I take "working on oneself" to be an ethical admonishment--work on changing your acts rather than somehow altering (or understanding) our perception (as phenomenology wishes); that philosophy for Witt is not about seeing in a new way, but, to use this re-framing, realizing what we can expect from interpreting and seeing, say, by finding the limit of what they (and we) can and can not do. — Antony Nickles

I agree that there is an ethical aspect to working on oneself, but how one sees things is a prominent and recurring theme for Wittgenstein. Beginning with his 1914-1916 he connects ethics and aesthetics:

The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between art and ethics.

The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them,the view
sub specie aeternitatis from outside.

In such a way that they have the whole world as background.

Is this it perhaps — in this view the object is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time?

Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak.

(The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole logical space.(NB 83)

And in the Tractatus:

Ethics and aesthetics are one. (6.421)

To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.

(6.45)

If the ethical view, the view from outside, changes your acts, it is as a result of how one looks at the world rather than how one acts within it.

we do not "conceive things" — Antony Nickles

His analogy with architecture should not be ignored. Throughout his writings we also see the recurring use of terms related to building and construction. The German term 'Auffassung' translated in the quote as "interpretation" means conception. In the revised edition (Blackwell, 1998) it is translated 'conception'.

The connection between perception and conception is also discussed in “seeing as”. He has a great deal to say about the conceptual involvement with perception. The way we see things involves the framework we see them in as well as the context we put them in as part of a larger picture. This picture is to a large extent culturally inherited but not immutable.


Although not what is at issue in 126:

For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

with regard to interpretation of Wittgenstein and something hidden:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest. (CV 7-8)

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.
...
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. (Philosophical Investigations, 90)

By the possibilities of phenomena he means the various ways in which we can see things. This is connected to what we say about things, that is, the way we conceive things. This includes our misunderstandings, which limit the ways in which we can see things. They must be cleared away.

Such clearing is preparation for what may grow:

I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. … Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV, 36)

He gives an interesting example of possibilities of phenomena:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a new true theory but a fertile point of view. (CV 18)

His concern is not novelty for the sake of novelty but with what a new way of viewing things can allow us to see.

The clear lines of distinction in the Tractatus between seeing and saying no longer holds. They are not separate but interrelated:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) (PI 122)

It is not simply a matter of what is seen objectively, but of the person looking:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value, 16)

His concern, however, is not with phenomenology as a method or discipline:

53. There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems.
(Remarks on Colour)

The additional statements from 126 should be examined:

For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

The first refers to what he calls the "subliming of logic", that is, to certain assumptions about language, the acceptance of which makes it seem as though an explanation for the connection between thought and reality is required.

101. We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal 'must' be found in reality. Meanwhile we do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this "must". We think it must be in reality: for we think we already see it there.

102. The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background -- hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something.

103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. -- Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

107.The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. -- We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!

108. We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. -- But what becomes of logic now? Its rigor seems to be giving way here. -- But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear? -- For how can it lose its rigor? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigor out of it. -- The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination around. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

The second, philosophy as what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions, is a matter of taking the glasses off, of dispelling the preconceived idea of the crystalline purity of logic.

119. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery.

120. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is another one to be constructed?—And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!

In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.

Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us?—Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask!

And your scruples are misunderstandings.

Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.

You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The
money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)

Some of the limitations of philosophy are the result of questionable assumptions about what philosophy is and does. There is more to philosophy than rational discourse. The imagination was of central importance to Plato and Wittgenstein as well.

What we see is not simply a matter of passive receptivity. The making of images, both mental and visual, is a way of seeing. The images on the wall of Plato's cave and Wittgenstein's "seeing as" or conceptual seeing, are a combination of something given and something imagined.

The play of images in Plato is more than it seems to be. Like two mirrors facing each other there is an endless reflection of reflections within which the reader plays a part. The use of images is one reason why Plato was interested in Geometry. It is also one reason why he often resorts to myths, both those that existed and those he created.

The dichotomy of seeing and saying continued from the beginning to the end of Wittgenstein's writings. The creative expression of language expands upon his earlier understanding of language as propositional, and both what is seen or pictured, including the frame, moves from the transcendent to the more mundane.

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, fo it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (PI 115).

I think I summed up my position vis-а-vis philosophy when I said: Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry. (CV 28)

Do not forget that a poem, although it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information. (Zettel)

Is this a useful approach ? It seems not to provide us with much. — Tom Storm

As Wittgenstein is using the term 'concept' he does not mean a rational construct, but rather, pictures of how things are. Such concepts do not provide a rational explanation, but rather, present ways of seeing things. Rational or scientific concepts stand in the way.

The expression "It is God's will" is taken to be an acknowledgement that we cannot know why things as they are. To posit a rational God you acts according to reason is to misunderstand this. It is also an acknowledgement that we are not in control.

One could read later W as a potential ally of theism in some way, right? — Tom Storm

In some ways both the earlier and later Wittgenstein are allies of theism, but in a way that is in line with what I pointed to in a previous post about "possibilities of phenomena". What he is doing clearing the ground to open up a way of looking at things. Tractarian silence is just such an opening up. But he is not an ally in the sense of providing arguments to demonstrate the existence of God.

Is there any way of conceptualizing transcendence outside of the tropes of idealism, higher consciousness, contemplative traditions or god/s? — Tom Storm

If by conceptualizing transcendence you mean a rational concept, then this is what Wittgenstein is struggling against. He retains a sense of mystery, wonder, and awe of life.

I wasn't aware that W had shown the way out of theism or matters connected with higher consciousness. Thoughts? Did he not just 'fly over' them? — Tom Storm

I want to address this again in a way that might be clearer. He did not address the question of God as a matter of fact, but rather, conceptually. He did not attempt to confirm or deny the existence of God. His concern is with how the concept of God can play a role in our lives.

He says that the way to solve the problems of life is to change the way you live, but he seems to question man's ability to do this on his own. He calls on faith to bring about this change. Philosophy, it would seem, is incapable of bringing this about:

But here we need something to move you in a new direction - (I.e.this is how I understand it.) Once you have been turned around, you must stay turned around.
Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. (CV 52)

His attitude is on the one hand pragmatic, but on the other, from his early to his late work there is a desire for transcendence.

To him that overcometh ... — ZzzoneiroCosm

The question is, what is it that is overcome? It is not the self, but rather external forces.

We may regard it as simple-minded and perhaps as a matter of avoidance -"the devil made me do it", but have we gone too far in the other direction by making the self the locus?

I wasn't aware that W had shown the way out of theism or matters connected with higher consciousness. Thoughts? Did he not just 'fly over' them? — Tom Storm

In a passage that has often been overlooked he says:

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. (PI 126)

Elsewhere he says:

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a transparent view of the foundations of possible buildings. (CV 7).

His concern is with "possibilities of phenomena" (PI 90). The possibilities of phenomena are not determined by either the facts of nature or of mind, but by our concepts. Much of Wittgenstein's work was an attempt to free us from the ways of representing things that hold us captive. This is an attempt to understand the grounds on which an alternative to science can be established.

... the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life. (CV 85)

What is important about the concept of God, what God means, is a matter of how the concept is used. How the concept is used means not only how it is used within the context of one's life but also how the concept of God can be used to change one's life.

The paradox that Wittgenstein could not resolve is that in order to be saved one needs the certainty of faith, but such faith comes about only through redemption. To be saved requires that one must first be saved.

What problems do you see Wittgenstein dissolving? — Jackson

He regards philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusion. By clearing up the language he shows the way out of the fly-bottle.

Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. (Philosophical Investigations, 90).

You might say that a strictly psychological interpretation requires the elision of constrictive theological and mythological content. — ZzzoneiroCosm

When the content is theological and mythological an interpretation that ignores them is empty.

Your view that my interpretation is a deformation is clear to me. You just said it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That is not my view. My view of what is at issue is not limited to the problems I see in your interpretation.

If you like: I've rewritten John's Revelation. That doesn't trouble me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That does not trouble me either. As long as there is clarity regarding what is going on.

Open up chapters one and two of the KJV and ctrl-F the word overcome. His chorus of overcomes I take to be a call to self-overcoming. — ZzzoneiroCosm

These statements are not about self-overcoming. I found four mentions of overcoming in Chapter 2.The first (2:7)refers to the Nicolaitans (2:6), who were a revel Christian sect. The second (2:11) refers to (2:11) the devil (2:10). The third (2:17) also refers to the Nicolaitans (2:15). The last (2:26) Satan (2:24).

To read it as a metaphor is to render it impotent.
— Fooloso4

This is a claim with no factual basis.

A metaphor about the Apocalypse does not have the same psychological consequences believing what is foretold. People do not fear a metaphor or change their life because of something that they do not believe will actually happen.

make explicit – problematize – this horizon. — 180 Proof

Many regard problematizing as the problem with philosophy. As if, if they were of any worth they would solve problems. A case could be made that this is what Modern Philosophy set out to do.

Instead of solving problems Wittgenstein attempts to dissolve them. I will leave open for the moment the extent to which he succeeded.

Your view is fine, but it doesn't interest me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It is clear that you have no idea what my view is.

I would ask the same question with regard to any text. It is not a matter of theology, but of how you read a text and the relationship between them. Does the text get lost when reading becomes a form of writing?

So,rorschach test?

If your preoccupations are theological ... — ZzzoneiroCosm

.

No, my interest is hermeneutical. Why start a thread on an influential theological text only to deform it and try to make it into something it is not?

You don't have to be faithful to a poem. You can dissect it and twist it until it's something useful to you. — ZzzoneiroCosm

By dissecting and twisting you end of with something that no longer resembles the thing you started with.

A "psychological reading" is ambiguous. Your reading seems to reflect more on you and your preoccupations then on John's experience or the psychological impact of his vision on centuries of readers.

This is not a theology thread. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You might want to avoid a theological discussion, but I do not see how the text can be read that way without ignoring what is actually said:

To him who loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood, and has made us to be a kingdom and priests to serve his God and Father—to him be glory and power for ever and ever! Amen. (1:5-6)

First is the claim of the lack of agency. It is not what we do or have done, but what has been done for us. Next is what we are to do, which is, to serve God.

Chapters 1-3: A plea for self-overcoming, self-transcendence — ZzzoneiroCosm

What evidence of this do you see? I see a good deal about repentance, but nothing about self-transcendence. To the contrary:

And I hold the keys of death and Hades.

“Write, therefore, what you have seen, what is now and what will take place later. (1:18-19)

Rather than self-overcoming and self-transcendence it appears to be about obedience and being saved in what is and will happen. The scope here is not the individual but the world.

submits to a psychological reading — ZzzoneiroCosm

What does this mean other than to impose an interpretation on the text that is not faithful to it?

The destruction of the earth read as metaphor — ZzzoneiroCosm

To read it as a metaphor is to render it impotent. One might still find it inspiring, but the force and magnitude of what is claimed is lost.

The limits of philosophy -
What is it that philosophy can and cannot do?

Argument -
What is the goal of argumentation?

I agree with Nietzsche regarding the importance of taste for one's philosophy.
— Fooloso4

I do not understand what you mean. — Jackson

Your preference for Aristotle based in part on your finding Plato too romantic I take to be a matter of taste.

Ok, but not my point. — Jackson

Arrogance is not simply a psychological problem, it is a philosophical problem, it has an influence on our thinking.

In the myth of the cave, Plato is describing silhouettes, not images. — Jackson

The cave is said to be "an image of our nature in its education and want of education". (514a)

The shadows on the cave wall are referred to as images. The shadows on the cave wall are also referred to as images. An image is a likeness. We can often tell what a thing is by seeing its shadow because the shadow is a likeness. The cave dwellers mistake these shadow images for the things they are images of. Understandably because all they have ever seen is images or likenesses of things, not the things themselves.

The "image makers" include those who shape public opinion. Homer', for example, gives us images of those who are brave, just, and noble. These images are, for many taken to be what it means to be brave, just, and noble. The poets also gave them their images of the gods, and again, they are not taken to be images but who and what the gods are.

No, words are not images. — Jackson

They are not visual images although something like the image of the cave continues to lead us to create our own images.

Arrogance. A psychological problem. — Jackson

For both Plato and Aristotle psychology or matters of character are not separate from but rather a part of philosophy.

I am more Aristotelian. Plato is too romantic and false for me. — Jackson

I agree with Nietzsche regarding the importance of taste for one's philosophy.

And as an artist, Plato's bashing of images is offensive. — Jackson

This must be considered in light of his pervasive use of images.

Socrates acted in accordance with what seemed to him to be just, but was willing to change his mind given an argument he found persuasive or evidence that he was wrong.
— Fooloso4

That seems pretty normal. — Jackson

But not of one thinks they already know what is and is not just.

Is it not also knowing the kinds of questions and matters you are unable to answer or resolve easily for yourself or others? — Tom Storm

I think so. When I was teaching, many students, like Socrates interlocutors,became confused and were aware of their ignorance. But, of course, they were not thereby made as wise as Socrates.

False modesty. I know what I know and act on it. — Jackson

Well, it is not false modesty in so far as he attributes ignorance to all of us.

Have you ever changed your mind about anything you regard as just or unjust?

There are many who make the same claim about knowing and acting who claim to know and act on things contrary to you.

Socrates acted in accordance with what seemed to him to be just, but was willing to change his mind given an argument he found persuasive or evidence that he was wrong.

I don't find that inspiring. — Jackson

Plato took the problem of inspiration very seriously. Countless people have been drawn to philosophy through Plato's myth of transcendence. Only it would be far less convincing if it were presented as a myth instead of something closer to an initiation into mystical knowledge. That it is a myth is something that many reject. They see it either as a wrong theory or the truth itself.

My criticism of Plato is that he reduces the universe to knowledge claims. That the universe itself is a form of knoweldge. — Jackson

I do not think he reduces the world to knowledge claims, but rather, he gives us reason to be skeptical of such claims. The problem is what he calls in the Phaedo, misologic, a hatred of reasoned argument, a form of nihilism. It is to guard against this that he tells stories of transcendent knowledge.But for those who look more closely, he also points to the inadequacy of the Forms.

I have discussed this

Here

and

Here

and elsewhere, including my commentaries on Phaedo

and Euthyphro which is also germane to the problem justice and acting on assumed knowledge.

I don't find that inspiring. — Jackson

Which do you think is preferable, to think you know what you do not know or to know you are ignorant?

How does one experience the forms? — Jackson

You don't.

I can know particular things about justice, but how does one experience the form of justice? — Jackson

Hence Socrates profession of ignorance,

Nirvana fallacy? — Agent Smith

I'm not sure I know what you mean. Despite the mythology of transcendence in the Republic, the Phaedo, and elsewhere, I think Socratic philosophy is grounded in the world of everyday experience.

If we're uncertain about something do we need to confirm this uncertainty, or 'hold it to be true', to ourselves? — praxis

What does it mean to confirm one's uncertainty? Confirm that you are uncertain? Attempt to eliminate the uncertainty? There are many things about which I am uncertain for which the uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Some of those things seem to be more likely to be true than others.

The expression of belief is nothing more than a sign of solidarity with fellow "believers" ... — praxis

This may be true with regard to some beliefs for some people but not others. There are beliefs that are matters of opinion. There are varying degrees with which one may hold those opinions.

... and a shared uncertainty is a leash, allowing yourself to be led like a dog. — praxis

Again, this may be true with regard to some beliefs for some people but not others. Without greater specificity this discussion becomes rudderless.

As per the Oracle of Delphi and Socrates, the quiddity of wisdom is awareness of (one's own) ignorance. — Agent Smith

I think there is more to Socratic ignorance than simply knowing or acknowledging that you are ignorant. The examined life is an inquiry into the question of how best to live in the face of ignorance of what is best.

First, you say that believing expresses uncertainty and knowing expresses certainty, but then say that believing can express certainty. — praxis

The latter is the result of the failure to make the distiction of the former.

There is also the fact that what we know can turn out to be wrong, and in those cases are we actually only believing when we think that we're knowing? — praxis

Right, but as you say, in such cases we only believe that we think we know. The distinction is maintained.

I carefully avoid believing anything at all. — Ken Edwards

Is this not an expression of what you believe about believing, that is is better to avoid believing?

To believe is used in distinction from to know. What I believe may turn out to be wrong. It expresses a tenuousness, a lack of certainty. It differs from a claim of knowledge.

It is when this distinction is not made, when one equates believing with being absolutely, indubitably certainty, that believing becomes dangerous.

My apology if there was offense based on my misunderstanding. — Jackson

I appreciate it, but no apology necessary. Disagreement is standard practice in philosophy. I learned long ago that it is a mistake to take such things personally.

No, in the Physics, formal cause is "eidos" or "morphe". You are wrong that it is ousia. — Jackson

I did not claim that ousia is the formal cause.

Ousia just means being or a thing. — Jackson

Which is what I actually said, several times. Except that the question of being qua being is of primary concern in the Metaphysics.

In the long history since those terms were used to translate 'ousia' they have gained various meanings that should not be attributed to Aristotle.
— Fooloso4

I believe you are just wrong. — Jackson

Which part? That 'essentia' and 'essentia' are Latin terms used to translate 'ousia' or that these terms have accrued other meanings?

I must be missing the point. — Jackson

Indeed, that is still the case!

Where I am from, using wiki to debate philosophy would get you laughed out of the room. — Jackson

Translation of terms is not philosophy, it is a well documented matter of fact. There are, however, philosophical consequences.

Wayfarer asked:

Could you say that Aristotle's later theory of essence and substance is foreshadowed here? — Wayfarer

Aristotle did not use the terms 'essence' and 'substance'. In the long history since those terms were used to translate 'ousia' they have gained various meanings that should not be attributed to Aristotle.

You say:

The Latin is wrong. By "essence" Aristotle means "form" or "shape." (eidos or morphê) — Jackson

Aristotle did not use the term 'essence'. It is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Ousia, the term used by Aristotle, does not mean eidos or morphê. They are three different terms that have some overlap but have different meanings.

It was translated into Latin as 'substantia' and thence English as 'substance' but it has a completely different meaning in philosophical than in everyday discourse. — Wayfarer

@Jackson

From the Wike page on 'ousia':

There was no equivalent grammatical formation in Latin, and it was translated as essentia or substantia. Cicero coined essentia and the philosopher Seneca and rhetorician Quintilian used it as equivalent for οὐσία, while Apuleius rendered οὐσία both as essentia or substantia. In order to designate οὐσία, early Christian theologian Tertullian favored the use of substantia over essentia, while Augustine of Hippo and Boethius took the opposite stance, preferring the use of essentia as designation for οὐσία.[4][5] Some of the most prominent Latin authors, like Hilary of Poitiers, noted that those variants were often being used with different meanings.[6] Some modern authors also suggest that the Ancient Greek term οὐσία is properly translated as essentia (essence), while substantia has a wider spectrum of meanings.

As Plato believes that the objects of reason have a greater degree of reality than those of sense, then they must have something unchangeable as their object. — Wayfarer

Well, he certainly makes an argument in favor of this, but that is not the same as believing it. The Forms are posited as hypotheticals. A hypothetical does not have a "greater degree of reality" then sensible things. In various dialogues Plato gives us reasons to doubt the adequacy of the accounts of the Forms.

I discuss some of these problems

Here

and

Here

Could you say that Aristotle's later theory of essence and substance is foreshadowed here? — Wayfarer

The term essence (essentia) was a Latin invention used to translate Aristotle's Greek ousiai, or substance. Substance oressentia is the “the what it was to be” of a thing. His answer was not that what it is is a Form.

But zetetic skepticism is not the claim that total comprehension is not possible, but simply that it is not something that anyone possesses.
— Fooloso4

I do not see the difference. — Jackson

The zetetic skeptic, unlike some other skeptics, does not deny the possibility of knowledge, claiming only that we do not know. Nor is it the suspension of judgment, but rather leaves open the possibility that we might be wrong about our judgments. It relies on what seems most likely, but remains open to revising these judgment about what seems most likely.

Although things are said to be images of Forms, the Forms are themselves images. A kind of philosophical poiesis.
— Fooloso4

Then reason depends on the imagination. Something which Plato spends his entire career denying. — Jackson

The Republic is clear about the limits of reason (dianoia). It does not grasp each thing itself in its singularity (noesis), but always as it is in relation (ratio) to something else.That is to say, it makes use of likenesses (eikasia). Plato repeatedly points to the use of images for mathematics

I think we are generally in agreement.

Plato was a sceptic. — Jackson

It is important to distinguish Socratic skepticism from other types, both ancient and modern. It is zetetic - it proceeds by way of inquiry based on the knowledge that one does not know.

An aporia is because you believe a total compression is possible — Jackson

An aporia is an impasse. If, as in the Republic, there is a movement from hypothesis to knowledge, an aporia represents the failure of that movement. But zetetic skepticism is not the claim that total comprehension is not possible, but simply that it is not something that anyone possesses. The problem this raises, as described in the Phaedo, is "misologic" (89d-e). With the failure of logos Socrates turns to mythos. In terms of the image of the divided line in the Republic, it is recognition of the importance of eikasia, that is, the use of the imagination and image making.

Although things are said to be images of Forms, the Forms are themselves images. A kind of philosophical poiesis. What it seems must be if there is to be knowledge of things such as Justice, Beauty, and the Good.

The fact that Plato situates the dialogue at the time when Socrates was young suggests that the whole of the Socratic dialogues that take place after this early meeting were informed by the problem of the Forms raised in Parmenides. This is not to be understood historically but rather as a literary device. These are not problems that only occured to Plato at around the time Parmenides was written but rather that the problem of the Forms informed his writing of the dialogues from the beginning.

That the Forms are hypothesis should be understood in light of what is said about hypothesis in the Republic. They are "stepping-stones and springboards" (511b). They are intended to free us from what has been hypothesized. In the Phaedo Socrates calls the hypothesis of Forms “safe and ignorant” (105c).

Given all the problems with the Forms we might ask why Plato did not just abandon them. Plato gives us the answer in Parmenides: One who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (135b8–c2). Something like the Forms underlies (hypo - under thesis - to place or set) thought and speech.

The problem is, despite the mythology of transcendence in the Republic, we cannot achieve transcendence through dialectic. This is why the dialogues frequently end in aporia. What is at issue is not simply the problem of Forms but the problematic nature of philosophy. It raises insoluble problems.

Nietzsche's political philosophy is an inversion of Plato's. Both are concerned with the politics of the soul, and in that sense works of psychology. For both Plato and Nietzsche the question of who is to rule is of central importance. For both Plato and Nietzsche the question of slavery in addressed in light of the problem of self-mastery.

Plato's concern was the education of the just soul . Nietzsch(e's is the education of the individual. Plato's concern was the creation of harmony out of conflicting desires. Nietzsche's concern was the creation of the individual who maintains strife, internal enmity rather than harmony.

For Plato although it appears as though the harmony of the soul and the harmony of the city gives us a picture of justice, the fact is that the just city is full of injustice. Nietzsche's soul in internal strife seems to lead to a troubling picture of the city full in internal strife, but strife cannot be eliminated nor is it desirable to do so; for it can only be accomplished through totalitarian suppression which is not harmony but a false image of harmony. But this is not to say that all claims are equal. Like Plato, Nietzsche hold to a hierarchical ranking. For both, the philosopher is "commander and law-giver". (BGE 211) And this is to be understood with regard to the politics of the soul.

A few quotes from Wittgenstein:

Sometimes a sentence can only be understood if it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly.

I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down the speed of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly. (As I myself read.)

In philosophy the race goes to the one who can run slowest—the one who crosses the finish line last.