interpretive reader, takes place without sight of the finish line. There may, in fact, be no finish line.

and:

It is within the space and tension of interpretive uncertainty that we engage the text, whether it is a completed whole or not.

If he says "x" and then a few pages later seems to contradict this, you might try to explain this away by claiming that the text is incomplete, but this seems to me to be a way a trying to avoid the problem.

No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno

How is "look closer" propositional justification? It is not about the proposition of looking closer but the act of looking closer.

Notice that (7) does not include the word "Know"? — Banno

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there ...

Neither of these count against what I have said. — Banno

I will respond one more time then drop it.

What you said is:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

How does using "know' only in situations where there is a explicit justification that can be given in the form of a proposition fit these cases?

The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. Taking a chair or shutting the door points to the fact that in doing these things we show that we do not doubt their existence. No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door.

I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. — frank

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost. If there is something unique about it that should not become part of a homogeneous whole.

I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, — frank

Well, its not individual words, its a matter of interpreting the text as a whole This is not the only approach. Is not yours. I have no problem with that and have read some interesting books and articles that take this approach.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. — Banno

How else might your claim that:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

be understood? I admit that I might have misunderstood you but you have not given any indication of how this is to be understood if not in a straight forward way.

In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7.

You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. — Banno

I don't think it counts against what you said. I think that it avoids the issue raised by 3 and 7. Unlike 10, they are examples where the term 'know' is used but no explicit propositional justification is present or needed.

Also:

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre").

Here is your argument:

Speaking against the Law is blasphemy.
Therefore, To break the Law is blasphemy. — Leontiskos

I have given textual evidence that speaking against the Law is regarded by the accusers as blasphemy. Have you forgotten your claim that:

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy. — Leontiskos

or are you just trying to bury it?

As to the second point. What I said was:

the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. To break the Law is blasphemy. — Fooloso4

It is not simply a matter of breaking the Law, as it every offense however minor would be a blasphemous offense. What is at issue destroying or abolishing the Law. (Matthew 5:17)

When you say:

Jesus gets accused of blasphemy for doing things like ... reinterpreting the Law "with authority," or forgiving sins.These are all the unique prerogatives of God ... — Leontiskos

you are making my point for me.

...the Jewish mind is characterized by a verse like John 11:51. — Leontiskos

Was the author of this a Jew? A rabbi? An expert on "the Jewish mind"? A proper characterization is captured in the oft told joking expression: two Jews and three opinions.

The subtlety ... What is blasphemous for others is not blasphemous for him./quote]

This is about as subtle as getting hit in the head with a sledge hammer. That any man "has God's prerogatives" would be regarded as blasphemous by the Jewish leaders. But even if the Christians believed this, it does not mean that Jesus or his Jewish disciples believed he was not a human being.
— Leontiskos

"I, in my uniqueness as the Son of man,* can forgive sins, and to prove it I will cure this paralytic." — Leontiskos

Again, you make my point. A son of man is a human being.

In the notes to the New International Version of Daniel 7 it says:

The Aramaic phrase bar enash means human being.

Young's Literal Translation has son of man. Other sources confirm that bar enash means human being .

This not to contest what you said. My preference when interpreting a text is not to bring other texts into it. It adds another layer of questions. I don't know how Moore might have responded, or what Wittgenstein thought of Hume's contention if he was aware of it. It just makes it cleaner.

From a chapter on Hume and Wittgenstein in "Impressions of Empiricism" Oswald Hanfling says:

Wittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of’.

link

Reading aaaaaalllllll the way to the end of your huge post it would seem that you are in agreement that Wittgenstein denies that Moore knows, while citing an argument that Wittgenstein did not appeal to.

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know

Then do it. Defend either of those two claims. — Leontiskos

Apparently, you are trying to walk back your claim that:

You are making things up left and right — Leontiskos

You are doing everything you can to distance yourself from that claim.

Acts, as quoted and referenced, says that Stephen spoke blasphemous words against Moses and against God. To speak blasphemous words against Moses means to speak against the Laws of Moses.

In Luke we find:

The Pharisees and the teachers of the law began thinking to themselves, “Who is this fellow who speaks blasphemy? Who can forgive sins but God alone?”

(5:21)

Jesus response is:

But I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.

(5:24)

This is fully in accord with what I said above:

the term 'divine' did not mean that someone who was called divine is a god, but rather has an important relationship to God. A son of God, for example. — Fooloso4

You seem to have missed the larger picture. The Gospel accounts are not historical accounts. They are polemical. They accuse the Jewish leaders of bearing false witness, including charges of blasphemy. And, as is evident in Acts, this meant blasphemous words against the Law. The division between the Jewish followers of Jesus and those who came to be known as Christians who did not follow the Law begins with Paul. Acts is attributed to Luke, who was Paul's companion. The accusation of blasphemy, according to this story was false. To bear false witness is not to give an accurate historical account.

I just finished listening to PBS "On the Media". They were discussing this. Pool, Rubin and others claim that they did not know the money for their propaganda platforms was coming from Russia. But this much is clear - they made a lot of money and it is not difficult to trace it back to the source. But why look a gift horse in the mouth when it is offering you so much money, even if it is a Trojan horse?

Regarding the question of how much influence they have :

Forbes is a good place to start:

Benny Johnson, who has more than 6.6 million followers across YouTube, X and Instagram, was described by the Washington Post in 2015 as the "king of viral political news”

The host of the "The Rubin Report” YouTube channel with 2.45 million subscribers as of Thursday

Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification... — Banno

And yet you say:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism. — Sam26

Yes, but how much? A house does not support its foundation (248). The axis (152) is not a foundation and is not in need of a foundation.

Feel free to defend either of these two claims. The second claim is more truly <It was considered blasphemy to claim to be the messiah>. — Leontiskos

I point to sources that support what you claim I made up, The fact is, I did not. If you were arguing in good faith you would admit that. I would accuse you of arguing in good faith when you made the accusation, but giving you the benefit of doubt it could have simply been ignorance.

My post began:

First, the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. — Fooloso4

This is true. The term means, as quoted above, reviling God. Convicting Jesus for blasphemy is not evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity. See, for example, Acts 6:11:

Then they suborned men, who said, We have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses, and God.

According to the commentary at Bible Study tools:

... that is, against the law of Moses, and so against God, who gave the law to Moses, as appears from ( Acts 6:13 ) the blasphemous words seem to be, with respect to the ceremonial law, and the abrogation of it, which Stephen might insist upon, and they charged with blasphemy; see ( Acts 6:14 )

Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. — Banno

That can happen when you ignore parts of the text that have direct bearing on the issue. Rather than identify the propositional justification at 3 and 7 you ask about 10, as if what is true in one case must be true in all

But let's look at 10:

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!

This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'. What is at issue is the occasion on which this proposition "I know" is used, not a proposition that justifies it.

Your claim again was:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification?

... one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible.

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. — Sam26

So, cultural relativism?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930609

You are making things up left and right, and I see no reason to reply to such bizarre and unsubstantiated ideas. — Leontiskos

Let's go point by point:

1.From My Jewish Learning

Blasphemy means reviling God. In Hebrew it is known as birkat hashem, literally “blessing [euphemism for cursing] the Name [of God].” The one guilty of this offense is called a megaddef (blasphemer) ...

It is, however, none too clear what exactly is involved in the offense. Does it mean to insult God, or does it mean to curse God?

According to the Gospels of Matthew (26: 63-6) and Mark (14: 53-64) Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on a charge of blasphemy, but New Testament scholars have puzzled over both the question of the historicity of the event and the precise nature of the offense.

Then the whole assembly rose and led him off to Pilate. 2 And they began to accuse him, saying, “We have found this man subverting our nation. He opposes payment of taxes to Caesar and claims to be Messiah, a king.”

(Luke 23:1-2)

To subvert the nation is to deny its laws. The second part supports what I said in 4.

2. [As it turns out Jews also sometimes thought that a human could become divine. [/quote] Bart Ehrman

3.

Towards the end of the accounts of all four canonical Gospels, in the narrative of the Passion of Jesus, the title "King of the Jews" leads to charges against Jesus that result in his crucifixion.

(Jesus, King of the Jews -Wikipedia)

This also helps explain why the Roman authorities would get involved. Jesus vs Caesar.

4. See 1 above.

You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno

Do the examples cited require propositional justification? If so, what is it?

His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. — Sam26

I agree, but when he says, as you quoted:

At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded .

It is analogues to the axis of our propositions at 152:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

and:

248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

But, of course, as he knew quite well, a house does not support its foundation. The point is, there are no indubitable foundations.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing.

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational. — Sam26

Anti-foundational foundations?

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy.* Someone who does not understand the Jewish context of the New Testament should presumably start there. — Leontiskos

Good advice. Let's look closer:

First, the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. To break the Law is blasphemy. Jesus claimed to have fulfilled the Law. The Jewish authority did not agree. Much of what he did could be considered breaking the Law. Clearly the question of the Law was of central importance. Second, the term 'divine' did not mean that someone who was called divine is a god, but rather has an important relationship to God. A son of God, for example. Third, is the political problem. A "king of the Jews" would have authority over the Jewish leaders. This is not something they would accept. Fourth, related to the others, is the claim to be the Messiah. The Messiah is divine but is not God.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

Let's look at a few examples:

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. Looking and seeing does not require propositional justification. But, of course, as he knows, "look closer" does not satisfy the skeptic who questions the existence of what is seen.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

Sit. Open the door. It is in such cases a matter of acting and doing not of saying. We know how to sit or open doors, but knowing that there is a chair or door in not a matter of knowing how. Justification does not even enter the picture.

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre"). And "I
knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't
there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition
(like "I believe") but between me and a fact.

This is related to 3: "look closer".

The passage continues:

So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.

This is the source of modern skepticism. What Descartes calls the problem of judgment.

20. "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the
existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist.

This is what Moore misses. If one doubts the existence of the external world then one would doubt the existence of something in that world - a planet or a hand. A theory of perception inserts itself" between me and a fact", leading to doubt and the demand for justification

Except the fact is he did not say this.

Rather than getting hung up on statements like "here is a hand", I think it would have been more effective to follow the example of Zen Master Lin-chi and hold out his hand so the skeptic could see it and then smack him.

This was his method of dealing with those:

... clinging to words, clinging to phrases ...

Empirical facts are fluid, they can change their truth value. — Joshs

How does this relate to the fact of our having been on the moon or having hands?

It is his treatment of his certainty as an empirical fact rather than as a tacit commitment to a set of practices that hold together facts. — Joshs

His having a hand is a commitment to a set of practices? The fact is, he either has a hand or he does not. This may be "fluid" in so far as his hand might be cut off, and then the fact is he doesn't have a hand any longer.

There are practice which involve having or using our hands, but this is not a commitment to a set of practices. The practices follow the fact that we have and use hands. Without hands the set of practices would no longer exist.

It is not one or the other, either the fact "alone" of landing on the moon "or" the system underlying the fact. We would remain doubtful if we were not made aware of the fact and we would remain doubtful if it could not be justified within the system

As to Moore, it is not his certainty that is at issue, but whether this is an adequate response to the skeptic. Unless someone has a prior commitment to some philosophical position that puts it into doubt, the response to Moore saying "this is my hand" would be to be as certain of it as he is. My dog does not require a system underlying the fact that this is my hand:

359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

That this is a hand is in no need of justification. No need for a system of convictions underlying that fact.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].

467. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a
tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This
fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."

At 108:

If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.

Much had to change within the system for it to be certain that someone has been on the moon. This includes having landed on the moon and our being aware of it. It the moon missions had been kept secret we might know that the science had changed enough that it might be possible but there would still be good grounds to doubt that anyone has ever been on the moon.

It is not either the fact or the system of grounds underlying the fact.

riverbed’s bedrock ( what is. beyond doubt) — Joshs

Saying the riverbed's bedrock is not the same things as saying:

The riverbed is bedrock. — Joshs

I suspect that his use of the river analogy intentionally points back to Heraclitus. He says, for example::

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

The mythology is our world picture (95). That the riverbed of thought can change back into a state of flux means that it is not entirely stable or unchanging. It may not be doubted at some given point in time, but consider his example of being on the moon. It was not too long ago that the proposition: Man has never been on the moon, was beyond doubt. Although there are still some who doubt it, it is part of our scientific world picture that man has been on the moon. It is beyond doubt that we have been there. As before it was beyond doubt that we were not.

Of course they are true or false. Wittgenstein isnt denying this. — Joshs

Right, Wittgenstein is not, but you said:

hinge propositions, forms of life and language games are neither true nor false. — Joshs

If the only example he gives of a hinge propositions is true, then at least some hinge propositions are true.

The riverbed is bedrock. — Joshs

Bedrock is not made partly of sand:

OC 99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand ...

The spade may turned when digging in a river-bank, unless it hits a rock, but a rock is not bedrock.

The river-bank analogy refers to empirical propositions (96), Bedrock occurs once (498) and refers to what is beyond doubt.

Where does this article discuss mathematical propositions?

The riverbed is not bedrock. It changes, sometimes slowly and other times rapidly. The axis around which a body rotates is not bedrock and is not held fast by bedrock.