According to the transcript the favor was actually regarding “the server” which I suspect is the Hacked DNC server — NOS4A2

Accord to the transcript the favor was:

... to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine ...

Trump then mentions CrowdStrike, but Adam Meyer's, vice president of intelligence at CrowdStrike, is as puzzled as everyone else as to what Trump was talking about. The cyber-security firm found that Russia hacked the DNC server. Trump's own Justice Department confirmed this, but Trump would prefer that there be a conspiracy with a missing server. Only there is no evidence to support his conspiracy theory. Trump then goes on to talk about the "very good prosecutor" who was shut down, suggesting that this was part of the cover up of "this whole situation".

He mentioned Biden only in passing — NOS4A2

What the transcript says is:

The other thing,There's a lot of. talk about Biden's son, that Biden stopped the prosecution ...

That goes far beyond mentioning him in passing. The claim is that Biden stopped the prosecution. That puts him in the middle of "this whole situation".

Hunter Biden ... — NOS4A2

So, Biden is mentioned "only in passing" but you think this is something that should be looked into. Whether or not it should be looked into, and by whom, it does not change the fact that there is an inquiry into Trump. Even if Hunter Biden and those who hired him are guilty of some unnamed impropriety, this does not exonerate Trump. This is nothing more than a childish and inept diversion tactic.

The transcript is only part of a larger story. According to the transcript Trump says:

I heard you had a prosecutor who· was very·good and he was shut down and that's really unfair. A lot of people are talking about that, the way they shut your very good prosecutor down and you had some very bad people involved.

A lot of people are talking about Viktor Shokin, Ukraine’s prosecutor general., but most reports, including a push by the International Monetary Fund to investigate and prosecute those guilty of corruption, claim that Shokin did not do his job effectively. There is no substantive evidence that Shokin was fired, as Trump claims, to protect Biden or his son.

It is clear that Trump ordered almost $400 million in military aid to the Ukraine to be withheld. It is also clear that Trump has told conflicting stories about why he did this and that these stories do not match the facts.

Of course Trump's defenders want to pretend that the transcript is evidence that Trump did nothing wrong and once again declare the case is closed. It is not. Just what the impeachment investigation will uncover is an open question, one that Trump is doing everything he can to block from seeing the light of day.

↪Fooloso4 The point we agree on is that the role of justice in ethics is prior to, or higher than, or of more import than, the role of piety or divine will or... pretty much anything.

Is that right? — Banno

Yes, it is.

We are agreed on the measure of Bartrinks as well.

Well, I think it might help to make sense of the distinction between 'necessary' and 'contingent' being. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree, but that is not a distinction I find helpful unless when reading those who make use of it. One must accept the notion of a necessary being.

Added: That is, one must accept the notion of a necessary being in order to make such distinctions. I do not.

Justice stands above piety.
— Fooloso4

That's the point. The dialogue is remembered for it's attack on god when it should be remembered for its support for equity. — Banno

As I read it, Socrates' concern is with justice, but that what justice is leads to aporia. It is an example of Socratic or zetetic skepticism. I have never interpreted it as an attack on god but an attack on Euthyphro's assumption of wisdom regarding divine things.

Although Socrates does raise the question of the justice of the gods according to the stories of the poets, such questions are not unique to him, as Euthyphro's responses make clear.

I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". Have you? In any case, it is evident that neither the dialogue nor the dilemma have been understood by someone who relies on bar tricks instead of careful reading, scholarship, and reasoned argument.

Knowledge, or more precisely, the assumption of knowledge and wisdom is at the forefront of the dialogue. Socrates brings into question the knowledge and wisdom of Meletus for indicting Socrates on charges of corrupting the youth. The conversation quickly turns to Euthyphro's own knowledge and wisdom in bringing charges against his father. In both cases the question of guilt or innocence is left to the jury to decide, which raises questions regarding their own wisdom.

Euthyphro claims to be acting not on his own authority but on the authority of the gods. But in doing so he is appealing to his own authority on divine matters. What he is doing is right because it is what the gods demand of men.

What is at issue is whether Euthyphro has knowledge of divine matters, that is, whether he is an authority on the divine. If Euthyphro is not an authority on such matters, and no one else is either, then the question of the gods' authority is called into question. For how can man appeal to the gods authority if he lacks knowledge of the gods?

Socrates eventually turns from the question of piety to that of justice, for the pious is part of justice (12d). Socrates asks what part it is. Euthyphro's response is revealing. He says:

I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice. (12e)

The part of justice that is concerned with the care of men is left unaddressed. If piety is part of justice than what he is doing cannot be pious if it is not just. Appeal to piety is insufficient grounds for establishing the justice of his actions.

Justice stands above piety. Socrates' words and actions might be seen as impious or atheistic, but if it can be shown that what he says and does is guided by his care for men, then either piety and justice are at odds or what is truly pious must be determined by what is just. Although the question of justice is not addressed, it looms over the dialogue.

↪Fooloso4 I'd be interested in any comments on the passage I quoted above (and the article it comes from). I think the notion that there are 'degrees of reality' is important in this, because it allows for the conception of things that are more and less real. Whereas, for us, 'existence' is univocal, something either exists or doesn't. — Wayfarer

I thought it was very good. I almost cited it in my response. As to degrees of reality, I think it is important for understanding the ontology of those who make use of it, but it is not a concept that I agree with.

The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer

This is an important point. One that I raised earlier:

The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. — Fooloso4

The irony here is that while appealing to reason Bartricks has demonstrated that he is incapable of reasoned thought and argument, relying instead on insults and personal attacks.

All finite and divisible things are a product of the imagination, which means that plurality, finiteness and divisibility are all illusory. — bobobor

Does Spinoza say this? In the quote from the letter to Meyer Spinoza is not talking about things in the world but measure, duration, and how many. It does not follow that the things that measured and counted are products of the imagination.


From the letter to Meyer:

The modifications of substance I call modes. Their definition, in so far as it is not identical with that of substance, cannot involve any existence. Hence, we can conceive them as non-existent. From this it follows, that, when we are regarding only the essence of modes, and not the order of the whole of nature, we cannot conclude from their present existence, that they will exist or not exist in the future, or that they have existed or not existed in the past; whence it is abundantly clear, that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different from the existence of modes.

I don't believe you. Teaching intro to philosophy - hahahahaha. Yeah, to your bathroom mirror. — Bartricks

Believe what you want. It is not something I usually bring up on the forum since I would rather be judged by what I say rather than by my credentials. There are, however, a few here who know enough about me to know the truth.

I don't see any value in continuing this. If you were not blinded by your assumptions you would find that there are other points that I brought up that you either ignored or more likely did not understand.

Do you know what 'paraphrase' means? — Bartricks

The first definition that pops up when you Google it:

verb
express the meaning of (the writer or speaker or something written or spoken) using different words, especially to achieve greater clarity.

You are not expressing Plato's meaning. As I said, the issue is justice not reason.

And have you read the actual dialogue? — Bartricks

I certainly have.That is how I knew it was about justice not reason. In fact, I used it when teaching intro to philosophy many times. Which leads me to wonder whether you have read it.

Er, yes. And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. Like I said!! Can you read? — Bartricks

Er, well you continually refer to "the Euthyphro".

To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro ... — Bartricks

This is not a paraphrase, it is a misunderstanding of Plato's dialogue.

The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. In any case, Socrates question is about justice not reason. The dialogue, like many of his others, ends in aporia. Reason does not provide an answer.

The dialogue and what came to be known as the Euthyphro problem are two different things.

Trump is attempting to block California from setting its own higher standards for auto emissions. He has also rejected higher standards for fuel economy. Why? The auto industry is preparing to meet those higher standards, so it is not for their benefit. In fact the uncertainty hurts them.

When looked at in light of his rollback of other environment protections it becomes clear that his intention is to render the EPA ineffectual. But it is not just the EPA, it is part of a larger scheme to dismantle the "administrative state" piece by piece. At the same time he moves to increase executive power and shield it from oversight. Republicans seem to approve, but will sing a very different tune when the Democrats occupy the White House.

Maybe it's because Christian morality is just right? — Shamshir

Christian morality is a misnomer. It ignores both differences in time and between sects. What did Jesus or Paul or the New Testament tell us about reproductive rights? Is what Jesus said about sexuality in agreement with what Paul or Augustine said? Does the "new testament" supersede the Law, which Jesus claimed he came to fulfill? As always, we pick and choose what we accept and reject, and this changes over time and place.

But I don't see them as more influental than common sense. — Shamshir

What does common sense tell you about Armageddon? What does common sense tell you about making Jerusalem the capital of Israel? Was is the influence of common sense that led the Trump administration to declare Jerusalem to be the capital?

What is the influence of common sense that has determined the availability of contraption to fight disease, poverty, and overpopulation?

What does common sense tell you about the rights of the fetus and the rights of a woman who becomes pregnant? If it were simply a matter of common sense then why is it that we have yet to find common ground to resolve the abortion debate?

Either way, that has more to do with politics than religion — Shamshir

It has to do with the power of the religious right to determine political law. The separation of church and state is not a clear dividing line. The boundary between private versus public choice and action is something that continues to change dependent on who is in power.

The movement could be non-religious, and accomplish the same results - because it's powerful and well organized. — Shamshir

It could be but in fact is not. Reproductive rights has become a religious issue. That has not always been the case. Reproductive rights has become a political issue, that too has not always been the case. The two have become intertwined in a way that will not soon become disentangled.

The problem, if there is one, isn't with religion, but that plenty of money and power hungry people flock to it. — Shamshir

Since religion is for many all pervasive and absolute, money and power can and have become its instrument. The fate of one's immortal soul is a motivating force that extends far beyond what money and power alone are capable of accomplishing.

The issues raised are in due to a pseudo or pretend religious mafia. — Shamshir

Whether or not it is a pseudo or pretend religious mafia depends on which side of the divide one stands on. While one may in principle separate church and state in practice today the separation is more ideological than real.

Once again, the question goes back to the "special" status and privileges that religion has managed to secure.

While you're likely right, I don't think religion holds the weight that you think it does, regarding the matter. — Shamshir

It is not religion but the religious right. They are enormously influential in matters of reproductive rights, education, limited government, and geo-politics.

As these beliefs are based on morals that may be upheld by anyone, religious and non-religious alike.
Favouring the fetus' right to live over the mother's complacency isn't necessarily religious. — Shamshir

That is true, but one's own views on the morality of abortion and a powerful, well-organized religious movement capable of influencing state and national law are two very different things. One need not be religious to be opposed to or non-religious to be in favor of reproductive rights.

Yeah, religion has a huge influence on laws . . . and there's no way around that, because we're surrounded with religious folks and they're voting (and lobbying and so on) — Terrapin Station

It is not simply the influence of religion. There are plenty of religious people who are opposed to the power of the religious right, but it does make for some strange bed-fellows, such as Trump hitching his wagon to the Evangelicals. The Evangelicals interest in Israel is based solely on their belief in Armageddon. This is exclusionary politics on the grand scale, orchestrated by God, with a little help from them.

Does a belief system that (for arguments sake) insist that every individual life is inherently valuable, deserve recognition over a belief system which says that some types of persons ought to be eliminated or imprisoned for the greater good? — Wayfarer

I assume you mean every individual human life. Your question leaves open the problem of
the developmental continuum that that define a person as well as the question of the relative value of an individual life and whether what a person does is a determining factor regarding the value of that particular life.

A few years back, there was discussion about Jurgen Habermas, one of the most highly esteemed social philosophers on the Continent. — Wayfarer

I think a distinction should be made between the Enlightenment conception of reason and reason as practiced by the ancients. It is not clear to many, including Habermas, that modern reason cannot accomplish all that it promised. In response some of turned again to some form of religious belief, but others have turned to a more reasonable practice of reason informed by its limits without seeking refuge in unreason or some imagined transcendence of reason.

If you are speaking about the US, which is what matters most to me, I don't think that's true. What intrusions did you have in mind? — T Clark

The religious right holds a great deal of power in the U.S.

the authority of law stands over that of religion.
— Fooloso4

That's true in the US, but not everywhere. — T Clark

Our conversation has been about the U.S., starting with my response to your claim about:

The US, in particular — T Clark

It's a choice people have to make. — T Clark

In just the last few months abortion is no longer a choice in many U.S. states. The anti-abortionists frame their arguments in terms of morals and rights, but it comes down to the religious beliefs of a powerful few who determine what is permissible.

The first amendment to the US Constitution does not protect anyone against religion. It protects against government intrusion into religion. — T Clark

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...

The establishment of religion is not an intrusion into religion.

There can be no protection of religion without protection from religion.

That's the danger - not religion, but religion combined with government. — T Clark

Indeed it is danger and today we are witnessing a troublesome religious intrusion into government. But this is only one aspect of the problem. The larger question is one of the limits of authority, and since religions often hold that their God is the absolute authority it becomes not so much a combination of religion and government that is the problem but one of religion's authority over government. As stated, the authority of law stands over that of religion.

Whatever, I don't see how that has anything to do with the issue at hand. — T Clark

I asked several questions regarding that but you ignored them.

:

I don't see how that is relevant to the question at hand. — T Clark

When you claimed that:

For that reason, protection of religion is built into the foundation and superstructure of our institutional protections, in particular our Constitution. — T Clark

it became a question at hand.

You raised it as evidence that religion is "special". But it was not simply a matter of protection of religion but a protection from religion. It is in part a statement of the awareness of the power and danger of religion.

Some recent Supreme Court cases have been about religious exemptions, all of which are predicated on the notion that religion is a special case, and so, behavior that is otherwise questionable is protected.

Just how special religion is becomes a question at hand.

As to the problem raised in the OP, yes some members behave badly, but you single out only those who do so on topics dealing with religion. And that raises another question at hand: is the problem bad behavior or only bad behavior is matters you regard as special?

The US, in particular, was founded by people escaping from religious oppression. — T Clark

This is true, but the oppression was by not from those who were anti-religious. It was from those who held different religious beliefs. Freedom of religion is freedom from religion. That is why the first amendment begins:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...

It continues:

... or prohibiting the free exercise thereof

The greatest danger to religious freedom was religion. It is only when one is protected from religious hegemony that one is free to exercise religion according to his or her own beliefs.

Since you introduced an historical perspective, we need to go back further. A key player in the diminution of "Holy Wars" was Francis Bacon and the concept of tolerance. The holy wars that Bacon addresses were not between theists and atheists or Christianity versus Islam, but between different Christian sects.

Going back even further, it should never be forgotten that Socrates was accused and sentenced to death for his outspoken atheistic views. The pre-Socratic philosophers too were often accused of atheism. The tension between philosophy and religion can also be seen in Plato and Aristotle, although it is not always readily apparent since they learned from Socrates' example.

It might be demonstrable that logic requires a god. — Bartricks

Do you have such a demonstration?

The god it requires would be omnipotent because the god in question would have control over both its existence and content. — Bartricks

Well, I think we can agree that logic exists in some form or other. If we accept a logic that forbids contradiction then we must then address the contradiction or apparent contradiction present in the paradox.

You posit an imaged God-given logic without saying how it resolves the paradox.

Yes, but the way in which it involves logic is that it tells us something about what the nature of logic would need to be for there to be an omnipotent being. — Bartricks

One could base a logic on such an assumption, but to require logic to conform to such an assumption is not something many of us would support.

The point, though, is that an omnipotent being would have to be the author of logic. — Bartricks

Okay, but we do not know what such a logic would look like. Do we? How would this logic resolve the problem of contradiction?

Well, either those concepts are the ones that have something answering to them -in which case we can conclude that no omnipotent being exists - or we have good evidence that an omnipotent being exists, in which case we can conclude that the alternative concepts do not have anything answering to them. — Bartricks

The logical problem exists whether such a being exists or is simply posited.

So we can learn something about the nature of logic from this kind of inquiry. — Bartricks

I do not think that what you come away with from this inquiry is the same as what regard the problem to be. I do not think the problem is with logic, but rather what one expects from it.

I don't think you'd use fig leaves in battle. — uncanni

That is the point! In their nascent knowledge they are inept. They cannot adequately protect themselves. They know that there is a need but do not yet know how to meet that need.

Although the term 'ethics' is anachronistic
— Fooloso4
I'd say that the Torah is the start of ethics. — uncanni

'Ethics' is a Greek concept, foreign to the story. With the death of the gods, the philosophers decided questions of ethics based on reasoned thought. In Jewish thought there are commandments and God stands as the final authority.

The Creator of the real, physical world cannot be existentially contained in it. — alcontali

Some hold that there is only God and God's manifestations.

So, it is not a question of about the real, physical world. — alcontali

It is a question of whether an omnipotent being exists. The question takes it as a given, even if only for the sake of the argument, that such a being exists. That is not a question that is reducible to the physical world, but it is also not a question for which we have a common agreed upon answer. Hence, it is a pseudo-problem about a hypothetical.

Can human knowledge even reach outside the universe in order to answer questions about what we would observe there? — alcontali

I would frame it differently: can a being that is not omnipotent comprehend a being that is? This leaves open the question of whether an omnipotent being exists as well as the question of the limits of the "real" world.

The snake promises one thing ... — uncanni

God confirms the truth of what the snake promises with regard to knowledge:

And the Lord God said, “The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. — Genesis 3:22

The snake, however, is devious, duplicitous. Snakes move in one direction in order to go in a different direction. What he says regarding death is true in one way and false in other. Adam and Eve did not die when they ate of the tree of knowledge, but because they ate and became like the gods they were barred from eating of the tree of life and so as a consequence of eating of the tree of knowledge they must die in order not to become immortal gods.

Then the eyes of both of them were opened and they perceived that they were naked; and they sewed together fig leaves and made themselves loincloths — uncanni

This is a complicated issue. To be naked means several different things. To be naked is to be exposed and vulnerable. The term translated as loincloths is used elsewhere to mean protective garments worn in battle. The term is often translated as 'girdle', which preserves the sense of girding, as in, girding for battle. With knowledge of good and evil comes knowledge of being vulnerable, of the possibility of having evil done to you, of being harmed. There is something inept and comic in fashioning girdles of fig leaves.

Then they hide from God. That's where it starts getting ethical, in my reading. When they lie to God about hiding from him is when it gets ethical. — uncanni

Although the term 'ethics' is anachronistic, the problem of the ability to do and suffer both good and evil is from the start ethical.

When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it. — Genesis 3:6

What is seen as good for food raises several questions, as does what is pleasing to the eye. What is good for food may be bad in other ways, and acting on what is pleasing to the eye may not be the proper measure of an act. Acting on the desire for wisdom has both good and bad consequences. Desiring wisdom is problematic because without possessing wisdom one cannot know if it is something that should be desired or whether acting on that desire is something one should do. Ultimately it is a question of whether it is better to seek wisdom or remain obedient. Solomon answers the question by claiming that wisdom begins with fear of the Lord, that is, obedience. But when Solomon asks God for wisdom (1 Kings) he does not mean simply to obey. Wisdom here does not mean simply obedience, since God has not given him specific instructions as to what he should do. There is no question that Eve desired wisdom. Perhaps it would have been wise to curtail her desire, but she did not. Although the pursuit of wisdom was forbidden in Eden, once they gained knowledge Eden was no longer a suitable place for them. What was a prohibition became a responsibility. But God thwarted the attempt to build a tower to the heavens:

The Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will not understand each other.” — Genesis 11:6-7

The problem here may have been knowledge, the ability to produce, without the wisdom of how to control the knowledge of what they were capable of. God chose to limit their capabilities. But the story repeats itself. The desire to know remains even when the capacity to know is thwarted. As a side note, we should hear in the idea of a universal language as proposed by the early modern philosophers an attempt to overcome God's attempt to thwart knowledge.

The natural is seen as unnatural to A&E, so they invent clothing to cover up their private parts. — uncanni

The making of girdles was unnatural, but necessary, hence their ineptitude. Talk of what is natural, however, is misguided. The fundamental division here is not between natural and unnatural but whether the ways of man are in accord with or against the will of God.

I would call this a form of implicit guilt about/terror of sexual desire. — uncanni

You are trying to stitch together the whole from the part. Sexual knowledge is only a part of the larger problem of knowledge.

It is the language of logic itself that causes the issue. — alcontali

I regard the paradox as a pseudo-problem since an omnipotent being is a hypothetical, but I do not think the problem of logical contradiction here is a language problem. I do, however, think the problem is compounded when one attempts to solve it on the basis of an abstract symbolic system.

It is a formal language along with transformation/rewrite/inference rules. — alcontali

The case is analogous to mathematics. There are fundamentally different views of their ontology. And, of course, there are different views of the ontology of language and thought. Are thinking and being the same? Is the logos a human activity or fundamental to being? Is it merely a human invention that attempts to give an account of what is or is it that which shapes and determines what is? That is, is logic merely descriptive or causal in the Aristotelian sense?

[Added: That is, the logos is regarded by some as an active, organizing principle that is prior to and and make possible formal languages and make possible the connection between thinking and being.]

I will not attempt to answer these questions, for any answer is based on certain assumptions that are not held in common by those who offer a contrary view.

But when I asked "why did you stop your reading?", I was not referring to you, or at least not just you personally, but to the reading group, huh, as a whole. — Pussycat

Having given my reasons I will leave it to others to say.

I am not sure I understand what you mean by "I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject". — Pussycat

The subject matter of knowledge includes things in the world - objects, events, processes, and so on. Knowledge of anatomy has to do with the structure of bodies that are other than the subject who desires to know.

I was referring to the relation that philosophy has to its subject-matter. — Pussycat

Philosophy is self-reflexive. Its subject matter is the whole.

So it is evident that it must be something circular, like for example a feedback loop, positive or negative or both, the loop being stressed in time. — Pussycat

Yes, it is circular. But not in the sense of closing off, rather it is all inclusive.

do you think he had his reasons for not doing so, or the thought didn't just cross his mind? — Pussycat

Although I don't know if he ever addressed the question either directly or indirectly, given his familiarity with the history of philosophy I think he was aware of the question. Nothing is fundamental to Hegel's logic. That there is something has something to do with nothing.

But when I wrote "the reason why these every-things exist", I wasn't thinking of this question in terms of existence, but as to their purpose, what do they serve? — Pussycat

I touched on the question of purpose, or more precisely purposive doing in my response to paragraph 22 (page 9 of this discussion). Purposive doing is not for some external purpose, that is, it is not about serving a purpose.

But what lead is that? — Pussycat

While I agree with you that we are at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, in my opinion, with any philosopher we hope to learn from, we must attempt to think along with them, follow their thoughts where they lead us. This is, of course, not the end of the matter. We might also learn from them by challenging them, but to challenge need not be to reject. We may, however, decide to reject them, but this may be a rejection of our own misunderstanding of them.

Logic is a formal language. — alcontali

That is one concept of logic, but certainly not the only one.

No, it is to do with the concept of power. — Bartricks

Yes, omnipotence has, as the term indicates, to do with power. But the question is whether logical constraints are a limit on power, whether a logical contradiction limits what is possible or merely limits our understanding of what is possible.

my question is about whether or not an omnipotent agent would have control over logic. — Bartricks

And so, the paradox has to do with logic and not just power.

Fooloso4 It is not clear to me what your answer to the question is. Are you saying that omnipotence involves not being constrained by the laws of logic? — Bartricks

What I am saying is that how one answers the question depends on what assumptions one brings to the answer. Do logical limits point to the limits of what is possible or to limits of our thinking? Is a omnipotent being constrained by logical limits?

Would you rather read philosophy (or pedagogical theory, sociology, history, literary criticism, etc.) that was expressed in familiar language (using words ranked in the most frequent 25% of the English corpus of 172,000 words -- that's still about 43.000 possible words -- or would you like to read texts composed with many of the least frequently used words (like cenacle) and freely borrowing from languages with which you are not familiar? Add to that clumsy sentence structure and other sins of composition. — Bitter Crank

Much of the philosophy I read was not written in English and much of it is not by contemporary writers. As to clumsy sentence structure and other sins of composition, some influential philosophers have been accused of this. While I think there is some justification of this, I am not so quick to put the blame on them. Perhaps the fault is in my understanding.

When it comes to others, however, I am generally intolerant of writings that take what is found in academic journals as the model of good writing.

Added:

I often get the impression of people doing the same sort of thing with respect to Heidegger, Derrida, etc. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that too!

The question is based on the underlying assumption that reason should underlie of understanding of God. The Jewish God was conceived of in terms of his will. In Ecclesiastes and Job there is a struggle to understand God. Both fail. This marks the limits of human understanding. A willful God need not be a god that acts in accord with reason and logic.

Much of Christianity, however, is informed by the idea of the compatibility of reason and revelation. In accord with this view, omniscience becomes logically problematic; as if God is constrained by reason.

I am reminded of Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy:

The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.

Philosophies for All Occasions
Specializing in the Obfuscational

Hilarious! — rlclauer

Most who asked for an explanation did not see the irony.

We as humans have made many technological break throughs over the past decades, but having us rely on such technology is simply dulling the human brain essentially making us idiotic people who think nothing of world issues or even issues in our own government. Is this wrong? — Lucielle Randall

In Plato's Phaedrus Socrates is critical of the technological breakthrough called writing, its corrosive effect on memory, and its indiscriminateness (anyone can read what is said).

In a class on business ethics there was a discussion a paper on the attitudes of the "younger generation". The students in the class were from several generations, but all but the youngest assumed that the paper was about the generation that came after their own and most agreed that standards had deteriorated since the time they first entered the marketplace. What most missed was that the paper had been written at an earlier date and referred to the same generation that so eagerly condemned the devolution of the younger generation.

In other words, criticism of the younger generation is much older than any living generation.

... it appears that some conversations just get lost in this sort of "intellectual posturing." — rlclauer

I am often of the impression that it is a way of hiding one's ignorance from both one's self and others. The gaps and jumps get covered over by reference to a specialized terminology and conceptual apparatus.

One of the most difficult things is to speak simply and clearly. Nietzsche said:

The misfortune suffered by clear-minded and easily understood writers is that they are taken for shallow and thus little effort is expended on reading them: and the good fortune that attends the obscure is that the reader toils at them and ascribes to them the pleasure he has in fact gained from his own zeal. — Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, Part 1, aphorism 181, Twofold Misjudgment

Many years ago I made a "business card" that said:

Philosophies for All Occasions
Specializing in the Obfuscational

While I am in general agreement, one's level of education must be taken into consideration. What may seem to be clearly stated to someone with the requisite knowledge of the subject matter may sound like nonsense to someone who is not familiar with the terminology and issues. If one wishes to discuss the work of philosophers then one needs to move beyond the level of ordinary discourse, which does not adequately address such matters.

God is the terminus of explanation.

For some this means explanation leads ultimately to God as the answer, but for others to God as the limit of human understanding, the unanswerable.

I think that you came to a standstill with the Phenomenology — Pussycat

My original intention was to put the question of absolute otherness aside for the time being. It is often the case that what I cannot understand at one moment becomes clearer later. I decided not to go further with reading the text now not because of a standstill but because of other demands, including the demand to not spend whole days with one text or with sitting, reading, and writing.

Eventually, and if it is successful, it should be found out and be evident that the work was speaking about itself all along, or the universal, so the relation that a philosophical work has with its subject-matter is internal, and not external. — Pussycat

While I do think that the subject must be taken into consideration with regard to the object, I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject. Perhaps here we must confront absolute otherness. The object of knowledge in general is not the subject, although with regard to knowledge of it there are the poles of knower and known.

A related problem is the identification of the subject. The subject should not be thought of as the solitary individual. The individual is culturally and historically situated in time. There is a sense in which the subject is 'we' rather than 'I'.

if there is such a science, like philosophy, that examines everything there is and the reason why these every-things exist ... — Pussycat

Does Hegel address the question of why things exist, why there is something rather than nothing?

I am guessing that he was at odds with himself with how he would present his findings. — Pussycat

Part of the problem is that the whole cannot be presented as a whole all at once.

So what I said earlier:

Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.

is plain wrong. — Pussycat

Well, one must start somewhere. A phenomenological account is a good place to start since it addresses both subject and object, but one might get to the same place starting elsewhere.

...we can be at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like... — Pussycat

If one's goal is to understand Hegel, and by this I mean regard him as a teacher of philosophy with something to teach us, then I think it best to follow his lead.