Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being — Hegel/Pinkard
The individual in his conscious awareness is not aware of his awareness but of what is given immediately in awareness. His absolute self-sufficiency, his being unconditioned, his immediate self-certainty of being, requires for its self-sufficiency self-knowledge. He must be both knower and known. — Fooloso4
Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder (‘thaumazein’) (Theaetetus 155c-d; Metaphysics 982b). There can be no wonder without a sense of the otherness of what engenders wonder. It is what lies beyond or outside of what can be understood or taken within consciousness, what remains a mystery. — Fooloso4
I had a teacher who once asked me how I could separate using tools made by others from one's I forged myself. I used to think the question was about authenticity versus imitation. An Hegelian point of view says to me that the new is both.
If I use something made before for my purposes, that is a new "determination." If I organize elements in a way that gets other people to start talking in a new way, that too, is a kind of new "determination."
The "Concept" beyond the boundaries of an individual are developed by both kinds of change. It introduces a Z axis where previously there was only X and Y. — Valentinus
Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole?
— Fooloso4
I don't know. I doubt it is exactly Hegel's approach. Goethe wasn't such a brilliant, mad philosopher.
It would be interesting to see how they compare. — Amity
Your statement has been articulated in many ways. Hegel, himself, said many things that compared his "culture" in a better light than others. — Valentinus
But, as a matter of intellectual inheritance, his work paved the way for you to express your objection. — Valentinus
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias.Irony abounds. — Valentinus
The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody. — Valentinus
I brought up Kierkegaard since he emphasized the centrality of the Single Individual. In the passage I quoted by Hegel, I wonder if the statement can be be seen as a shared point of departure, a moment of agreement before struggling with each other. — Valentinus
So, in addition to the specific arguments made in regards to what must exist, there has been introduced a psychological register where some models fit better than others. The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody. — Valentinus
If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole. — Fooloso4
Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole? — Fooloso4
https://philosophyisnotaluxury.com/2013/06/14/goethes-method-of-doing-science/The method of science that Goethe practiced was in certain respects diametrically opposed to the objective science described above. Goethe believed that the outer physical world and the inner world of our senses were mirror images of each other, the inside view and the outside view of the same reality. Therefore, paying attention to the outer world leads to necessary inner responses in us that tell us directly about qualities of what we are observing. The science that Goethe advocated was also one of deep observation. The difference that Goethe brought was that the scientist, while observing the outside world, would pay attention to their own inner responses which would reveal essential elements of what was being observed. It was in a sense a science of subjectivity, or what you might see as a mystical approach to science. — Jeff Carreira
[my bolds]His literary works certainly addressed contemporary philosophical concerns: Iphigenie auf Tauris (Iphigenia in Tauris) (1779–86) seems a prophetic dramatization of the ethical and religious autonomy Kant was to proclaim from 1785; in his novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (The Elective Affinities) (1809) a mysterious natural or supernatural world of chemistry, magnetism or Fate, such as ‘Naturphilosophie’ envisaged, seems to underlie and perhaps determine a human story of spiritual adultery; in Faust, particularly Part Two, the tale of a pact or wager with the Devil seems to develop into a survey of world cultural history, which has been held to have overtones of Schelling, Hegel or even Marx. But whatever their conceptual materials, Goethe’s literary works require literary rather than philosophical analysis. There are, however, certain discrete concepts prominent in his scientific work, or in the expressions of his ‘wisdom’ – maxims, essays, autobiographies, letters and conversations – with which Goethe’s name is particularly associated and which are capable of being separately discussed. Notable among these are: Nature and metamorphosis (Bildung), polarity and ‘intensification’ (Steigerung), the ‘primal phenomena’ (Urphänomene), ‘the daemonic’ (das Dämonische) and renunciation (Entsag — Nicholas Boyle
http://journal.telospress.com/content/1968/1/34.abstractIn two different media, poetic drama and philosophic prose, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) explored the same subject: man's perilous journey to discover his consciousness along a course of doubt and despair. — Ingrid Poole - abstract
The basis of this new epistemology was the “fundamental conviction that the relation of the human mind to the world was ultimately not dualistic but participatory…. In this view, the essential reality of nature is not separate, self-contained and complete in itself, so that the human mind can examine it ‘objectively’ and register it from without. Rather, nature’s unfolding truth emerges only with the active participation of the human mind. Nature’s reality is not merely phenomenal, nor is it independent and objective; rather, it is something that comes into being through the very act of human cognition. Nature becomes intelligible to itself through the human mind” (Tarnas, 1991).
The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
— Hegel/Pinkard
If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage. — Valentinus
According to standard interpretations of 19th-century European philosophy, a stark ’either / or’ divided Hegel and Kierkegaard, and this divide profoundly shaped the subsequent development of Continental philosophy well into the 20th century. While left Hegelians carried on the legacy of Hegel’s rationalism and universalism, existentialists and postmodernists found inspiration, at least in part, in Kierkegaard’s critique of systematic philosophy, rationality, and socially integrated subjectivity. In Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Jon Stewart provides a detailed historical argument which challenges the standard assumption that Kierkegaard’s position was developed in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy, and as such is antithetical to it. — Matthew Edgar review
Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."? — Fooloso4
Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said. — Fooloso4
Goethe does that elsewhere. Possibly even at the same time. One can write poetry even as one studies rocks. He was multi-talented that guy. I mentioned his theories earlier.I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science — Fooloso4
Self-engendering spirit. — Fooloso4
Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it. — Fooloso4
Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other. — Fooloso4
3 brief statements of facts (no metaphors or similes) are followed by an assertion for the future.
Uber allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh.
In allen Wipfeln
Spurest du
Kaum einen Hauch.
Die Vogelein schweigen im Walde,
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch.
By the very order of the poem, Goethe is embraced in it, the last link in the chain of being.
From the inanimate to the animate, from the mineral, through the vegetable, to the animal kingdom, from the hilltop, to the treetops, to the birds, and so at last to man.
The subjective and objective experience are completely fused.
The appearances of Nature are rendered, but also the organic relations between them; man's mind is shown as the final link in the chain of creation, Nature become conscious of itself, but it also takes its place within nature. It does not stand outside or over against it.
It was Goethe's way of being - the poet; not here offering conscious opinions, intellectual convictions and philosophical beliefs. The latter don't always express the self, they may even disguise.
At the level of his deepest thought, the subjective and objective modes are quite evidently harmonised.' — Wilkinson and Willoughby
The concept of Bildung—a word that means learning and education but also implies a cultivation of the self and of maturity—was central to Goethe’s thought, and he, in turn, made it central to German culture. For Thomas Mann, whose admiration of Goethe took the form of spiritual imitation, Goethe was above all an educator, but one who had first to learn, through experience, the wisdom he taught. Mann wrote that a “vocation towards educating others does not spring from inner harmony, but rather from inner uncertainties, disharmony, difficulty—from the difficulty of knowing one’s own self.” — Adam Kirsch
I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.
Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.
Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it. — Fooloso4
(He opens a tome [of the New Testament] and begins.)
It says: ‘In the beginning was the Word [Wort].’
Already I am stopped. It seems absurd.
The Word does not deserve the highest prize,I must translate it otherwise
If I am well inspired and not blind.
It says: In the beginning was the Mind [Sinn].
Ponder that first line, wait and see,
Lest you should write too hastily.
Is mind the all-creating source?It ought to say: In the beginning there was Force [Kraft].
Yet something warns me as I grasp the pen,
That my translation must be changed again.
The spirit helps me. Now it is exact.
I write: In the beginning was the Act [Tat]
— Goethe's Faust
Ten years of office work, of literary projects left incomplete, finally took their toll. In 1786, in a spirit of adventure characteristic more of a young poet than of a middle-aged civil servant, Goethe abruptly threw aside his work and left Weimar without telling friends and colleagues where he was going. Travelling under an assumed identity, he made his way to Italy, where he spent the next two years studying art and enjoying the country that he described, in one of his most famous poems, as “the land where lemon blossoms blow, / And through dark leaves the golden oranges glow.”
— Adam Kirsch
There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge. — Fooloso4
https://www.marxist.com/science-old/dialecticalmaterialism.htmlThe dialectic of discussion. In a properly conducted debate, an idea is put forward (the Thesis) and is then countered by the opposing view (the Antithesis) which negates it. Finally, through a thorough process of discussion, which explores the issue concerned from all points of view and discloses all the hidden contradictions, we arrive at a conclusion (the Synthesis). We may or may not arrive at agreement but by the very process of discussion, we have deepened our knowledge and understanding and raised the whole discussion onto a different plane.
Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth. — Fooloso4
In as much as there is nothing personal, still, though, you are pressed for some reason or reasons. I think Hegel is going to investigate those reasons via his analysis of history, in a dialectic of history.
That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale. — tim wood
I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting — Valentinus
I think for him the game is over, unity has been realized. — Fooloso4
So project fear was in fact reality?': readers on no-deal Brexit funding
Readers have been reacting to the government’s £2.1bn funding boost for no-deal Brexit preparations
Funny how the old magic money tree * can cough up some dosh if required. But of course there is no chance of money for social provision. Instead we can be proud that we are a society with food banks where Tory MPs can take selfies.
In the distant pre-unicorn days I remember when George Osborne talked about an emergency budget necessitated by Brexit it was lambasted as project fear. But now it’s “planning”. pipini
WW1 was a war of individual people? Jim and Steve and Gunter and Heinrich? Or the immigration/refuge crisis in the world today - a matter of individuals not liking where they are? Or is there some more elemental force at work? — tim wood
23:
"The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc." - Hegel.
Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)? — Fooloso4
The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement - — tim wood
...you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ? — Amity
...Or another way, it's all personal, but more accurately considered at the appropriate scale as "impersonal." — tim wood
The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement - — tim wood
gebildet" means nothing but "formed". It has the second meaning of "educated", true, but Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all. — WerMaat
I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed.
— WerMaat
Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished. — Fooloso4
I don't see a reference to culture, to society or education in its literal sense. — WerMaat
prior existence of a material culture, subject to interpretation.. — Andy Blunden
What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I. — Fooloso4
...That prompted the Sun to compare Trump to a dog.
“Slamming Baltimore must have been irresistible in a Pavlovian way,” the paper wrote. “Fox News rang the bell, the president salivated and his thumbs moved across his cellphone into action.” — Martin Pengelly and Edward Helmore
Yes, the development of the individual is through the development of the culture. But also, it is "the few" the philosophers who are responsible for the development of the culture. — Fooloso4
with Hegel Heraclitus lives to fight another day. — Fooloso4
In paragraph 4 — Fooloso4
Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:
— Fooloso4
However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself. — Hegel
While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended. — Fooloso4
That sort of thing reminds me of:
Thus, not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement."
— tim wood — Valentinus
The first question should not be whether he believed in God but what he means by God. — Fooloso4
Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop. — Fooloso4
Chapter 7
"Religion"
One of the great, enduring mysteries of Hegel scholarship is the role of religion in his mature theory, including the Phenomenology. More than a century and a half ago, the breakup of the Hegelian school after his death into different factions already turned on different approaches to this mystery. In simplest terms, the orthodox, or Hegelian middle, desired to maintain what was perceived as his synthesis of religion and philosophy, the Hegelian right wished to subordinate philosophy to religion, and the Hegelian left wanted to eliminate the religious component entirely.
The idea that Hegel is a basically religious thinker is very strong, for instance, in British Hegelianism, which routinely relates all phenomena to the self-development of religious spirit that is equated to the Christian God, thereby further expanding the traditional right-wing reading of Hegel. — Tom Rockmore
I asked about the reversibility of terms because the logic that seems to be operating here does not seem to be focused on corresponding necessity to event in the way other ideas of causality are often discussed. — Valentinus
I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said. — Fooloso4
That’s all we really know about the man behind the clown mask: It’s a person with no convictions, delivering a political project he does not believe in, with a plan that does not exist. — Ian Dunt
Listen and subscribe to Politics: Where Next? on Apple Podcasts, Spotifyand other good apps.
As Boris Johnson moves into Number 10, who better to talk to this week than Peter Foster, the Europe Editor of The Daily Telegraph – widely seen as the best plugged in analyst of the Brexit saga on the bloc…
And Francis Elliott – The Times Political Editor – the first to spot a snap election was coming down the tracks back in 2017. What does he think is coming down the tracks now?
There are new episodes of Politics: Where Next? every Friday. — Gary Gibbon
Vote Lib Dem — Michael
If you want to feel happy for a fleeting hour or so watch this excellent debate regarding Greek vs. Rome and which culture modernity is more indebted to between Mary Beard and Boris Johnson. Boris ends up looking like an undergrad compared to the magisterial expertise of Mary. — Maw
In 2015 at Central Hall Westminster, Johnson debated Greece versus Romewith the historian Mary Beard. He presented his beloved Greece as a brilliant, sophisticated, multifaceted cradle of democracy. But as Beard pointed out, political Athens was all romantic bluster. It was Rome that triumphed. Greece might fashion marble but, as Virgil said: “These be your arts, to impose the ways of peace.” Beard won the vote. — Simon Jenkins
I had an epiphany about restaurants a long time ago. You don't go to a restaurant to get what you like, rather you go to a restaurant to (because you) like what you get. That is, they do what they do and you cannot change their menu - and you like it or you don't. — tim wood
All the jargon, then, applies to something concrete. So far I find that concreteness best laid out in his metaphor of plant-flower-fruit, and acorn seed-tree. The totality of a thing, then, lies not in any moment, but all of its moments considered as a one, a unity. — tim wood
The style is typical for the time, but it could be wielded with more elegance and clarity. Take Goethe - his reputation as a master of language is sometimes a bit blown up, but not undeserved. Texts by Goethe are far easier to read — WerMaat
Goethean Science -
Goethean Science defines and values "expansion of knowledge" as: 1) Observing organic transformation in natural phenomena over time (historical progression); and 2) Organic transformation of the inner life of the experimenter.
"Individual phenomena must never be torn out of context. Stay with the phenomena, think within them, accede with your intentionality to their patterns, which will gradually open your thinking to an intuition of their structure.”
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
[ Article includes the Kantian Problem]
— Wiki