major parts of his philosophy is still out of harmony with today's zietgeist — Wayfarer

Plato's is a broad all-encompassing philosophy, How much new has been invented since to be philosophized over? The zeitgeist is the opposite. In the analytic quest for veritability philosophy has become so specialized that most of the subject is missing in action.

In the analytic quest for veritability philosophy has become so specialized that most of the subject is missing in action. — magritte

No argument from me! A lot of the reaction is driven by the fear of religion. As Plato became appropriated into theology, then he’s become a victim in the culture wars. Caught in the crossfire, you could say.

It was the age of essence. We're in the information age. The mechanical age stands between us and Plato.

If Plato hadn't done his thing, we'd still be striking flints.

If Plato hadn't done his thing, we'd still be striking flints. — Wayfarer

Philosophical flint? :chin:

Concisely put, what we see in the Euthyphro is not that Socrates wants Euthyphro to give up the concept of piety. On the contrary, he wants Euthyphro to develop a broader and more precise definition that stands to reason and that, as we shall see, conveys a very profound Platonic teaching.

Socrates wants Euthyphro to expand his definition of piety from “that which is loved by the Gods” to “that which is loved by all the Gods (i.e., the divine)” and from there to what the actual nature of piety is.

Socrates starts in the role of student and keeps asking Euthyphro to teach him about piety.

Euthyphro eventually says that piety is a kind of justice

What kind of justice?

Of the kind that is pleasing to the Gods.

Socrates at this point assumes the role of teacher and suggests that piety is a form of justice that assists the Gods in achieving an act. What might this act be?

Euthyphro insists that piety is knowing how to speak and act in a way that is pleasing to the Gods.

Socrates suggests that piety must be the science of putting requests and giving returns to them (or giving and asking).

Euthyphro exclaims that Socrates understands him well.

Socrates agrees and explains that the reason he understands Euthyphro so well is that he pays close attention to everything Euthyphro says so that “nothing shall fall to the ground” (14d)

“Fall to the ground” means nothing else than “be rendered invalid”. In other words, Euthyphro’s words are accepted as valid. The concept of piety as something that is of service to the Gods stands. It only needs clarification.

The only thing that remains in need of clarification is (a) “what is the divine?” (ti esti to theion) and (b) “what is the act or work in the accomplishment of which piety can assist?”

The answer is that (a) the divine is the nous (a key conception in Plato) and that (b) its function or “work” (to ergon) is to apprehend the Platonic ideas.

Therefore, the service that piety renders to the Gods lies in aiding them to perform their “work” or function of apprehending the ideas.

The definition of “the pious” (to hosion) depends in the first place on the definition of “the Gods” and in the second on the definition of the “divine work” (to ergon) that piety is supposed to assist.

This is the true intent of the dialogue, to uphold the principle of piety whilst endowing it with a deeper, Platonic meaning.

W Gerson Rabinowitz, Platonic Piety: An Essay towards the Solution of an Enigma, Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1958), pp. 108 -120.

I think this would be an acceptable and rather neat solution (though variations of it are possible). What do you think?

The definition of “the pious” (to hosion) depends in the first place on the definition of “the Gods” and in the second on the definition of the “divine work” (to ergon) that piety is supposed to assist. — Apollodorus

My sincere thanks go out to Daniel Bonevac for teaching a very crucial fact regarding the very first steps taken by the Greek philosophers, particulary Socrates, the founding father of Western philosophy. Bonevac in a video, sorry the link to it is unavailable at the moment, were in, not surprisingly, linguistics, to be precise definitions. What use is thinking/talking/writing if we're, well, talking past each other and every disagreement we have is merely a verbal dispute as opposed to a genuine/authentic one?

Socrates was mostly concerned with definitions - piety, justice, to name a few. This might please @Banno to no end but did Socrates anticipate Wittegenstein and the linguistic turn in philosophy? Bonevac's assessment suggests that though he doesn't seem to realize that's what he's doing.

Just curious but have we talked about this before? Some of the posters here seem to have the ability to anticipate my thoughts! How remarkable. I'm going to sign all of you up for paranormal experiments. :joke:

This is the true intent of the dialogue, to uphold the principle of piety whilst endowing it with a deeper, Platonic meaning. — Apollodorus

What's the principle of piety?

Socrates was mostly concerned with definitions - piety, justice, to name a few. — TheMadFool

When Socrates asks: "what is piety?" or "what is justice?" he is not simply asking for a dictionary definition. The question "what is X?" is the question of what it is by which we can know that in all cases something is or is not X. If we know what a triangle is then we are able to identify whether a particular figure is a triangle. If Euthyphro knows what piety itself is then he will be able to determine whether what he is about to do in the name of piety is pious or impious. If we know what justice itself is then there would be no dispute as to whether some action is just or not.

But it is not so straight forward. In the Republic it is agreed that justice is "minding your own business" (433b). What is and is not your own business? Plato does not provide complete answers to the "what is X?" questions. Instead he guides our own inquiry.

When Socrates asks: "what is piety?" or "what is justice?" he is not simply asking for a dictionary definition. The question "what is X?" is the question of what it is by which we can know that in all cases something is or is not X. If we know what a triangle is then we are able to identify whether a particular figure is a triangle. If Euthyphro knows what piety itself is then he will be able to determine whether what he is about to do in the name of piety is pious or impious. If we know what justice itself is then there would be no dispute as to whether some action is just or not. — Fooloso4

You're going round in circles I'm afraid. Socrates wants to know what piety is? Another way of asking the same question is, what is the definition of piety?

What's the principle of piety? — frank

It is the principle that guides our actions or standard by which we measure them.

Piety is defined by Socrates as "that which is of service to the Gods".

In everyday life, "service to the Gods" is worshiping, sacrificing, obeying the laws, observing the customs, etc.

In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self.

In other words, "minding our own business" or attending to our divine self all the way to the final goal which is self-realization or union with the One.

From Merriam Webster.

Piety:

1: the quality or state of being pious: such as
a: fidelity to natural obligations (as to parents)
b: dutifulness in religion : DEVOUTNESS
2: an act inspired by piety
3: a conventional belief or standard : ORTHODOXY

This is not particularly helpful. 1a points to the problem of Euthyphro's actions. Is his obligation to the city, his parents, the gods? He thinks his obligation is to the gods, but by prosecuting his father he neglects his obligations to family and the city. Defining the term does not tell us what piety itself is, it does not tell us whether Euthyphro was acting piously.

It is the principle that guides our actions or standard by which we measure them.

Piety is defined by Socrates as "that which is of service to the Gods".

In everyday life, "service to the Gods" is worshiping, sacrificing, obeying the laws, observing the customs, etc.

In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self.

In other words, "minding our own business" or attending to our divine self all the way to the final goal which is self-realization or union with the One. — Apollodorus

I mentioned this earlier, that piety is the way to control the gods; to derive their blessings in war, at sea, in procreation, etc.

So you're saying the Euthyphro dilemma leads us to transform this practice in the light of the idea of justice and goodness?

Sounds good to me. It makes me think: how much of morality is about control?

What use is thinking/talking/writing if we're, well, talking past each other and every disagreement we have is merely a verbal dispute as opposed to a genuine/authentic one? — TheMadFool

Correct. That's why proper scholars point out time and again the importance of understanding the precise meaning of words in the Greek original.

So you're saying the Euthyphro dilemma leads us to transform this practice in the light of the idea of justice and goodness? — frank

Words or concepts have different levels of meaning depending on the area of application.

On a social level, piety is worshiping the Gods, being a good citizen, etc.

On a personal level, piety is being good to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence, by recognizing its divine identity and acting according to what is good for the self (nous) in Platonic terms.

Otherwise put, piety is acting in ways that are good and just not only to others but also, and above all, to one's own inner self.

He thinks his obligation is to the gods, but by prosecuting his father he neglects his obligations to family and the city. — Fooloso4

Well, you can't always keep everyone happy. Sometimes you need to make tough choices. But Socrates and Euthyphro have agreed that piety is "to be of service to the Gods".

Plus Socrates himself said that he would "rather obey God than the men of Athens" (Apology 29d). What is right for Socrates is right for Euthyphro, don't you think?

Defining the term does not tell us what piety itself is, it does not tell us whether Euthyphro was acting piously. — Fooloso4

Neither Socrates nor Euthyphro says that Euthyphro is not acting piously. Socrates merely says:

“For if you had not clear knowledge of piety and impiety, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not (15d – e).

Socrates has discussed the general meaning of piety which everyone must now apply as they understand it.

It may be said that he leaves it in the hands of the courts in the same way he did with his own case.

If your own father killed someone, what would you do? Would you call the police or would you bury the body in the garden? Ultimately, it is for the authorities to decide what action, if any, to take.

Socrates is the example of law-abiding citizen par excellence. If he made no exception for himself, why would he advise others to make an exception in other cases?

Also, he leaves it at that because he is conveying a more important philosophical message - to which the materialists unfortunately refuse to pay attention. But that isn't my fault.

What do you make of the theory that Socrates and Plato were connected to the Thirty, and that Socrates was sentenced to death because of that, in defense of democracy?

The only thing that remains in need of clarification is (a) “what is the divine?” (ti esti to theion) and (b) “what is the act or work in the accomplishment of which piety can assist?”

The answer is that (a) the divine is the nous (a key conception in Plato) and that (b) its function or “work” (to ergon) is to apprehend the Platonic ideas. — Apollodorus

That is in line with my understanding of Plato. Still can’t say if it *is* the case, but I’d sure like it to be.

I’m sure the prosecution of Socrates was political, with his supposed atheism being a pretext. I’d like to read something about that too.

That is in line with my understanding of Plato. Still can’t say if it *is* the case, but I’d sure like it to be. — Wayfarer

Well, we can never be 100% sure but it certainly seems 100% consistent with Platonic method and thought. Personally, I can't think of any other reading that would bring more clarity to the dialogue in a Platonic sense and make it much less of a conundrum. In any case, I think that Rabinowitz's exposition is just brilliant. That's what I would call proper scholarship and I think everyone should read his paper.

I’m sure the prosecution of Socrates was political, with his supposed atheism being a pretext. I’d like to read something about that too. — Wayfarer

I found this piece informative and well argued:
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/socrates/ifstoneinterview.html

What do you make of the theory that Socrates and Plato were connected to the Thirty, and that Socrates was sentenced to death because of that, in defense of democracy? — Olivier5

The connection was through Critias, who had been a student of Socrates.

It is generally thought that Anytus was behind Meletus. He was a leader of the democratic regime that overthrew the Thirty Tyrants. His son had been a student of Socrates and Anytus thought that Socrates had turned him away from the vicious ways of his father.

Another student of Socrates, Alcibiades, had fled Athens for Sparta, Athens enemy.

This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject:

“… we may assume that, owing to Aristotle’s testimony, Plato when he wrote Euthyphro, believed in the existence of separate Forms, even though they do not appear as such in that work […] as has been argued recently by a number of scholars, it is simply false that Socrates in say, Euthyphro, is just a philosopher concerned only with the search for universal definitions and oblivious to metaphysics[52]. For example, Socrates in Euthyphro does not just want to know what the Form of Piety is; he also believes that there is such a thing as Piety that is the instrumental cause of the piety in pious things [see 6D 10 – 11. In addition, this instrumental cause is a “model” as in Parm. 132 D2] […] Since, as we have already seen that Plato at the time of writing the Euthyphro in all probability believed in the separate existence of Forms, the appearance that the question is left open is explained (far better, in my view) by the exigencies of the dramatic dialogue structure … “

52. See Kramer 1973; Prior 2004; Fronterotta 2007

(L. P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 2013, pp. 52, 58-9)

I believe that this answers @Banno's objection re aporia and I don't see any arguments presented by @Fooloso4 that would successfully challenge this.

Since, as we have already seen that Plato at the time of writing the Euthyphro in all probability believed in the separate existence of Forms, the appearance that the question is left open is explained (far better, in my view) by the exigencies of the dramatic dialogue structure … “

52. See Kramer 1973; Prior 2004; Fronterotta 2007

(L. P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 2013, pp. 52, 58-9)

I believe that this answers Banno's objection re aporia and I don't see any arguments presented by @Fooloso4 that would successfully challenge this. — Apollodorus

Maybe I can take that. The end of Euthyphro is best understood as ironical, a tone frequently associated to Socrates.

SOC. Let us begin again from the beginning, and ask what the holy is, for I shall not willingly give up until I learn (1). Please do not scorn me: Bend every effort of your mind and now tell me the truth (2). You know it if any man does, and, like Proteus, you must not be let go before you speak. For if you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty, you could not possibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action be wrongful, and you would be ashamed before men (3). But as it is, I am confident that you think you know with certainty what is holy and what is not. (4) So say it, friend Euthyphro. Do not conceal what it is you believe (5).

EUTH. Some other time, Socrates. Right now I must hurry somewhere and I am already late.(6)

SOC. What are you doing, my friend! You leave me and cast me down from my high hope that I should learn from you what things are holy and what are not, and escape the indictment of Meletus by showing him that, due to Euthyphro, am now wise in religious matters, that I no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation (7), and most especially, that I shall live better the rest of my life.(8)


1. Thus Socrates is not clear yet about what piety is.
2. Implying that so far Euthyphro was not telling the truth.
3. Accusing Euthyphro of doing something that most men would think unjust, and covering up his shameful act with false piety.
4. Note the wording: "you think you know", which is different from knowing.
5. Ditto: "you believe".
6. Euthyphro cannot provide a concise, clear answer, and eludes the question.
7. A glimpse into Meletus' accusation that Socrates indulges in innovation and lose speech about Athenian religion.

In other words, Socrates is accused of being impious. His defense is that "pious" means everything and nothing, that it cannot be defined, that it helps justify the most unjust behaviors such as Euthyphro's, and therefore that justice should not concern itself with piety.

In other words, Socrates is accused of being impious. His defense is that "pious" means everything and nothing, that it cannot be defined, that it helps justify the most unjust behaviors such as Euthyphro's, and therefore that justice should not concern itself with piety. — Olivier5

As I mentioned earlier, Athens has just lost a war. It was a demoralizing defeat, and we know with hindsight that Athens will never recover and return to what it was during Socrates' lifetime.

The fact that Socrates had apparently praised the Spartans in the midst of the war wasn't helpful, but we know Socrates was widely scorned and ridiculed earlier.

His lack of piety is being blamed for the Athenian defeat. That he taught people to question the basics is seen as a truly diseased way of being that has brought on catastrophe.

The Athenians can't just drop piety. They would have to let go of a worldview that's ancient to them and upheld by Solon.

This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject:

“… we may assume that, owing to Aristotle’s testimony, Plato when he wrote Euthyphro, believed in the existence of separate Forms, even though they do not appear as such in that work — Apollodorus

It's kind of obvious, really.

Maybe I can take that. The end of Euthyphro is best understood as ironical, a tone frequently associated to Socrates. — Olivier5

When I first read the Euthyphro, I had already read the Republic and other dialogues, so I was familiar with the forms, etc.. But for some strange reason I never took the "aporia" as a big deal at all.

Obviously, Socrates was trying to convey a message, but I never felt that he was too concerned about Euthyphro taking his father to court. After all, the courts could have ruled that it had been involuntary manslaughter or even an accident that didn't warrant any serious punishment. Surely, the courts would have considered his age, absence of mens rea, etc, right?

So that didn't seem like a big deal to me either. He was just using Euthyphro's court case to make some other point. And as he mentioned "idea", "form", "pattern", etc., why not a metaphysical point that dawns on you when you realize that the dialogue doesn't really make much sense if you read it any other way?

:100:

Anytus thought that Socrates had turned him away from the vicious ways of his father. — Fooloso4

More probably, Anytus thought that Socrates had corrupted his son.

He was just using Euthyphro's court case to make some other point — Apollodorus

No way. Euthyphro examplifies the ambitious demagogue, plotting against his father in the most unprincipled way and covering it up with good old religion.