But what is the reason you are unsure about eternity? — Zenny

It hasn't happened in my lifetime. Seriously, I have nothing by which I can determine whether there is such thing and its consequences for me.

Some of us try to live in such a way that if there is something after death we will be judged well and will avoid punishment.

The problem isn't that the lanes aren't clearly marked. The problem is that people won't stay in their lanes. — Hanover

A significant part of the population and their influential leaders do not mark the lanes in the same way you do. Who has the right of way at the intersection of science, religion, and politics?

According to Nietzsche, it is only when nihilism is overcome that a culture can have a true foundation on which to thrive. He wished to hasten its coming only so that he could also hasten its ultimate departure.
— Wikipedia, ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’

So, what's the status of nihilism vis-à-vis humans? Is its "departure" imminent or has it already taken place? If it's still with us, how is humanity coping with it? What's the most promising philosophical idea in re a solution to nihilism? — TheMadFool

There are three parts to this, as described in The Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit is Zarathustra. When what was once a cultures source of strength becomes its weakness then it must reject those values. But if this is not in turn overcome, if negation of the old is not replaced with new affirmative values which will be a new source of strength, then there no new "yes" only "no, that is, nihilism.

This cycle repeats whenever existing values are no longer life affirming.

The two have competing epistemologies ... The ought questions rely upon introspection and wisdom, relying upon ancient texts and time honored traditions. — Hanover

I agree in part, but while ancient texts may help with regard to thoughtfulness, technological problems require technological solutions. We cannot say what we ought to do if we do not have a proper understanding of the science involved.

The point being, there ought be no conflict if each stays within its lane and we can therefore ask ourselves whether a particular scientific discovery ought enter our lives or not without coming off as anti-scientific. — Hanover

The lanes are not clearly marked. Religious groups have restricted the use of contraceptives to control population growth and the spread of disease. There has been opposition to medical research and technologies that make use embryonic stem cells.

I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over — Amity

The issue arises because of Socrates' choice to stay in Athens and drink the poison rather than flee. To some this seems like suicide, but it is questionable whether not doing everything you can to save your life amounts to suicide. In the Crito Socrates gives his reasons for his decision to stay.

At the end he does not simply calmly drink the poison, he:

downed it with great readiness and relish.

I don't think this is an indication of suicide but rather his eagerness to find out what happens next, if anything. And, of course, if death is nothingness then he won't find out.


There is also another issue: if being dead is so much better than the prison of life why not escape. Socrates appeals to the gods and our being their servants, but I do not know if there is a better argument to be found in the dialogue.

I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too... — Amity

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview.

Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”

I don't know the context but this seems to be overstating the problem. Belief should be critically examined but where it cannot be replaced by knowledge it is all we have to work with. In the quest for knowledge saying that it is shameful might be a rallying cry but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all begin with the examination of opinion and end it aporia; thereby providing knowledge that we do not know.

You are right about their zetetic skepticism being something different from modern skepticism. Modern skepticism, as I understand it, occurs as the result of representational theories of perception. What we see are representations in the mind. We cannot step outside these representations to determine whether things are as we represent them. It also differs from Pyrrhonian skepticism. The goal of zetetic skeptic is not the suspension of judgment. It is an inquiry into what seems best or most likely to be true, while fully aware that what seems to be may not be what is.

I learned a lot. — Valentinus

I am glad to hear that.

It’s a mythical journey that Abraham takes here. — Possibility

I don't buy it. But I am not going to argue the point.

a heuristic device, — Possibility

But the story is such that what one takes from it the that one should blindly and unquestionably obey what God commands.

It is reason that Abraham brings to the relationship. — Possibility

If he brought reason to the relationship he would have baulked and challenged God. He actually did this later when God was ready to wipe out Sodom and Gomorrah.

Says who? — Possibility

I provided the reference. Proverbs says "wisdom is fear of the Lord".

‘God will provide the offering’. — Possibility

He says this to Isaac who is about to be slaughtered. The angel stopped him from doing what he was about to do and would have done if not stopped.

A problem occurs when one's faith in reason is given the absolute authority of God. As if any conclusions that they have arrived at rigorously are true. I am not accusing you of this, but speaking generally. Those doing philosophy often fall into the trap of assuming truth based on reason alone.even if they do not involve the authority of God. They mistake argument for evidence.

You are right, The Theaetetus, as well as many of the other dialogues, ends in aporia. What is less well known or agreed upon is that there are also aporia in Aristotle. Some recent work addresses this.

In my opinion, and I am not alone, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all zetetic skeptics - driven by the knowledge that they did not know to inquire.

Another thing worth pointing out in the Theaetetus is that there is no mention of recollection. It would be here, in a dialogue devoted to knowledge, that one would expect to find it if it was something he accepted.

I trust the thread was worth your while ... — Banno

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter. I know that there are some here who admire Plato who did not appreciate what I had to say because it runs counter to their own assumptions. But running counter to assumptions is fundamental to Socrates and Plato.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

An indication of my level of interest. — Banno

Yeah, I was going to comment that you were probably not a fan.

My view: it is part of our intellectual, spiritual, and cultural history.

If one reads Descartes' Meditations in light of the Genesis story of knowledge and the tower of Babel, what Descartes was up to takes on a whole new meaning. A topic for another thread.

I think it's traditionally taken by Jews and Christians as an allegory. — frank

Right, but the question is what does the allegory mean?

Things changed. Jesus was the sacrifice. — frank

From the story of Abraham: "your son, your only son".

You're getting your stories mixed-up but I agree.

So back in the day, if you went to war with your neighbor, you were pitting yourself against their gods. — frank

Good point. Having a god who is to be feared can work in your favor, but you really have to be careful, his anger can turn against you.

So maybe the story of Abraham and Isaac is not about faith at all, but about fear.

Christians generally prefer a god of love, but given what happened to Jesus in the hands of the Romans, he does not look like a good choice to lead you into battle either.

According to Socrates, the greatest evil that can befall someone is misologic. The cause is having unreasonable expectations of what reasoned argument can accomplish and the lack of personal soundness to judge the soundness of arguments.

It is entirely devoid of any rational conception of a God. — Janus

That is correct, his is not a God of reason, but of will. He is in this way similar to Job's God and the God of Ecclesiastes. A God whose will cannot be understood by humans.

How is faith is a rational conception of God different from faith in rational conception, that is, faith in reason?

@Banno

I just posted the last section of my commentary on the Phaedo. Socrates was unable to demonstrate through argument the existence of the soul separate from the body or its continued existence in death.

The counterpart to argument is myth. Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. He did not end with an argument but with a myth he made up. After telling the myth he immediately says:

“No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places …”

Here again, as he said near the beginning, one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again” in order to persuade himself. (114d)

As to recollection, he says:

"Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'" (73b-d)

One does not need to have previously died to be reminded of lyres or lovers or friends.

Socrates uses the terms recollection, remember, and remind without distinction. Amusingly enough, his friend cannot remember the argument for recollection and asks to be reminded.

Socrates sees the myths as beneficial, at least for some, even if they are not true. It may seem odd that he does not put the truth above all else, but in the absence of truth the philosopher must be guided by what seems best.

Maybe we just haven't found the original Abraham and Isaac story in the archeological record yet. — frank

That may be. But this is the story that has been passed down from generation to generation for thousands of years.

We too readily assume that what is written as what ‘God said’ is in fact what God actually said, as if the words were God’s actual words. Given that we have yet to confirm this is even possible (and much reason to doubt), why do we accept this without question? — Possibility

If I am to discuss a story I take the story as it is written. If I read in a book:"Harry said" then I can safely say that according to the book this is what Harry said. If the book is a novel then the question of whether or not it was actually said goes no further. If the book purports to be historically accurate then whether Harry said this or if there even is a Harry comes into question. I do not read Genesis as history, and so the question of whether God said this goes no further than the story. I do, however, read it as a story about belief and faith.

The simple fact that what is apparently commanded here is not what transpired, despite Abram following it to the letter, is indication enough for me that Abraham misunderstood what (if anything) was asked of him. — Possibility

To me it is an indication that he did not want Abram to carry out the command. The story says nothing about a misunderstanding. But if I grant that it was a misunderstanding this still points to the danger. Many horrendous things are done because it is believed that this is God's will. In order to distinguish between what should and should not be done as a matter of faith we must turn to reason.

No, it is about faith in what we think God is. — Possibility

Perhaps that is true of some "we", but in the Jewish tradition God is ineffable. Faith is a matter of keeping His commandments.

But what is wrong for Abraham is to put his own fears and desires ahead of his relation to an infinitely significant existence, of which he was aware beyond conception. — Possibility

Since God says that Abram loved his son (22:2), "your son, your only son" (22:12) his desire would be to keep him alive. His proper relationship with God should be one of fear (22:12)

It’s only disturbing when we assume the command was beyond doubt. Abraham never assumed this. — Possibility

We are given no indication that he doubted, but even if he did, he was going to carry out the commandment.

Since we have strayed from the topic I will leave it here.

The Hebrews were horrified by the idea of child sacrifice. — frank

And yet their patriarch would have sacrificed his own son, and they still hold this up as a great example of faith.

Maybe the part about the test of faith was added later to a story which originally emphasized the angel's arrest of Abraham's hand and the presentation if the sheep that Abraham sacrificed instead. — frank

Rewriting the story is evasive. If you include the part about the angel staying his hand, you can't get rid of the part where he will obey and sacrifice his son.

This is often regarded as a story about faith, but it is more precisely about fear and obedience:

Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld from me your son, your only son.(22:12)

There is in the story no indication of a misunderstanding:

Then God said, “Take your son, your only son, whom you love—Isaac—and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on a mountain I will show you.” (Genesis 22:2)

Abram hid what he was about to do from Isaac and his servants.

...it’s not about God — Possibility

It is not about God, it is about faith in God, and it is god who told him to do this.

it’s about having the courage not only to act in the absence of certainty — Possibility

Some see this as exemplary, but others look at this example and recoil. It is not simply a matter of the absence of certainty. It is contrary to what we hold most dear. It is shocking and disturbing that he would have obeyed. Are you not certain that it would have been wrong to do this?

Cebes is unaware of the problem and says that he is completely satisfied with Socrates’ account of the deathlessness of the soul and has nothing further to say. (107a)

Simmias says he has some lingering distrust:

I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the bigness and importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some lingering distrust within myself about what we have said. (107b)

Socrates responds:

Not only that, Simmias. What you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses - even if to all of you they’re trustworthy - must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety. And if you sort them out sufficiently, you will, as I think, be following up the argument as much as its possible for human beings to follow it. And should this very thing become sure, you’ll search no further. (107b)

Socrates is telling them that they should not be so ready to accept what is said as the truth. There seems to be a play on a double sense of human weakness, the limits of human argument and Simmias’ ongoing concern that death means our destruction, that we are too weak to endure. In any case, there is a limit we human beings cannot go beyond, and we should not search further. That limit occurs at death.

Socrates leaves it there for us to sort it out. Generation and destruction are each one and together two, but it is by the division of what is one, that is, the cycle of generation and destruction, that they become two. Socrates has identified two causes: mental and physical. Mind arranges or orders things according to their kind or Form. Things are not Forms, they come to be and perish. We can now see the difference between Socrates’ unlearned or ignorant hypothesis and the one that has replaced it. The first used only Forms and could not account for things coming to be and perishing. It was a static model that did not allow for change. But change itself needs an account. The two accounts must be unified, made one, by the good, that is, by an account of why it is best that things are as they are. This has not been done.

The discussion of generation and destruction is guided by two considerations that at first may seem odd to have conjoined: physical causes and number. The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death.

According to Cebes’ argument, body and soul are each one and together are two, each separate and distinct. Weaving is an ordering or arrangement. Arrangement or ordering, an activity Socrates attributes to Mind. The act of weaving requires something physically acting on something else that is physical. A disembodied soul cannot be a weaver. Unless the two are one, the man Socrates is cut in two.

Simmias’ account is physical. Body and soul are not separate entities, they are one. A harmony. But harmony is one from many. An attunement is an arrangement. A purely physical account is not adequate either. This is why Socrates initially rejected physical causes but later reintroduced them after the introduction of Mind. Physical things cannot order themselves without Mind.

The problem with Simmias’ account is that if body and soul are one then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. Socrates attempts to separate them in order to save the soul, but can only do so by blurring the distinction between the Form Soul and a soul. If Soul is imperishable it does not follow that Socrates’ soul is. The human soul is átopos, literally, without place, unclassifiable,. It is not a Form and not a physical thing. If there is no distinction between Soul and Socrates’ soul, then it would not be Socrates’ soul that is undying. The fate of Socrates in death is not assured by the fate of Soul. Just as the snow is destroyed at the approach of heat, Socrates’ soul is destroyed at the approach of death, while Snow and Soul remain unchanged Forms.

He turns back to stories that have been told:

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here.(107e)

The trustworthiness of the story is not questioned. This seems to be because arguments have come to its end, and stories are all that is left. In his last minutes Socrates turns from Hades to the Earth. It is here that he has been all along. (61d)

His tale of the Earth mixes science and myth. The Earth is a sphere in the middle of heaven balanced at rest without support or force. It is very large and we live in only a small portion of it, “like ants or frogs around a swamp”. Many other peoples live in many other similar parts.

Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where the stars are situated … We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other,heavenly bodies through the water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the upper
limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light and the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water. (109b - 110a)

There are similarities and differences between this story and the allegory of the cave in the Republic. In both stories humans are unaware of their true condition and believe that what they see is the whole of things as they are. The cave images are human artifacts, but what is seen in the hollows is by the nature of our condition.

What the humans say is based on what is seen or experienced. Because of the limits of our experience there are natural limits to our arguments. Myths have no natural limits. In both stories there is an image of an ascent to the truth, a journey from here to There. We have no experience of death and so Socrates’ arguments are not strong enough to transcend that limit. His myths of death, the journey from here to There, are myths about the ascent to truth.

It is only in myth that Socrates can find what is sought in argument: the good. Why it is best that things be as they are. In the myth we find:

The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is
superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their
happiness is in accord with this. (111 b-c)

But the question of the good of the whole is not complete without the inclusion of human actions:

Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. (113d)

Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. (114c)

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)

Crito asks about final instructions. Socrates says they should take care of their own selves.(115b)

Socrates goes into a chamber to bathe. What should we make of this? Why care for his body when the whole time he has been treating it without regard and even with contempt?

Despite all that Socrates has said to convince his friends that what is happening is a good thing, they are distraught:

So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again
talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. (116a-b)

Socrates, on the other hand, did not appear to be troubled at all as he took the cup and drank.


Perhaps the appropriate question is not whether this is a comedy or a tragedy but rather the question of how we choose to persuade ourselves. One might wonder how this can be seen as a comedy. To begin to answer that question we might consider that Socrates himself did not regard his life or its end as a tragedy. This is so not because of what happened but because of how he judges. Argument cannot reveal the good, why it is best that things are as they are. Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best.

Being told he could not, as he ironically requested, pour a libation (117b), he says:

“I understand but I suppose I am allowed to, and indeed should, pray to the gods that my emigration from here to There may turn out to be a fortunate one. That’s just what I am praying for - and may it be so!” And with these words he put the cup to his lips and downed it with great readiness and relish. (117c)… these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius (118a)

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

Abraham's sacrifice of his son is the paradigm of faith in God. It is also the paradigm of everything that is wrong with such faith, the willingness to sacrifice everything.

What did Jesus say? Matt: 5, 37 — tim wood

Well then, the "evil one" is in good company.

Maybe someone can help. I once came across an essay by a highly regarded philosopher about, if I remember correctly, why it is wrong a bake a child in the oven. The point was that we all recognize this as wrong but moral arguments as to why it is wrong fail.

I take it you are referring to Online Philosophy Club and Philosophy Now Forum in that order. When I was a moderator at Online Philosophy Club I would make sure that new topics were reviewed and approved within two days. The policies on who could approve posts changed at about the same time I left. I agree that when I was there things there could be a bit stilted. The Philosophy Now Forum is a cesspool. I left once it became clear that it was not a place for reasoned discussion. I am not friends with either site owner. But thanks for the kind words.

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"? — magritte

Thanks for your contribution. I am not sure I understand you. But based on what I think you are getting at.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. In one sense a half and a half is two, but in another it is one.

But with regard to twoness:

And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness ... (101c-d)

Note the similarity to the quote from 73e.

He is not claiming that Twoness is a thing known. It is an hypothesis.

From my discussion of recollection at 73 :

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something.

my point is that the values Nazism espouses is closer to a slave morality than Christianity is. — Ross Campbell

The fundamental difference is that the early Christians had no power. They turned inward because they were powerless to make outward changes. Their inwardness led to their power. Rather than impose rule on the world they learned to impose their will on themselves and rule themselves. Nietzsche saw this as a great advancement for mankind.

I am an atheist and I have no reason to hope there is no God, I simply find no compelling reason intellectually, conceptually, or spiritually to believe there is. We do not know if there is a God or not and so cannot say in what way things would be different if there was or was not a God. In addition if there is a God we do not know what God is and so cannot say what that might mean for the way things are.

The problems that science creates can only be solved by science and intelligent policy decisions.

The problem of knowledge is an ancient one. In the mythology of the "tree of knowledge" for example, the one tree produces fruit that is both good and bad. The story reflects changes that came about through productive or technological advances in agriculture, instruments, and tool making, including the making of weapons. These changes were in some ways good but in others bad. In any case, these advances have progressed, sometimes slowly and sometimes rapidly, but fast or slow they have been unstoppable.

One definition of wisdom is knowledge of knowledge. This can mean, as it does in Plato's Charmides, knowledge of what you know and don't know (the irony is intentional), but it can also mean the knowledge of how best to use and control our knowledge. Good or bad, the only way forward is through knowledge.

That's not a correlation. The vast number of people in Western civilization were Christians. — Hanover

I am not suggesting a correlation. It is not because they were Christian that they were Nazis. What I am saying is that the fact that they were Christian did not prevent them from becoming Nazis. The OP points to the Christian emphasis on love, forgiveness, compassion, hope and kindness, but this did not prevent them from becoming Nazis.

He claims that:

Nietzsche characterizes slave morality as one which emphasized obedience, pity, conformity and following the herd. And he said that it's a morality based on resentment but it seems to me that this is more true of nazism rather than Christianity'. — Ross Campbell

My point is that this seems true of both, especially given the fact that they were both.

Nietzsche was openly critical of Christianity and he would describe that religion as being consistent with a slave morality. — Hanover

Yes, but if I understand him correctly Ross Campbell objects to that description.

You claimed that Nazism and Christianity go hand in hand, so it appeared you were making the argument that Nazis and the Christians, whose hands were clasped together, were all members of the same slave moral mentality. — Hanover

Perhaps I did not make my point clear enough. Hand in hand rather than opposed to each other.

With regard to all being members of the same slave moral mentality, from my first post:

His analysis is genealogical. — Fooloso4

In other words, Nietzsche was talking about a particular historical movement, that cannot be reduced to obedience, pity, conformity and following the herd, or transferred from one time and place to another. As a genealogy its concern is how that morality developed. A main point of which is how its weakness became its strength.

Again:

I would have hoped that in a thread whose title is Nietzsche's notion slave of morality there would be a discussion of Nietzsche's notion slave of morality. — Fooloso4

Christianity and Nazism are related by the simple fact that most Nazis were also Christians.

Many Christians were also anti-semitic which was one reason Nazism was attractive.

But none of this has anything to do with Nietzsche's notion of slave morality.

I would have hoped that in a thread whose title is Nietzsche's notion slave of morality there would be a discussion of Nietzsche's notion slave of morality. His analysis is genealogical.

What should not be overlooked is that Nazism went hand in hand with Christianity.

The best and safest hypothesis according to Socrates is the hypothesis of kinds (eidos or Forms). Two “shares in the reality” of Twoness, one in the reality of Oneness. Recall that the discussion of Socrates second sailing came up from the need for a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction (96a)


Mind arranges things according to their kind, that is, what kind of thing it is. But the arrangement according to kinds is only part of the story. Things are as they are, according to this hypothesis, because it is best that they be this way.

What happens when we use this hypothesis to investigate the cause of generation and destruction? It would seem that living things are alive because they share in the reality of Life and things that are dead because of the reality of Death. It follows that it is best that living things are alive and dead things dead.

There are two problems with this. First, it contradicts the argument that things come to be from their opposites. Second, it undermines what Socrates said about life being a prison and being alive the destruction of the soul by the body (95d). Unless, of course, it is better to be a slave and better that the body destroy the soul.

Socrates introduces the forms Bigness and Smallness.

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

At this point an unnamed listener speaks up. Phaedo says he does not remember who it was. (103a) What is the significance of this? Perhaps the anonymous participant is the model for the anonymous reader who does not accept what is said but questions it.

"By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now think we are saying that this would never happen?" (103a)

Socrates responds:

… you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the
opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another." At the same time he looked to Cebes and said: "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?" (103b-c)

The anonymous man to whom he turns and then turns away from is not given a chance to respond and does not interrupt. While it is true that Socrates was talking about things coming to be and now the Forms themselves, there is the problem of how they are related.

Although it appears that Socrates simply dismisses what the unnamed man said, the conversation moves in that direction. Socrates says:

Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. (105b-c)

Why would Socrates have previously gotten them to agree with an answer he now says is an ignorant one? Is Socrates’ new safe answer different from the answers he rejected as a young man because in part they made use of the senses? But how could he now know that fire is hot without the senses?

Before his second sailing Socrates rejected natural causes including heat, cold, and fire. (96b) As well, or so it seemed, to two being the result of adding one to one. He claimed that the safe
answer was caused by twoness. Upon closer reading, however, what he was saying is that neither the one added or the one added to becomes two. (96e) In other words, each one remains one and together they are two.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. We must consider how this relates to the Forms, which are each always one even when combined.

The significance of the unnamed man’s challenge now becomes evident.

Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul. (105c)

It is not, as the ignorant answer would have it, Life that makes a body living but soul.

Now the soul does not admit death?—No.
So the soul is deathless?—It is.
Very well, he said. Shall we say that this has been demonstrated, do you think?
Very sufficiently demonstrated indeed, Socrates. (105e)

But has it?

Well now, Cebes, he said, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?—Of course.
And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true. (106a)
Socrates is now doing exactly what he criticized the unnamed man for doing, mixing things and Forms of things. The Form Uneven can never become even, but three things are not indestructible. When the Hot is brought to snow it does not retreat safe and unthawed, it melts. The Form Cold, however, if the Forms are indestructible, would not be destroyed when the snow is.

One might object that the Forms “Triad” and “Snow” are indestructible, but this points to the problem of Socrates’ distinction between Forms and things. When it snows it is not the Form Snow that snows.

Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. (106b)

The Cold in snow is indestructible, but snow is not. If the soul is like snow then it too would be destroyed. But Socrates has confused Cebes, and no doubt some readers.

So the Soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said? (105d)

The opposite of what the soul brings along is Death. In accord with what has been said, snow brings Cold and three Odd. Snow cannot admit Hot without being destroyed. Three cannot admit Even and remain three. So, soul cannot admit Death and remain soul.

Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death. (106e)

According the examples, when the opposite approaches - Hot or Even, the Cold in snow and the Odd in three retreats. But if it is the soul in body that retreats then what is the opposite of soul that approaches?

Socrates has not been able to navigate the ship to safety. They are in treacherous waters, in danger of being shipwrecked, just as Simmias feared.

"What has been said" by whom? Are you taking us for a ride or something? — Apollodorus

In case there are some here who are seeing this and might be confused, read the quoted statements above by Rowe and Rosen. The desire for a neat little "package" tied with a pretty bow is antithetical to an educated reading of the dialogues.

So how would you sum up Phaedo in a few words (if you had to)? — frank

Are you joking or just ignoring what has been said?

But when it comes to comedy - listening to the audio really brings it out.
The request to be reminded of the Recollection proof: 'Not sure that I remember the doctrine !'. — Amity

I am glad you caught that. Plato's playfulness goes unnoticed by those searching for his doctrines,

Socrates gives some counselling:
There are plenty of 'charmers' in Greece - incantations to reduce fear.
However, I think the final words at 78b say it best:

And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.'
'That shall certainly be done,' said Cebes; ' — Amity

And to be clear, Socrates is talking about myths and those involved in the cults of mystical rites. Some here are advocating that we pay attention to them but ignore what Socrates says about them. If they are to be looked at, it should be from this perspective if looking at them is intended to shed light on the dialogue.

Thus what began in Strauss himself as an interesting method with the potential for plausible readings, not least of the Republic, has hardened, in the hands of some of his epigoni, into the treatment of Plato as an advocate for a conservative politics: — Christopher Rowe

I agree. One time I shared my concern about this with Rosen. He said that this is why he deliberately tried to distance himself from the "Straussians". More recently there has been a split between "East Coast" and "West Coast" Straussians over the conservative activism of those on the west/right. Whereas Rosen emphasizes the unresolved problems, they have convinced themselves that they have the answers. It is remarkable how Strauss has engendered such a wide, varying, and opposing set of views.