Note how Fool neither mentions nor addresses Schiff's lies, the subject of Trump's complaints — NOS4A2
Barr’s objection was that Mueller could have, and in fact was obligated to do so, make a decision whether a crime was committed, to assess whether a person’s conduct was a federal offense. — NOS4A2
The attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.
There is a very good reason I have not mentioned or addressed Schiff's "lies": as most here can see, Schiff's account of the phone call are consistent with the reconstructed transcript released by Trump. We cannot, in fact, say that the reconstructed transcript is consistent with what was actually said since Trump has hidden the actual transcript away.
I actually checked the justice manual, and could find no support for this view.
Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person’s conduct “constitutes a federal offense.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought.
I'll quote Mueller: — NOS4A2
I'm not sure if you're aware, but Schiff blatantly mischaracterized the phone call in his opening statement to congress.
He said, when describing the phone call, "What is the president's response? Well it reads like a classic organized crime shakedown", — NOS4A2
I think that pretty much sums it up. Trump does not believe his own national security agencies or their having gotten to the bottom of "this whole situation". The call did not mention it, but Schiff reports that Giuliani had been to the Ukraine looking for dirt. And we know that he ordered to have funds that were approved to go help the Ukraine defend itself were withheld. He talks about reciprocity. He asks for a favor. He makes it clear that he wants information on his political opponent Biden and his son. He asks several times for Zelenskyy to talk to Giuliani and Barr. Giuliani is Trump's personal lawyer and has not business discussing matters of national security. Barr reportedly was unaware of the arrangement Trump proposed and was perturbed to have been dragged into it. Given the situation it is as if someone were holding a gun to your head and the police withheld help but instead asked for a favor. There is nothing inconsistent with what Trump said or did. It is clear when he said that it reads like a classic organized crime shakedown that it was not intended to be a verbatim account, but you use this to claim the whole thing was a fabrication.
Was it a fabrication that Trump withheld military aid? Or that he expected reciprocity? Or that he asked for a favor regarding his political opponent?
The other thing. There's a lot of talk about Biden's son,. that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if you can look into it ... It sounds horrible to me.
"It is clear" you're just reiterating Schiff's piffle. — NOS4A2
According to the transcript, the favor Trump asked for had nothing to do with Biden, but the 2016 election and Ukrainian meddling. — NOS4A2
I would like you to do us a favor though because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it. I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine ... There are a lot of things that went on, the·whole situation ... A lot of people are talking about that, the way they shut your very good prosecutor down and you had some very bad people involved ... The other thing. There's a lot of talk about Biden's son,. that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great.
The Justice Dept, of which Barr is the Attorney General, is currently investigating Ukraine's meddling in the election. — NOS4A2
Attorney General Bill Barr was "surprised and angry" to find that President Trump had grouped him together with his personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani during a controversial July 25 phone call with the president of Ukraine, a source "familiar with Barr's thinking".
The intelligence community inspector general is forcefully pushing back against assertions made by President Donald Trump and several Republican lawmakers about the whistleblower complaint that has rocked Washington in recent weeks.
In a rare statement released Monday, the inspector general addressed a false claim pushed by Trump and some of his allies on Capitol Hill, including House GOP leader Kevin McCarthy of California and Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, that the whistleblower lacked firsthand knowledge of the conduct outlined in the complaint and therefore the allegations were based on "hearsay." But the statement from the inspector general made clear that the whistleblower was not simply communicating secondhand knowledge.
Remember "innocent until proven guilty" applies to Trump as much as it does to anyone else. — Janus
I predict an impeachment inquiry into this matter will hurt the democrats more than it does Trump. — Janus
Sorry, but that doesn't make a lick of sense. A majority of voters favor impeachment, but when the GOP controlled Senate acquittes him, voters will be spurred to...vote for Trump? — Maw
I'm no Trump supporter, but I predict an impeachment inquiry into this matter will hurt the democrats more than it does Trump.
If Nosferatu is overstepping the bounds of reason in his blind support of Trump, I see a few others here doing the same in the opposite direction. Remember "innocent until proven guilty" applies to Trump as much as it does to anyone else.
Of course I am not saying there should be no inquiry to establish whether there are grounds for impeachment, but let's wait to see what the findings are before rushing to ill-considered conclusions.
Of course I am not saying there should be no inquiry to establish whether there are grounds for impeachment, but let's wait to see what the findings are before rushing to ill-considered conclusions. — Janus
Couldn't agree more. While I've no doubt that Trump is dirty in multiple ways, the insistent calls for impeachment are just shitty politics. It's relying on a deus ex machina to try and address serious social, political and institutional problems that would be far better served by coalition building, policy overhaul, and the hard fucking work of building a political vision for the future. Impeachment is anti-poltical in the extreme, a blunt tool with high-vis spectacle value that ensures that things can continue the way they are without having to address big, structural issues at the heart of what's going on in the States. — StreetlightX
Couldn't agree more. While I've no doubt that Trump is dirty in multiple ways, the insistent calls for impeachment are just shitty politics. It's relying on a deus ex machina to try and address serious social, political and institutional problems that would be far better served by coalition building, policy overhaul, and the hard fucking work of building a political vision for the future. Impeachment is anti-poltical in the extreme, a blunt tool with high-vis spectacle value that ensures that things can continue the way they are without having to address big, structural issues at the heart of what's going on in the States. — StreetlightX
American Democracy?
Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion.
By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.
The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect.
Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for.
Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence.
Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.)
Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero.
What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.
A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorlyinformed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support.
But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good.
All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative.
Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies.
Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other noneconomic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues.
Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.
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