But it's not the case. "There are no objective values" is true. — creativesoul

It bloody baffles me that you guys do this. “Err, I’ll think you’ll fine you’re wrong mate.” *Post Comment*

Wow. That has to have been on purpose. Here’s the full quote again mate, come on now:

Actually the word “fact” doesn’t even mean anything here. It means “state of affairs”, which means “is the case”, which means “fact”. The word just refers to itself. — AJJ

No mate, this was the important bit:

Actually the word “fact” doesn’t even mean anything here. It means “state of affairs”, which means “is the case”, which means “fact”. The word just refers to itself. — AJJ

If “fact” doesn’t actually mean anything then you can’t match a proposition to one.

What is it that you contend and what is it that Clark contends? Is your OP a statement in his words or yours?

Is the claim that facts ought to be believed a fact? I have asked this question before. — Fooloso4

The OP is more or less a quote.

Yes, I would say so.

In what sense is being believed a necessary part of the existence of facts? Can something exist without its necessary parts? According to what you say, in the case of facts, it seems they can; and so, in what sense is believing them a necessary part of their existence if their existence does not depend on them? They ought to be believed implies that they are not necessarily believed, and so, being believed is not a necessary part of their existence. — Fooloso4

Come on now, it’s not “being believed” that is necessary, it’s that they ought to be believed.

If facts are true statements and there are no objective values then saying that there are no objective values is a fact. If we ought believe true statements, then we ought not believe the above quote. — creativesoul

The argument, rephrased a little, contends that there must be objective values if there are facts. If this is the case then it’s not actually possible for “there are no objective values” to be a fact.

And I contend facts do exist, which means they ought to be believed if that is indeed a necessary part of their existence.

If a necessary part of what facts are is that they ought be believed, then if this necessary part does not exist, if they are not believed, then they do not exist. — Fooloso4

It’s not that they don’t exist if they’re not believed. Everyone could stop believing facts and they’d still exist. It’s that they can’t exist without the necessary factor that they ought to be believed.

Just start with this. You claimed that someone was saying or something implied the following:

"something that 'is the case' neither is nor is not the case."

Where are you getting that from? — Terrapin Station

I understand your objection now.

So a fact is a state of affairs, which is something that is the case, which is neither true nor false. You still have to answer how it is that a proposition could match such a thing.

Actually the word “fact” doesn’t even mean anything here. It means “state of affairs”, which means “is the case”, which means “fact”. The word just refers to itself.

By objective values he means things we ought to believe. If there are not things we ought to believe then there are no objective values and therefore no facts. — Fooloso4

Yeah. But that’s not to say that the very existence of facts is determined by our beliefs, but that a necessary part of what they are is that they ought to be believed.

The idea is rather that the values are a fact, somehow as a necessary upshot of facts in general. How that's supposed to work is left completely unattended, aside from saying that it's nonsense to believe otherwise. — Terrapin Station

Well, it’s not left unattended. I demonstrated that believing otherwise is nonsense, I didn’t just say it.

Where is someone saying that something be a fact, or being the case, where the latter is another way of saying "is the case," isn't a fact or isn't the case? Where are you getting that from aside from using the terms as a synomym for "is true" and equivocating? — Terrapin Station

You’ll have to be clearer, I can’t make sense of that.

The premise of the argument is that if there no objective values there would be no facts. The claim is that without the former there cannot be the latter. This is a determinate relation. — Fooloso4

It’s not that our beliefs determine facts. It’s that facts are necessarily things that ought to be believed, but not that what they are is determined by beliefs.

We're not saying that the cat being on the mat is not the case. "Is the case" is another way of saying "is a fact." It's not another way of saying "is true" BECAUSE "true" is about the matching relationship. — Terrapin Station

If “is the case” means the same as “is a fact”, then something that “is the case” (since that just means “is a fact”) neither is nor is not the case, which (since “is the case” means “is a fact”) is to say it neither is nor is not a fact.

I’ll be honest and say I don’t entirely know what you’re on about, and I’m quite tired now. You seem to think the argument is that beliefs determine facts. This is not the argument. The argument is that there are facts and we ought to believe them.

This doesn’t answer my question of how it is that a proposition can match something that neither is nor is not the case.

Right.

So facts are states of affairs, and are neither true nor false. But then if it’s a fact that the cat is sitting on the mat, then we must say that it is neither true nor false that the cat is sitting on the mat. How then is it even possible for a proposition to match this fact? It neither is, nor is not the case that the cat is on the mat.

So how it is that a proposition is true when it matches something that's not true (or false) is that "true" is what we're naming that matching. — Terrapin Station

You’re giving “the matching” the name “true” there, not the proposition.

The point is, once again, that it has nothing to do with "objective values" and what one "ought to believe". The problem is not axiological but logical. Facts are not a matter of what we "ought to believe". What we ought to believe is not a matter of fact. — Fooloso4

That’s precisely what is under discussion mate. You can’t just assert your own view and expect that to convince anyone.

It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd. — Fooloso4

That is absurd, but I don’t see what bearing this has on the OP argument. It seems to me that if you asserted both those things you’d simply be lying about at least one.

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false?
— AJJ

Because what it refers to to be "true" is that the proposition corresponds to a fact. In other words, it "matches" the fact. The fact itself wouldn't have that property--what would it be corresponding to or matching? — Terrapin Station

It would have to be part of the objective Truth. You haven’t actually answered my question. How is that a proposition is true when it matches something that is neither true or false? You can’t just say “Because it matches”, you need a logical explanation why the match has that effect.

Re facts being true. No. They are not true. That's just the point of the standard philosophical distinction. What is true (or false) is a proposition. Not a fact. Propositions are about facts--they're claims about facts. In the most common take on it, propositions have the property of being true if the proposition corresponds to the fact it's about. Otherwise the proposition is false. Facts aren't true or false. — Terrapin Station

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false?

Aye. So facts are states of affairs. Are states of affairs not things and true?

You say, ignoring the summary I just gave of my reasoning.

It seems to me that facts are things, and that they’re true. That’s the definition I’ve been assuming for this argument. Swapping out that definition would be to play a different game anyway; why not define “values” as “baby geese” while you’re at it, and cause the argument to fail that way? “Facts” here means “things that are true”.

In summary:

With that definition in place the argument works, as far as I’m concerned. The principle objection has been over whether we ought to believe true things. It has been claimed that we sometimes ought to believe lies. I responded that it’s not that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way those particular lies facilitate. On top of that I believe I have demonstrated the absurdity of denying that we ought to believe true things, because of the bottomless pit of questions that invites. There has to be something we ought to believe (does the statement “there is nothing we ought to believe” not defeat itself?), and that thing will be true and good to believe, which are the reasons we ought to believe it.

A couple of people have claimed I’ve not been supporting the argument or answering objections. It should really be obvious that’s not the case.

Whatever man. Here’s the OED’s first definition: “thing that is known or proved to be true.” — AJJ

I was just bloody answering your questions.

So you have no answer to my questions, nor to those of your other correspondents. So where will you take your topic now? — Pattern-chaser

This is truly astonishing. I mean... look back over the thread mate, bloody hell.

True things are propositions, not facts. Truth is a property of propositions, which on some accounts, obtain that property via corresponding to facts. (That's it the only theory about how propositions obtain truth-value, but it's one of the more popular theories.)

Facts are states of affairs, ways that the world happens to be. — Terrapin Station

Whatever man. Here’s the OED’s first definition: “thing that is known or proved to be true.”

Yeah, like I said.

Oh. I thought it was a "Brief argument for Objective Values". Not quite the same thing. And The Truth deserves and requires a topic of its own, not a derail in this one. :chin: — Pattern-chaser

And the bit people are getting hung up over is whether we ought to believe facts. And so this is mainly what the discussion has been about.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values.
— AJJ

This garbled statement is what we started off with. It contains so many oddities that it's difficult to know where to start. But it is not obvious from this that this topic is about The Truth. Not to me, anyway. — Pattern-chaser

“Difficult to know where to start” = “I don’t understand this and have nothing cogent to say”

I was commenting on how you twisted your sentences to include 'The Truth' - an important concept, but one which is nowhere near central to the discussion going on. Not being a central issue, The Truth is (a) usually taken for granted, and (b) not really relevant to this particular discussion. But you are trying to drag it in.... — Pattern-chaser

I explain the context of my remark. You quote my remark back at me without the context. I explain the context again. You continue to ignore the context, and claim that the Truth is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts.

Aye, whatever you say mate.

It seems to me to be a sound reason to believe in objective values:
— AJJ

It it not a matter of whether I or anyone else is being forced to be a Christian. It is a question about whether his argument is sound. It's not. I suppose that those who already believe what he is claiming believe that one ought to believe it but it does not hold water as a philosophical argument. — Fooloso4

Ohh! So it’s not a sound argument. It doesn’t hold water as a philosophical argument. Right, my mistake everyone, I had no idea this was so simple.

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary.
— AJJ

But you haven't explained how knowing that it is true that one ought to do something leads to the person actually doing something. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know it is true that I should help you when you’re having a heart attack, therefore I help you. Like I’ve said, goodness and truth - or how we perceive them - are the basis for our actions.

I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it.
— AJJ

And I do not agree with that, for good reasons, as I explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. As I have explained, appealing to probability doesn’t help you. When you base a action on a probability, you are judging that probability in relation to the truth, as you perceive it, that it is probable.

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this.
— AJJ

This is ridiculous. You are reducing confidence to a belief in truth, when in reality the confidence which is required to proceed with an action has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. If an action worked for me in the past, I will proceed with it again. I may even develop a habit. I am proceeding with the action to bring about what I perceive as a good, not because I believe that I know the truth about what good is. — Metaphysician Undercover

And again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. How can you perceive something as good without knowing -
or believing you know - what the good is?

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious.
— AJJ

Again, this is ridiculous. If you want to reduce the faith and confidence which is required for the actions of an animal such as a human being, to a matter of believing that something is true, then that's your own business. But if you are inclined toward understand the truth about what motivates animals to act, and what produces the faith and courage required for such acts, you would be wise to dismiss this premise as faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bald assertion mate.

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral.
— AJJ

We teach children to act properly when they are far too young to understand the "truth about what is moral". Only at a much later age, if they study philosophy, will they come to understand about what it is to be moral. So it is very clearly untrue that we must understand the truth about what is moral, before we can be moral. In reality we learn to act morally long before we understand the truth about what it means to be moral. In fact, philosophers today continue to debate about the truth of what it means to be moral, and if they are respectable philosophers they recognize that the truth about what it is to be moral has not yet been uncovered. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the same way that animals are not moral agents, I would say children are not either. Animals cannot murder, only kill. It’s only by understanding the immorality of killing that it can become murder.

But whatever. I’d like to ask this important question again: Where does our inspiration to be moral come from, if not from our understanding of what is moral?

As I explained, your example failed, and I still don't think that what you claim is possible. Our actions are tailored to our beliefs, the actions are designed to bring about what is believed. I really do not see how it is possible to change the belief and expect that the different belief would bring about the same action. You seem to believe that this could be done, but your example did not show it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, you should be aware that at this point you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying.

I gave you my example, one could believe what is true, and still be sedentary. Therefore believing what is true does not necessarily lead to doing good actions. Doing wrong is irrelevant because one could not do what is good without doing wrong, simply by being inactive. Being inactive is neither doing good nor doing wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary. If you’re dying in front of me from a heart attack then it would be wrong from me to remain sedentary, it would be true that I should help you, and therefore good for me to do so.

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth.
— AJJ

This is false, and I went through it already. When I proceed with a project, a plan, I believe that there is a high probability that I will be successful, and that good will come from the procedure. When I start the procedure I do not believe that it is true that good will come from the action because I have respect for the fact that failure is possible, there could be an accident, and harm could come from the procedure instead. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is to say you take it as true there could be an accident, but that you also take it as true that it could work out. You believe that good could come from the action. My use of “will” rather than “could” should not have indicated certainty to you. To believe something isn’t to be certain of it.

When judging whether or not to proceed with an action, we often consult truths to aid us in the judgement, but there is no truth to whether or not the action will be successful, prior to carrying out the action, and to believe that there is is to believe a falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’ll have to quote where I actually said that. I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it. That doesn’t mean we check the truth to see if the action will definitely be successful or not, but that we judge its goodness and likelihood of success by reference to our understanding of the truth.

Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good.
— AJJ

There's no contradiction. Do you recognize the difference between saying "X is probably the case", and "it is true that X is the case". When I believe that my action will be successful, and I have the confidence to proceed, I do not believe "it is true that my action will be successful", I believe "my action will probably be successful". — Metaphysician Undercover

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this.

It is you who is being pedantic, trying to restrict the use of "believe" to truth. So you claim "I believe I will be successful" means "I believe it is true that I will be successful". But believing does not necessarily imply truth, as your pedantic ways suggest. It sometimes means to have faith and confidence, and this is the case when we believe in the success of our actions. When we believe in our actions, we have faith in our ability to judge, and confidence that the good will come from the action. Truth is not relevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious.

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth.
— AJJ

Do you not see the unwarranted jump which you are making here? You are jumping from knowing or believing the truth to "abiding by the truth". Knowing the truth does not make one abide by the truth. People often know what they ought to do, yet act in a contrary way, like when they knowingly break the law. This is what I've been trying to tell you, knowing the truth does not inspire one to act well, it is something else which inspires morality. And this is why the inspiration to be moral must take priority over the inspiration to know the truth — Metaphysician Undercover

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral. Knowing the truth about what is moral absolutely does inspire us to be moral, according to our understanding. When someone acts in way contrary to what is moral, they are acting on the implicit lie that it is not actually contrary to what is moral to do what they’re doing. Have you not recognised the way we justify our actions to ourselves? Have you ever justified an action by appealing to its wrongness? Where does the inspiration to be moral come from, if not from understanding the truth about what is moral?

Aye, well maybe it is true mate, but don’t worry about it. No one is going to force you to be a Christian.

I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth.
— AJJ

And I said that this is normally taken for granted. Does it really need stating, even here, in the midst of a debate in a philosophy forum? I suspect not. — Pattern-chaser

What? I explain the context of my remark, you quote my remark back to me without the context. I was responding to a statement that denied what you rightly acknowledge as the obvious.

The point I made though, is that the action comes about as a result of the belief. If the reason for leaving is innocuous, then you will not see the need to leave, and you will not necessarily leave. So the example doesn't bring to the discussion what you want it to bring. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand our actions are based on our beliefs. I understand you as saying that this means it can be the case that we ought to believe certain lies. I’m saying that it isn’t that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way the lie facilitates. My example illustrated this; you’re just being a pedant.

We ought to believe what is true, since believing what is true leads to doing good anyway, unless you can give an example where this wouldn’t be the case, where believing the truth would lead to doing wrong.

This is not the case. We act when we believe good will come from the action. In no way am I claiming that we act when we think that we know the truth about what is good. This is what I said about actions being based in the probability of success, not in the certainty of truth or falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth. Why do we appeal to the truth? Because we ought to, because it is good to do so. Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good. You’ll have to quote where I said anything about certainty in regard to choosing our actions; what I’ve said is that when we choose our actions we appeal to the truth, or our perception of it.

Ugly fallacious logic. It is not true that we should never take any actions. Therefore we should take action now.

You need to explain how knowing the truth necessitates action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth. It makes no sense to say we don’t need to abide by the truth, because if that statement is true, then we don’t need to abide by that either.

It was said that we do not judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, but base them on probability. I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth.

I don’t know what you’re struggling with. We can only judge that a coin has a 50/50 chance of landing on tails by referring to the mathematical truth that this is the case. If there was no truth to refer to, you couldn’t possible have any idea of the outcome.