I don't see fundamentally new happening in this paragraph. Actually, Hegel is being quite patient with us, isn't he? — WerMaat
The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth. — Hegel
In the middle of these distinctions there is what seems to be a non-sequitur:
"However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved."
I take this is a direct reference to Spinoza’s God. Hegel thinks it shocked the age not because, as is commonly assumed, threatening the status of God as distinct and separate, but because it threatens the status of man as distinct in his self-consciousness. It is not a non-sequitur because this is precisely what is at issue - the relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole. — Fooloso4
I introduced Spinoza because of what Hegel goes on to say about God as the one substance. Why does he introduce this here, at this point? — Fooloso4
it means that there is only one substance and that it is not derived from or dependent on anything else. — Fooloso4
The allusions to God as one substance (§17, 10) refer to the controversy about Spinoza, after G. H. Lessing's death, in correspondence between Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn. This correspondence, published in 1785, led to a famous "struggle over pantheism" (Pantheismusstreit ). Eventually, Kant, J. W. Goethe, J. G. von Herder, J. C. Lavater, and others became involved. In the Encyclopedia, recalling Lessing's famous remark that Spinoza was treated like a dead dog, Hegel later comments that the treatment of speculative philosophy is scarcely better. His sympathy for Spinozism is apparent in his claim, redolent of pantheism, that "the living Substance is being which is in truth subject" (§18, 10).
Hegel further stresses his idea of the true as substance and as subject.
The object of knowledge is, like a subject, active in that it develops within consciousness.
For "the living substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self -othering with itself" (§18, 10).
He echoes a passage in the Diffirenzschrift in comparing the process through which the object changes as we seek to know it to a "circle that presupposes its end as its goal, at its beginning, and is only actual through the carrying out and its end" (§18, 10*).
— Tom Rockmore
Self-positing is negative in that it is a rejection of what it is in order to become what it will be. — Fooloso4
The movement is within the subject, a turning from within itself away from and back to itself. In its otherness it is still its sameness. That is, it is never wholly other.
The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
The subject here is not the individual or only the individual but mankind. — Fooloso4
Now returning to his view of substance as subject, he draws the consequence in writing that "the True is the whole" (§20, 11); what we seek to know, which he calls the absolute, can only be known when it is fully developed, as a result. For it is in the result, in which its essence (Wesen ) is effectively realized, or actual, that it has become and can be known. The result follows from a process. — Tom Rockford
Well, what is the reverse of a condition made only possible through development? — Valentinus
I think Rockmore speaks too generally when he says: "The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves". The master's dependency on the servant develops over time and when the relationship is superseded by a new one. — Valentinus
Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other." — Valentinus
In the Pinkard translation, it can be found in Section B, Self Consciousness, starting with Chapter A, titled: Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness;Mastery and Servitude.
The paragraphs 179 to 181 specifically involve "sublating" the other. — Valentinus
...Hegel further sees that self-awareness is not all or nothing but a question of degree. Like Rousseau, he understands social life as an ongoing struggle for recognition that can have vastly different outcomes. Both his exposition of the master-slave relation in the first section and his further exposition of free self-consciousness in the second section concern the social constitution of the cognitive subject...
...The German terms in the title of the passage suggest a distinction between those who are self-sufficient, hence independent, and those who are not. Hegel's surprising point is that in inherently unstable relations of social inequality, the master is not self-sufficient but dependent on the slave. When such a relationship has finished evolving, the unexpected result is that the slave is the master of the master and the master is the slave of the slave. The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves.
Hegel's reputation as a social liberal is justified. His liberalism is not restricted merely to his early period. He composed this passage against the backdrop of the still recent French Revolution. It is at least arguable that what is still the greatest political upheaval of modern times resulted from the emergence of social awareness. For the change in our way of looking at ourselves and our world leads to their transformation.
— Tom Rockmore
Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other." Reason, with a capital R, is not possible without lots of awful experience. — Valentinus
The substance of my point is that he separates thinking from the world. In contrast to Kant who wants to figure out how we know about the world (in a scientific sense), Hegel just seems to find it in his perception. — tim wood
Or another way, with Kant, on land, your feet are always on ground. At sea with Hegel, floating, or if in the water, then treading water to stay afloat. Two different ways. — tim wood
The general theme of human self-realization in the practical sphere presupposes a conception of potentiality elaborated by Aristotle in Greek antiquity. For Aristotle, human being is rational as well as political. Subordinating ethics to politics, he sees life as realized in the political arena, what we now call society. Distantly following Aristotle, Hegel has constantly in mind a view of human beings as realizing their capacities in what they do. Society forms the real basis for human life, including knowledge of all kinds.
Hegel considers the practical consequences of two main views of human self-realization. Individual self-realization founders on the inevitable conflict between the individual and social reality, or between the individual and other people. The Kantian view, which focuses on strict application of universalizable moral principles in substituting rigid obedience for human self-realization, is self-stultifying for two reasons. First, universal principles binding on particular individuals cannot be formulated; and, second, proposed principles are unfailingly empty. Although human beings are intrinsically social, neither view of human subjectivity comprehends them in the sociohistorical context. Accordingly, Hegel turns to a richer conception, with obvious roots in Greek antiquity, of human action as intrinsically teleological. We must comprehend a person as acting teleologically to realize universal goals through action within the social context. — Tom Rockmore
Hegel casts loose from the world — tim wood
What appears in consciousness is the immediacy of the chair. it "self-posits" itself there - don't ask how*. In its immediate self-positing it then becomes the ground, or first movement, in its own sublation into whatever it is to be in its completeness. — tim wood
Yes, but we need not discard our immediacy of perception, right? We need to find the synthesis of both world and mind, Wesen(essence) and Form — WerMaat
From this I get that negating isn't something I do, either consciously or unconsciously, rather it is a step intrinsic to understanding as the thing in revealing itself also conceals, and as (my) the understanding becomes aware of the concealment, the original insight/understanding is "destabilizes" (from above). — tim wood
.The negative is that which is different from, opposed to, other than. Negation is for Hegel determinate, as determinate as what is negated. Hegel's thought characteristically observes the dialectical sequence:
1. affirmation
2. negation
3. negation of negation = affirmation of something new.
Applied to consciousness, per Pinkard, negativity is the capacity to critically undermine its own form of rationality; (determinate) negation is the sceptical undermining of a form of rationality — Gardner
To fill it out a bit. Based on Revelations a "new Jerusalem" is one of the signs of the Apocalypse according to Evangelicals. One of Trump's promises was to make Jerusalem the capital of Israel. — Fooloso4
The first moment I didn't copy, but the three together comprise what is called thesis, antithesis, synthesis (in some books, and as noted above somewhere, is terminology Hegel disavowed). — tim wood
Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section 4)—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.
This “textbook” Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel’s dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a “thesis” or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its “antithesis”, which in turn leads to a third concept, the “synthesis”, that unifies the first two (see, e.g., McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3–4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]: 90–3, 125–6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93–7; Singer 1983: 77–79). Versions of this interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster 1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3–5). On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment ofaufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.
We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel’s logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel’s dialectics, see Mueller 1958)...
...Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf. section 1), the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept or form for each subject matter—the Absolute Idea (logic), Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law (Philosophy of Right), and so on—which, taken together, form the “circle of circles” (EL §15) that constitutes the whole philosophical system or “Idea” (EL §15) that both overgrasps the world and makes it understandable (for us).
— Julie Maybee
I can’ t fathom how any self-described Christian could approve of Trump if they know anything about him. — Wayfarer
This process continues as I read. Sometimes what I thought fit together must be torn apart and rebuilt if I cannot get what I am now reading to fit. Maybe what I had put together is not right and maybe what I am now trying to put together is not right and sometimes neither is right and the whole thing needs to be revised. But it may be that there are pieces that come later, and so, everything remains tentative. — Fooloso4
just great... now I don't just have Hegel to read and reread again, now I need to do the same AGAIN with your posts.. — WerMaat
You know quite a bit of German, don't you? — WerMaat
(I take this from the way I tackle Latin translations... I go with my first vague understanding of a sentence, and then check the grammar in detail to see if it matches my thesis. A lot of times I have to discard my first idea, or at least revise it significantly, but it gives me a starting point) — WerMaat
I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains. — WerMaat
For example, my association with Plotin is probably nonsense if we have much closer, more contemporary candidates in Spinoza and Kant. — WerMaat
For that reason we should probably rely on our more knowledgeable participants as well as secondary literature to point us in the right direction — WerMaat
Good point, I'll make sure to sort out the quote function in future! Sorry about that! — WerMaat
One thing we can do is go through it again and again and again ourselves. — Fooloso4
One assumption that guides my reading of the philosophers is that when things do not make sense to me the problem is probably with me and not the text. — Fooloso4
One disadvantage of the way we are proceeding is that we have not read the whole of the preface or the whole of the book. — Fooloso4
... looking at Hegel to supply that clarity. — tim wood
Nice resource. Maybe not a Dummy's Guide, but helpful. — tim wood
The way to win is to animate the Democratic base is with actual progressive policy proposals on issues people actually care about, such as Climate Change, Income Inequality, Healthcare, and Gun Control (and what's interesting is how different the 2018 voter issues are compared with the 2014 issues here....Climate Change and Healthcare have become top concerns now). — Maw
Trump didn't believe he was going to win and he surely doesn't believe at all that he could enlarge his base. — ssu
Conventional wisdom holds that Trump’s “premeditated racism” is designed to energise his base, often white people without college degrees in the industrial midwest. Douglas sees it differently.
“I don’t think he’s after his base. I think he’s after the moderate who’s not yet comfortable with this conversation
“He is positioning these four women as a socialist movement and he did it with Obama as well. So he is creating this not for his base. His base has decided. This is the centrist that he’s after.” — Andrea Douglas
Mueller testifies in front of Congress Wednesday, broadcast live, although the depressing fact is that if the Mueller report hasn’t sunk Trump yet, then this probably won’t either. — Wayfarer
From 15,000 miles away it looks awfully like it ought to be a Biden-Warren ticket. — Wayfarer
Funny, while Trump's minions are out there pretending he hasn't been openly racist, one was asked by Chris Cuomo: "Well, what if he said he was actually a racist? Would you support him then?" The poor guy was stumped. "That's a tough one" was the best he could he manage. — Baden
The object of Trump's taunt was no congresswoman. — Bitter Crank
Sanders crowd or a Warren Crowd or a Trump crowd can all be turned on with the right--but quite different--words. Trump seems to have a feel for his people, which is important for him since his whole strategy has been to pander. — Bitter Crank
You may shoot me with your words,
You may cut me with your eyes,
You may kill me with your hatefulness,
But still, like air, I’ll rise. — Maya Angelou
Although he has not used the term, it is aufheben, both to cancel or negate and preserve. You referred to "aufheben and sublation" on page 4. Sublation is the English translation of aufheben. It is the preserve part that you seem to have overlooked. It is not a matter of leaving the past behind. If we are to understand the ontological status of 'idea' for Hegel we must see that he does not mean what we ordinarily mean when we talk about ideas. On the other hand, he does not mean some transcendent realm of unchanging beings either.* — Fooloso4
Thank you all for your helpful comments! I currently feel that I have nothing useful to add, but I'm following this discussion with great enjoyment. — WerMaat
The next few paragraphs further develop this. 16 begins:
In so doing, this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the absolute ... — Fooloso4
Pinkard #16
- 17 and 18 seem to go along with this, but combined are too long for one entry. No law against looking ahead at them. — tim wood
Like: they're just piling up stuff that was already there, and spray-paint it pink, and then expound how this perfectly shows the superiority of the theory of pinkness. — WerMaat
Section 5. Positive and Negative Philosophy, and the Critique of Hegel
The differences between Hegel and Schelling derive from their respective approaches to understanding the absolute. — Andrew Bowie
I might add, learn your instrument and don't break it. — Fooloso4
But the extent to which you allow this to happen is determined by you. — Fooloso4
One does not begin with the ability to play freely. So too, one does not begin with the ability to live freely. — Fooloso4
Dynamic means that it's changing/it doesn't stay the same. You're constantly changing, your personality is always in process of changing a bit, etc. — Terrapin Station
That's about other persons' concepts, and specifically, it's about what they'd consider the "essential" features for them to christen something by a particular name. — Terrapin Station
The United States is great because of people like those women, who are changing what needs changed from the inside, because they love our country. Wanting change does not equate to hating one's country. — creativesoul
Another foreign leader has weighed in on Trump’s racist comments about “the Squad.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the president’s remarks run counter to “the strength of America.”
The German chancellor voiced her solidarity towards the Democratic politicians who were told by Trump this week to ‘go back...to the places from which they came’, saying:
‘I firmly distance myself from (the attacks) and feel solidarity towards the attacked women.’ She added: ‘the strength of America lies in the idea that people of different origins contribute to what makes the country great.’” — Kate Connolly reports