It seems to be more about ego with you than getting to the truth about what Wittgenstein is saying. — Sam26

It is actually the exact opposite. Given the hostility and resentment I think it best that I do what I had intended to do and leave.

We can justifiably deny that his foot is not a hand — magritte

I'm not sure I follow. Why would we deny that his foot is not a hand?

And yes, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation, but whether it's a hinge or not is. — Sam26

Wittgenstein is clear:

"The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: 'Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn.'" (655)

It is also clear that 2x2=4 is a mathematical proposition (10) just as 12x12=144 is:

"In the first place there is the fact that "12x12 etc." is a mathematical proposition". (654)

I really do not want to get stuck on this point. I think this is clear and unambiguous. If you don't then there is nothing more I can say or show from the text.

Sam, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation.

Fooloso4 We disagree and that's fine, but I'm moving on to continue the analysis. — Sam26

Interpretative differences are to be expected, but there really should be no disagreement over whether it is true that 2x2=4. One interpretive rule I follow is that when my interpretation contradicts the text, the interpretation and not the text should be altered. But by all means continue in any way you see fit.

I think a better approach would be to let go of Moore's hand for a moment and look at what was said about mathematical propositions.They are hinge propositions and true. If this is correct then it cannot be true that all hinge propositions are neither true nor false.

That is an important point and should not be overlooked.

If Moore's propositions or hinges cannot be known, it follows that there are no grounds/justification or reasons/evidence to say they are true. — Sam26

Wittgenstein points to many ways in which the term "know" is used and some ways it is misused. If Moore held up his hand as said: "This is a hand" we could look and confirm that it is indeed a hand. If he raised his hand and said instead: "This is a foot" we would know that it is not a foot. We have no difficulty distinguishing a hand and foot. We know what a hand is and what a foot is.

That Moore does not hold up his foot and say "This is a hand" is significant. He does, after all, know the difference.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4. — Sam26

There is nothing unclear about the proposition: "It's false that 2+2=4." It is clearly false.

What is unclear is how we could learn mathematics if mathematical propositions are neither true nor false. We are not taught that 2+2=4 is neither true not false or 2+2= n for any number is neither true nor false.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false?
— Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas. — Sam26

Wittgenstein clearly states that 2x2=4 is a true proposition of arithmetic. He also clearly states mathematical propositions are hinge propositions. From this it should be clear that what follows is that at least some hinge propositions, namely mathematical propositions, are true. Moore, so to speak, has no hand in the truth of mathematical propositions.

If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. — Sam26

We do not question their truth we accept it.

Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology. — Sam26

Perhaps you get far enough that you will have to confront this:

248: "And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house." — Fooloso4

In order to understand this you should attend to this:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. — Fooloso4

But all this really is disruptive of the narrative you are developing. So carry on.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false". — Banno

12x12=144 is indubitable, but that does not mean that it is not true that 12x12=144.

The truth or falsity of hinge concepts cannot be called into question and remain hinges, but that does not mean that the propositions themselves are not true.

I am reminded of a joke Wittgenstein once made: "we are not crazy, we are doing philosophy".

There is a good deal of disagreement as what stands as a hinge proposition, as a review of the literature shows. Part of the problem is a lack of examples. The point I made is that 655 is the only example explicitly called a hinge proposition. This does not mean that mathematical hinges are the only hinges.

Before any of this I gave an example of what I think Wittgenstein means by a hinge proposition:

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

Sam denies that it is.

I cited the example at 655 because Sam claims that:

What makes something a hinge is not what people accept as true or false, which are epistemological ideas, but they are concepts that lie outside our epistemological concepts of true and false, and what it means to know. — Sam26

This is not only an incontestable example of a hinge proposition, more importantly it is contrary to what Sam has claimed. It is true that 12x12=144. Or do you too deny this?

I am well aware of 340 and 341, I cited them.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do.

I will leave, but my claim is not that it is the only example of a hinge proposition. It is the only example in the text specifically identified as such. I did not state the point clearly, I thought it would be understood, but clarified it in my next post:

This is the only example of a hinge proposition that is given. — Fooloso4

I'll stick around long enough for you or him to provide another example identified as such in the text.

Sam's account in the post immediately before the one here quoted answers your scepticism...or at least points to the answer found in OC. — Banno

This is wrong. I could explain why but I will not interfere.

When you said in your first post:

... as we examine On Certainty — Sam26

I did not think by "we" you meant you.

This area of the forum, as the heading indicates, is for philosophical discussion.

Moore has found something significant though, and Wittgenstein respects Moore's for this. Moore has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements (Moorean statements or facts). They seem to provide a kind of foundational belief that is not only fundamental to epistemology, but fundamental to language. — Sam26

I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. More importantly, this traditional picture of foundations is rejected by Wittgenstein. He reverses the order:

248: "And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house."

I'm not sure why you would say these are the only examples of hinges. — Sam26

This is the only example of a hinge proposition that is given.

The reason the book is written is because Wittgenstein is saying that there is something special about Moore's proposition, — Sam26

This is what prompted him to put these thoughts down on paper, but he says addresses much more than Moore's proposition.

... there are many other hinge-propositions. — Sam26

Yes. What is at issue is what counts as a hinge proposition. You exclude propositions that are either true or false. I think this is incorrect.

I didn't exclude mathematical propositions from being true or false, only hinge mathematical propositions. — Sam26

"In the first place there is the fact that "12x12 etc." is a mathematical proposition ... (654)

"The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: 'Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn.'" (655)

Are you claiming that the mathematical proposition 12x12=144 is neither true nor false?

If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. — Sam26

This is the claim that is in question. 12x12=144 is given as an example of a mathematical proposition. The mathematical proposition is said to be a hinge. 12x12=144 is true.

If these things were not fixed, then no linguistic culture, no language-game of epistemology. — Sam26

That is why I pointed to the river and relativity. Nothing is permanently fixed. These analogies show how it is possible for there to be knowledge without eternal verities.

This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's challenge. — Sam26

If you would prefer, we can put this off until you are further along in your analysis.

As you know, the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. To exclude mathematical propositions from what is true or false is problematic to say the least.

The statement prior to the first mention of a hinge proposition:

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood".

Between the two mentions of hinge propositions at 341 and 343 is this:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

And the statement immediately following the second mention:

344. My life consists in my being content to accept many things.

We do not doubt hinge propositions because they are somehow beyond doubt, but rather because of everything that hinges on them. To call them into question would be to call everything that revolves around them into question. It is fundamental to the logic of our investigations that certain propositions stand without question. It is fundamental to our way of life that certain propositions are not called into question. "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (343)."

So would a person without empathy and different values be perfectly justified in committing genocide? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

By whose standards? Those who participated in the genocide of Native Americans and the Holocaust thought they were justified. They regarded those they slaughtered as less than human and a threat to their own existence and well being.

The proposed answers are not relative they are either right or wrong. We do not know the origin of the universe with certainty but we do believe that the big bang is more probable than the idea that a turtle puked it out. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

If you are to treat your claims about morality as equivalent to claims about The Big Bang then you must provide empirical evident and not just poorly defended arguments. Scientific claims are provisional, subject to change. If you are to treat your claims about morality as equivalent to scientific claims then you must treat them as provisional and subject to change.

We can only make this distinction because there absolutely is an origin to the universe. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Even a superficial reading of the scientific literature will show that this is not true. There are many cosmologists who think that there is no origin, that there has always been something.

We may not know with absolute certainty what is right or wrong in some circumstances. We are then left to our best guesses as to what the correct answer is. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

With that you have conceded the argument. If we are left with our best guesses then we are left with relativism.

These guesses are not relative but either right or wrong. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

But if we do not know which of these guesses are right and which are wrong then none can be held as absolutes. Welcome to moral relativism. You will find that it is not as scary and dangerous as you imagine.

All that matters is that we know this absolute answer exists. From that standpoint we can rank moral ideas, based on how close we believe it is to the truth. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

If we only know that an absolute answer exists but do not know what that answer is, then how can be know that the answer we guess is right is closer to or further from the truth?

Philosophy actually does often deal in certainty, see absolute truths (but that's not really important right now I just thought you'd find it interesting). — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Philosophy is not monolithic. There may still be some who cling to the dream of certainty, but many who reject it or limit its range.

Science and history do not operate based on absolute certainty but both disciplines operate based on the idea that there is an absolute truth. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Asserting it to be so does not make it so. You seem to be woefully unaware of the literature in these fields. But again, unless you are consistent in your claims of equivalency this does not address the issue at hand.

I am not arguing for absolute moral certainty — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Without absolute moral certainty there is only relativism.

I am arguing that the absolute moral truth exists. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Are you certain?

My question is that if we invented morality why would we not use it to justify the actions we are currently doing instead of placing a goal that we will fall short of? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

There is no moral justification without morals. Some moral claim or principle is what we use to justify or condemn an action. We do not invent morals is order to fall short but to guide our actions.

a relativist like that would just say that it doesn't matter how we act at all. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

"A relativist like that" is not a relativist like me. I have made it clear that it does matter how we act. After all that I have said, if all that you have to resort to is this mischaracterization of my position then I will take this as an admission of your failure to do what you set out to do. Less charitably, but perhaps more accurately, I will take it as evidence that you have failed to understand what moral relativism is in its more developed, more defensible form.

First, hinge-propositions, or what I call basic beliefs or foundational beliefs (foundation carries other baggage though), are outside any of our epistemological considerations (I think this is an accurate interpretation of W.), so they (the hinges) don't require any justification, nor can they be said to be true or false. — Sam26

I think this overstates the case. It is not that they can't be said to be true or false. They are accepted as true and further justification is not needed. As hinge propositions they are what justification hinges on.

But we need to look at his depiction of knowledge via the analogies of the Heraclitian river and relativity, that is, the rejection of some fixed, unmoving point:

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. But at one time "the Sun revolves around the Earth" was a hinge proposition. It was not simply a matter of correcting a mistake. The fate of man hinged on it.

This is exactly my view. Do you disagree with this premise? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Have you not understood anything I have said? Of course I disagree.

Again if no one on Earth ever condemned genocide would it be the right thing to do? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Since I am one of those people on Earth my views would likely be the same as everyone else.

Why would you not find it persuasive? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

My reasons are based on empathy and what I value.

Historical facts are not actual facts, they are our most probable guess based on evidence. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Based on this analogy, where are no moral facts, only probable guesses.

My point is that a lack of knowledge does not constitute a lack of fact. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

And my point is that a fact that no one knows cannot be appealed to as a fact.

Also you all seem to be ignoring the absolutes that we agree on. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

What we do not agree on is that they are absolutes.

We do this because certain, basic, moral principles are understood universally, such as human life should be protected, or one should never cause another undue pain. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

No matter how many times you repeat the same thing it does not thereby become true. These things are evidently not universally understood given the fact that human life is not always protected and often taken.

You are arguing that ending suffering should be more valuable that preserving life, are you not? If this is the case where did your idea of this come from? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

You miss the point. I am not arguing that one is more valuable than the other. Moral principles come into conflict. Neither choice is good. Both choices conflict with a moral principle. Some will hold that life is more important but others believe that to allow suffering is intolerable.

But it seems that morality is the only discipline in which we take disagreements to mean there is no answer. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

In any discipline where there is disagreement an absolute answer has not been determined. In some cases an answer will be found but until or unless it is found the proposed answers are relative not absolute.

Morality is studied, even by self proclaimed relativists, why would we do such a thing if there was no answer? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

We must make choices. Moral deliberation is about making choices in the absence of clear answers.

Also consider this if morality was invented by humanity how did we come to set a moral standard that is impossible for humans to reach? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

What moral standard is that? This is not something a moral relativist would do.

Just because we don't know the answer to is abortion wrong does not mean there is no answer. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Not only do we not know the answer we do not even know if there is an answer. In either case, if we do not know the answer then whatever position we take is relative not absolute. Once again you have not refuted relativism you have confirmed it.

Yet you accept that these are true because they are the most probable explanation. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think you are becoming confused about what side you are on. Absolute and most probable are not the same.

Also apodictic is defined as clearly established or beyond dispute by the dictionary. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Yes, and since moral claims are not clearly established or beyond dispute they are not apodictic, that is, necessarily true or logically certain. In other words, the are not absolutes.

Can you make an argument for a scenario in which genocide is a good thing? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Yes, but not one that I would find persuasive.

2. Things that are invention of the human mind do not exist in reality. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Look around you. There are many things that are inventions of the human mind. We are communicating on one right now.

3. Therefore morality does not exist in reality. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Morality does exist in reality. We deal with moral issues every day. What neither you nor anyone else has been able to establish is the reality of a transcendent realm of timeless, changeless, universal moral truths.

Except for the fact that you have not proven 1 to be true, this seems like solid logic. Where I get confused is how you get from "morality does not exist in reality" to you should not kill babies. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

First of all, I did not say that morality does not exist. Second, it is not a question of whether babies should be killed but of whether it is ever justified. There are serious medical conditions that are irreversible and lead to a life of continuous extreme pain and suffering. In my opinion, it would be immoral to allow such a life to continue. Third, I make a distinction between an embryo, early stage fetus, and a baby.

Can you please explain how we should always do the moral thing if there is no such thing as a moral thing? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

This depends on what you mean by "moral thing". If one holds the moral thing to be that thing that they regard as right or good, then there is no problem; one does what they regard as proper. You seem to mean that thing that is good or right without regard to whether anyone knows or accepts it as such. In that case we may not be doing the moral thing even if we are absolute in our conviction that we are.

You did not answer the question:

So by what argument do you demonstrate that certain moral claims are apodictically true and others false? — Fooloso4

If you cannot demonstrate this you cannot refute moral relativism.

The only way to argue these moral dilemmas is to appeal to an unyielding moral absolute. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Our agreement that killing innocent babies is wrong or genocide is wrong is not an appeal to a moral absolute, it merely indicates that we are in agreement on these issues. Our agreement does not yield an absolute answer to the disagreement on abortion. The failure to provide an absolute answer means that all we have to go on are relative answers that cannot be agreed on.

We do not ordinarily argue that 2+2=4. But when it comes to questions of morality there is a great deal of disagreement. So by what argument do you demonstrate that certain moral claims are apodictically true and others false? By what reason or logic can you show that abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, and stem cell research are either right or wrong, good or bad so that everyone will see that this is the case as with 2+2 and thus put an end to all such disagreement?

All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth. — frank

The first thing I look for when interpreting a statement is to read it in context. Although this is attributed to Nietzsche, it appears he did not say this. In the collection of notes Will to Power) we find:

Against positivism, which halts at phenomena-"There are only facts"-I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing.
"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is.- Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.- "Perspectivism."
It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. — WtP 481

As I interpret this, Nietzsche is not setting interpretation over and against truth. It is not simply that those in power say what truth is. It is that the desire for truth, our needs, our drives, is itself is will to power. It is not simply what those in power impose on others but it is also internal, one drive against another.

But shouldn't the truth, by virtue of being the truth, exert some power of its own? — frank

This is an age old question. It is the heart of Socrates battle with Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic. Plato plays off of the different senses of strength between Thrasymachus' sense of the advantage of the stronger in both its political and rhetorical aspects and Socrates' appeal to the stronger argument. The stronger argument is the argument that persuades, but persuasion and coercion are not clearly distinct as we can see with such expressions as the force of the argument. A skillful speaker can may win an argument, but winning an argument does not mean that one has established the truth. We can see this in political, legal, and philosophical arguments. It should not be overlooked that Socrates was not above using sophistical arguments himself.

In the Rhetoric Aristotle says:

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites ...

but then goes on to say:

Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct.

Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways
(for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him.

Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend
himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs.

He concludes:

A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

Rhetoric is important not only to learn to persuade others of the truth but to counteract those who are skillful in using argument against the truth.

I've started reading some Geuss and like it a lot. So far, the gist seems to be that 'politics is not applied ethics' because there is no universal ethics that can be applied. — praxis

In the introduction to "Outside Ethics" he says the essays are bound by:

... a shared skepticism about a particular way of thinking about what is important in human life which I take to be characteristic of contemporary European societies.

That particular way of thinking is one that is timeless and universal. His particular way of thinking about what is important in human life is historical or genealogical.

what, exactly, do I (the teacher) what them to know or be able to do when I've done? — tim wood

What I aim to do is make my role unnecessary, for the students to be able to do what I did and in some cases to do it better. What I want them to know about any particular book depends on that book. For example, one thing I want them to know when reading Plato's Republic is that the Forms are images. This is an exact reversal of the way they are presented. That this is so requires a careful reading of the text. The reason I want them to know this is because it leads to reflection on what the activity of philosophy is about and what it accomplishes. Briefly, it is the quest for wisdom and always falls short. That is part of what Socrates calls human wisdom. The other part is how we are to lead the examined life, how can we aim to do what is best if we do not know what is best.

I, myself, have some problems with Aristotle (not just him) in that I read, comprehend, understand, get, but when I put down the book and try to review what I've just read, most of it has just flowed away. — tim wood

This is a problem, especially if one is doing it on his own. Reading something and then discussing it helps enforce it. For whatever reason there are some things I remember, but I have always resisted having to memorize facts.

How about: "When things are put into water, things become wet"; or, "when shapes are round, they have no sharp edges". — StreetlightX

On the one hand you claim that character and morality are of no importance and on the other when it is pointed out how they are factors in policy deliberation you claim that it is obvious.

You can continue floundering and covering it up with insults and noise but I am done.

Oh gee whiz bad people will do bad things wow such insight so wise.

Lowest. common. denominator. — StreetlightX

This has nothing to do with anything I actually said, but your response is a fine example of the problem of reasoned deliberation that I did address.

This structure sounds perfectly sensible. Could you incorporate that into an online discussion ? — Amity

Yes, but the anonymity of online discuss can be problematic. While there are some who remain silent in class who feel comfortable speaking online, there are others who become rude who would not otherwise.

Well then, good teacher, if I brought you an apple would you open up for me the 'Rhetoric' ? — Amity

At some other time I might have agreed, but not now and have doubts about doing so on this forum.

I added another comment to my last post.

Imagine thinking immigration policy is a result of either charatcter or morality. — StreetlightX

It is not a matter of it being the result of character or morality but of the fact that they factor into one's own views on what that policy should be. Someone who has little or no regard for the plight of others will favor policies that keep them out. Someone who is xenophobic will favor policies that keep them out. Someone who believes that we should help those is need will favor policies that allow them entry.

A factor is not the whole of the matter. There are other considerations as well - security, economic impact, overpopulation, and so on. It is about the relative weight one gives to these competing factors.

But some are not capable of doing this. They are incapable of or have limited capacity for reasoned deliberation. They are governed by fear or hatred or anger or sentiment or ideology or self-certainty.

So, how far have you got with Aristotle's Rhetoric ? — Amity

Not very far. I got side-tracked. I found a transcript of a class by Leo Strauss on the Rhetoric, started reading that and then got side tracked from that.

... is your memory so well-trained that it can retain such without marking them out in some physical manner ? — Amity

My memory ain't what it used to be. If I was working on something I would underline, but on first reading usually not. Rather than remember exactly what I read I would often remember roughly where in the book I read it so I could go back and find it.

From what you say about writing things out, it sounds like you must make and take notes when you are working on something. — Amity

Yes, but in general I don't make marginal notes. It tends to lock me into a particular way of looking at the text.

If you were to teach this text, how would you structure the process ? — Amity

Pretty much the same as with any other text. Two interrelated paths. One is to do an analysis and synthesis of the text. Start at the beginning, identify key passages, break them down in order to figure out what is being say, and as we move forward make connections from passage to passage. The other is to discuss key ideas.

I'm not sure what you mean by the part I have bolded. Where do you go for practice and discover what is possible, in what respect ? Inside your own head ? So, what have others done - what others ? — Amity

Discovering that there may be far more than what at first meets the eye. A good teacher opens the book up so you can enter a world that is not apparent to the casual reader, and can help you do the same by way of example.

So, that is what happens in a forum discussion. — Amity

Ideally it is, but the reality is often different. Too often it becomes an intransigent clash of opinion and a need to win the argument, to demonstrate one's own superiority.

So, how or where would you start dissecting Aristotle's Rhetoric ? — Amity

The book begins:

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic

That is where I would start. Again, along two tracks. How does he explain and support this? What follows from this? How does this inform one's own reading and writing?

Which edition are you reading ? — Amity

http://www.bocc.ubi.pt/pag/Aristotle-rhetoric.pdf translated by W. Rhys Roberts

What secondary resources are there to be used as guidance ? — Amity

I don't know. I don't recall what led me to start reading it but I did so without surveying the secondary literature.

Which ones do you trust ? — Amity

As I mentioned above, I found the transcript of Strauss's class. I trust him. My approach is modeled on his, but his discussion is a continuation of the discussions from other classes.

How would reading Aristotle's Rhetoric help in getting to 'know thyself' ? — Amity

As with the "examined life", to know oneself is a lifelong pursuit. Perhaps a consideration of the role persuasion plays in your life.

Do you have a specific purpose in a re-read ? — Amity

I think I read something else by someone whose opinions I value emphasize how important it is and how it is neglected, and so, I was curious.

Added:

On persuasion and self-knowledge - I often find myself making cutting remarks only to delete them before posting. They are not likely to be persuasive and often have the opposite effect, making others more combative.

When politics is confused with morality, people fucking die. Morality is for those who can't think. — StreetlightX

Your understanding of morality seems to be as impoverished as your understanding of character. The irony is that you object to Trump's putting children in cages, but that is not a morally neutral objection and the decision to do so is directly related to his amoral character. If morality is irrelevant than why are you not indifferent to people fucking dying?

Streetlight thinks we ought to change the topic of the thread to discuss politics rather than character. But we're the peanut gallery here, and we like to think we're judging the politician's character, not the politician's policies. There's no fun in the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it is a false dichotomy.

Not interested in hypotheticals. — StreetlightX

A feeble dodge.

There's nothing more disempowering than moral outrage. — Janus

Really? Did moral outrage have nothing to do with ending the Vietnam war? Do you think it is moral indifference that fuels efforts to reverse reproductive laws and attempts to make law based on religious beliefs? Do you think significant changes in environmental protection will be the result of moral indifference?

Trump is out there putting people in cages and Plutocrtizing the cabinet and someome thinks the most appropriate response is to extensively cite milennia old dead people on virtue ethics and the subtleties of Machiavelli. It's almost like you want Trump to win. The US burning down might not be such a bad thing after all. It'd take a bunch of political incompetants with it. — StreetlightX

I was responding to your claims about character. Far from being the stuff of gossip magazines, TV reality shows, and children's fairytales, it is an essential part of political philosophy and practice.

Concern for character does not preclude opposition to what Trump does, which, of course, is based on his character. Do you think he would put people in cages and make wealth the criterion for holding political power if he had any regard for anyone but himself?

It is not simply a matter of Trump's character but of the character of whoever it is we vote into office. Suppose candidate X puts forth policy proposals that you agree with, but X is not trustworthy and his actions raise serious questions about whether he has any intention of doing what he proposes to. Will you vote for him because you like the policies he is running on?

Character is for gossip magazines, TV reality shows, and children's fairytales. — StreetlightX

You are confusing character and personality. One can present a persona but one's character is, as the etymology of the word makes clear something very different. It is what marks a person for what they are.

Only the politically infantilized talk about character as if it meant anything at all. — StreetlightX

It was of fundamental importance for Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics.

Good Guys and Bad Guys. — StreetlightX

Machiavelli teaches political leaders:

... to be able not to be good and to use or not use that knowledge according to necessity

Machiavelli's subtly is easily and often overlooked. It is only political leaders who are good who needs to be taught not to be good. Political leaders who are bad must learn how not to use that knowledge, that is, how not to be bad. According to necessity means what is necessary to be and remain a prince. This is not what is it is commonly assumed to be. It is not advocating self-interest, for he takes that as a given. It is about satisfying the people's own self-interests, the desire for freedom, peace, and prosperity.
In other words, Machiavelli teaches how not to be good in order to do good.

In his Discourse on Livy Machiavelli says:

The criterion of character afforded by a man's manners and conversation is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is far inferior to that afforded by his actions ...

... nothing helps so much to make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth, whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good, and show him to be so magnanimous, generous, and just, that he may well pass into a proverb among his subjects.

One would do well to learn that the discussion of political character of leaders is not to be found in gossip magazines, TV reality shows, and children's fairytales, but in reading the classics of political philosophy.

Character? My God no wonder the world is burning. — StreetlightX

Just what is it that you think character entails and why do you think it does not matter?

Yes, the character of the regime. I agree with Plato regarding the degeneration of democracy and tyranny. It is only in such a condition that someone like Trump could be elected.

But modern American democracy is not the same as ancient democracy. It is a mixed regime and may be able to correct its course. If, as some say, Trump is just a symptom then it is a symptom that has its own causal consequences. One sign for hopefulness is the faction at Fox News over the impeachment inquiry. If Fox is an important opinion maker and opinions at Fox differ then, without a consistent, unified message some will give more weight to those who report the news rather than to those who spin it and the difference will become more obvious.

The importance of the impeachment is something that will become more apparent as things develop, not simply with regard to extent of the corruption of this administration but with regard to larger questions of governance and political philosophy.

This makes no sense. It should be evident from my posts in this topic that I strongly oppose Trump and what he does. Everything he does is determined by his character. The same is true for the rest of us.

Do you think that Warren's reform platform is independent of her character? Would she propose such things if they did not reflect her values, public spiritedness, and regard for others? Would her promises mean anything if she lacked honesty and integrity?

'Character' is another distraction made for dupes. Consider instead giving a shit about — StreetlightX

Do you not see the disconnect? If Trump's interests were not limited to self-interest he would give a shit about such things and would not roll back regulations regarding work conditions and the environment, and would not support the move to determine the make up of the judiciary along ideological lines. It is his character that determines what he does.

... stop pathologizing Trump... — StreetlightX

I agree. A true pathology would absolve him of responsibility.

Trump is a perfectly normal American person. — StreetlightX

Rather than getting into the question of what is normal in its various senses I think it is more productive to focus on what is, as a minimum, acceptable behavior for the president.

The character of a person should be given much consideration when deciding who would be a suitable president. When expediency is prized and character ignored we end up with someone like Trump. When public spiritedness is regarded as a quaint notion that plays no part in political realities we end up with someone who is avaricious, self-serving, and vindictive, we end up with Trump.