whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts. — AJJ
You continue to ignore the context, and claim that the Truth is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts. — AJJ
If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ
Oh. I thought it was a "Brief argument for Objective Values". Not quite the same thing. And The Truth deserves and requires a topic of its own, not a derail in this one. :chin: — Pattern-chaser
If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values.
— AJJ
This garbled statement is what we started off with. It contains so many oddities that it's difficult to know where to start. But it is not obvious from this that this topic is about The Truth. Not to me, anyway. — Pattern-chaser
“Difficult to know where to start” = “I don’t understand this and have nothing cogent to say” — AJJ
There's so much about this topic that's unclear. It seems to be trying to justify the existence of objective values by asserting that there are facts. It doesn't say whether "objective values" are accurate reflections of that which is, or merely impartial and unbiased observations. Then there is "ought", which says that there is a reason to believe the original thesis. But he won't describe or explain what this reason is.
What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? :chin: — Pattern-chaser
True things are propositions, not facts. Truth is a property of propositions, which on some accounts, obtain that property via corresponding to facts. (That's it the only theory about how propositions obtain truth-value, but it's one of the more popular theories.)
Facts are states of affairs, ways that the world happens to be. — Terrapin Station
So you have no answer to my questions, nor to those of your other correspondents. So where will you take your topic now? — Pattern-chaser
What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? — Pattern-chaser
Whatever man. — AJJ
It seems to me that facts are things, and that they’re true. That’s the definition I’ve been assuming for this argument. Swapping out that definition would be to play a different game anyway; why not define “values” as “baby geese” while you’re at it, and cause the argument to fail that way? “Facts” here means “things that are true”. — AJJ
You say, ignoring the summary I just gave of my reasoning. — AJJ
Aye. So facts are states of affairs. Are states of affairs not things and true? — AJJ
Re facts being true. No. They are not true. That's just the point of the standard philosophical distinction. What is true (or false) is a proposition. Not a fact. Propositions are about facts--they're claims about facts. In the most common take on it, propositions have the property of being true if the proposition corresponds to the fact it's about. Otherwise the proposition is false. Facts aren't true or false. — Terrapin Station
So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false? — AJJ
So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false?
— AJJ
Because what it refers to to be "true" is that the proposition corresponds to a fact. In other words, it "matches" the fact. The fact itself wouldn't have that property--what would it be corresponding to or matching? — Terrapin Station
It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd. — Fooloso4
It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd.
— Fooloso4
That is absurd, but I don’t see what bearing this has on the OP argument. It seems to me that if you asserted both those things you’d simply be lying about at least one. — AJJ
The point is, once again, that it has nothing to do with "objective values" and what one "ought to believe". The problem is not axiological but logical. Facts are not a matter of what we "ought to believe". What we ought to believe is not a matter of fact. — Fooloso4
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