I do not think it follows from the rejection of one true philosophy that one holds to their own philosophy as the one true philosophy. But since this was directed at Banno I will leave it to him to respond.

So is your position that there is "One True Philosophy" or that all claims are equally true?

This is a common mistake. That there is not one true philosophy does not mean that all claims are equal. Some ideas are in error.

You made this one dialogue alive for me. I went back and read it — Olivier5

In the Phaedrus Socrates says of a well structured speech:

Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work (264 c-d).

Plato does the same for his dialogues. They are wholes with all the parts having a function and working together. It is up to the reader to see the whole and how the parts fit together, to make it more than just inanimate words on a page, but as something alive.

Given those you named I suspect it has more to do with the fact that they were the originators more than anything else. They laid the ground rather than followed the path.

I know hardly any music from the period of my youth 1970's and 1980's - I find it ugly. I too stick with 18th to early 20th century music for the most part. I find it more accurately reflects my experiences. I do listen to some jazz (Coltrane, Davis, Monk) and some Blues (Muddy Waters/John Lee Hooker/ Little Walter/Albert King). — Tom Storm

I lost interest when rock lost its roll. Mostly jazz and blues for me too. The Chicago blues guys could swing. The later blues-rock guys not so much, with the exception of some of the Austin guys.

Fooloso4 started an interesting thread and he presented his position clearly. He certainly taught little me about this dialogue. So he can be a teacher to me. — Olivier5

Thank you. If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo.

I support Fooloso4's efforts in these threads. It is extremely useful to have methodical expositions of Platonic dialogues such as these. I take issue with some aspects of his intepretation, but it is possible to do that without bickering over it. — Wayfarer

Thank you. I have decided I will no longer respond to those who are here only to bicker.

In fact, I thought of using you as an example of how philosophically and emotionally mature people can disagree. We go way back and often disagree but we always present our reasons for the position we hold, and listen respectfully.

Goat has been gotten. My work is done. — frank

Is this what you think philosophy is about? I have spent a good deal of time and effort trying to address what you have said. I thought you were arguing in good faith. I now see that I was wrong. I won't make that mistake again.

I am thinking about starting a thread on the Socratic way of philosophy -his "second sailing", aporia, and what to do with knowledge of ignorance. I think it is still a viable way of life today.

I hesitate though because I am tired of the incessant yapping of little dogs under foot.

The only professionals in philosophy are academics — unenlightened

Hence my comment:

I agree with her criticism of academic philosophy — Fooloso4

So, what seems to be the problem? — unenlightened

The problem is the notion that an academic/professional philosopher is going solve our problems. There is no reason to think that they are better qualified than others.

If Plato and his disciples were to read the Euthyphro, would they, or would they not think of the forms when coming across words like eidos, idea, paradigma, etc.? — Apollodorus

Of course they would. Eidos and idea are translated as Forms in English.

Incidentally, your constant diatribes against monotheism in a discussion of Platonic dialogues — Apollodorus

This is completely unfounded. I am going to let my posts speak for themselves.

Apart from you, I'm not aware of anyone who feels they deserve a medal for that. — Apollodorus

This is bullshit. I started a thread on Plato, you and Frank attacked it. I started another thread and you and Frank attacked it. Neither of you know enough about Plato to know how misguided and uninformed your constant attacks are. The simple fact of the matter is that I happen to know a great deal more about Plato than both of you put together. I have the degrees to back that up. I don't need a medal, I would however like you to [edit].

I think our main difference is that you see the outcome of the dialogue as a life-long quest, searching in the darkness, so to speak, for what constitutes righteousness. — frank

I do not think Socrates was searching in the darkness. I don't see how anyone who knows the works of Plato and Xenophon would think such a thing.

Apollodorus and I are cheating because we both know quite a bit about how this will play out over the next 2400 years. — frank

It seems your need to congratulate yourself is being bought at the cost of underestimating me.

And your point is what exactly? — Apollodorus

My point is that I learned to read books. Rather than being fed information, reading requires active participation, trying to think along with what is said, examining, interpreting, reexamining, and reinterpreting. Seeing how well all the parts fit and operate together in the interpretation and how the interpretation sheds light on the whole.

1. The point that Euthyphro may represent an early form of the Theory of Forms has been made for many years in academic publications. That's precisely why it shouldn't be lightly dismissed. — Apollodorus

And what do you make of this? How does it shed light on the text? In the dialogue Parmenides, a mature work,Plato presents the young Socrates' theory of Forms, which Parmenides demolishes. The Euthyphro takes place when he was 70 years old. The dramatic chronology is more revealing that any theory of the development of Plato's theory of Forms.

Plato has been read by millions of people worldwide. But there is no point reading Plato if you keep insisting on reading him in a narrow materialist or nihilist light. Plato was neither a materialist nor a nihilist and even less a fanatic. — Apollodorus

Nice speech but irrelevant. Your accusations are misguided. I attempt to read the dialogues, to the extent this is possible, on their own terms. Following the action and arguments. If this does not conform to the Plato you desire to find that is your problem.

You sound like you are stuck in a bygone era ... — Apollodorus

You really are clueless. You appeal to Neo-Platonism. Do you think 'neo' means new in the 21st century?You cite someone's Master's thesis written in 1970 but are unaware of the scholarship being done around that time up and until the present that informs my own interpretation. This scholarship has only relatively recently gained widespread acceptance, precisely because it overturns the conventional scholarship of a bygone era.

... and are intellectually too set in your ways to move on. — Apollodorus

Actually, the opposite is the case. When I first read Plato I read him in a way you would not doubt find conducive. It was only years later that I began to see how problematic the conventional view is.

The fact is that terms like idea (“idea”), eidos (“form”), auto to (“(thing) in itself”), paradeigma (“pattern”), etc., occur time and again in Plato’s dialogues. — Apollodorus

Yes, and I have frequently pointed this out. That these terms are there is obvious. How we are to understand them is not so obvious.

I think the problem has to do with the notion of the domain of the philosopher.

... journalism, comedy, activism, authors of fiction, and advocacy ... — Banno

Although these are not what is generally thought of as the domain of the philosopher, the are not devoid of reasoned thought and self-reflective deliberation.

I agree with her criticism of academic philosophy and like the metaphor of plumbing, but I think the idea of calling a professional philosopher to fix our thinking the way we would call a professional plumber to fix the pipes is a bit comical. A professional plumber will fix the pipes, I am not sure a professional philosopher will fix anything.

Anyway, εἶδος eidos which Plato uses in his Theory of Forms means “that which is seen, e.g., form, image, shape but also fashion, sort, kind — Apollodorus

From an earlier post, in response to Wayfarer:

He does ask about the 'idea' and 'eidos' of piety, that is, the Form. If the Form or Kind can be identified then it can be determined whether what Euthyphro is doing is pious. But the Form is not discovered. As with the Form of the Good and the other Forms the best we can do is discuss what we think it looks like. 'Look' is another term for Form. — Fooloso4

Only I did not learn these things by copying and pasting from Wiki. I spent many years reading Plato, starting long before there were such things as Wiki and google. I did so formally in school and on my own with the use of secondary material that at the time was marginalized but is now becoming mainstream.

I'm trying to explain to you that we're reading Plato's ideas. Not Socrates'. — frank

We are not reading Plato's ideas. Some of us, at least, are reading Plato's dialogues.

In the Second Letter Plato says he has made Socrates "young and beautiful (noble)". I will leave it to you to work out what that might mean.

In the Seventh Letter Plato says: "There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be."

There is no consensus on the legitimacy of the Letters, but I think they accurately represent Plato's dialogues.

There is no need for you to explain these things to me. I am well aware of them and have discussed them on many threads here and elsewhere.

So Plato was faithfully taking dictation? No scholar believes that. — frank

If no scholar believes such things why bring it up? It seems you are trying to find something to dispute. When it turns out that what I have said is in agreement with the authorities you cite, you skip over that and fabricate a point of contention.

It makes no sense to say that believing Socrates isn't a relevant issue. These are Socratic dialogues. The dialogues point to Socrates' irony. To understand his irony we need to do more than just accept what he appears to be saying.

More to the point, if in the dialogue Socrates says he has no knowledge of divine things then we need to consider how he might respond to claims of "divine principles". Socrates says he is wiser that others because he at least knows that he does not know. Others, he says, do not even know that they do not know. In other words, no one has knowledge of divine principles. To accept them as things know and known by having been told the myths is to be ignorant of your ignorance.

We're reading Plato — frank

And yet Plato never speaks in the dialogues.

To point to the ancient Greek context and culture as if this provides the answers is to exhibit a complete lack of understanding of Socratic philosophy. Socrates does not accept the gods of the city. He banishes the poets, those who create the myths of the gods, from the just city. He is not defined by culture and context. He can only be understood in his opposition to them.

If you read my OP you would see that except for the last part about the divine principle of justice I addressed the issues cited in this Master's thesis.

From the OP:

Socrates asks:

Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved? (10a)

Euthyphro says he does not understand. Socrates says he will “try to explain it more plainly”, but what he says seems designed to confuse rather than make it clear. Or rather, it is intended to show the incoherence of the claim. It says no more than that what is loved is loved. The question of why this is loved and that is not loved is not addressed. That this is loved and not that tells us nothing about whether what is loved is best and just. — Fooloso4

Socrates now offers to show Euthyphro how he can teach Socrates about the pious. (11e) Things have indeed gone around with the need for the student to teach the teacher. Socrates proposes that the pious is what is just. (11e) — Fooloso4

The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. What should guide Euthyphro’s actions, and how are we to judge Socrates’? Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? — Fooloso4

As to Forms or Ideas of Goodness and Justice, a good deal of important scholarly work (and by that I do not mean a Master's thesis written 50 years ago) has been done on the Forms. If we believe Socrates when he says that he is ignorant about divine things, possessing human rather than divine wisdom, then a "divine principle of Justice" is not something he has knowledge of. In addition, a Form is not a principle.

I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here.
— Wayfarer

He does ask about the 'idea' and 'eidos' of piety, that is, the Form. If the Form or Kind can be identified then it can be determined whether what Euthyphro is doing is pious. But the Form is not discovered. As with the Form of the Good and the other Forms the best we can do is discuss what we think it looks like. 'Look' is another term for Form.

See my discussion of Socrates 'second sailing' in the Phaedo thread. Socrates says he is unable to see the things themselves and resorts to speech, to hypothesis, to images of things. — Fooloso4

I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here. — Wayfarer

He does ask about the 'idea' and 'eidos' of piety, that is, the Form. If the Form or Kind can be identified then it can be determined whether what Euthyphro is doing is pious. But the Form is not discovered. As with the Form of the Good and the other Forms the best we can do is discuss what we think it looks like. 'Look' is another term for Form.

See my discussion of Socrates 'second sailing' in the Phaedo thread. Socrates says he is unable to see the things themselves and resorts to speech, to hypothesis, to images of things.

About the only modern philosophical theologian who makes this point is Paul Tillich. — Wayfarer

I have read Tillich. I think the idea of the ground of being as opposed to a supreme being has its appeal. But I don't think it helps resolve the issue. If for no other reason than it is regarded as one of many different views.

Descartes did not limit his method to the objective domain as the term is now understood. It applies to the Meditations, questions of soul, God, and all the rest.

The Apology doesn't contradict the historian's account. — frank

I did not say it does. I said there is more to the story. Start by looking at the other accuser behind Meletus and at Meletus himself.

If I had one piece of advice for you, it would be this: by lifting texts out if the time and place they were written, you end up with wrong conclusions and in the process miss the genius of Plato. Take it however you like — frank

Funny coming from the guy who could not grasp the problem of attempting to apply anachronistic terminology to Plato.

I have not recovered from the fall. — unenlightened

Adam and Eve's fall or as in "I've fallen and can't get up"? (The latter might be an US cultural reference.)

Really? What's the other part? — frank

A discussion for another time and place. Perhaps you can do a summary of the Apology and we can discuss it.

I explained this earlier. It was scapegoating that followed the defeat of Athens at the hands of the Spartans. — frank

This is part of it but not the whole story.

And clouds. He apparently spent a lot of time trying to discover what clouds are. — frank

That is the joke from Aristophanes Clouds.

It is the will of gods, not the will of God in the Euthyphro; and that's why the argument doesn't work in the monotheistic context. — Janus

The argument does work in a monotheist context:

If instead of gods we consider God then the question is whether something is beloved of God because it is just or just because it is beloved? In terms of piety the question would be: is it pious because it just or just because it is pious? If God loves the just and hates the unjust then what is pious, as what is loved by God, would be what is just. If someone like Euthyphro claims he is pious because he is doing what is beloved of God and what he does is unjust then either the unjust is beloved by God or he is not pious. In other words, the equation beloved of God = pious is insufficient without the possession of knowledge of God. — Fooloso4

The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. What should guide Euthyphro’s actions, and how are we to judge Socrates’? Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? Although it may seem that with monotheism there is no problem of conflict between gods; but the problem remains with the conflicting claims, laws, interpretations, and practices of the monotheistic religions. — Fooloso4

Per Aristophanes he publicly questioned the existence of the gods. It doesn't get more impious than that — frank

Right, but there is more to it. Neither Aristophanes nor anyone else at that time thought to bring charges against him. It was not regarded as a criminal matter until Meletus brought charges against him. Why he did so is a question better addressed in a discussion of Plato's and Xenophon's apologies.

Socrates does not deny his impiety. His concern is not for the gods but for the city. Again, his concern if for the human things.

I am in general agreement, but I don't think his motivation was to kill his father. That is in his mind an unavoidable consequence

I do think that part of his motivation was to make a demonstration of his piety and expert knowledge of the gods.

He was impious. — frank

This is true from the perspective of the city, but the gods of the city are not just. If the gods loved justice, however, then Socrates would be a paradigm of piety.

That's a strawman argument; no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. — Janus

It is not a strawman, it is an extreme example of why piety must be tempered. In fact, it often has been, but not as the result of piety.

Hence the kind of analytic theology you seem to rely on, is foly. God is not bound by human logic. — Olivier5

If you are suggesting that we cannot provide reasonable answers to what God does or allows to happen, then I agree. But a great deal of theology does just that. In addition, all kinds of wonderful things are attributed to God. It is one thing to believe them as a matter of faith, it is quite another to make them the foundation of logical arguments attempting to defend those beliefs.

You can't really assert that without giving an alternate account. — frank

By Socrates' argument and your own example we can say what it is not. That is an important starting point for further inquiry into what it might be. The Socratic dialogues do not give us answers, they help guide us in asking questions.

If he didn't know, then he couldn't rule out that it's what the gods love. — frank

Once again:

If Jesus is correct then piety is not a sufficient guide to doing what is right.
— Fooloso4

And since God or the gods, if good, do not love what is wrong, then:

... piety does not equal what is loved by God.
— Fooloso4 — Fooloso4

Or do you think God or the gods love what is wrong?

I think you're skirting the issue. — frank

I think you still do not understand what is at issue.

Since you approved of Jesus' impiety (which was pervasive), think about his solution. — frank

It has nothing to do with my approval of Jesus' impiety. The issue of the Euthyphro is the question of what piety is and what follows from his claim that piety is what the gods love. Despite his claims, he does not know what the gods love and is unable to say why he thinks the gods love what he thinks they love.

As I said:

If Jesus is correct then piety is not a sufficient guide to doing what is right. — Fooloso4

And since God or the gods, if good, do not love what is wrong, then:

... piety does not equal what is loved by God. — Fooloso4

Then from whence the just, noble, and good? — frank

Socrates was a zetetic skeptic. Because he knew that he did not know the just, noble, and good he spent his life inquiring about them, trying to determine what is best and avoid doing what is unjust.

Socrates steps outside the circle and in order to bring in the just, noble, and good.
— Fooloso4

As a higher law? — frank

Unlike Euthyphro Socrates knows he does not know. If there is a higher law he does not know what it is. Socrates focus remains on the human things.

The Book of Job — Olivier5

This and Ecclesiastes have always been problematic. They do not give us the kind of answers we want. Instead they say that such things are beyond the limits of our understanding. We cannot understand why God would allow the Adversary to do all these things to Job simply to prove that Job is only righteous because his circumstances allow him to be.

The problem with Job's friends is that they insist that he is to blame, but, as the author says, Job is blameless.

We might read this as merely symbolism, that the author is pointing to what happens in life, that we do not always get what we deserve. That righteousness is tested against adversity. But the story says more than that. God does not defend the idea that he is just. He has no defense against Job's accusations.

The truth of the matter is Job is never fully restored. He endured terrible suffering. His children were killed. No happy ending, which some scholars think was a later addition, can fix that.

Jesus' condemnation of the piety of the Pharisees is like Socrates' criticism of Euthyphro.

If Jesus is correct then piety is not a sufficient guide to doing what is right. And so piety does not equal what is loved by God.

One might say that their's is a false piety, but this gets us back to the beginning with the question "what is piety?" What Socrates was trying to get Euthyphro to see is that it is not enough to say that it is what the gods love. We must consider what it is that the gods love. To say they love piety is circular. Socrates steps outside the circle and in order to bring in the just, noble, and good.

If you are good with that we can leave it there but I suspect you really do not know how it is that you made my point.

I think the distinguishing mark of modern philosophy is the mathematical concept of reason. Descartes' mathematical method for solving any unknown, however powerful at its inception, has not been able to do what was hoped for. The alternative is not to abandon reason but to hold to a more modest view of reason and the limits of what it is capable of.