The best summary is from Dr. Greyson himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QYBhzi67NY

What happens after the confusions are dispelled? Does that speak to the veracity of the cleared ground, or is it simply a case of being better off to do whatever else is required than before? I'm always wary of leaving the implicit accounts our use of language has as the final word, when their analysis is intended only to be the first. — fdrake

It depends on what the confusions reveal. For example, if we're referring to Moore's argument against the skeptics, the argument fails. If we're referring to the skeptic's argument against Moore, their argument fails. Both arguments fail because of the misuse of the words know and doubt respectively. In both cases it clears the ground, so that future mistakes of the same kind are not made. Does it speak to the truth of the arguments? Yes. If both arguments fail, then their conclusions are not true. Is it the final word on the matter, of course not. One might need to revise the arguments in light of the new information. It depends on one's goals. Moreover, understanding the points made in Wittgenstein's analysis clears the way in many other similar arguments.

It's seems you're implying that not much is accomplished after the air clears. It depends on what the clarity achieves. It might be a minor point of clarity, or a major point of clarity. Wittgenstein's analysis of what it means to know in OC is a major point of clarity. It affects the way we use the word know across a wide domain of uses.

Most of us have talked in generalities, although you have brought up specific examples from Austin. There are many words that philosophers use (and others) that could do with some Wittgensteinian analysis (as per the PI or OC). For instance...

Truth
Knowledge
Illusion
Delusion
Soul
Hallucination
Reality
Unconscious
Subconscious
Belief
Time
Thought
Experience
Infinity
Subjective
Objective

The list goes on and on with words that cause linguistic confusion. Austin tackles a few of these in his book Sense and Sensibilia.

Then there is Wittgenstein's analysis of how we derive meaning. How that many of our words aren't associated with objects (mental or otherwise) that give meaning to a word. It's the problem of thinking that meaning is associated with something internal to me (some mental phenomena) that I associate with the word as I use it.

Obviously, as we have already agreed, linguistic analysis in the tradition of Wittgenstein and Austin isn't the be-all and end-all of understanding, but it is an important study, helping us to understand many confusions that arise philosophically.

Here's a link for you.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1

Some of you may enjoy this spoken essay based on J. L. Austin's notes.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIB6rUa9fJQ

I think it illustrates the kind of linguistic analysis we're talking about.

As an example, Austin's analysis of the argument from illusion (for perceptual anti-realism, specifically used to argue for sense-datum theories). The original argument goes like: we see a stick half submerged in water, it appears bent. The stick has not really bent as immersion in the water does not bend it. The bending of the stick in the water is equivalent, insofar as it generates a perception, to seeing a stick really bent in that manner. Since a perception of the stick appearing to bend in water is sensorially equivalent to a perception of the stick bending outside water in precisely the same way, we do not see reality as it is; we see appearances, construable as sense data.

Austin intervenes in the argument by, among other things, pointing out that it is fully consistent to say "Yes, we see a stick which appears bent", undermining the equivocation of appearance and perception used to establish the equivalence of the "really bent stick" perception from the "bent stick in water" appearance (there's more to the argument of course).

The internal tension highlighted is the elision of perception and appearance through a shifting of vocabulary, which when criticised dispels the force of the argument by revealing unstated, implausible premises. — fdrake

I really enjoyed reading Austin's analysis when I was in college, and would recommend Sense and Sensibilia to anyone interested in the issues being discussed in this and other threads like this.

The internal tension highlighted is the elision of perception and appearance through a shifting of vocabulary, which when criticised dispels the force of the argument by revealing unstated, implausible premises. — fdrake

Austin's analysis is a good example of how such arguments can shed light on linguistic confusions. You're right to point these out.

In the context of this thread, Linguistic analysis should not be isolated from the confusions of meaning that often occur when stating one's ideas. Moreover, the analysis should not be separated from the world in which we live and breathe, where language gets its life.

We've had a brief discussion about it being useful for clarity; and we've conducted the discussion in pragmatic terms in general. It's a truism that clarity is certainly desirable when writing on a topic, but it does not seem a sufficient reason to render linguistic analysis necessary for discussing that topic; even if such a topic would benefit from it, that does not establish that it is required to discuss the topic at all. — fdrake

It's certainly the case that it's a truism to say that we need to be clear when we write, especially writing from a philosophical perspective; and generally it's the case when writing about anything. However, there's something unique about Wittgenstein's (and Austin for the matter) later philosophy that lends itself to the clarification of meaning that we've rarely seen before. And, it's in this sense that clarity for me takes on a whole new study. These kinds of discussions are needed because it's easy to overblow the significance of any advancement. Wittgenstein's later works are an advancement in philosophical thinking, viz., clarity of meaning.

We both seem to agree that in order for people to have discussions, at least on an everyday level, this kind of analysis is not necessarily needed for us to communicate. People communicate all the time without ever hearing of Wittgenstein or Austin, or without ever understanding some of their methods of linguistic analysis.

Given that, what seems a more interesting discussion topic is are three related issues:

(B1) What circumstances necessitate adopting linguistic analysis as a philosophical methodology? — fdrake

Books could be written trying to answer these three questions. Nevertheless, they are good questions.

First, one needs a good understanding of the methods employed by Wittgenstein and Austin in order to be able to recognize when to apply them; just as a scientist recognizes when to employ the scientific method. Second, one needs to recognize the context (philosophical discussions, and the depth of those discussions) that might permit such a discussion. On the other hand, sometimes when talking about meaning, one can interject some of these methods into simple discussions. Depends on how adept you are, and how well you understand the methodology.

(B2) What does it mean that linguistic analysis is necessary for analysing a topic?

As I understand it, in this context, it would mean that a clarification of meaning is required that would help resolve an argument, or at least clarify a philosophical problem. These kinds of issues arise all the time, especially in a philosophical forum. Rarely are there threads where such clarifications would not benefit the discussion.

(B3) Does the necessity of linguistic analysis for a topic say anything about the topic's nature?

Yes, from Wittgenstein's early philosophy to his later philosophy, he has concentrated on how it is that we mean something by this or that word, or by this or that statement/proposition. Thus, if one could sum up Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, its been one devoted to understanding meaning.

Seeing as you reacted to the question "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?" strongly, affirming that it is a classic example for linguistic analysis, what was it about the question that made you believe it was necessary (if you believed it was necessary) to approach it through that lens?

And moreover, to what extent are these features generalisable? Can you use them more abstractly as indicators that linguistic analysis is necessary (or profitable) in a circumstance? And moreover, if that is true, how can you transfer those indicators to philosophical discussion more generally? — fdrake

I can see why you might want me to react to the moral question, but since my main work has been in the area of epistemology, I think it would be appropriate to answer the question in terms of my epistemological background, as meager as it might be.

In just about every subject the question of knowing arises. What does it mean to know (I use JTB as a generalizable definition), and how has Wittgenstein's methods helped to clarify what it means to know? This, it seems to me, is paramount if we want to claim that we know anything. If we look at use in terms of knowing we see that there is at least five ways of justifying a belief (remember we are applying Wittgenstein's methods, we are looking at use).

1) Linguistic training, which is a very basic justification of the use of words, i.e., it agrees with correct public usage. It's a matter of learning how to use words within a particular language. A child learns that's Mom or Dad because they were taught that's Mom or Dad. Later they will learn to use words like cup, water, dog, cat, etc. How does a child know that's a dog? Because it was taught that's a dog. How do we know they know? We observe how they use the words. They surely don't give us a definition.

2) Pure reason, pure logic, so a proposition is true due to its logical structure. It's called a tautology. For example, "Either Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president of the U.S., or he wasn't the 16th president of the U.S." This statement is true due to its logical structure. The logical structure of the statement is "X or not X." Any proposition of this form is always true.

3) The third way of justifying a belief is through sensory experience. You can know the car is blue by looking at it, that the apple is sweet by tasting it, that someone is playing a trumpet by hearing it, that the table top is smooth by feeling it, etc.

4) The fourth way of justifying a belief is through inference, argument, or proof. A belief is inferred from other propositions (e.g. inductive and deductive reasoning) or evidence.

5) The fifth way of justifying a belief is through testimony. We very often learn things from those who are in a position to know. Much of what we know comes from the testimony of others. In fact, there is a massive amount of information that comes to us through testimony. Can we doubt most of this information? No. Why? Because the very tools for understanding the world around us, our words and concepts, come from others. If we doubted most of it, we would be reduced to silence. Our culture and other cultures succeed because of the truthfulness of most of what is conveyed to us. This is not to say that we should trust everything we read or hear, because sometimes there are good reasons to doubt what is said or written.

I think it's clear how these uses are generalizable, and I think it's clear how each of these can be used to further explain what it means to know. As you can see, knowing is not restricted to any one subject (e.g. science). Moreover, most of what we know is not known with absolute certainty. Very often people classify knowledge as knowing with absolute certainty. If this was the case there wouldn't be much that we could claim to know. You couldn't even claim to know algebra if you got less than perfect scores on all your tests. As it is, we can get a B, or even a C, and claim to know algebra. Thus, knowledge extends to what is probable or likely the case.

I think I've answered some of your questions.

I bring these up because questions in fields can provide philosophical insights or impinge upon philosophical questions; "do special and general relativity impact the A-theory of time?", "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?". Questions in metaphysics and political economy do not seem to require linguistic analysis to play a central role in order to pose them or attempt to answer them.

But this is hardly the "home turf" of linguistic analysis. — fdrake

There is much here to agree with, but on the other hand, there are philosophies that grow out of some of the analyses done that need (I believe), in order to be more precise, a Wittgensteinian analysis. For instance, your example, "were the banker bailouts in 2008 (morally) right?" This, it seems, is a classic example of where a linguistic analysis might be needed. What does it mean to be morally right? What theories of moral right and wrong are we talking about (utilitarian, deontological, or relativistic theories, to name a few)? This would bring up the different uses we have for these words in our culture. That said, much of the time when using these words, we take it for granted that people are referring to the same things, until you press them on the specifics.

I would disagree that "[q]uestions in metaphysics and political economy do not seem to require a linguistic analysis." Especially when discussing the philosophical theories that arise from different belief methodologies. There is a sense, though, where both of us are correct depending on what we are emphasizing. If we are talking about a statistical analysis of income brackets, as you pointed out above, then you're probably right about not needing a linguistic analysis (as per Wittgenstein). It depends on what we're trying to accomplish. However, if we're developing a philosophy as a result of a statistical analysis, we might need a linguistic analysis for precision's sake.

When it comes to epistemology, in many of these subject areas I find a lack of understanding from scientists and lay people alike as to what it means to have knowledge, or what it means to know. They fail to understand the many ways in which we can claim to have knowledge. This can be seen from Wittgenstein's unfinished notes called On Certainty. Epistemological considerations come up in almost all of the subjects you exampled above.

If there is something above that you think I failed to address, please press the point.

Something that makes me deeply suspicious of this whole endeavour of subordinating conceptual analysis to the analysis of word use is that an idea can be posited and motivated by use and insulated from its problems by claiming that the idea itself is sound — fdrake

If analyzing concepts isn't a matter of linguistic analysis, then what is it? Concepts by definition are linguistic, and definitions arise through use. Even when someone discovers something new, and thereby discovers a new concept, it's through use that it becomes a norm of language. It's in a culture of language that correct and incorrect uses become manifest. Furthermore, use isn't the be all and end all of the answer, simply because it takes a huge amount of effort sometimes to untangle correct use from incorrect use. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's Investigations, and it's clearly seen in On Certainty, which, I believe, is the actual application of Wittgenstein's thoughts in the PI.

Because something is motivated by use, it doesn't mean the idea is sound (so I agree). We often fail to understand just how complex some of these problems are, even those who think they have a good grasp of Wittgenstein's ideas (and I include myself in this class) often fail (more often than not) in their attempts to explain some of these ideas or concepts.

This is not to say behavioural indicators regarding a concept are worthless for examining how it works, it's just to say that it's not the whole story - simply because the use of words does not exhaust the domain of analysable phenomena. — fdrake

Of course the analysable data goes far beyond just a linguistic analysis. There is a danger in thinking that a linguistic analysis always answers a particular philosophical problem. I tend to use it for two reasons, first, it's where my interests lie, and second, language is the medium used to talk about these problems, especially philosophical problems.

that nonlinguistic belief are not under consideration in the paper, nor have they been throughout the history of epistemology. — creativesoul

Correct, Plantinga never discusses basic beliefs in terms of nonlinguistic beliefs. Nonlinguistic beliefs wouldn't fall under the category of epistemology.

Hey Creative, how's it going?

I'm curious as to what happened. Do you no longer hear the sounds which you had attributed to God whispering, or do you still hear the sounds but now believe that they are caused by something other than God? — Metaphysician Undercover

This discussion would take us far away from the thrust of this thread. Suffice it to say that I don't believe, because I don't think there is sufficient evidence to support many of the Christian beliefs.

By the way, I never heard sounds, it was more like a feeling or intuition.

I don't know that there is an everyday use of words that maps neatly onto the distinction between direct and indirect experiences. — fdrake

I agree with this, i.e., there is no neat way of mapping this. It's like trying to map out what pornography is, like the Supreme Court said, I know it when I see it (Justice Stewart). I know that seeing that tree in my back yard is about as basic as you can get. The problem is setting out some definition that will fit each case. I don't think that can be done. It's like trying to come up with a definition of game that will fit every use of the word. It can't be done. This is why I say that each use needs looked at on its own merits. Even the words direct and indirect have problems as you pointed out.

This is why in most of my discussions I use the phrase "generally it's the case that." So, there are some general things we can say about basic beliefs. I do think there are nonlinguistic basic beliefs along with linguistic basic beliefs, but this covers a lot of ground.

Would you agree that the distinction between a direct experience of X and an experience of X differ only insofar as direct experience of X is not mediated, whereas experience of X in general is mediated? — fdrake

I would agree, but would compare direct with indirect experiences. The best way to examine these kinds of experiences is to examine context driven experiences, or how we use the words in specific cases.

I think when someone reads the bible and hears God speaking to them through it, the experience they have is not of the character of God announcing their presence through the interpretation of words; a mediated relationship; it's a borderline aesthetic sense of identity, a tacit "this is divine" that comes from immersion in the words, like a calling or a whisper of purpose. The people who have experienced this readily distinguish it from ordinary functioning of their senses, even if the divinity expresses itself in a usual sensory modality (so no necessary divine sense to have it). It's direct in the sense of finding oneself in an intimate connection with the divine while reading, not by inferring something is divine or being caused to believe that something is divine as a result of what is read. — fdrake

I generally agree that some people, maybe most view it like you've described. I considered myself a Christian for many years until recently, and believed that many subjective experiences I had were from God. For example, that quiet whisper of God speaking - a kind of divine sense, that some would argue all of us have. I now have many problems with this kind of thinking. I don't outright dismiss it, but I'm very skeptical of most of it, even though I still have a strong spiritual belief system (e.g., my beliefs associated with NDEs).

Epistemological justifications require inter-subjective corroboration. — Janus

Explain this statement, I don't follow.

What distinguishes a direct experience from an experience? — fdrake

I suppose a direct experience might be something like the following: Standing in front of my oak tree in my back yard, as opposed to looking at the same oak tree in a picture (direct and indirect). Hearing God speak as he stands in front of you (e.g., Jesus and the disciples), or reading his words in the Bible. Although it's not always clear the way many religious people use these words.

Most basic beliefs wouldn't be doubtable no matter what time in history. Consider the following:

1. This is a tree (as I point to a tree on a clear day).
2. This is my mother or father.
3. This is my hand.
4. I live on the Earth.
5. He is conscious, pointing to someone sawing a piece of wood.
6. He is a person.
7. etc

There are endless basic beliefs that would be silly to doubt. Moreover, because someone doesn't doubt a belief, that in itself doesn't make it basic. It's not a matter of opinion.

There are some basic beliefs that do change over time, but many do not.

Many basic beliefs aren't even linguistic, they are simply part of the background we find ourselves in. I would say that animals, prelinguistic man, infants, and modern man show that they have certain beliefs without saying a word. They show their beliefs by their actions - digging a hole, a dog recognizing its master as he comes home, a baby reaching for a toy, each of these actions requires certain basic beliefs. Most of our daily actions require certain basic beliefs or we wouldn't be able to function.

Outside of language there is no epistemology, therefore it's not a matter of being true, these kinds of beliefs fall outside our epistemological language-games. Not all basic beliefs are of this kind, but many are.

I find the discussion in Platinga's article to bring us to consider the ambiguities involved with the very idea of basic beliefs and discovering what they are through analysing language use — fdrake

I agree with this. Although I find Wittgenstein's analysis of language to be much more sophisticated than Plantinga.

Religions have been around a lot longer than psychology, which is a discipline that hardly seems to know what it is half the time. Surely religious experiences must have a psychological dimension, and surely they may have profound psychological consequences, not always benign, but the 'merely' says something else; 'the science of psychology' speaking from the white lab coat of authority. — Wayfarer

When I speak of psychology in this (context you quoted) context, I'm speaking of mental and emotional contexts that arise from particular beliefs. I'm not speaking of the study of psychology. Thus, in my sense psychology has been around since man first walked the Earth. Moreover, I'm also thinking about meaning, and how meaning has a cultural context apart from our inclination to derive meaning from our subjective experiences or mental experiences.

I find it very difficult to put down in a few paragraphs what I believe about many of the things talked about in this thread. Much of the time it just gets misinterpreted. This isn't a complaint, it happens with all of us.

I disagree with much of what Wittgenstein said in those passages. But I also agree with some of it. For example, I agree that the mystical can be shown in our actions (e.g. prayer). I disagree with the idea that it's beyond language or beyond words. My study of NDEs indicates that mystical experiences can be expressed. I don't believe as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus that there is a boundary to language, beyond which, is that which is senseless (not nonsense). I also disagree with his ideas about ethics. The explanation would take us far afield of this thread.

I'll use Wittgenstein's examples to partly answer these questions. Wittgenstein argues against Moore's use of the word know in the proposition "I know this is a hand." One of the reasons Wittgenstein gives for this argument is that in Moore's context it would make no sense to doubt that that is Moore's hand. Later, Wittgenstein gives an example in which it would make sense to doubt that that is hand my hand. The example is where someone might wake up after an operation with their hand bandaged, and not know whether their hand had been amputated. In this case it would be perfectly legitimate to doubt whether you have a hand or not.

The criteria here is not arbitrary. The meaning of our words has a lot to do with context, a word might mean one thing in one context, and another in a quite different context. However, it's more than just context, as I pointed out, i.e., the use of the word doubt in a particular context tells us something about the use of the word know in the context also. Moreover, it tells us something about basic beliefs.

There are no absolutes here in terms of basic beliefs, which is why I say that generally it doesn't make sense to doubt that that's your hand. And generally it makes sense to doubt that God exists, or that you're having a direct experience with God. However, I would point out that IF someone did have a direct experience with God, then the belief would be basic for them. Of course what exactly counts as a direct experience? My contention is that what most people count as direct experiences with God are merely psychological. This is not to say that there can't be real experiences with God (if one exists), but only that it would be difficult to discern in most cases.

Plantinga is talking about belief in God (the Christian God) as properly basic. Just because billions of people believe something, that doesn't make it basic. He wants to argue that people have a kind of built in belief (innate belief) about God, but not just any God. Regardless, all one has to do is ask, "Does it make sense to doubt the existence of God?" Yes, unless I'm having an undoubtable experience, and I'm not doubting that this can happen. It's certainly metaphysically possible.

If I tell someone who is an agnostic that God spoke to me audibly in my bedroom last night as I prayed, it would make perfect sense to doubt such a declaration. That belief (if it really happened) would be basic for you, but surely not for the agnostic. The agnostic would have every right to doubt your experience.

When you see your hand and are prompted to believe that your hand exists, the contents of that belief are an elaboration upon the details of the experience that prompted it. — Pfhorrest

I think I understand what you're saying, although it seems like a strange way to say it (using the word "prompt"). I would say that our sensory experiences can justify a belief, i.e., it's one of the epistemological ways we use to justify a belief. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" "I tasted it." Or, "How do you know that Mary shot Joe?" "I was there the night Mary shot Joe, I saw it."

If we want to understand how it is that we know something, then look at how we use the word in ordinary circumstances. There are several ways we justify a belief. For example, testimony, sensory experience, linguistic training, logic (inductive and deductive reason), etc. My point is that there is a better way to talk about how we arrive at a belief without using the word "prompt." At least that is how I see it.

Ya, he would say something like that. Years ago I went to a couple of conferences and listened to Plantinga give lectures on this topic. I think it was around 1979-80 at Wheaton College.

On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God: — Relativist

I know he claims that, but I'm saying that it's not the same as the kind of experiences we have with one another. The kind of experiences we have with one another are not the kind that can be sensibly doubted, at least not usually. Whereas these supposedly direct experiences with God are easily doubted for good reason.

If they can be doubted, then they are not basic as Plantinga claims. None of the major religions can agree on these experiences. People claim all kinds of things as direct experiences. However, now I'm a bit off topic.

I haven't read everything in this thread, so if duplicate some of what's already been mentioned forgive the laziness.

Plantinga's properly basic beliefs are in some ways similar to how I interpret Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs. I believe, and have argued this extensively in other places, that Wittgenstein's bedrock beliefs are outside the language-game of epistemology, i.e., they are not based on epistemological justifications. One way to understand this, is to consider doubting these kinds of statements. The classic example is Moore's statement, "I know this is my hand." To see how unclear this statement is (according to Wittgenstein) consider its negation, "I don't know this is my hand (but consider this is Moore's context, before a crowd holding up his hand). For the belief to be bedrock in the Wittgensteinian sense, it must generally (i.e., in most contexts) be the kind of belief that is exempt (again, in most contexts) from doubt. If it is generally not doubted, then it is a statement that is outside of our epistemological language-games in those undoubtable contexts.

If a proposition/statement can be sensibly doubted, then it makes sense that it would need to have a justification to support it, or it would need an epistemological justification to overcome the doubt. Knowing and doubting go hand-in-hand, which is why we need good reasons/evidence, or some other kind of justification. Otherwise, we could infer that one knows, simply by one's claim that one knows. Knowing requires an objective justification.

Plantinga's basic beliefs are similar, in that Plantinga believes that his properly basic beliefs, in this case, belief in God, is direct, immediate, and basic. So, in Plantinga's reformed epistemology, belief in God is so basic that support in terms of an epistemological justification is not needed. Belief in God is foundational or basic as Plantinga says. However, I would argue that Plantinga is wrong about this. Why? We can use the Wittgensteinian test, i.e., does it make sense to doubt that God exists? The obvious answer is, yes. The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God. Belief in God is not the same as a belief that one has a mother or father. Believing that one has a mother or father is properly basic. If you don't believe it, try doubting it.

My conclusion, is that if you have a belief in God, then it requires a good epistemological justification. It's a cop out to think that such a belief doesn't require such a justification.

Banno?

When you argue for the possibility of evidence of consciousness surviving the body, what is your understanding of a proper-name? — sime

Roughly, there has to be some consistency of memory and experience to be able to say that that person is Elvis. Memory and one's experiences create a kind of narrative that follows that person throughout his or her life. I'm of the opinion that identity goes beyond the physical body. Others believe that one's identity is necessarily tied to the physical body, or the brain. I would tie a proper name to that which has the memories and/or experiences of the one we call or called Elvis. When we talk about Elvis we're talking about the one who had the experiences associated with a particular life. Whether one's identity goes on after death is the question at hand. I believe the evidence is strong, given my argument, that one's consciousness or identity survives.

This is a video documentary showing the commonality of NDEs. It's over an hour long, but worth watching.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uDA4RgHolw&t=1996s

In my view there are two senses of justification. First, there's what we mean by justification, viz., having good reasons or good evidence, etc. Second, there's the application of what we mean by being justified. For example, think of it this way, in mathematics we have the formula, and then, we have the application of the formula. The formula is a guide, but we can often or sometimes get it wrong, i.e., we can make an error in the application of the formula. So, I can believe, think, or surmise that I'm correct, but later find out that I was wrong. This is why I say that you have to distinguish between thinking you're justified, as opposed to actually being justified in reality.

I've already mentioned this, but it bears repeating. Built into the application of JTB (not the definition, the application) is the idea of probability. So, when I look at a clock there is a low probability that I'm going to arrive at an incorrect time. This is built into the application of JTB, just as it's built into the application of a mathematical formula, that sometimes we're just incorrect. Knowing this, explains the conflict in the clock example, at least to my satisfaction. The man (again) isn't justified, he merely thinks he is.

Andrew asked me if we could be justified, and yet have a false belief. Yes, in the application we can think we're justified and yet have a false belief. However, in terms of the definition of JTB, if we're really justified, then it necessarily leads to a true belief. This doesn't mean that what we're really saying is that JTB simply amounts to JB, because we're not talking about any belief, we're talking about true beliefs. Again, being justified leads to the truth under the definition of JTB (justification and truth are different concepts), but not necessarily in its application.

Fiveredapples has given an eloquent defense of his position, but my position is much simpler. I'm sticking to JTB as the definition of knowledge. I don't see any good reason to give it up. The clock was broke, therefore the person wasn't justified in their belief that the time was X. If they weren't justified, then they failed to meet the definition of knowledge under JTB. Gettier fails for similar reasons.

As I've said I don't understand the primacy you give to 'belief'. What for example is added to the above phrase by the word 'beliefs'? It seems to me 'bedrock' and 'foundation' would be perfectly clear without them, as metaphors. — mcdoodle

I don't understand this mcdoodle, the whole subject revolves around the idea of beliefs, if we're not talking about foundational or bedrock beliefs, what are we talking about?

It feels like you are shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core, as in my eyes language games are all about knowing-how: skilful use. 'Belief' is relatively unimportant then. As Harry says, to proclaim a belief is to exhibit the skill in making such proclamations; it's the tying the shoelaces that counts. It counts for me, as something the shoelace-tier knows. They may believe they are solving the final problem that makes the universe whole, but to me they are tying shoes, and their beliefs are their own affair. — mcdoodle

You're correct, languge-games do involve skills, Wittgenstein was skillful in showing us the different uses of words in different language-games. However, Wittgenstein not only showed us his skills in doing this kind of philosophy, he also showed us his beliefs about what language-games told us about language as a whole. His beliefs about language are what's important, and that's what I've focused on.

By now everyone should know Russell's stopped clock example as a counter to JTB. Fiveredapples has laid out the problem very well. I'm going to try and put forth my own explanation as a defense of JTB.

The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes. We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time. However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time. In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes. So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.

Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example? After all, reason dictated that your conclusion (you had the correct time) was justified. So, in one sense you believe you have JTB based on your experiences with clocks. However, later you find out the clock is broken, and so you weren't justified after all. This seems to be contradictory, but is it really? Does it really show that JTB fails? No. Why?

Because no definition, at least few definitions, are absolute. An example of an absolute definition would be, "All triangles have three sides," an example of a definition that's not absolute, is the definition of a game. Those of you who have read Wittgenstein know that there is no definition of the word game that covers every possible use of the word. The point is, do we say that the definition is incomplete or doesn't work because we find some exception. Again, no. The definition is a guide, it's not some absolute that works in every possible use of the word. The same is true of the definition of knowledge as JTB. It's not some absolute that will work in every possible use, but, I believe it's the best definition as a general rule or guide.

Much more could be said about this, but it would take about 15 or 20 pages of writing.

No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge). — fiveredapples

You're right I do want to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition. I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible. We are always updating and changing what we think we know. So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified. If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period. Just because you thought you were justified, doesn't mean you are or were justified. This is why often our justifications need testing, because we are often wrong. Fallibility always includes the possibility of being wrong, even if it's a very low probability.

False premises can and do lead to true conclusions, as was shown in the argument. The real question is about justification.

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand and people think it refutes JTB. When examined closely the cases are not really justified. All Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge (for e.g., thinking one is justifed when you're not), as opposed to actual knowledge. So, if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end it lacks proper justification, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB.

I believe Five that a form of your argument can be used against Gettier. Gettier's examples fail to either be properly justified, or not true. I've always believed that Gettier's examples fail to undermine JTB.

Nice to hear from you again fiveredapples.

I'm not really writing to debate with people on this subject. Although I'll entertain a challenge or two. I'm just writing to explain what I've gleaned from my study of On Certainty. People will either see the points or they won't. I do appreciate the input though.

We just disagree when it comes to knowledge as a skill. I have to move on, I don't want to get stuck on that particular disagreement.

Let me say a few more things about basic or bedrock beliefs, and I'm mainly thinking of prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. First, Moore's claim that he knows he has a hand, is one such belief, i.e., we know that Moore is incorrect to say that he knows such a belief for many of the reasons Wittgenstein points out. The reason Moore is making such a claim is to attack the skeptic (extreme skepticism), who claims that one can't know such a thing. One cannot know, for example, that there are physical objects. Thus, Moore starts out by making a claim that most everyone seems to agree with, viz., "Here is one hand," and "Here is another," and I know it. After all who would deny such a claim.

Second, how do we know that Moore's beliefs are not knowledge? We know for various reasons. As I pointed out above we know this belief is formed without justification, it's part of our inherited background. I find myself believing that I have hands as I interact with them in the world around me. These beliefs are causally formed through sensory experience. It has nothing to do with knowledge as a belief, especially since knowledge as a belief requires language.

Another reason that these beliefs are not what Moore thinks they are is that they cannot be doubted sensibly, which is why Wittgenstein points out the negation of Moore's propositions - "I don't know this is a hand." Remember we are talking about normal circumstances. Wittgenstein points out that there are instances where it would make sense to doubt such a claim, but Moore's context is not such a context. What would a doubt or mistake look like in Moore's context. Moore is giving a lecture before an audience and holding up his hands.

If you know something such as Moore is suggesting, then you are able to justify how it is that you know it, but what would such a justification look like? Do I observe the hand from different angles to make sure it's my own? Do I feel it or pinch it to make sure I know it's my hand? No, none of this happens. We find that we believe such things and many others as part of the world around us, outside the language-games of epistemology. These are some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions.

That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out.

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so — Harry Hindu

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. We can observe knowledge as a skill, for example, tying your shoes, but there are many other examples. Riding a bike and counting to ten are skills. Knowing that bikes have wheels and that 2+2=4 are beliefs.

There have been times in the past where I stated that prelinguistic man doesn't have knowledge, but I was mainly thinking of the language of knowledge in terms of propositions/statements. It's clear though, if you want to be precise, that prelinguistic man and even young children display certain kinds of skills, which is another aspect of knowledge. You don't necessarily need language to demonstrate a skill, but you do need a language to demonstrate knowledge as a belief. Knowledge as a belief is necessarily linguistic.

So, I agree that you can show that you have knowledge (knowledge as a skill) without the use of language. Your example of tying your shoe is just that.

Beliefs are much more basic than knowledge, so the act of tying your shoe or skinning an animal shows that you have certain beliefs about the shoe and the animal. In both these cases we see very basic (bedrock) beliefs and knowledge as a skill.

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle

Hello Mcdoodle.

Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. I agree that to use language is an act, but I also believe that all beliefs are actions of a sort. If someone walks into the woods with an axe, walks up to a particular tree and start chopping it down, it would be weird to say that the person doesn't believe there is a tree in front of them, or that they don't have an axe in their hand. Our actions, linguistic or not, show that we believe certain things apart from the linguistic act of saying (verbal or nonverbal) "I believe..." There are all kinds of things we do on a daily basis (opening doors, starting our cars, brushing our teeth, etc) that reveal that we believe certain thiings, all of which are acts of a kind.