In my studies of NDEs this subject comes up frequently. People often report that they are aware of living other lives. I do not like the term reincarnation because it carries religious baggage. People also report choosing to come here, i.e., to live a human life. The body seems to be more of a receptacle. Once you leave this life your memories come back, it is similar to waking up after a dream.

If she was genuinely fearful for whatever cause or reason that doesn't amount to racism. However, there is no way to know what's going on in her head. At the very least her fear is unfounded. Many on the left love labeling people they disagree with as racist, not that that is what happened here. Anyone can be racist, power has nothing to do with it.

Russel thought we could build a faultless language could be based on sense data. Wittgenstein I thought it could be built from names for simple objects. Davidson thought we might translate English into a first order language.

SO, could it be done? — Banno

Wittgenstein never thought that there could be a perfect language. Russell thought that Witgenstein was trying to construct a perfect language in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein commented somewhere that Russell misinterpreted the Tractatus. Any language for everyday use will have some of the same problems that our current language has. I'm not sure what you meant by faultless, I interpreted it to mean perfect.

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ya, and if we look throughout history it's the people with the low IQ's who have corrected the Newton's, the Beethoven's, the Einstein's, and the Plato's of the world. Even on something so obvious as this your wrong. What a silly thing to say. And of course everyone makes mistakes, that's obvious, but according to you, you know so much more, right, MU?

If we think of this in chess terms, it's like comparing a 1600 rating with someone who is rated 2700 or above. We don't have a clue. We think we do, but we're stumbling in the fog. You may have a few opening moves that you memorized, but the middle and end game eludes you.

It's interesting that even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he had in mind in certain passages. So, the fact that we can't quite grasp what Wittgenstein was saying in a particular passage isn't anything unusual. Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. I don't think any of us can keep up with his thinking. It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts.

If we can just grasp bits of his method, I think that would be progress.

There is a kind of foundationalism in On Certainty, but it's not traditional foundationalism. It's a foundationalism driven by language-games and context. So, if we were to look at chess as an example, the rules, the board, and the pieces are foundational to the game. One doesn't need to justify the rules, no more than one needs to justify the statement "This is my hand," it's just part of the background in which we act. There are many foundational statements in our language. One can generally spot them because knowing and doubting are for the most part senseless in relation to these kinds of bedrock statements.

Is Wittgenstein putting forth a theory of foundationalism, of course not, but it seems to follow from many of his thoughts. Many philosophers have interpreted Wittgenstein in this way, but they're careful about how they frame the idea. There is no doubt, at least as I interpret Wittgenstein, that Moore's statements
do fall into a kind of foundational thinking. Whether a statement is foundational depends on the context, and in Moore's context, viz, "This is my hand," it is foundational.

/

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It seems like this thread is just an argument with MU.

What I'm saying is that use in itself doesn't always determine meaning. If that was the case, then how would we be able to determine that someone was incorrectly using a word? What we would have to say, is that their use is so far outside the boundary of correct use, or so far outside the rules normally associated with correct use, that its lost its sense or meaning. However, what if a group has been incorrectly using a word or concept for years, how does one correct that, or does one correct it? Or has the meaning of the word evolved into something else? But what if the meaning of the word as they define it, is associated with some mental object - that would surely be incorrect, even if they had been doing it for years.

So all I'm saying Banno, is that examining use is not necessarily going to resolve the problem, again what if it's an incorrect use? I do agree that generally use gives us the correct sense or meaning, but can we say that dogmatically. Can every case of incorrect use be resolved using Wittgenstein's method? Would Wittgenstein himself say such a dogmatic thing? I'm not sure. I'd be interested in what you and others think.

I'm not saying that there aren't problematic ideas within Wittgenstein's thinking. No method, not even Wittgenstein's, will solve every problem, but his method comes as close as you can to solving linguistic problems of the sort he's talking about.

The way you talk about rules seems confusing to me.

I think Streetlight, Luke, Fooloso4, and myself are pretty close in our interpretation as far as I can tell, but your interpretation seems a bit off. Wittgenstein isn't exactly the easiest to interpret, but it's not beyond our reach either, at least generally.

On the whole I think the thread is going well. I hope we don't give up on it like so many other threads.

MU, what you're saying goes way beyond what I'm saying, so don't equate the two.

I know that most of us agree that Wittgenstein wants us to see meaning or sense in terms of use, but I think it's a mistake to say that meaning equates to use (at least dogmatically). I've said it myself, but we have to be careful, i.e., if meaning equates to use, then it would follow that anyone, or any group who used a word or concept incorrectly, could make the claim that their use of the word is the correct use. So, use must be seen in the wider social context, but even here it can be difficult to say that one use is correct over another use. Especially if we're acknowledging that words (sense or meaning) don't always have clear borders. Moreover, given this, there can be genuine disagreement over a particular use of a word.

If you think Wittgenstein is incorrect, then it doesn't apply.

I think it's important, as we think about what Wittgenstein is saying, to think about how we as individuals make these kinds of mistakes in our own thinking. So, where have we gone wrong in our thinking by making the mistakes that Wittgenstein points out. It's one thing to grasp what he's saying, but it's another to actually apply it as we do philosophy.

§69
Wittgenstein keeps saying the same things, only from different angles. It seems that philosophers and others get hung up on the form of the proposition/statement, as opposed to the function of the proposition/statement, word, or concept. Clarity of thought is not about some very precise definition, which as it turns out is generally impossible. This is clearly observed in our use of the word game, which doesn't have clearly defined borders. On the other hand, clearly defined borders may be drawn if we're talking about a particular kind of game, say chess. However, the tendency for philosophers is to look for unifying principles, or some theory that sums up the concept in some neatly defined idea.

As Wittgenstein points out, someone might say that before we come to understand these unifying principles or theories, we didn't have a very exact definition or an exact measure, but then the problem raises it's ugly head again, what do you mean by exact. So, the problem continues because we aren't seeing the social nature of language in the stream of life.

There are similarities in the Tractatus and the PI in that Wittgenstein is still trying to mark out the limits of sense. In the Tractatus he sets out the limit of language, but in the PI he speaks of the limits (plural) of language, which are found in how we use language. These limits (in the PI) are seen in the various uses of propositions, words, and concepts, they are open to view. They are not hidden, as in the Tractatus, but open to view in the stream of life.

Another similarity between the Tractatus and the PI, is that Wittgenstein is still trying to understand the function of language. In the PI there is no absolute method of determining sense from nonsense, no formal boundary as he set up in the Tractatus. Something only makes sense (in the PI), or is nonsense in a particular language-game. Even the term make sense is vague, just as the term game is vague. Just as the word game would alter its meaning from context to context, so making sense would alter its meaning from context to context, or from language-game to language-game.

This is an expanded version of PI 69, pulling together a general overview.

In my Wittgenstein Commentary thread I start out by talking about the Tractatus in general terms. You can read some of my comments there.

We can always start a thread on the Tractatus.

It is not simply a matter of how propositions connect with the world but of the logical structure of the world from simple objects that make up the substance of the world (T 2.02 - 2.021) that combine in determinate logical ways to form the facts of the world (T 2.01). — Fooloso4

I don't find anything to disagree with here, at least not in this statement. I'm very familiar with the Tractatus and what it says.

I still think it is important to emphasize that the rejection of Tractarian logic is as much a rejection of an ontology as it is a rejection of a view of language and the activity of analysis. — Fooloso4

Yes, but it depends on what you mean by his ontology. If you mean his analysis of how propositions connect with the world, and the limits he puts on language, then I agree. Although, in the PI he still believes there are limits to what can be said, it's probably where I disagree with Wittgenstein.

Logic, according to the Tractatus underlies and is the scaffolding of both language and the world.

In the PI logic is not prior to, independent of, or determinate for the language game. — Fooloso4

I'm not saying that it's the same method or the same kind of logic. His understanding of the role of logic in language is much different in the PI.

It is not the logic of language but the logic of the language-game, different games different logics, that is to say, different grammars or rules. — Fooloso4

Your point seems to be a distinction without a difference. When I speak of the logic of our language I'm talking about grammar, rules, use, and finally meaning or sense, which would obviously include how words and concepts are used in language, and thus language-games. This expression is used not only in the Tractatus, but in the PI (PI 93, 345,).

§66
This paragraph reminds me of the courts trying to come up with a definition of pornography. A definition should be seen more as a guide than some absolute measure of meaning. Although, many definitions try to show how a word is used in a variety of contexts. However, most people use the dictionary as some absolute arbiter, and in some sense it can be used as an arbiter. And although there are not always clear boundaries around the definition, as seen in W. idea of family resemblances, there are still uses of the word that fall outside normal usage. This in turn may give rise to the idea that there is some way of setting limits, or of being more exact in our talk of games. This desire is so powerful that even after understanding what W. is saying, we are still drawn to the idea that we can describe the game more precisely.

§68
It's interesting that even the concept number, which we tend to see as more rigid, is not necessarily bounded. It too can have uses that are unbounded, just as the concept game has unbounded uses.

The question is: Why does this trouble us? It seems to be our desire for exactness, but even the concepts of being exact or being precise is not subject to a strict boundary. So, it seems we are fooled into thinking a certain way due to our lack of understanding of just how language works. Hence, Wittgenstein's method of showing us the way out of this kind of thinking.

Finally, although there are rules that govern the uses of concepts, concepts are not everywhere bounded by rules. There seem to be just enough rules to allow us to say this or that is correct or incorrect, but also enough elasticity to leave room for expansion or growth in terms of what we say, and how we say it.

We don't learn concepts of types, like "game" through ostensive definition. There must be some other form of rule, other than a rule of definition, which is at play here. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's not saying that you can't learn how to use certain words by referring to things or objects. We teach children all the time by pointing to things (cups, houses, trees, etc). He's saying that meaning or sense is not derived in this way, i.e., not by pointing to some object. So, ostensive definition can be part of the learning process. Learning meaning or sense involves a wide variety of uses that may include pointing to this or that in social contexts, but is not dependent on this or that object.

Part of the problem with philosophers and probably with thinkers in general is that we want exactness, we want some final analysis that will answer our questions. And analysis can be useful when done properly, or when seen aright. Part of the problem of the Tractatus was that Wittgenstein was trying to give propositions clarity of meaning or sense. In the Tractatus this is done via elementary propositions in terms of the simple and complex, i.e., propositions are complex until we break them into their constituent parts, viz., elementary propositions and still further into names. So, by understanding the simple parts of propositions (names), and correlating these simples to the simplest parts of facts in the world (objects) we come to some final analysis. For Wittgenstein it's objects, for Russell it was individuals, in terms of the simplest components of reality (facts).

His talk about the broom and the table in terms of some final analysis should be seen in light of his former thinking, as some of you have already pointed out. And isn't this our tendency, as philosophers especially, we seem to think that if we can get to the bottom of what is meant by this or that term or concept, then we have a more exact sense of meaning. It seems to be the case that the more exact we are with a word, for example games, the more inexact we become, i.e., we exclude many other uses of the word.

Wittgenstein still believes in the logic of language in the PI, but it's the logic of use, and not the a priori logic found in the Tractatus. The PI is more of an a posteriori investigation, or a pragmatic investigation of language usage. There is clarity in the PI, but it must be seen in terms of use and context, and one must be careful about being too dogmatic, and not to overgeneralize as is seen in many philosophical theories.

I mean, two pages of self-congratulatory fake 'eureka' to arrive at the basic standard Hacker and Baker interpretation of a single aphorism which I can only presume (from the level of implied scholarship) that everyone has already read. So what was the point? I just don't get it. — Isaac

I hope these interpretations are just Hacker and Baker interpretations. I know I don't use Hacker and Baker, most of my interpretations are my own.

its a really tough one so I’ve had to try and dig at it. Still not totally happy with the exegesis and I think I’ve missed some details — StreetlightX

I feel the same way you do about 58. I've read it several times, and I still feel as though I'm missing something. It's probably just about use, as opposed to some ontological meaning we're attributing to a particular context (not sure). It would be interesting to see how this applies when philosophizing.

Thanks Fdrake, but for some reason my writing lately has been piss poor. I can't put my thoughts down very well. Help, I'm getting old.

§60
Wittgenstein continues in 60 to repudiate that the sense or meaning of a proposition/concept/word is somehow enlightened by some deeper analysis, as in his example about the "broom." This again points to his former thinking in the Tractatus. However, note that this analysis is not about a deeper understanding of an idea (the ideas for e.g. in the PI), but a deeper understanding of the object associated with the word. As if the meaning of broom really refers to the parts associated with the word.

If I say, "Bring me the broom," do I need some further analysis to reveal what is really meant by the statement/word? Does further analysis of the kind described in 60 really add something that's missing? And if we were to ask someone, as Wittgenstein points out, what they really meant, would they add this missing analysis, i.e., would it reveal the thinking behind the statement?

This reminds me of how people try to analyze what we really mean by the word nothing, as if there is some metaphysical thing associated with the word. You'll even find threads on the word nothing, as if there is some hidden meaning or sense in the word itself, apart from its use . If you ask me to look in a particular room to see what's in there, and after looking I say, "Nothing," - then later, you look in the room and note that there was a desk in the room, would you come back and say, "What do you mean there was nothing in the room?" You might, but we can all think of circumstances where it would be completely appropriate to use the word nothing in this situation depending on context. Now there is a difference between Wittgenstein's example in 60 and this example, but I'm pointing out that the use of a proposition/word/concept will tell us much more about meaning or sense than most anything else.

if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work.
— StreetlightX

I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4

You're right to point this out. The paradigm is the color or the yard stick that the name refers to.

A quick interpretive note on the last two sections I wrote about: it's often noted that Witty is targeting the idea that the use of names must correspond to images in our head. The open question is whether this entails the opposite position, namely, that words (or names, to be more specific) must then correspond to things 'out there' in the world instead. But, given the equivalence established between 'out there' and 'in here', one ought to instead read Wittgenstein as rejecting the inside/outside dichotomy altogether. — StreetlightX

I agree, and this is very important in so many areas of our thinking. It has particular importance in our understanding of epistemology.

How do you relate #59 in this way? It appears to me like "meaning is use" has met the paradox of 58. We want to say "red exists" means that the word red has meaning, rather than that there is an existing thing called "red". However, since meaning is use, and we use "red exists" to say that there is something, a colour called "red", we cannot do what we want to do, the attempt contradicts itself. So it appears to me, like he has met this dead end, this paradox at 58, so he goes all the way back to the proposition "A name signifies only what is an element of reality" at 59, to get a fresh start, from a new perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality [the interlocutor, or his former self] (PI 59)," is not him going back because he is at some "dead end." He is continuing with his analysis of the idea that a name signifies some thing in reality. Just like you said, the name red, in terms of meaning, is not bound to some object for the reasons his already given in various analogies and examples. Much of 59 is connected with his view of objects and names in the Tractatus. As if some deep analysis of the names and objects will reveal the nature of the logic behind the connection, those things that are the simples. In other words, that one-to-one correspondence between the name in the proposition, and the object, which is the simplest part of a fact in the world. He concludes with, "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality." "Picture of reality..." is also pointing back to the Tractatus, viz., the picture theory.

Much of this is an argument against his former view, his early philosophy as seen in the Tractatus. I'm not exactly sure what it was that I said that was confusing or unclear, so I tried to give you some insight in to my thinking as I read this paragraph.

§58
If the meaning of a word is not tied to an object, paradigm, sample, memory, or any other object (mental or otherwise), then it seems to follow that the meaning of "X exists," is derived in another way. In particular, meaning is derived how it is used in social contexts. So, "X exists," if it is to mean anything, means, there is such-and-such a use for the word. Although as Wittgenstein points out this is senseless.

We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59).

This is not to say that the object has no place in the conversation, only that, when it comes to meaning, we need to separate meaning from the aforementioned objects. In saying that "Red exists," it appears "...to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red..." This causes us to look for some thing to associate with the color, which can cause confusion about meaning.

I think there is much more to what Wittgenstein is saying than what we are capturing in our comments.

But not all games are played by rules that are set and clearly defined. Sometimes the rules are made as we go along by some kind of consent and agreement. There are no rules that stand as the rules for making rules. In addition, the existing rules may no longer be adequate when something new is learned, as in the case of quantum mechanics, where the Newtonian rules do not apply. — Fooloso4

I agree, and part of the problem with language and/or concepts, is that because there aren't always clearly defined rules, we have a tendency to limit the use of a word based on a particular context, and forget other contexts in which the word is also correctly used. We forget the family resemblances associated with being in a family, and focus on only brown eyes and large noses. It's as if when thinking about the concept game we're only focused on board games and ball games.

So why is it a case of "you must see it my way or else you don't see it at all"? It really does not come down to "I must see it your way, or else I don't see it". What makes your way the correct way? — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the things I did MU was to read primary sources and make an interpretation based on what I understood the interpretation to be, then I compared that interpretation with other philosophers who knew the material. One of the ways I knew I was on track was that my interpretation was lining up with what others were saying. If my interpretation was not in line with what others were interpreting, at least generally, then I would have good reason to suspect that something was wrong. So it's not a matter of seeing it my way, or having an open mind, it's about understanding the material.

My first challenge to you would be to find other philosophers who see it the way you do, no interpretation is a matter one person's view, as if you can simply choose any interpretation you want. So why don't you find other philosophers who view rule-following the way you do, and present the argument.

One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. This is just basic stuff. It's fine if you disagree with it, but all I'm saying is that I don't follow your arguments. I've read your responses, and I can't make any sense of some of what your saying. It's not personal, it's just that I can't see how anything anyone can say will change your mind, or make you understand.

Whenever I'm arguing with someone in person, and I suspect that they're not understanding my argument, I'll ask them to explain my argument as they see it. In this way, I'll know that either I'm not explaining the argument well enough, or that they don't understand the argument.

My second challenge to you is to explain Wittgenstein's rule-following argument as you understand it, whether you disagree with it or not. Explain it like you were explaining it to someone who never read Wittgenstein, and use supporting paragraphs.

Oh god, I just want to laugh when I read all of our work trying to get MU to understand. These disagreements with MU go back years. In the forum most of us belonged to before this one, I had a thread that went on for years, and MU has never given up this position. No serious student of Wittgenstein, if even they disagree with Wittgenstein, would deny many of these points being made about rule-following. There may be disagreements, but most of this is understood by those who study Wittgenstein in a serious way.

The one thing I can say about MU is that he keeps his cool about all of this. In that sense he is better than me. The Marine in me wants to take the person and kick them in the ass, which would solve nothing. I think it comes down to this, you either see it or you don't. If you don't see it, fine, just move on. Now, if I can take my own advice, I'd be doing well.

I have nothing against you MU, you may be the greatest guy in the world, I just don't have the patience with continually arguing or repeating myself over and over again. Luke seems to be able to do it. Luke has also been arguing some of these ideas for years.

What's interesting is that I'm going to be giving a class to some people on some of this material. I hope I can keep my cool. Just kidding, I'll be fine.

My point is that if you think you're going to get anywhere with your explanations you're living in a dream world. The only reason I see to answering some of his questions is to help others who may also be confused.

In some ways this is pretty funny, and frustrating, at least for me.

Sorry Luke that wasn't clearly written so I erased it. It's 2:30 in the morning and I'm to lazy to re-write it. :gasp:

So, it seems that we use objects (physical or abstract), memories, pictures (mental or otherwise) as tools to learn meaning, not that these things entail meaning for the reasons Wittgenstein has already shown. For example, I will teach a child how to use a word by pointing to an object. I say "cup," as I point to the object sitting on the table, and before the child learns to use the word correctly I may have pointed to many different cups in many different contexts. None of these objects entail the meaning of the word "cup," as much as I'm tempted to think so. As someone analyzing the word (as a philosopher might analyze the word nothing) I might think I'm discovering something special in the cup itself that gives meaning to the word.

Paragraph 58 I find very interesting. I'm interested in how some of you are going to interpret it.

Thanks for that post Andrew. I couldn't agree more.