I like this one from Wittgenstein

Work on philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24)

It is probable that as the eyes are fixed on astronomy, so the ears are fixed on harmonic movement, and these two kinds of knowledge are in a way akin, as the Pythagoreans say and we, Glaucon, agree ...

we'll inquire of the Pythagoreans what they mean about them ... (Republic 530d-e)

It isn't these men I mean but those whom we just now said we are going to question about harmony.
They do the same thing astronomers do. They seek the numbers in these heard accords and don't rise to problems, to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which are not, and why in each case. (Republic 531c)

The numbers in the heard accords are the ratios of the octave, fourth, and fifth. Knowledge of harmonic movement is not auditory, in is intelligible, it is knowledge of the ratios. What all harmony, whether it is music or parts of the soul or body or city, has in common is proper proportions of the parts or elements. It is not just a mixture or an ordered arrangement, it is a properly proportioned arrangement, one with the correct ratio of parts.

Simmias says:

... the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)

The tuning is not the thing that is tuned. The tuning is the octave, 4th, and 5th, the ratios according to which the strings of a lyre are tuned. Analogously, the tuning of the parts of the body too is in accord with the proper ratios. Again, the tuning should not be confused with the body that is tuned.

I don't think this is quite what he is saying. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what he says:

“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

“... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease.” (95d)

“Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul.” (105c)

That is the problematic perspective further analyzed to a great extent in the Timaeus. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether or not the perspective is problematic is not at issue in the Phaedo.

To say that there is a body first, and then life is put into it is not consistent with our observations of living things. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet, that is what is said. You are trying to do two different things at the same time. On the one hand, you argue about what the text says, and on the other reject what the text says without distinguishing between the two.

To deny that there is a Form Harmony is arbitrary. The term is used in different ways with regard to different things. Here, given Simmias' analogy, musical harmony must not be ignored. Harmony itself is not the harmony of a particular lyre. The ratio of frequencies exists independently of any instrument. The octave is 1:2, the 4th is 4:3, the 5th is 3:2. It is not just the sounds that are harmonious. In the Republic he says that these numbers are harmonious. (531c) These are things known to the intellect, not to the senses. There are of a Kind distinct from their opposite, Dissonance.

Right, each part needs to be ordered, — Metaphysician Undercover

Socrates does not claim that the soul orders [each part of] the body [to be as it is]. [The soul does not cause the parts of the body. The soul does not take an undifferentiated mass and make fingers and hands and the other parts of the body]* The soul, according to his argument, brings life to the body.

*Bracketed statements are edits.

[His response to Simmias' argument is that you can't have it both ways. You can't have both the soul existing before the body and the soul being a harmony of the parts of the body.]

Do you think that the parts just happen to meet up, and decide amongst themselves, to join together in a unity? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your version of the clock makers argument is not found in the dialogue.

The problem is with the active/passive relation. — Metaphysician Undercover

The hypothesis is problematic. As he says:

I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)

He does not, however, reject the Forms hypothesis, he affirms it. Beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. It follows from the hypothesis that harmonious things are harmonious by the Harmonious.

The source, or cause of activity must come from the Idea, or Form, rather than from the particular thing — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. In this case the Form would be Harmony. Just as a beautiful body is beautiful by the Beautiful, the harmonious body is harmonious by the Harmonious.

We can proceed from the premise of "harmony" to a need for something which directs and orders the parts ... — Metaphysician Undercover

First, there is no need for something to order the parts. If you assume that the parts together need to be ordered, then each part would also need to be ordered because each part of the body has an order.

Second, in accord with Socrates' notion of Forms something is beautiful because of Beauty itself. Something is just because of the Just itself. Something is harmonious because of Harmony itself. Beauty itself is prior to some thing that is beautiful. The Just itself is prior to some thing being just. Harmony itself is prior to some thing being harmonious. In each case there is an arrangement of parts.

The question is, why did Socrates avoid his standard argument for Forms? It is an important question, one that we should not avoid.

These two ideas, that there is such a thing as the soul, and that each part of the body is itself a "self-organizing" entity, is what Socrates demonstrates are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is what he argues against. He does this by changing the terms of the argument. His argument is based on a pre-existing soul, something that is not part of Simmias' argument.

The argument leads to the conclusion that the soul must be prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover

Just the opposite. Immediately prior to Socrates' refutation, Simmias says that he has been persuaded that:

“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

Socrates points out that the two premises are incompatible:

But it is necessary that you have different opinions as long as this thought of yours sticks around - that a tuning is a composite thing and a soul a sort of tuning composed of bodily elements tensed like strings. (92b).

He then asks:

“But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.”
(92c)

Simmias chooses recollection and a pre-existing soul. All of Socrates' arguments follow this premise.

When the logic tells you that the soul must be the cause of the body ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Nowhere does Socrates claim that the soul is the cause of the body. He says that the soul is the cause of life in the body. An arrangement of parts is not the cause of those parts that are arranged.

I see an ontological distinction between humans and animals - not on account of 'special creation', as I fully accept the evolutionary account of human origins, but because of the ability of the human to see beyond the sensable. — Wayfarer

I see it first as a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind, and second as a difference that grew considerably due to the power of conceptual thinking, which is not simply a matter of difference in capability but of cultural history, In other words, the difference expands not simply because humans are different but because of the power of conceptual thought which develops as a second nature.

I have started on that, courtesy of your previous recommendation. — Wayfarer

Not an easy book but one well worth the effort.

My remarks about Plato and 'this secular age' were not directed at you in particular, it's a general observation. — Wayfarer

Understood. I agree with you that we always bring our own assumptions to our reading of the text. I also think that the Platonic dialogues allow us to examine our assumptions.

I understand that our interpretations are at odds, but I have appreciated the opportunity of explaining my approach. — Wayfarer

I appreciate that our differences can be discussed respectfully.

In Socrates' culture, belief in the soul was generally accepted, so was axiomatic, one might say. — Wayfarer

Cebes later calls this assumption into question. (70a)

'Dead soul' is an oxymoron. — Wayfarer

It is, that's the point. Based on the argument that the living come from the dead. He skirts around the problem:

the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died ... living people are born again from those who have died ... living people are born from the dead

. If the soul was alive then it would not be true that living things come from dead things.

Stepping outside the framework of strict textual intepretation, consider that the concept of 'equal' represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. — Wayfarer

Does it? If so then more and less and same also represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. Only it may not be so abstract. It is something that can be seen. It is a practical skill. Primates can count.

Number, on the other hand, is not composed of parts (or any parts other than numbers) and neither goes into or out of existence (hence, 'imperishable'.) — Wayfarer

See Jacob Klein's "Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra". Number for the Greeks was always an amount of something. It is the count. It tells us how many.

I take this to mean that although snow melts, wherever snow exists, it instantiates 'the idea of cold', because it has the form of the idea of cold. — Wayfarer

Right, not only the Form Cold has that name, snow too has the name cold. The question is, what happens to the snow? As it melts it becomes less and less cold.

I accept that many people will find the idea of the soul archaic and anachronistic and that these arguments will fail to persuade them otherwise. Indeed there's a lot of people who think Plato has been superseded, that it's all ancient history. — Wayfarer

I still remember my intro to philosophy class as a freshman. The professor told us the week before that next time we were reading Plato's Phaedo and that it proves the immortality of the soul. I was very much looking forward to the class because this was something that interested me and that I thought was important. I was receptive to the idea but not convinced. When reading the dialogue I thought I might have missed something that would be brought out in class. The next week I was disappointed to find that the dialogue did not do what was promised. When we later read the Republic I was for several years convinced the Forms existed and that through transcendent experience could be found.

I have related all of this in order to show that my reading of Plato was not based on pre-existing opinions. If anything, I was far more inclined toward the discovery of mystical truths.

Saying that the soul is like a harmony, or attunement, is to assume that there is such a thing as "the soul" which is being talked about. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right and this is what Simmias says:

... our soul is as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)

Simmias could have insisted that there is no such thing as the soul, — Metaphysician Undercover

He could have said that if he was denying that there is such a thing as a soul, but he does not deny it. The Pythagorean concept of the soul as presented in his argument is that it is not some separate thing. Cebes and Simmias are said to have "spent time with Philolaus.(61d) It is Philolaus who is the "somebody" who might give the account Simmias does. (85e-86a)

From the Wiki article Pythagoreanism:

The surviving texts of the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus indicate that ... the soul was life and a harmony of physical elements. As such the soul passed away when certain arrangements of these elements ceased to exist.[53]

Therefore the thing which directs the parts is necessarily prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Simmias' argument there is nothing prior to the body that directs its parts. The body is self-organizing.

... which would also be composed of an arrangement of parts, ad infinitum. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, and that is the problem with your argument. Not only do you assume that all the parts together must be arranged, but for the same reason each of the parts individually must be arranged. If the soul arranges all of the parts together what arranges each of the individual parts? It can't be the soul because then the soul would be the cause of the body.

Postmodernism is all about premature portentous pronouncements.

In response to @Wayfarer and the conventional view of the arguments, I would like to briefly go through the arguments and show why they fail.

Before doing so we need to look at how Socrates defines death:

And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by Itself, and the soul's being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? Death can't be anything else but that, can it?(64c)

Simmias agrees. But of course death can be something other than that! Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion, but argument is made that at death the soul is alone by itself. It is simply accepted from the start as a given.

Cebes will soon raise an objection:

... what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. (70a)

Cebes' hope is that what Socrates says is true. Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not? (70a-b)

Cebes' hope is based on the truth of what Socrates is saying, But Socrates lowers the standard from truth to what is likely.

The first argument is the Cycle of Opposites:

“ … do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.'”(70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. A reborn soul is one that has previously died. It exists in Hades as a dead soul. This is incompatible with the next argument, recollection. The other problem with the cycle of opposites argument is that obviously the living come from the living.

Recollection:

“ 'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

His example of recollection surprisingly has nothing to do with life in Hades or a previous life. There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. It is about what we are reminded of here and now.

Socrates shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”.

Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is dubious. All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal.

“If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born” (76d-e).

But they are, as he says in the second sailing, hypotheses, not things recollected while dead.

Forms:

“ 'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?'” (79a)

Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchanging. More to the point, Socrates talks about such things as the corruption of the soul "polluted and impure" (81b) and the soul of a human being becoming the soul of an ass or some other animal or insect. (82a-b) So, the claim that the soul is unchanging is questionable at the least.

Most important is the distinction between a Form and some thing of that Kind. Beauty is unchanging but beautiful things are not. The Form Soul may be unchanging but it does not follow that Socrates' soul is not.


Sophisticated Cause:

The final argument alters the hypothesis of Forms "safe but ignorant" (105b-c)

And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true.” (106a)

But it is not true. The snow does not retreat, it melts. Cold itself may be indestructible but something that is cold is not. Socrates is deliberately conflating Form and thing. The same holds for all other things. It is not the Form Life that causes something to be alive, it is the soul that brings life with it that causes body to be alive. At the approach of Death the soul, being a thing rather than an indestructible Form, does not retreat. Like the snow it perishes.

The failure of the arguments does not mean that the soul is not immortal, it simply means that Socrates has not shown that it is. He says it is worth the risk of believing that it is, but if the philosopher seeks truth she does not settle for a belief. What the soul is and what its fate may be remains unknown.

turn it around to produce the opposite conclusion — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case he did more than just turn it around. Simmias' argument did not include a separate soul. Socrates does not deal with Simmias' argument because the result would be that the soul does not endure.

Yes, Socrates does argue this. The soul directs the parts — Metaphysician Undercover

Directing the parts does not mean creating the parts. The soul does not cause the body.

The conventional view was that Phaedo presents four arguments for the soul's immortality, and I see no reason to doubt that Socrates believes them to be true. — Wayfarer

Socrates himself is never persuaded by conventional views. If you have followed the arguments yourself and found them convincing and do not think my arguments showing them to be problematic to be convincing then we are at an impasse.

The passage about misologic is simply a warning not to be too easily convinced by false arguments, so as to become cynical. — Wayfarer

The problem is deeper than that. Of course one should not be convinced by false argument, but how do we know which arguments are false?

Phaedo:
“ Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust.” (88c)

Echecrates:
“'What argument shall we ever trust now?” (88d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time.” (90b-c)

From the first part of the last quote one might conclude that having the art of argument is the solution, but the second part indicates that it can be part of the problem.

I have benefitted a lot from this thread, as it has made me pay much more attention the text. — Wayfarer

Glad to hear that. In my opinion, no interpretation is final or definitive.

Socrates doesn't have a lot of time left. He does not seem interested in making some last minute deals. — Valentinus

I agree. It does not seem likely that any of these things are occurring to him for the first time. I think the whole thing is rhetorical. Persuading himself of anything is antithetical not only to a life spent in pursuit of truth, it is contrary to the advice given in the dialogue not to accept any argument about which one cannot be sure.

But Cebes and Simmias are not Socrates. They need something to believe. Socrates' attitude seems to me to be, wait and see. The final irony is that if death is nothing then he will not see.

For Socrates it is not a matter of belief but of trust, that is, not something to be taken as true, but of an attitude toward life, that he will not be harmed.

I quoted this same passage in response to your question about what Socrates believes:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/569248

I think it likely that Pascal's wager is derived from this.

Nothingness is nothing to fear, but it's only one of the possibilities, no more certain than the alternative. — Wayfarer

Right, none of the possibilities are certain, but as far as Socrates is concerned, none are to be feared if one has led a just life. He thinks he lived a just life and so if death means rewards and punishments he is confident he will be rewarded rather than punished. Early on in this thread I tied that to what it might mean for philosophy to be preparation for death. Live in such a way that you will be rewarded rather than punished for what you did in life if, in fact, that is what happens in death.

I bolded the passages in order to dispel the notion that Socrates believes that the soul is immortal.

There are three issues under discussion with regard to Simmias' or the Pythagorean argument for attunement.

1) Simmias' argument
2) Socrates' refutation
3) An argument consistent with the Forms.

Simmias' argument was presented in my last post. The argument consistent with the Forms is neglected:

Things that are beautiful are so, according to the hypothesis of Forms, they are so because of Beauty itself. In the same way, things that are harmonious are so because of Harmony itself. Beauty and Harmony are the cause of things that are beautiful and harmonious. This extends to the human body. It is not the soul that causes the body to be harmonious, it is Harmony.

There is nothing in Simmias' Pythagorean argument about a separate pre-existing soul. Socrates introduces it into Simmias' argument when he reminds Simmias that they had previously agreed that the soul was something pre-existing. But there was no one there to remind Socrates of his own hypothesis of Forms.

He will, however, call the hypothesis of Forms an "ignorant" answer and propose a new sophisticated answer that is much like the sophisticated answer he rejected in favor of Forms. (105b-c)

Now, Socrates' argument is that the soul is what directs the parts in such a way as to be an harmonic arrangement of parts — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not Simmias' argument. Note the following:

For I certainly suppose, Socrates, that you've gathered that we take the soul to be just this sort of thing - that while our body is strung and held together by warm and cold and dry and wet and the like, our soul is as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)

By "we take" he means the Pythagoreans.

The argument is that a harmony, or "attunement", whatever you want to call it, requires a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what Simmias' argument says. And according to Socrates' argument, the soul does not cause the body that is strung and held together by warm and cold and dry and wet and the like

For you which you think that the text offers no real explanation? — Wayfarer

It does. Once again

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b) — Fooloso4

This is the same thing he said in the Apology:

“...to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place .”(40c).

The problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

“Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not.”

It is entirely consistent with the text to think that Socrates' self-persuasion may be, in whole or in part, along these lines.

There is certainly nothing of what we would accept as empirical proof, but that says as much about our beliefs and standards as it does about Socrates'. But he thinks it is 'fitting' - suitable, reasonable - even if it can't be proven to a 'sensible' man. — Wayfarer

First, empirical evidence is not a modern invention. Second, my response said nothing about empirical proof. What I said is that the arguments fail. I also said that this is a matter of the limits of argument. The limits of argument is the central theme of the text, literally occuring at the center.

But he seems, in the end, to believe, himself, in the immortality of the soul, even if it cannot be proven. — Wayfarer

See the following:

I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible.” (91a).

He goes on tho say:

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b) — Fooloso4

Saying that he would be well of believing it is true in case it happens to be true is quite different than saying he believes it to be true.

Simmias says he has some lingering distrust:

“I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the bigness and importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some lingering distrust within myself about what we have said.” (107b)

Socrates responds:

“Not only that, Simmias. What you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses - even if to all of you they’re trustworthy - must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety. And if you sort them out sufficiently, you will, as I think, be following up the argument as much as its possible for human beings to follow it. And should this very thing become sure, you’ll search no further.” (107b)

Socrates is telling them that they should not be so ready to accept what is said as the truth. There seems to be a play on a double sense of human weakness, the limits of human argument and Simmias’ ongoing concern that death means our destruction, that we are too weak to endure. There is a limit we human beings cannot go beyond. That limit occurs at death. The search ends only with surety, but surety cannot be found in life.

And regarding the final myth:

“No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places …” (114d)

To risk the belief is not the same as simply believing.

The one thing that seems certain is that he is not afraid to die.

So, it's your view that none of the arguments succeed? — Wayfarer

Yup. Note that in the middle of the dialogue is the problem of misologic. At 107b Socrates tells them to keep investigating, to not be content with the arguments as they stand.

in formal academic study is a student spending considerable time and effort in developing ideas, only to have them torn to shreds. — Banno

I suppose it is possible but very difficult to make it through while maintaining the belief that you have all the answers.

It teaches one what to do when one is wrong. — Banno

This is a valuable lesson. Some drop out rather than learn it.

So, you don’t accept the idea of ‘the soul as the principle of unity’? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think it is a principle of unity but a physical unity (86c). This answer is rejected, as Simmias points out, because it means that the destruction of the body is death, that there is no separate soul that endures.

Given your concern with division I would think you would make a distinction between the different strangers in the dialogues, terminology that is in one way or another strange, and being strange to ourselves and others. Instead you run them all together.

It is through diaeresis that the Stranger in the Statesman arrives at man as a featherless biped, or, as Diogenes of Sinope would have it, a plucked chicken.

The Stranger does not "succeed" Socrates, he is shown to be inferior. In addition, the Eleatic Stranger of the Statesman is not identified as the same stranger, the Athenian Stranger of the Laws. The Laws is about nomos, laws and customs. The whole project is not undone by something all to human, it is fundamentally about what is all too human.

All of this comes down to the extremely uninteresting claim that he believes God exists. That God does exist has not and cannot be demonstrated, and so, it is is, as he acknowledges something he believes. Until shown to be otherwise God's existence remains a matter of belief, or to state it otherwise, whose existence is contingent upon belief.

One aspect which I wonder about this, is to what extent are people creating identities on social media because the scope for expressing in daily life is so restrictive. — Jack Cummins

I think it is not so much that daily life is so restrictive as that on social media there is little or no restrictions. Who you are can be whoever you want to appear to be. It is not constraints of society but the constraints of reality that can be overcome in part or in whole by the creation of a fictitious self.

We have seen individualism but I think that we are now in a time in which the individual is viwed as being so insignificant. — Jack Cummins

As I see it, there are opposing extremes. On the one hand, those who are intolerant of deviation from what they regard as the norm, and on the other, an obsessive need to assert one's individuality and uniqueness. The former has been with us forever, the latter is a relatively new and growing phenomenon, supported and fueled first by the self-esteem movement and now by social media where everyone can have a platform to talk about themselves in endless and nauseating detail.

The way I do it, at first I pick what kind of life I want to live and then construct a moral framework that supports it. At least I really can't think of any other criteria. — stoicHoneyBadger

That is not at odds with the Socratic way. It is, rather, part of it, what he calls the "examined life". It includes an examination of what you want in life and whether your current life helps or hinders your goals.

Moral framework is supposed to bind & blind people, not be factually accurate. — stoicHoneyBadger

The question is, what is each of us to take or use to build our moral framework.

For example, 100 vigilant Muslims who act in unison would easily take over, probably, 10.000 atheists, who are caught in analysis-paralysis and are unable to act as a group. — stoicHoneyBadger

And what follows from that with regard to how I am to lead my life?

Oneself is what each of us is, but yourself is what no one else can be.

You got Socrates all wrong.

Instincts say - I want to procreate. Logic follows - ok, we would need a mate for that, let's see where we could find one and how could we attract her. — stoicHoneyBadger

Instincts say - I want to procreate. Logic follows - ok, but don't try to procreate with just anyone who comes along.

Let us look at the first principals — stoicHoneyBadger

since none of those questions can be really answered in a definite manner — stoicHoneyBadger

Since none can be answered in a definitive manner none are first principles.

and each of them, of course, believes his world view is the only correct, which is an evolutionary feature, not a bug! — stoicHoneyBadger

But of course they cannot all be right, although they may all be wrong. What are we to believe? Here someone like Socrates plays a crucial role. Not by telling us what to believe but by thinking and analyzing. Starting with the fact that none of these worldviews is instinctual.

From this it could be inferred that you do not want me addressing you. — Gary M Washburn

Quite the opposite! It would be helpful if you would be more specific regarding who you are addressing what you are commenting on.

As I said above:

I am not sure if this is intended as a criticism of what I said or if what I said is being pointed to in support of your claim about how we speak or think or understand each other. — Fooloso4

how do we suppose we understand each other at all? — Gary M Washburn

This is a problem. It is for this reason that I attempt to write simply and clearly, but, of course, misunderstanding still happens.

It's really bogus to suppose there is some lexical field that supports this. — Gary M Washburn

Right, but the possibility of being misunderstood is the condition within which we communicate. I don't think anyone here assumes anything different.

Exactly, but reason only works by division. — Gary M Washburn

That is only half the story (pun intended). Reason does not work only by division.

to ignore the difference meant to be excluded — Gary M Washburn

What is it that you think is meant to be excluded here?

if I take your meaning correctly — Gary M Washburn

You don't. On the one hand, by dividing Socrates into two, body and soul, Socrates himself cannot be found. On the other hand, the arguments for an immortal soul all fail, but further, the idea of an independent soul is incoherent.

The harmony is the effect of, therefore caused by, the appropriate tuning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The harmony is the tuning. The analogy with the lyre is with a lyre that is tuned (86a), not a lyre that needs to be tuned. The organic body is an arrangement of parts. They do not first exist in an untuned condition and subsequently become tuned. A living thing exists as an arrangement of parts. An organism is organized.

This is the key point, what directs the tuning is the mind with some mathematical principles, and harmony is the result, or effect of that direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

The assumption is that the mind or soul exists independently of the body. That is what is in question. All of the arguments for that have failed.

The soul is more like the thing which does the directing, therefore the cause of the tuning, rather than the result of the tuning, the result being the harmony itself, which is produced. — Metaphysician Undercover

The argument proposed by Simmias is that it is neither what tunes or is tuned. It is the condition of a self-organized body.

Do you agree that Socrates' argument is that the soul is more like the thing which directs the parts — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that is the argument, but it assumes the very thing in question, the existence of the soul independent of the body, that they are two separate things. (86c) The attunement argument is that they are not. But Simmias had already agreed that the soul existed before the body. It is on that basis that Socrates attacks that argument. In evaluating the argument we do not have to assume the pre-existence of the soul.

All of which is fraught with often hidden baggage. — Gary M Washburn

All of what? 1) I pointed to an ambiguity that as far as I can tell you did not address. 2) I said this ambiguity was ironic. 3) I mentioned a few ways in which we talk and think about the soul and the self. But your statement was in the singular:

It is not how we speak or think or understand each other. — Gary M Washburn

Do you include your response as being fraught with hidden baggage? Is that comment applicable to language as a whole or to specific unidentified statements in this thread?

But convention has it that holding firm to convictions, or ultimately achieving convictions resistant to critique is a virtue and goal. — Gary M Washburn

That may be, but what is true by convention is not the same as what may be true for all participants in this thread.

I suppose it may seem an irony that I may seem convinced of this. — Gary M Washburn

The irony that I saw was that you talked of understanding each other, but I have not understood much of what you have said and you have done little to clarify. In addition, although you are fond of speaking in generalities, if any of your comments were directed specifically at me, I suspect you have not understood me either.

Claiming this to suggest self-hood as the theme of the dialogue hangs on a pretty slender thread. — Gary M Washburn

It is not that "self-hood" is the theme. In the specific sense what is at issue is what will happen to Socrates, and more broadly what happens to us when we die, what will happen to me myself and you yourself. It is addressed in terms of the soul rather than the self, of a part rather than the whole. Comparing the analysis of the soul in the Republic and Phaedo points to the problem.

It is a dangerous matter, too, to assume Socrates is ever serious about drawing conclusions, other than to discourage them. — Gary M Washburn

I think that Socrates was a zetetic skeptic. I also think that he was aware that this could be a dangerous attitude for most people.

It is not how we speak or think or understand each other.↪Fooloso4 — Gary M Washburn

I am not sure if this is intended as a criticism of what I said or if what I said is being pointed to in support of your claim about how we speak or think or understand each other. There is an irony here.

How we speak includes those who say that we are a soul, and those who say we are physical bodies, and those who say the self is a social construct, and so on.

The dialogue opens:

You yourself

And in response:

I myself

The dialogue is about what happens to oneself, or, more narrowly, Socrates himself. The question “what counts as oneself?” is never asked. Rather than Socrates being treated as ‘one’ he is immediately divided into two, body and soul. Socrates is neither a body or a soul, but it would be wrong to regard him as some third thing. By division one becomes two, and by addition two becomes three. Either 1 (body) + 1 (soul) = 1 (self) or 1 +1 = 3 (some third thing which is a combination). There is something wrong with this arithmetic (arithmos). There can be no proper count or account without identification of the unit of the count.

The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death, but in doing so Socrates can no longer be found.

That Socrates should be identified with the soul alone rather than the whole of him is shown to be problematic.

The supposedly immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

Either the soul of ants and donkeys are immortal and so it is not Socrates’ soul but a soul that is now Socrates’ and previously and latter not Socrates’ that endures; or Socrates is at various times an ant or donkey or some other animal. Or a god. Only in that case it is no longer immortality that distinguishes mortals from the immortals.

The consequence of the attempt to save Socrates by dividing him into soul and body is the destruction of the unity that is Socrates. No coherent account can be given because of the failure to properly identify the unit of the count, that is, Socrates himself.

There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues. — Valentinus

Good point. The artisans are one of only a few groups that Socrates allows knowns anything.

There is no such thing as "more or less in tune". Either the waves are in sync or they are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't want to get too far off topic but there is 'just temperament or intonation', 'equal temperament or intonation'. With fretted instruments such as the guitar all tunings are a compromise so that most chords with sound good wherever they are played on the neck. Some electronic guitar tuners allow for 'sweetened tunings'. There is an old joke when tuning: "close enough for rock and roll".

See this article on ancient tuning methods: https://ancientlyre.com/blogs/blogs1-f324d18b-4152-49e5-aa3c-6539ac974916/posts/ancient-tuning-methods

The problem is that while the intervals of perfect 4th and perfect 5th sound in tune other intervals such as the major 3rd do not. The Wiki article on Pythagorean tuning:

"The Pythagorean system would appear to be ideal because of the purity of the fifths, but some consider other intervals, particularly the major third, to be so badly out of tune that major chords [may be considered] a dissonance."

Either the waves are in sync or they are not. Either it's in tune or not, — Metaphysician Undercover

"One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them". — Metaphysician Undercover

The first is true independent of any instrument. The second is true of a particular instrument. The first is about the ratio of frequencies. The second about whether those relations are achieved on a particular instrument.

of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul — Metaphysician Undercover

In the Republic the problem is not between the parts of the body and the soul but which part of the soul. The answer is reason. In addition, appetites are treated as a part of the soul and not the body. The conflict is within the soul, not between soul and body. Also the soul in the Republic has parts but in the Phaedo it is denied that it has parts.

Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”' — Wayfarer

I think Vogt is right in saying that there is a difference between true belief and knowledge. I don't know the context in which belief is said to be shameful, but I suspect it has something to do with the philosopher, one who desires knowledge and wisdom. To be content with belief or opinion would be shameful. But the importance of belief in the dialogues should not be overlooked.

The problem is brought into focus by Simmias:

“It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps to you too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account.” (85c-d)

It is not just in the dialogue that arguments are to be exhaustively tested, and in the timeframe of a dialogue it cannot be done. We too much test the arguments. We should never accept what is agreed on as the final word or truth of the matter. To not do so "shows a very feeble spirit".

In addition to finding the best accounts Socrates calculates the risk of holding a belief:

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b)

But it is not only his own beliefs he is concerned with. To the extent that myths are persuasive they are so without an argument or account. With regard to accounts he gives some odd advice:

“Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another.” (101c-d)

At the same time as he exhorts the would be philosopher to not settle for opinions he is an opinion maker and leads some to believe that his mythologies are truths of the world outside the cave, that is, a world freed of opinion.