When someone looks at a post-box and says "I know the post-box is red", what they really mean is that when looking at the post-box they have the sense impression red. — RussellA

Speaking as someone, that is not at all what I mean. What I really mean is that I am able to distinguish between post-boxes that are red and post-boxes that are not.

What do you really mean when you say you have the sense impression red? How do you know it is red? Do you compare it to a red post-box? Does your sense impression emit light at a wavelength of 750nm?

When someone says that they know something about which they have no direct knowledge, the sceptic is justified in asking for a reason. — RussellA

What serves as direct knowledge that a post-box is red? A sense impression? That may be direct knowledge of the sense impression but the sense impression is not the post-box. Only the post-box can serve as the source of direct knowledge of the color of the post-box.

"Here is a hand" is true IFF here is a hand. What more empirical a demonstration could there be than Moore waving his hand at you? — Banno

OC 3:
If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This
possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

It does not go any deeper than looking and seeing.

I think Wittgenstein is being playful: "look closer". The problem is not with what is seen, it is with thinking there is good reason to doubt it.

The skeptic has it backwards, believing that reason is the ground and arbiter; that in order to know that there is a hand here we must satisfy the doubts raised by reason.

... we might be secretly wired differently. — frank

Shhh. I want to keep my secret wiring a secret.

I have not presented a philosophical outlook. My comments were intended to point to the problem faced in asking the question. It you are asking whether your mind-o-vision would provide a clear answer to the question, perhaps; although there may still be problems with the identify of brain-states and subjective experience.

There is general agreement about the frequency range on the light spectrum for red. If we can identify specific areas of the brain that light up when we see specific colors, I assume, given our biological make-up that they would be the same. But if my perception of color had been altered as in the example then the area of my brain that lit up would be the area associated with green. Practically speaking though, this would not be a problem. I would still be able to identify colors and call them what everyone else does.

You might find this interesting: https://aeon.co/essays/does-consciousness-come-from-the-brains-electromagnetic-field

The what thing in your what? — bongo fury

I was responding to your question:

In front of you, or inside you? — bongo fury

Is this the beetle story? — bongo fury

I don't think it is helpful to introduce one problem as the solution to another.

It is clear that you do not see that and why my original response was a philosophical joke.

SO is On Certainty about what it is to show as opposed to tell? — Banno

Well, not in the Tractarian sense of the terms.

Wonder if it is worth a new thread...? — Banno

I would be interested.

Thank you for confirming my suspicion that Bloom did not call him a martyr. The passage does not say in what way it might be useful. I think it has to do with his being law abiding. Given the tension between Socrates and the city, demonstrating that the philosopher is not higher than the law was very helpful.

Notice that these three figures are all great men characterized by tragedy ... — Todd Martin

Whether Socrates death was a tragedy requires a longer discussion about philosophy, tragedy, and comedy. If I remember correctly Bloom has a few things to say about this. And note that the reasons you cite:

he is old, because it is inevitable, and because it costs him almost nothing — Todd Martin

and

it would be unjust for him to have benefitted all his life from Athens, then turn around and negate her lawfully conducted jurisdiction. — Todd Martin

'
say nothing about martyrdom.

But what greater degree of harm can one do to something other than by undermining its foundation? — Todd Martin

Does this mean you would have found him guilty? Athens was not in good health.

And the idea that Socrates, after a lifetime of philosophizing, suddenly felt guilty after being indicted and was willing to be put to death seems rather silly . — Todd Martin

I agree, it is rather silly, but I did not say anything about feeling guilty. That is your conjecture. 'Pharmakon' means both a medicine and and a poison. It can bring both benefit and harm. Socrates plays with this dual meaning in the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Consider also the destabilizing effect Socrates had on his interlocutors and him calling himself a physician of the soul.

The Dark Ages were not lacking in philosophy. — Todd Martin

Yes, but I was referring to modern philosophy. [Edit: when I said: "Modern philosophy and science overcame the domination of the Church." Medieval philosophy is often described as the handmaid to theology, 'ancilla theologiae']

But the Renaissance scientists were busy contradicting Aristotle. — Todd Martin

Right. This marks the transition from ancient to modern.

After many centuries of stasis, it was the political philosophers, not the natural ones, who dared/decided to shake things up. — Todd Martin

It was both. The Copernican Revolution (Copernicus, 1473-1543) changed man's view of the universe and his place in it. He was no longer the center of the universe.

It is not an argument I can't challenge. It is a weak and sophomoric argument. It is an argument I won't spend my time and energy challenging.

In front of you, or inside you? — bongo fury

This presupposes a problematic representational theory of perception. I do not see two things - the thing in front of me and the thing in my mind.

The other things it is (colour-wise) like? — bongo fury

Suppose something happened to me when I was very young and my perception of color was altered. What I previously saw as red I now see as green. This happened long enough ago when I was young enough not to remember it happening. But I was thought to call this "green" sample in front of me "red". Although I see it differently than you do, there is no way for either of us to know that.

There are too many questionable assumptions here posing as facts that it is pointless to argue with you.

This is why I prefaced my remarks with the quote from Wittgenstein.

From Stanford:

"The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that “the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata,” then it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent definition.

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat."https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

It is not Moore's statements about his hand that function as a hinge. If Moore's propositions about his hands are hinges then what revolves around them? Most people do not know who Moore is. It makes little or no difference if he claimed to have hands. Not much hinges on the statements that any of us make about having hands.
It is the fact of our having hands around which things pivot. Our doing things with our hands, our holding tools and other things designed for hands. Even our statements about hands hinge on our having hands.

Suppose you show me a sample of a red paint chip. I agree that this is what I call red, but this does not get us any further. What I am seeing, what it looks like to me is not something I can show you. We have learned to call this sample 'red' but this is as far as we can get.

A sign, to be a sign, needs a sign writer, yes? — Bartricks

Yes, but the question of who wrote it cannot be ignored. Your claim is that God wrote it. So, where is it written and how do you know God wrote it?

quote="Bartricks;521155"]You are making an unrelated point, namely that sometimes the signs seem to contradict.[/quote]

It has direct bearing on the issue because we find various claims that contradict each other. They could not all have been written by God.

I don't know. Show me your red.
— Fooloso4

You're saying I can't, because it's private? — bongo fury

I'm saying there is no way to compare. Anything that you show me would be something that I see.

Imagine you come across two freshly painted signs next to each other. One says "keep out" and the other says "welcome". You conclude that someone doesn't want me to go any further and someone wants you to come in. One sign painter may have the authority to keep you out or invite you in and the other doesn't. Who painted the signs and what was on the sign painter's mind makes a difference.

Analogously, like the different signs, we have different books claiming to be the work of God making different commands. Which one you choose to follow is up to you. This is not a matter of God's subjectivity but your own. The fact that you did not paint the signs or write the books does not mean that God rather than some other person did. Your imagined scenario has not demonstrated that it is God's and not human's subjectivity at work.

Thus, moral norms and values are composed of the prescribing and proscribing and valuing activity of an external mind. And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks

Are you claiming to know the mind of God? Or simply the moral norms and values given to us? And if the latter, how do you know that whichever moral norms and values you choose are God's own and those that are said to come from God but differ from your own are not?

"Is my red your red"?

I don't know. Show me your red.

A prefae to the remarks that follow:

Wittgenstein: “The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight” [CV, p. 47].

Just as shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk, the language used by philosophers makes it difficult to think.

I think that what Wittgenstein is trying to show is that there is both something correct and something wrong in the claims of knowledge, certainty, doubt, and skepticism.

Foundations are not incompatible with relativism. They only become incompatible under certain definitions and with certain expectations. To illustrate the point here are four hinges:

1) The Earth is flat
2) The Sun revolves around the Earth
3) The Earth is a sphere
4) The Earth revolves around the Sun

The first two at one time functioned as hinge propositions but were later shown to be false. A great deal hinged on them, a whole system of beliefs that were overturned. But the fact that it they formed a coherent picture of the world should not be overlooked

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges. Hinges are fixed, but some are more permanent than others.

The skeptic is right to the extent that he points to the limits of knowledge, but wrong to doubt everything. The philosopher is right to point out that there are things we know, but wrong in some of the claims about what knowledge entails. Interpreters are misled when they consider only some of the cases Wittgenstein examines and ignore others, and mistaken in their assumption that Wittgenstein is articulating a theory of this or that.

A striking example of Wittgenstein's skepticism for the Tractatus:

5.634
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

6.36311
It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

I don't think he ever rejects this.

how would Socrates’ acceptance of death because he was already naturally so close to it show that he wasn’t lying about the daimon? — Todd Martin

The suspicion is that Socrates was lying about his daimon. He said it always guided him and kept him from doing harm. But he says being being condemned to death did not harm him. Xenophon begins his Apology by saying: "But what they didn’t make clear—and without it his boastfulness is bound to appear ill-considered—is this: he had already concluded that for him death was preferable to life."

I think your point is that he had someone to live for. — Todd Martin

My point is that he was not so old as to be incapable or uninterested in sex. That does not match up with the picture of an old man about to die.

Nevertheless, it could reasonably be expected to come in the ensuing years — Todd Martin

How many years? Would those years be worth living? Wouldn't those years be spent philosophizing with his friends? Perhaps not if his health significantly declines, but such decline is not inevitable. Xenophon was no fool. I don't think that any of this should be taken at face value. There may be more to this, but if there is and what it is requires a careful look at the texts. I have not done this so will leave it an open question.

yet he chose to die despite all the appeals of his friends that he live. — Todd Martin

Socrates said that philosophy is preparation for death. I think he did more for his friends by being obedient to the law and showing that because of the life he lived he had no fear of death.

Bloom meant that Socrates chose to be philosophy’s martyr — Todd Martin

I would be very surprised to learn that this is Bloom's view.

I don’t know the exact timeline on these matters — Todd Martin

Machiavelli died 1527. Galileo was born 1564. Francis Bacon was born 1561

natural philosophy was coming to the fore — Todd Martin

Natural philosophy was already prominent, guided by the work of "the philosopher", that is, Aristotle. I think that what changed was the beginning of a new chapter in the conflict between reason and revelation. Between the ancient and modern world there is the Christian middle ages. The claims of reason were regarded as inferior to the claims of revelation. Modern philosophy and science overcame the domination of the Church.

But philosophy, true philosophy, cannot be made safe for the city — Todd Martin

I think there will always be a tension, but what Plato learned was how philosophy could avoid the fate of Socrates. Later philosophers learned this as well. They developed salutary public teachings while hiding their true teachings in the text. Allan Bloom knew all about this through his teacher Leo Strauss.

Which is evidence that Plato never believed his imaginary city was practicable. — Todd Martin

Right.

What he meant to do was show us the ideal city; the theoretical one by which all practical ones would be measured. — Todd Martin

I don't agree with this. I think it is a warning against ideal cities. The breeding program alone should be enough to warn us off. Beginning with Glaucon's objection that it is a city suited for pigs, we are led to see that what is best in speech is not what it fit for human beings.

I am not aware of any harm the ancient physicians caused the city. — Todd Martin

It is an analogy. The physician treats the body with medicines that are to some degree harmful but restore and promote health. Socrates harmed the city by undermining its foundations, but he did so to promote the city's health. To make it more just and reasonable.

I think the question of why Socrates did not defend himself is an interesting and important one. Perhaps it is an admission of guilt and an acknowledgement of the threat of philosophy, that it undermines the foundations of the city. It was necessary for the just city, the city in speech, that it be a new beginning, populated by the young. But real cities must be a continuation of the city as it already exists. The harm caused by Socrates, like the harm caused by medicine, was a necessary harm for the benefit of the city.

Allan Bloom speculates that Socrates chose death over exile for two reasons: “because he was old [and therefore had little opportunity left for philosophizing], and because it [his death] might just help philosophy.” — Todd Martin

On the first reason, from Xenophon's Memorabilia IV. 8.1:
"If anyone thinks that Socrates is proven to have lied about his daimon because the jury condemned him to death when he stated that a divinity revealed to him what he should and should not do, then let him take note of two things: first, that Socrates was so far advanced in age that he would have died soon, if not then; and second, that he escaped the most bitter part of life, when all men's mental powers diminish."

I am not sure this can be taken at face value. First, we know from the Phaedo that he had a young son, and second, there are no accounts, as far as I know, in either Plato or Xenophon of any infirmity.
,
On the second, does Bloom explain how this might help philosophy?

As you have noted, Machiavelli was primarily speaking to future—not princes, but rather philosophers. — Todd Martin

It is not only would be philosophers who read Machiavelli. Those who seek power find him very helpful. This would not have been unexpected by Machiavelli. In addition, as you pointed out, the rulers establish the conditions for political/public life. By instructing the rulers Machiavelli helps shape the conditions in which the philosopher is free to follow his pursuits.

... if we only benefit them enough to otherwise leave us alone to our austere study? — Todd Martin

The theme of mutual benefit reoccurs throughout the history of philosophy. We see it in the Republic with the ironic definition of justice as minding your own business. But the goal is not simply to make the city safe for philosophy but to make philosophy safe for the city.

My mistake. I only looked at the post to see if the quote was correct. I assumed, perhaps wrongly, that an accurate quote would not be taken to mean the opposite of what it says.

This leads Mww puzzling over the mistaken metaphor as to whether the house is built on its foundations or the foundations built under the house. — Banno

This is not the metaphor and it is not mistaken. Wittgenstein knew a thing or two about architecture and engineering. What he says is:

248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.'....”

It is not that the foundations are built under the house. or that there are fixed foundations upon which the house is built (see Descartes) but rather:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

I suggest Machiavelli was not simply addressing Lorenzo but intended to instruct not only future princes but future philosophers. It is not simply a question of whether Lorenzo might fear him but of the ruler fearing the wise. Consider, for example, Xenophon's Hiero. Machiavelli held Xenophon in very high regard.

Yes, he was trying for the princes favor. That is consistent with everything I have said. And yes, he hoped for gain in return. That is consistent with Machiavelli's teachings.

Right, Stilbo did not wish merely to change himself but to draw closer to the Good, that is, to be good. Hence :

... a way of life devoted to virtue, excellence, and spiritual development — Fooloso4

And now I submit the same question to you: is the philosopher more like Stilbo or Machiavelli?

A key passage in OC is a quote from Goethe's Faust:

"In the beginning was the deed." (OC 402)

This is expanded upon:

"But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal." (OC 359)

"I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination. " (OC 475)

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.

something changed in the way they viewed the world — Todd Martin

What changed is that Machiavelli was not guided by the image of the Good. As a member of the Megarian school above all else he sought the Good. The Good played no role in Machiavelli's view of nature and man. He takes man as he is rather than according to some ideal to be achieved.

Descartes marks the difference between the ancient and modern in the third of his provisional maxims from the Discourse on Method. He begins: "My third maxim was always to try to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world ...". The maxim is provisional because what he actually intends to do is move the world with his Archimedean point (Meditations). Machiavelli too sought to conquer fortune rather than himself.

We do not have any writings of Stilbo, but it is clear that Machiavelli was a skilled rhetorician. His gift to Lorenzo was the one things ruler's most value, knowledge of how to rule. But any ruler who desires to stay in power will naturally be wary of someone who claims to have this knowledge because they pose a threat. So Machiavelli plays the part of the humble, ordinary citizen who has suffered greatly, that is, a weak man who would pose no threat to a prince.

If we agree with Nietzsche that the philosopher is a creator and legislator (Beyond Good and Evil, chapter 6, We Scholars) then I think Machiavelli takes the title. While ostensibly he instructs the politically ambitious how to gain and maintain power, like Nietzsche, he knows where the real power lies. that is, in shaping the hearts and minds of generation after generation.

If, on the other hand, we take philosophy to be a way of life devoted to virtue, excellence, and spiritual development then perhaps the nod goes to the equanimous Stilbo. He was powerless to change fortune but demonstrated great power in his ability to change himself.

It seems to be more about ego with you than getting to the truth about what Wittgenstein is saying. — Sam26

It is actually the exact opposite. Given the hostility and resentment I think it best that I do what I had intended to do and leave.

We can justifiably deny that his foot is not a hand — magritte

I'm not sure I follow. Why would we deny that his foot is not a hand?

And yes, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation, but whether it's a hinge or not is. — Sam26

Wittgenstein is clear:

"The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: 'Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn.'" (655)

It is also clear that 2x2=4 is a mathematical proposition (10) just as 12x12=144 is:

"In the first place there is the fact that "12x12 etc." is a mathematical proposition". (654)

I really do not want to get stuck on this point. I think this is clear and unambiguous. If you don't then there is nothing more I can say or show from the text.

Sam, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation.

Fooloso4 We disagree and that's fine, but I'm moving on to continue the analysis. — Sam26

Interpretative differences are to be expected, but there really should be no disagreement over whether it is true that 2x2=4. One interpretive rule I follow is that when my interpretation contradicts the text, the interpretation and not the text should be altered. But by all means continue in any way you see fit.

I think a better approach would be to let go of Moore's hand for a moment and look at what was said about mathematical propositions.They are hinge propositions and true. If this is correct then it cannot be true that all hinge propositions are neither true nor false.

That is an important point and should not be overlooked.

If Moore's propositions or hinges cannot be known, it follows that there are no grounds/justification or reasons/evidence to say they are true. — Sam26

Wittgenstein points to many ways in which the term "know" is used and some ways it is misused. If Moore held up his hand as said: "This is a hand" we could look and confirm that it is indeed a hand. If he raised his hand and said instead: "This is a foot" we would know that it is not a foot. We have no difficulty distinguishing a hand and foot. We know what a hand is and what a foot is.

That Moore does not hold up his foot and say "This is a hand" is significant. He does, after all, know the difference.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4. — Sam26

There is nothing unclear about the proposition: "It's false that 2+2=4." It is clearly false.

What is unclear is how we could learn mathematics if mathematical propositions are neither true nor false. We are not taught that 2+2=4 is neither true not false or 2+2= n for any number is neither true nor false.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false?
— Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas. — Sam26

Wittgenstein clearly states that 2x2=4 is a true proposition of arithmetic. He also clearly states mathematical propositions are hinge propositions. From this it should be clear that what follows is that at least some hinge propositions, namely mathematical propositions, are true. Moore, so to speak, has no hand in the truth of mathematical propositions.

If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. — Sam26

We do not question their truth we accept it.

Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology. — Sam26

Perhaps you get far enough that you will have to confront this:

248: "And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house." — Fooloso4

In order to understand this you should attend to this:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. — Fooloso4

But all this really is disruptive of the narrative you are developing. So carry on.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false". — Banno

12x12=144 is indubitable, but that does not mean that it is not true that 12x12=144.

The truth or falsity of hinge concepts cannot be called into question and remain hinges, but that does not mean that the propositions themselves are not true.

I am reminded of a joke Wittgenstein once made: "we are not crazy, we are doing philosophy".

There is a good deal of disagreement as what stands as a hinge proposition, as a review of the literature shows. Part of the problem is a lack of examples. The point I made is that 655 is the only example explicitly called a hinge proposition. This does not mean that mathematical hinges are the only hinges.

Before any of this I gave an example of what I think Wittgenstein means by a hinge proposition:

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

Sam denies that it is.

I cited the example at 655 because Sam claims that:

What makes something a hinge is not what people accept as true or false, which are epistemological ideas, but they are concepts that lie outside our epistemological concepts of true and false, and what it means to know. — Sam26

This is not only an incontestable example of a hinge proposition, more importantly it is contrary to what Sam has claimed. It is true that 12x12=144. Or do you too deny this?

I am well aware of 340 and 341, I cited them.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do.

I will leave, but my claim is not that it is the only example of a hinge proposition. It is the only example in the text specifically identified as such. I did not state the point clearly, I thought it would be understood, but clarified it in my next post:

This is the only example of a hinge proposition that is given. — Fooloso4

I'll stick around long enough for you or him to provide another example identified as such in the text.

Sam's account in the post immediately before the one here quoted answers your scepticism...or at least points to the answer found in OC. — Banno

This is wrong. I could explain why but I will not interfere.

When you said in your first post:

... as we examine On Certainty — Sam26

I did not think by "we" you meant you.

This area of the forum, as the heading indicates, is for philosophical discussion.

Moore has found something significant though, and Wittgenstein respects Moore's for this. Moore has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements (Moorean statements or facts). They seem to provide a kind of foundational belief that is not only fundamental to epistemology, but fundamental to language. — Sam26

I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. More importantly, this traditional picture of foundations is rejected by Wittgenstein. He reverses the order:

248: "And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house."