An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content * of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred. — fdrake

Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?

Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.

I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content. — fdrake

I think we're close too. I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content. However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe. We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs. I'm not sure about your last sentence. For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?

Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions? — fdrake

Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.

Ya, I think we agree.

Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as: — fdrake

One's intention is shown in one's acts. This I believe is partly the point of Wittgenstein's remarks about how beliefs are also shown in one's actions. For example, the act of picking up the cup or opening a door shows that we have particular beliefs about cups and doors. Moreover, these actions are quite apart from propositions or statements. Language came later, as something we attached to our mental states.

Mental content or mental states is necessarily reflected in one's actions. If there were never any corresponding acts, it would be difficult, if not impossible to ascribe a mental state to a person. This is true of beliefs, intentions, anger, love, etc. We don't ascribe mental states to trees, because trees don't exhibit the corresponding actions.

I can see what you mean that my experience was more of an unusual experience than an actual near death experience, but perhaps what you are saying about my experience is true of near death experiences too, because the individuals did not die in the permanent sense. — Jack Cummins

You don't have to die in the permanent sense to know that there is life after death. There are millions of accounts of people seeing their dead relatives while having an NDE. This testimonial evidence alone tells us that those who have died in the permanent sense are still around. Sure we can't answer many questions about the afterlife, but that doesn't mean we can't answer some questions, viz., that we survive the death of the body.

The evidence for the argument I give in this thread is overwhelming. Only those people committed to a materialist world view, or those who seem unable to understand how testimonial evidence can be very strong, reject the argument.

The Inductive Argument:

The following argument is based on the testimonials at the following site:

https://iands.org/ndes/nde-stories.html

The following argument is based on the testimonial evidence of those who have experienced an NDE, and the conclusion follows with a high degree of probability. As such, one can claim to know the conclusion is true. This argument makes such a claim.

Each of the aforementioned criteria (in the above post) serve to strengthen the testimonial evidence. All of the criteria in the previous post works hand-in-hand to strengthen the conclusion, and these criteria serve to strengthen any claim to knowledge. If we have a large enough pool of evidence based on the criteria above, then we can say with confidence that we know that consciousness survives the death of the body. In other words, we can say what is probably the case, and that is all that is needed.

Again, if there is a high degree of probability that these testimonials reflect an objective reality, then we can also say with confidence, that we know consciousness survives the death of the body. Thus, our knowledge is based on objective criteria, not on purely subjective claims.

We will now look at the testimonial evidence in terms of the five stated criteria, and how these testimonials support the conclusion.

First, what is the number of people who claim to have had an NDE? According to a 1992 Gallop poll about 5% of the population has experienced an NDE; and even if this poll is off by a little we are still talking about hundreds of millions of people. Thus, the number of accounts of NDEs is very high, much higher than what we would normally need to decide the veracity or accuracy of the testimonials, and much higher that what is normally needed to draw a proper conclusion.

Also, as was mentioned in the previous post, numbers in themselves are not enough, which is why the other criteria must be coupled with numbers. It's not numbers alone.

The second criteria of good testimonial evidence is variety, i.e., do we have evidence from a variety of sources? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. NDEs have been reported in every culture from around the world, which by definition means that we are getting reports from different religious views, and different world views. NDEs also span every age group, from young children, to the middle-aged, and finally to the aged. The testimonial reports come from doctors, nurses, scientists, atheists, agnostics, literally from every imaginable educational level and background. NDEs occur in a variety of settings, including drowning, electrocution, while awake, while on the operating table, after a heart attack, etc. People have also reported having shared an NDE with someone else, although rarely. They have happened when there is no heartbeat, with the blood drained from the brain, and with no measurable brain activity. They have been reported to happen with a minimal amount of stress, i.e., without being near death. Finally, there have been many thousands more reporting these and similar events happening to those who have taken DMT (N,N-Dimethyltryptamine), which is an illegal schedule 1 drug. These DMT reports are also reports that are happening without being near death.

The third criteria is scope of the conclusion, and the scope of this conclusion is limited to consciousness surviving the body. The conclusion claims that we can know that consciousness survives bodily death.

The fourth criteria is truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing some objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It lends credence to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on Youtube.

Consistency is also important to the establishment of the truth of the premises. We have a high degree of consistency across a wide variety of reports. What are these consistent reports?

1) Seeing one's body from a third person perspective, i.e., from outside one's body, and hearing and seeing what's happening around their bodies.
2) Having intense feelings of being loved, and also intense feeling of peace.
3) Seeing a light or tunnel in the distance and feeling that one is being drawn to the light, or moving through the tunnel towards the light.
4) Seeing deceased loved ones.
5) Seeing beings of light that one may interpret as Jesus, Mary, Muhammad, an angel, or just a loving being that one may feel connected to.
6) Heightened sensory experiences, viz., feeling that one is having an ultra real experience, as opposed to a dream or a hallucination.
7) Communication that happens mind-to-mind, not verbally.
8) Seeing beautiful landscapes.
9) Seeing people who are getting ready or waiting to be born.
10) Having a life-review by a loving being who is not judgmental in any way, but simply showing you how important it is to love, and the importance of your actions on those you come in contact with.
11) Feeling as though one has returned home. This is also confirmed by people who were told they chose to come to Earth.
12) A feeling of oneness with everything, as though consciousness is at the bottom of everything.
13) Memories of who they really are return, as though they temporarily forgot who they were, and where they came from.
14) There are also reports of knowledge returning, and many questions being answered.
15) Understanding that ultimately we cannot be harmed.
16) That we are eternal beings simply entering into one of many realities.

These are just some of the reports from those who experienced an NDE, and some of these reports are confirmed by those who have taken DMT.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence are firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are literally thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near Death Studies. And according to polling, there are hundreds of millions of firsthand accounts of NDEs.

The fifth criteria is cogency of the premises. Whether the argument is cogent for you depends on many factors, but many people have heard of near death experiences, so the concept is not an unfamiliar one. It is not going to be cogent for everyone, but with a little study and reading it can be cogent. It is not difficult to understand the concept. Although it is probably going to be difficult to understand how it is metaphysically possible. This argument is claiming that it is highly probable that consciousness survives the death of the body, and that the conclusion is very strong based on what makes for strong inductive arguments.

The further claim of this argument is that I know that I know the conclusion is true. Is it possible the conclusion is wrong? Of course it is possible, but we do not want to base a belief on what is possible, but on what is likely the case. All kinds of things are possible, but that does not mean we should believe them.

I'm re-posting this from page 14 with minor changes. The original post was in response to a question.

There are two ways to use the word proof, one is in reference to an inductive argument, i.e., I have sufficient evidence to conclude that X follows from the evidence. Inductive arguments are either strong or weak based on the evidence. They follow with a low, medium, or high degree of probability. You've proved your inductive argument if the evidence used to support the conclusion follows with a high degree of probability.

The second way we use the term proof in philosophy is when referring to deductive arguments, i.e., the conclusion follows with absolute necessity if the argument is sound (it's valid and the premises are true).

Although I can use both arguments, the deductive argument is less convincing, so I mainly use an inductive argument.

My claim is that there is sufficient testimonial evidence to reasonably conclude that consciousness survives the death of the body. In other words, I'm making the claim that I know the conclusion is true. And although I believe that I could make other claims based on the evidence, i.e., claims of knowledge, I'm limiting the scope of the conclusion. By limited, I mean I'm not trying to give evidence of a god, heaven, that we are eternal beings, or any other spiritual or religious idea; nor am I trying to give evidence of many of the other claims people are making while having such an experience. Although I do believe there is strong evidence to support other conclusions, and these conclusions have varying degrees of certainty, just as many of our everyday rational conclusions have varying degrees of certainty.

The first question is, what makes a strong inductive argument? As some of you know, the criteria for a good inductive argument is much different from the criteria of a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say X happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers, because numbers in themselves are not sufficient.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. Remember that when examining the conclusion of an inductive argument, the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. The difference being what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), verses what necessarily follows (deductive arguments).

Third, scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph. It means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are much harder to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend.

Fourth, truth of the premises. Clearly this means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that makes a good deductive argument, i.e., a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness has to do with whether the deductive argument is valid, plus the premises must be true).

(a) Also, since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the fourth criteria of a good inductive argument, viz., the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely here this criteria, but it's very important in terms of effectiveness. Any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true. You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. Thus, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an arguments effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

The next post will give the actual argument. This post simply tells us what makes a good inductive argument.

I read it, but it doesn't sound like an NDE. I'm not saying the experience wasn't real, only that it doesn't seem to fit into the experiences of NDEers. For example, if I want to know if person x,y and z went into my bedroom, I would compare what each of them saw, generally there is some overlap. They might not all see the exact same things, but some of what they saw would have to be the same, at least generally.

Some of what I posted is speculation (and I've stated it as such), i.e., it's based on no testimonial evidence or very little testimonial evidence. However, the thrust of my argument, which I've given a couple of times in this thread, is based on thousands and thousands of first hand NDEs, and these experiences are evidence. Keep in mind that there are millions of people who claim to have had an NDE. Now some people write these off as hallucinations, but I think there is to much similarity between them to say they're hallucinations. What distinguishes a hallucination from a veridical experience is that many others are experiencing that same thing, i.e., we generally agree that we are having the same or relatively the same experience.

And yes, I do think there is a strong case for an afterlife, but I don't agree with the Christian perspective or an afterlife. In fact, I don't agree with any religious idea of an afterlife. Although it could be that religion arose from these experiences.

After a long break from any discussions, I thought I might come back to add more information to this thread. Although at 70 I don't always have the patience to deal with many of the topics and/or questions in this forum.

In this thread I tried to steer clear of religious beliefs, although there is some overlap because we're talking about an afterlife. I've tried to use evidence that's not based on religious ideology, and I think I've succeeded. The testimonial evidence is from a wide range of cultural perspectives and beliefs, which gives a better picture of the NDE experience. The picture that I've formed is based on examining many thousands of these experiences. I don't believe you can conclude much by watching a few testimonials, other than to dismiss or agree with them based on your particular world view.

As has already been mentioned earlier in this thread, my view is that consciousness survives the death of the body. To say it another way, I believe we survive as persons, i.e., whatever it is that makes us who we are is not dependent upon the body/brain. For me, the testimonial evidence is overwhelming, which is why I took an epistemological approach to answering the question of consciousness surviving death. My main argument was inductive, and based on the rules of good inductive arguments I concluded that consciousness survives death. Do I know it with absolute certainty, of course not, but I do claim to know it with a high degree of certainty, and that's all that's needed. That's all that's needed in our everyday lives, and that's all that is needed in science, because much of what we claim to know is based on what is probably the case.

Is there racism in the U.S., yes, but is there "systematic racism," absolutely not. Did that police officer murder that man? Yes. That said, I don't want to have anything to do with this forum after reading some of the most disgusting posts by those who run this forum. Please delete my account.

On Certainty Post 8

"I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face.-So I don't know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion "I am here", which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself.---Then is 2 x 2 = 4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? "2 x 2 = 4" is a true proposition of arithmetic-not "on particular occasions" nor "always"--but the spoken or written sentence "2 x 2 = 4" in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that the proposition has its sense. And "I know that there's a sick man lying here", used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible (OC 10)."

Consider the following: We are sitting together visiting a friend in the hospital. We are in a well lit room, and we are not under the influence of drugs or anything that would alter our perceptions, so there is no reason to doubt that we are looking at a sick friend. I say, "There's a sick man lying here. In fact, I know there is a sick man lying here. It's our friend Bob." You respond, "What's your point? Obviously there is a sick man lying here. Did you have any doubts?" Notice how out of place the proposition sounds. It is important to realize that if there was a reason to doubt the statement, then it would not be out of place. For example, if we were standing outside Bob's room, and it was not well lit, and you asked, "Is that Bob in there?" And I replied, "Yes, it's Bob." You ask, "Are you sure (the doubt), it's hard to see in here?" I respond, "I know that's Bob, because a few minutes before you arrived, I was in there talking with him." In this last example note how the use of "I know..." fits together with the doubt, and the resolving of the doubt. In the former example, where a doubt does not arise, the use of "I know..." seems like nonsense or silliness.

The problem it seems, is that because we can imagine a situation that fits Moore's propositions, then it follows from that Moore's propositions are good examples of what we know. But the problem may be that some of these propositions will work within the language-game, and some will not. One needs to understand the context. Therefore, is it proper to say, as Moore did, "I know I have hands." One cannot answer the doubts of the skeptic by simply using the word know, as if the utterance of the word conveys that you really do know. In fact, the statement that one knows is no more intelligible in this situation, than the statement that one doubts that one has hands. Both people are making the same mistake, viz., using the words out of the language-game that make them intelligible.

Wittgenstein seems to be making the same point about the mathematical proposition 2 + 2 = 4, i.e., when it is used outside of its normal range of use (outside the language-game in which it resides), it too, is out of place.

Consider how we use the word know in our everyday lives. We take a course in algebra, history, ethics, or physics, and the teacher wants to know if you know the subject. Is it enough to say to the teacher "I know algebra." Is that enough to alleviate the doubts of your teacher? Obviously not, we have to demonstrate our knowledge? We take quizzes, we take tests, and we answer questions in class, this is what convinces others that we have knowledge. Once the doubts are eliminated, then the question of knowing does not generally arise. If we say in a court of law that so-and-so is guilty of murder, then hopefully the evidence will convince us, so that very little doubt, or even no doubt remains. A claim to knowledge is a special kind of claim that requires an objective standard, so that we generally have no doubts that we have such knowledge. Moreover, the claim to knowledge is not a claim of absolute certainty. We do not need absolute certainty to say that we know that a proposition is true or false, but we do need a high degree of certainty. This is often seen in courts of law when the jury is told to disregard doubts that are not reasonable.

What possible doubt could there be in the examples above? Doubting has to have a context beyond the expression of the word doubt. Just as knowledge must have a context beyond simply expressing the word know. Just because someone is able to use the words know and doubt in a proposition, that does not mean that the proposition has sense.

Using the word know as Moore used it, is senseless, in fact, it creates bogus philosophical problems. Many so-called philosophical problems are just as senseless. The way we talk about free will and determinism, time, knowledge, and a whole panoply of other philosophical ideas, propositions, and words are also just as problematic. Once you come to understand what Wittgenstein is saying, or trying to do via his method, then many of the problems of philosophy simply vanish as pseudo-problems - many, but not all.

Descartes' very bad idea. — Banno

Ya, I think it is poor philosophy.

On Certainty Post 7

"Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand-my own hands, that is (OC 9)?"

The fact that we don't doubt that we have hands, at least in most cases, tells us something important about Moorean propositions. It tells us that they have a grounding that makes them exempt from doubt, at least in the contexts we are describing. This is also true of most of our sensory experiences, viz., those experiences with the world around us. Moreover, it is these experiences that seem to all fit Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions.

On Certainty Post 6

"The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. In a law-court, for example, "I am certain" could replace "I know" in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say "I know" there. [A passage in Wilhelm Meister, where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense "You were certain", the fact being different from what he knew.] (OC, 8)."

This passage seems to be straight forward, i.e., in many instances we can use the two words know and certain interchangeably; and this is probably where some confusion occurs. Except, as Wittgenstein says where it's "...meant to mean: I can't be wrong." - this seems to be a reference to Moore's propositions. Moore seems to be saying that here is a hand, and I can't be wrong about this, or many of the other propositions Moore uses. There seems to be something special about Moore's propositions, and Wittgenstein picks up on this. It's probably why Wittgenstein has some sympathy for Moore's argument.

It seems to be the case that Wittgenstein uses the word certain in both the subjective sense and the objective sense. The latter is akin to knowing, the former is reflective of my inner state of subjectivity.

On Certainty Post 5

"My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on.--I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc, etc. (OC, 7)"

Our lives show that we have certain beliefs, and many of these beliefs are shown by our actions. The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc.

The backdrop of reality grounds us, if this wasn't the case, then the skeptic would have an argument. However, the skeptic tends to doubt things that shouldn't be doubted. They doubt that which is outside the language-game of doubting; and they violate the rules of doubting within the language-game of doubting. Similarly, Moore is extending the use of the word know beyond its normal use, beyond the grammar associated with the word.

Both Moore and the skeptics are misusing the words know and doubt respectively.

Sorry, but I'm not going to respond to every post. I'm just going to get the exegesis out, and you can do what you like with the information.

On Certainty Post 4

"Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition (OC, 5)."

This is an interesting point, many of our beliefs are indeed determined by what we make count as evidence. In fact, most arguments are over this very thing. For instance, some religious people believe there is evidence for the existence of God, but others do not believe there is evidence, or at least good evidence. Now, I am not saying that there is or there isn't evidence, only that a proposition is true or false for me or you based on what we allow to count as evidence. In fact, language-games can arise to support any system of belief. However, it's not the language-game itself that decides whether we have knowledge of this or that, otherwise we could create language-games to support any belief.

Language-games can give support for the correct use of certain words; and in the case of On Certainty, we are looking at how we use the word know. So, not all language-games are created equal. We need to look at the original use, and how a word has developed over the years, i.e., the language-game and grammar that surrounded the word's birth and growth.

"Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC, 6)."

This is where Wittgenstein begins to show that Moore's use of the word "know" is contrary to the word's original home, i.e., contrary to how the word is normally used. There is a kind of logic of use involved in Wittgenstein's method throughout On Certainty.

For the longest time I didn't know exactly what Wittgenstein was referring too, when he made the following statement about Moore's proposition: "...a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed."

However, in a later passage he seems to clarify what he has in mind. In paragraph 42 Wittgenstein speaks of the "mental state of conviction," and that this state of conviction is something that occurs regardless of whether a proposition is true or false. Wittgenstein seems to refer to it as a subjective state of certainty, and we observe this in the way people speak or gesticulate. The way we gesticulate will often show our convictions. Moore's claim to knowledge seems to be more in line with this subjective state of certainty, than with real knowledge claims. This will be developed more as we look at these passages.

Finally, if some of you want to learn how Wittgenstein examines words using the methods in the Philosophical Investigations - I believe On Certainty puts Wittgenstein's methods (the methods of the PI) to use, i.e., we can learn how to apply his methods by a close examination of his notes.

That just makes a mash of the meaning of the word. What do you imagine pre-suppose to mean? If I claim justification, then that is exactly not presupposing. See the problem? — tim wood

If I presuppose there are good reasons for believing X, then I'm presupposing there is a justification for X. In this case presuppose means to entail.

On Certainty Post 3

"If for e.g. someone says 'I don't know if there's a hand here' he might be told 'Look closer'.--This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features (OC, 3)."

The language-game of doubt, and what it means in a particular context to overcome the doubt.

"'I know that I am a human being.' In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human'. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as 'I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC, 4)."

Here we begin to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt. The negation of the proposition "I know that I am a human being" illustrates this. Wittgenstein points out what it might mean, but we get a sense of how unclear the former proposition is by its negation. The negation being "I don't know that I am a human being."

What are the grounds for doubt? What are the grounds for knowing? Maybe part of the confusion lies in the fact that we can imagine situations were we can doubt such propositions. However, can we doubt the propositions Moore is using, and can we doubt them in Moore's contexts?

Presupposes as used in this context means there is a justification for believing X, or rather a justification for making the claim that one knows that X is the case.

The word certainty in On Certainty seems to be used in at least two ways. First, a subjective sense, viz., "I feel certain." Or, two, "I know or am certain that such and such is the case." In the second case the word certain could replace the word know, i.e., they essentially mean the same thing.

On Certainty Post #2

"If you do know that here is one hand [G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World], we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself (OC, 1)."

So, Wittgenstein grants that if Moore does indeed know that he has a hand, then Moore's conclusion follows (see post 1). The skeptic says that such a proposition can't be proved. This doesn't mean, according to Wittgenstein, that we can't derive them based on other propositions. However, the derivation may not be any stronger than the proposition we started with. My interpretation is that there is something foundational here, viz., that some propositions are foundational to our claims of knowledge or our claims of doubt. When you reach bedrock no part of the foundational structure is stronger.

"From it seeming to me--or to everyone--to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC, 2)."

The skeptic may have a point (although it may not be the point he/she is trying to make), that just because people (or Moore) say something is so, it doesn't follow that it is. However, Wittgenstein points out that what we need to ask, is whether the doubt makes sense. Doubting occurs in a language-game, and language-games have rules - later Wittgenstein will point out that a doubt that doubts everything is not a doubt. Some kinds of doubting make no sense, i.e., if you start out doubting everything, then doubting loses all sense.

Knowledge has to be demonstrated - whereas Moore seems to just state his propositions as facts, and this needs to be shown or demonstrated in some way.

Sorry, but I'm through responding, this is going nowhere but around in circles. Thanks for all of the responses.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I don't believe the cat "takes it to be the case that the floor is solid," it acts as if the floor is solid. Maybe it means the same thing to you, but for me it's a strange way to say it. It's probably not even aware that it's acting in such a way. The cat just does what it does.

Also if a dolphin inspects itself in the mirror, the shows the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection. — Marchesk

I don't think the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection, reflection involves concepts that the dolphin doesn't have. It believes it's seeing another dolphin, or some such thing.

I might ask you the same question I asked Banno. If they refer to "things" what are these things, for you? Where are they, what do they consist of? How do they come into existence? — Isaac

I don't know how many times I have to answer this question, for the umteenth time, beliefs manifest themselves in our actions (nonlinguistic or linguistic, both are actions). So, if I open the door, then that act shows that I believe there is a door. Or, if I tell you my belief via language, then the act of telling you reveals what I believe. Meaning also is revealed in how we use words in social contexts. These are the "things" I'm referring too.

Hence it might be that at some future time belief comes to refer usually to neural networks. — Banno

I don't see this being the case at all. It is similar to saying that meaning can be associated with neural networks. Beliefs and meaning both refer to things apart from the mind. In fact, they give evidence that we have a mind.

There's much liability for confusion thereabouts. Does showing have a broader reach than saying - are there things that can be shown but not said? — Banno

I think Witt believed that there are things can be shown but not said, because he believed there was or is a limit to language. I disagree with Witt on this point.

Ya, I do believe that showing has a broader reach than saying (at least it seems so), but that doesn't mean that we can't put it into words. Any belief portrayed in our actions, or in the actions of others can be put into words. However, the fact that a belief can be put into words, doesn't take away from the idea that it need not be put into words in order for it to be a belief. I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. It's true that the concept belief didn't exist, but that doesn't mean the belief itself didn't exist. Again, the belief is in the showing, or the action apart from language.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's knowledge claim while remaining consistent? — creativesoul

Witt was sympathetic to Moore's propositional claims, but I don't think he was trying to make sense of Moorean propositions. On Certainty shows throughout the book that the grammar of Moore's propositions is just incorrect, so no, I don't think Witt is trying to make sense of Moorean propositions.

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about? — creativesoul

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about.

I really don't know how to make it any more clear than I already have. Nonlinguistic beliefs are simply those beliefs shown in our actions. This is closely related to Witt's idea of showing vs saying.

You can keep using this thread, I really don't have much more to say.

I may be completely off the mark here but you seem to be surprised by how "foundational" beliefs differ with domain and that some of them are, in your words, "structurally more significant". Could it be, is it possible, that you're under the spell of, in a Wittgensteinian sense bewitched by, language? — TheMadFool

Well, if it is the case, then one would have to show how it is the case. Many things are possible, but that does not give us reason to suppose they are true. If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar.

I do think I am correct about my hypothesis, but of course I could be completely off the rails. I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on.

↪Sam26
I found jamalrob to be quite clear:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement.
— jamalrob

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else? — Luke

Ya, that statement is clear.

All he is saying, is that he believes, beliefs are statements. I'm saying, as you know, that beliefs can be reflected in non-linguistic ways. We don't need language to show what we believe, at least in terms of these very basic beliefs. Can you tell me how opening a door doesn't reflect a belief about doors, regardless of any statement. There are millions of things we do that reflect our beliefs apart from language. How does language even start without basic beliefs about the world around us?

I really don't know what else to say, or how to respond to some of your responses. It's as if we're talking past one another. I tried to simplify my position, but some of you didn't even respond; and if you did respond, I didn't understand the connection between what I said, and your response. I don't know what else to say without repeating myself.

Then I'm not sure I understand your objection.

Yeah, then he sets out 286, showing that he was having a bad day. — Banno

Ya, it could have been a bad day. :gasp:

So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition. — Isaac

My only point in saying that it has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind is to address the beetle-in-the-box question, i.e., it's not like the beetle-in-the-box question, because our actions point to beliefs, viz., something happening in the world. So, for example, if I open the door, the action of turning the knob reflects the belief that there is a door. If I sit in a chair, that action reflects the belief that there is a chair.

I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. In particular, certain kinds of actions that give voice to what is happening in the mind.

I'm presuming that from your answer to Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?

So what forms are we left with that a belief might take? — Isaac

I am referring to beliefs which are not linguistically formed, not that they can't be, but that they need not be. All beliefs that are reflected in our actions (linguistic or non-linguistic actions) are products of the mind. In fact, that we have a mind is reflected in our actions.

There are three ways beliefs can be demonstrated, (1) simple actions, as in the opening of a door, (2) stating one's belief, and (3) writing out the belief. All are actions of a sort.