Comments

  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Gregory


    It is not insignificant that all the arguments for the immortality of the soul fail.The reason is simple. No one knows what happens when we die.

    But that is not the end of it. Not knowing and positing an immortal soul are two very different things. Of course, myths of the soul were well known and Socrates borrows from them to tell his own. The myths take over where the arguments fail.

    “I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments ... ”(61b)

    In the Republic he says that:

    “there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (607b)

    He says the poets are inspired and therefore do not speak from knowledge. Myths can be persuasive in a way that arguments, especially weak arguments, cannot.

    There are two reasons why I think Socrates wants to persuade people that the soul is immortal. First, to charm away childish fears of death. Second, through images of death he can improve souls. If one believes that there are rewards and punishment one might lead his life accordingly. In addition, he secures the belief in notions of truth, knowledge, and wisdom. Even if they cannot be found in life they will be found in Hades, and, with the myth of recollection, these are things we already know and so can be found in life.

    The philosopher sees the myths for what they are. Her life is guided not by myths and promises but by phronesis.
  • What is Philosophy
    So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?

    I think the whole thing is an image and is identified as such. I don't think we transcend opinion when it comes to matters of the just, the beautiful, and the good. I think Plato instills the opinion that they are things that can be known because otherwise some type of relativism prevails. He thinks that such truths are best kept from those who are not suited to deal with them.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    But Plato is part of the Aristotelean and Thomistic tradition — Gregory

    He is part of that tradition is the sense that he influenced their thinking, but this does not mean he would agree with them, especially not with Aquinas.

    Plato never has a strong argument — Gregory

    This is true, but perhaps this is because he did not hold the beliefs that some ascribe to him. The same may be the case with Aristotle, but that is a discussion for another time.
  • What is Philosophy
    No, I don't think that is so. I think the forms are understood to be real, in the sense that principles are real. Where do you see principles? They can only be grasped by reason. — Wayfarer

    I don't want to turn this into a second discussion of the Phaedo, so I will only say a couple of things. Further discussion I hope will occur in the Phaedo thread.

    The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real.

    So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

    I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100c-e)

    Socrates is unable to say what the relationship between Forms and things of that kind is. He later calls this safe answer an ignorant one (105b-c) and introduces physical causes such as fire and fever. Things that cannot be known without the senses.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    In Parmenides and Sophist Plato makes distinctions between several meanings of 'not being'. With regard to this discussion there is:

    What in no way is. The opposite of what “is entirely”
    Becoming. What is between being and not being.
    The Good which is beyond being.

    Becoming is below being. The Good is above being.

    What is entirely is entirely knowable. What in no way is is entirely unknowable.
    Becoming, since it is not entirely, is not entirely knowable. About becoming we have only opinions.
    The Good, since it is beyond being, is not something that is entirely. It is beyond what can be seen with the mind, beyond what can be known. About the Good we have only opinions.
  • How do we understand the idea of the 'self'?
    But this isnt a functional unity — Joshs

    Sometimes we are conflicted and at odds with oneself. Plato points to this with the story of Leontius in the Republic.
  • How do we understand the idea of the 'self'?
    Didnt you just quote Nietzsche saying we need to get beyond the ‘one’? — Joshs

    No. The distinction is between 'one' as in what someone might think or say or do (see how often he says "one must" in the passages above) and 'one' or 'I' as a substance or "soul atomism" as:

    something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon

    to get along without the little "one" — Fooloso4

    The little one is that:

    to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself


    Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science.

    He distinguishes between an old refinement and a new one.
  • How do we understand the idea of the 'self'?
    How does it differ from Kant’s , for instance? — Joshs

    Kant's concept is unitary. The 'I' is for Nietzsche a multiplicity.

    I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Toward the Ubermensch)

    What do you mean by independent? In what way are they dependent on my subjectivity? — Joshs

    "ONE thinks"

    If we follow the postmodern readings of Nietzsche — Joshs

    In my opinion, this multiplies that problem because we must now provide an interpretation of interpretations.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    Socrates makes an ironical comment about Cebes:

    “'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
    what anyone may say.'” (63a)

    It is ironic because this in the opposite of what Cebes does. He simply accepts whatever argument Socrates makes. The following exchange is telling:

    “Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soul is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.”(70a)

    Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

    Socrates responds:

    “What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?””(70a-b)

    Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such way as this”:

    “ … do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
    ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.'”(70c-d)

    But, of course, some other argument is needed. First, the argument assumes the very thing that is in question. It is question begging. Second, the living come from the living. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents. Third, the argument plays on an ambiguity. Hades is the place of the dead, but the whole force of Socrates' arguments is to show that the soul does not die. And so, life does not come from death if the soul does not die.

    The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

    “And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?'” (72 b-d)

    Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.
  • How do we understand the idea of the 'self'?
    ↪Joshs

    If you have not already done so, it would be helpful to identify the source of the quotes. They are from Beyond Good and Evil 16-17.
    ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).(BGE 17)

    He is not denying that we think: “ONE thinks”. What he rejects is an “interpretation of the process” by which “the ‘one’” “does not belong to the process itself”.

    This is easier to understand if we look an earlier section:

    Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! (BGE, 12)

    But if we stop there we will not understand him. He continues:

    Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new. (BGE 12)

    He is not critical of Descartes' “I think” but of the notion of a thinking substance, which Descartes identifies with his immortal soul. The soul is not something we have. In his refinement of the soul-hypothesis Nietzsche posits a “soul of subjective multiplicity”. This solves the problem of the seeming mystery of a thought that comes when it wishes rather than when I wish. It is not that the thought has some kind of independent existence and comes to me from elsewhere, but simply that there is not something within me, an “I” or “ego” or “little ‘one’” that is the agent of my thoughts. This is not a denial of agency, it is a denial of something within me, some substance or soul-atom that is the agent.
  • What is Philosophy
    When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle. See for instance the thread about the Phaedo. — Wayfarer

    My reading of the dialogue is that the Forms are hypothetical, the way Socrates arranges the world in order to make sense of it. That the world is and how it is in accord with his hypothesis is something he does not address.
  • What is Philosophy
    ↪Valentinus


    The reminds me of the story of Zhuangzi's butcher, cook Ting, whose knife never dulls because he cuts between the joints of the oxen, that is, according to the natural division of things.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    When reading Plato’s dialogues it is important to keep in mind who he is talking to and what the circumstances are. Socrates says that under the circumstances it is fitting to:

    inquire and speculate as to what we imagine that journey to be like (61e)


    But Cebes and Simmias are fearful of death. What they imagine might happen makes them fearful. They want more than fearless inquiry and speculation. In other words, they want the truth only in so far as the truth is comforting.

    Socrates says that their fears are childish and that they are in need of incantations to sing away their fears. (77e) Earlier Socrates said that philosophy is the greatest music. (61a) The song that Socrates sings about death will address their fears.

    In the Apology Socrates says:

    Now being dead is either of two things. For either it is like being nothing and the dead man has no perception of an anything, or else, in accordance with the things that have been said, it happens to be a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.

    And if in fact there is no perception, but it is like a sleep in which the sleeper has not dream at all, death would be a wondrous gain. (40c-d)

    And here he says:

    “ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b)

    The arguments are all in service of the hope that there is life after death. The image of life after death brings with it another fear, the fear of punishment for wrongdoing. The image thus serves to promote virtue and justice and discourage vice.

    The arguments do not hold up to rigorous logical examination, and yet for some they are persuasive.

    In the center of the dialogue, both literally and figuratively, is the problem of misologic and the question of what one expects from philosophy. (89d) Does one desire an outcome that provides comfort and reassurance, or does the pursuit of truth mean that one fearlessly inquires independently of a hoped for outcome? The genius of Plato is to satisfy both desires.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Simmias' argument begins here:

    “...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished …” (86a-b)

    All of Socrates' arguments are about Forms or Kinds, which Wayfarer calls universals:

    So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

    Let's look at the arguments at 93-95.

    Socrates asks:

    Wouldn't it be more so and more fully a tuning, if could be tuned more fully, and less so and less fully a tuning if it were tuned less so and less fully? (93b)

    Socrates does not make the proper distinction between a tuning and what is tuned. It is not more or less a tuning, it is more or less in tune.

    Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

    Note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul". In addition Socrates earlier raised the problem of the adulterated condition of a soul. (81c) Such a soul is not "less fully a soul". In both cases it is a matter of the condition of the soul, not whether it is a soul.

    Next he asks:

    'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?'” (93c)

    The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

    “'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning?” (93e)

    Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

    “Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls.” (94a)

    The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

    Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.
  • How do we understand the idea of the 'self'?
    Nietzsche repeats Pindar's urging to:

    Become who you are.
  • Nietzsche's Antichrist
    Nietzsche makes a crucial distinction between belief and the necessity of belief as such. When belief becomes necessary above all else:

    then one has to bring reason, knowledge, inquiry into disrepute. (Anti-Christ 23)
  • Socratic Philosophy
    Bearing in mind the passages in Phaedo about the fact that the ideas have no opposite — Wayfarer

    It is not that they have no opposite but that they cannot "accept" or "allow" or combine with their opposite.

    then in some fundamental respect, they truly are - as I think the quotations indicate. — Wayfarer

    Yes, that is true of all the Forms except the Good. It is beyond being (509b)

    Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer

    They are said to be images of the things that are, the Forms, but I don't know if that is what you have in mind.

    I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer

    But he does not say that all the Forms are beyond being, only the Good. The Forms are the beings. The Good is beyond being.

    Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer

    When making comparisons it is useful to see not only similarities but differences. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    Wayfarer's point explains why we must conclude that the immaterial soul is prior to the material body. — Metaphysician Undercover

    His argument is that Harmony is a universal. What is at issue is the difference between the universal and particular. Harmony itself is prior to any particular thing that is in harmony.

    I don't think Socrates neglects this at all. In fact, it is focused on in many dialogues. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Elsewhere he accepts that there is a harmony of the soul, that the soul can either be in harmony or out of harmony, but here he rejects it. We need to take a step or two back to see what is going on.

    Prior to Socrates examination of the idea that the soul is a tuning Socrates says:

    “ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b)

    The truth of the matter has not been established. Socrates points to the fact that it may still be that in death there is nothing at all, it is the end.

    The argument proceeds on the assumption that:

    … our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

    Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But it is only an assumption that the soul exists prior to the body. The alternative, that the soul is not some separate immaterial thing, undercuts the argument that the soul cannot be an attunement of the body.


    When the mind succumbs to the desires of the body, and is overwhelmed by these desires ... — Metaphysician Undercover

    In the tripartite soul of the Republic, desire is located in the soul.

    This assumption, that the soul exists prior to the body, is based on a more fundamental assumption, that body and soul are two different things. That assumption needs to be examined.

    But Socrates demonstrates, by the argument we've been discussing, that this idea, "that the soul is a harmony" is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

    But as you pointed out, elsewhere he says that it is a harmony.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Gary M Washburn


    It is worth noting that the dialogue is named after a person, Lysis, rather than the topic, friendship. In short, what is at issue here as in other dialogues is the question of self and other selves.

    This ties in nicely with the question of the self in the Phaedo, specifically with the problem of the self as a whole and the analysis of the self as divided or doubled, that is, the place or topos of self in relationship to the separation of body and soul.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    I posted this before, but given the low signal to noise that has plagued this discussion I am going to post it again so that it not get crowded out:

    Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

    The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

    I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation. Bold added.

    "So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

    "Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
    "Yes."
    "While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

    "If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

    "To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

    "Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

    “... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

    "You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

    “... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

    He makes a threefold distinction -

    Being or what is
    Something other than that which is
    What is not


    And corresponding to them

    Knowledge
    Opinion
    Ignorance



    The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

    What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

    The quote at 517 continues:

    … but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it. (517c)

    But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Gary M Washburn


    The question of who the friend is cannot be answered apart from the question of what friendship is. But what is at issue in practical not theoretical, the goal is not to find the definition of friendship but the ability to identify a friend in distinction from someone we may call a friend.

    David Bolotin gives an alternative "perhaps more literal" translation of the closing words in the footnotes to his translation:

    "we have not yet become able to discover" . This final phrase may also be translated as follows: but we have not yet been able to discover that he who is a friend is [i.e., exists]" (Plato's Dialogue on Friendship)

    The dialogue ends in aporia. It is up to us to determine who, if anyone, is our friend.

    Have you determined that I am any kind of Platonist?
  • Plato's Phaedo
    But a lyre does need to be tuned. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Right, but a lyre is not a living thing. It is not capable of self-movement or self-attunement.

    Wayfarer makes an important point:

    But the harmonies, which are ratios, don't come into existence when the lyre is tuned. They are the same whether there is any lyre or not. — Wayfarer

    With all his talk of opposite forms Socrates neglects to consider Harmonious /Unharmonious or

    'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just.

    The Tuning of the Lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. The Tuning is the relationship between frequencies of the strings. It is this relationship of frequencies that is used to tune a particular lyre. Analogously, the Tuning of the body exists apart from any particular body, it is the relationship of bodily parts. (edited)     — Fooloso4

    The question is why Socrates neglected this argument? First, they had already agreed that:

    “… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

    but that does not mean that in evaluating the argument that we too must accept it. As was correctly pointed out:

    Dialectic is (friendly) wrestling with each others' convictions — Gary M Washburn

    The reader of a Platonic dialogue should not be a passive observer simply accepting what has been said.

    Second, the argument that the soul is a harmony means that the fate of a particular soul is tied to the fate of a particular body.

    All of the arguments have the same problem. The distinction between Soul itself, that is, the Form Soul and the individual soul means that even if Socrates is able to show that Soul continues to exist after death, he has not shown that the individual soul does.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    So the fact that this particular instance of being in tune (a harmony) is destroyed when the lyre is destroyed, is irrelevant to what Socrates is arguing, because he argues that the soul is not like a particular instance of being in tune (a harmony). — Metaphysician Undercover

    I am suggesting that his argument against the body being a tuning is problematic. And that the real reason he dismisses it is because if it were accepted the soul could not be before the body or outlast the body.

    The analogy with the lyre is not with a lyre that needs to be tuned but that is tuned, that is, in harmony.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    Might want to look at Charmides. — Gary M Washburn

    Therein the lie and truth of the charm.

    But not only did Socrates offer Charmides a charm that was said to be a cure, we must also consider Charmides own charm and how Socrates sublimated it. The problem of the inner and the outer, beginning with seeing inside his cloak. And related to this the question of the beautiful and the good.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    The characters accept the argument? Maybe, but Socrates merely uses that assent as grist for his mill. All he really has proven is that they should continue the discipline of dialectic. /quote]

    At the risk of providing grist for your mill, I agree.     — Gary M Washburn
  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Wayfarer


    As the examples show snow has the right to the name Cold and three to the name Odd.
  • What is the Obsession with disproving God existence?
    I am far less concerned with the question of a god's existence than with appeals to the authority of a god and abdication of responsibility in the name of a god.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    ↪Valentinus


    I think that is a good suggestion and a diplomatic way of putting it. I share your concern that other discussions of the texts that are being crowded out by the repetition, especially given that they are discussions that I initiated and have an interest in maintaining.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    ↪Apollodorus


    Perhap you can take up basket weaving. I heard it can be therapeutic.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    ↪Apollodorus


    Why is it so unsettling to you that my opinions differ from yours and that there are highly regarded scholars whose opinions differ from those you favor?

    You have made your views known, so now what is it you hope to accomplish by going over the same arguments yet again?

    Anyone who is interested can make up their own minds. Or, perhaps that is what worries you, that they may not find your opinions as convincing as you do.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    ↪Apollodorus


    If you think that what you imagine to be the "mainstream view" is so secure then why are you so insecure as to continually post the same opinions? Your intolerance of other views is incompatible with free and open philosophical discussion. After over two thousand years of Plato scholarship a great deal of disagreement remains. Most scholars regard this as the condition within in which they work. They do not share your need for orthodoxy and do not spend their days endlessly arguing with heretics and trying to have the last word.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    ↪Apollodorus


    Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    All of these things have been discussed. You have your opinions, I have mine, and different scholars have theirs as well. Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    Nothing changes when you repeat your opinions about what you believe the poets believed yet again.

    Perhaps. But you have no evidence that this is the case. — Apollodorus

    One must follow the argument in order to determine whether there is any evidence. You are unwilling or unable to do that. What more is there to say?

    A talk about a reality is a talk about a reality, i.e. a talk about something that is a reality. — Apollodorus

    It is not talk about something that is a reality, it is talk about a hypothetical. You seem either unable or unwilling to see the difference. What more is there to say?

    If without knowledge we cannot determine whether an opinion is right or wrong then we cannot claim that it is wrong without evidence to show this to be the case. — Apollodorus

    We can, however, make a distinction between an opinion about reality and reality. You have denied, that the Forms are hypothetical, and have asserted that they are metaphysical realities. But you now confirm that the Forms are hypothetical. What more is there to say?

    If the questions about the Gods are never resolved then you cannot insists that they are. — Apollodorus

    That is your issue not mine. Your first post on the Phaedo thread:

    According to some, Plato taught "animism" and "atheism". Is that true?

    With fanatical frequency you have returned to that question. What more is there to say?

    I have told you this many times. — Apollodorus

    Right, we have discussed this. What more is there to say?

    And if they agree what the theology of the city should be, then there is a theology that is agreed on. — Apollodorus

    A theology of false speeches (376e-377a). We have been over this already. What more is there to say?

    All of these things have been discussed. You have your opinions, I have mine, and different scholars have theirs as well. Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.
  • Socratic Philosophy
    Making images of something means making images of the objects represented, not making the objects themselves. — Apollodorus

    So, you believe that the Olympian gods actually exist?

    Religious people do not think that when making images of deities they make the deities represented by the images. — Apollodorus

    That may very well be what religious people believe.

    A statue of Zeus was an artistic representation of the God residing on Mount Olympus, not Zeus himself. — Apollodorus

    So, you do believe that Olympian gods exist!

    Once again, follow your own statement. If a speech about the Gods has a true form, then it has a true form. — Apollodorus

    Perhaps the true form of speech about the gods is that they do not exist. That is why such speech is reserved for the few who are suited to hear it.

    No, the onus is on you to show that I don’t read the dialogue. — Apollodorus

    You are doing a good job of that yourself. We have a record of it across three threads.

    Once again, the issue is not the reality but Socrates’ belief in it. — Apollodorus

    You have completely reversed your position, from claiming that the Forms a metaphysical reality and not hypothesis to saying the issue is not the reality but Socrates' belief.

    Exactly, investigate the truth of beings, i.e., realities, not imaginary things. — Apollodorus

    Investigate the truth of beings through speech. A speech about beings is not the reality of beings. The beings are hypothetical. They are investigated the same way that the mathematicians investigate, through images.

    “Putting something down as being true” means believing it to be true. He is talking about realities. — Apollodorus

    What is believed to be true is not true because it is believed. Yes, he is talking about reality, but it is still just talk. It does not transcend beliefs. The Forms are not realities, they are hypotheses about reality.

    An opinion can be right opinion. — Apollodorus

    And it could be a wrong opinion. Without knowledge we cannot determine whether it is right or wrong.

    Of course he doesn’t. He speaks through his characters. — Apollodorus

    His makes his characters speak. He chose not to speak. We have no way of determining if and when he agreed with what his characters say. As I previously pointed out there is an extensive literature on this. I provided a few sources.


    In that case, the claim that Socrates or Plato do not believe in God/s is an assumption without support. — Apollodorus

    The dialogues raise questions about the gods that are never resolved. The gods are absent from the discussion of what you call metaphysical reality in the Republic. The existence of gods are called into question not affirmed. Draw your own conclusions.

    Anyway, as I said, the Sun is a God and the Good is (1) said to be the creator of the Sun and (2) is likened to the Sun. — Apollodorus

    Where in the dialogue does it say that the sun is a god? It may have been a common belief but that does not mean that this belief is affirmed in the dialogue.

    L. Strauss, On Plato’s Republic — Apollodorus

    Once again, context is important. The context of the passage under discussion can be found at 379a:

    It's appropriate for founders to know the models according to which the poets must tell their tales.

    Socrates and Adeimantus are not agreeing to what the gods actually are or even if they are but rather to what the stories of the gods, that is, what the theology should be if the city is to be just. The theology begins with false speeches (376e-377a), for such speeches are in accord with the model.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    This is what you are implying. — Apollodorus

    The failure of the argument is the result of the limits of argument. No argument can determine the fate of the soul. This does not mean that myths are lies.

    You are using weasel words to imply that Socrates has failed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul and is resorting to “charms and incantations” to persuade his companions — Apollodorus

    These are not my words. I gave several translations with those words. In addition, you seem to be unaware that mention of charms and incantation occurs several times throughout the dialogue.

    You need to show more respect for people and not constantly try to take us for a ride with unwarranted Straussianist sophistry. — Apollodorus

    The translations I cited were not translated by Strauss. Strauss is not the author of Liddell and Scott lexicon. Did you just ignore all of it? Perhaps you missed it:

    According to Liddell and Scott:

    2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d.

    From the IEP:

    and repeat such a tale to ourselves as though it were an “incantation” (114d).
    https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

    And Gallop:

    -so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell;

    and Grube:

    and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation     — Fooloso4
  • Plato's Phaedo
    I really don't think you understand universals. — Wayfarer

    What is at issue is the fate of Socrates' soul. It is a question of the distinction between the particular and the universal. The immortality of universal Soul does not tell us what happens to Socrates' soul. The myths in the Phaedo are about particular souls not universal Soul.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    I do not know the tuning of the lyre, but let's say the strings are tuned in 4ths or 5ths. The standard is independent of any particular lyre, but whether this particular lyre is in tune cannot be independent of the tension of the strings of this lyre, and that tension cannot be achieved when this lyre is destroyed.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    But the harmonies, which are ratios, don't come into existence when the lyre is tuned. — Wayfarer

    The instrument is tuned in accord with the ratios. The particular lyre, however, is in tune only when the strings of that instrument are at the proper tension.

    It's those that represent 'the immortal'. — Wayfarer

    The ratio of frequencies, say 4ths or 5ths is always the same, but the question is whether that ratio exists in any particular instrument. It can only exist when the strings are at proper tension and the string cannot exist at proper tension if the lyre is destroyed.
  • Plato's Phaedo
    The harmony argument shows that 'how to tune a lyre', the principle concerning the relationship between tones, is prior to 'the tuning of a lyre'. So the soul is prior to the body, by having that principle of how to create harmony within the parts of the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

    The tuning does not tune the lyre or body, the lyre or body is tuned according to the tuning. It must exist in order to be tuned.

    The argument against the soul as a harmony, is not intended to say anything about the existence of the soul after death. — Metaphysician Undercover

    But if the argument is accepted then the soul is not immortal. The destruction of the lyre means the destruction of its tuning, and analogously the destruction of the body would mean the destruction of its tuning. How a lyre or body is tuned according to the relationship of its part is not affected, but the tuning of this particular lyre or body certainly is when the lyre or body is destroyed,
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